"Non Cents"

[Smitten Eagle]

he argues that we need innovation that "calls for devising techniques that avoid exposing thousands of young Americans to the hazards of combat." How could anyone oppose this idea?

I'm opposed to selling the idea that we can merely "avoid exposing thousands of young Americans to the hazards of combat" precisely because to do so is will only bloody them more. COIN fighting means controlling populations, and populations are controlled with presence, security, paybacks, politics, and force protection. Air certainly has something to add to this. COIN is not about lobbing a few cruise missiles at asprin factories in the Sudan and hoping they do some good.

It would seem that this zeal to rely on technology/airpower is a throwback to Rumsfeld circa 2000, when Transformation was the key buzzword in the beltway. Or perhaps a throwback to the 1994-2001 time period when the US embarked on random cruise missile crusades throughout the globe, often to little effect. (remember when Pres. Clinton ruled out a ground invasion of Kosovo, telling the 1990s enemy du jour, Milosovic, that our resolve is only as deep as our quantity of PGMs and the will of the KLA).

Bottom line, wars are bloody affairs. Anyone who says otherwise is trying to sell something.

In the end, after the shock-and-awe decapitation of a government, we'll still have to send in ground forces. And we're heard it before that "you go to war with the army you have." So what kind of army are we going to have? One that "avoids the hazards of exposing thousands of young Americans to the hazards of combat?" I sure hope not. Such an army, when employed, would certainly shatter upon contact with the enemy.

[LawVol]

I agree that we'll see some form of COIN in the future, probably sooner than we think. However, I do not see it in the form of large troop deployments. This is where I agree with Dunlap that the American public and politicians won't stand for it. In other words, I don't think the pols will do it even if they think it is necessary because they don;t have the backbone to go against public thinking. That being said, I do see smaller versions as becoming the norm (e.g. Philippines, HOA, etc.). Maybe I'm wrong, but we went through a similar thing after Vietnam and I don't think its a stretch to say we'll likely face the same thing again.

I do not see airpower as the solution to all. I happen to agree that when you're objective is to install a friendly government or instill democracy (or whatever we call it), it is manpower intensive. You have to deal with people face-to-face to win friends and a fly-by doesn't do that.

One questions comes to mind that relates to whether Dunlap is correct in his argument that COIN won't work in Iraq. From some of my reading, I've seen that the COIN force typically chooses a side. Have we made a mistake by not doing this? It seems as if we're trying to do peacekeeping between the Sunnis and Shiites. WOuld we be better off just picking a side and getting to stability? Maybe I'm off base here, but just trying to thinking broadly.

S.E.: I'm not so sure we always have to enage in COIN. You are correct that lobbing missles isn't COIN. COIN happens after we enter a country. My questions involves whether we actually need to enter the country. Perhaps another method of dealing with a problem will enable us to avoid COIN by not going in somewhere. For example, there as several books out that indicate that our policy of containment was working against Iraq. Assuming in a future and similiar situation that faulty intel wouldn't lead us astray, why not continue to pursue that option rather than enagge in COIN. I don;t necessarily subscribe to the school of thought that says the US has to spread it brand of democracy (and I'm not saying you are either), so I look at things from a more realist perspective.

[JAK]

All -

The Dunlap piece in debate here & at the SWJ Blog:

Title: We Have a Serious COIN Shortage., By: Dunlap Jr., Charles J., U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 0041798X, May2007, Vol. 133, Issue 5
Database: Military & Government Collection

We Have a Serious COIN Shortage

Nobody asked me but…
Recently the U.S. Army, with help from the Marine Corps, touted a significant counterinsurgency (COIN) success. No, it was not an announcement of the extermination of another major terrorist as happened when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed in an airstrike last summer. Nor was it about yet more debilitating air attacks against al Qaeda havens in Somalia.

Rather, it was the unveiling of the "new" COIN doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 3-24. With magazines such as Newsweek declaring it "The Book" on Iraq, it quickly became a public relations triumph for boots-on-the-ground advocates.

FM 3-24 does exploit the brilliance of respected warriors such as U.S. Army Colonels H. R. McMaster and Peter Mansoor, and other ground-force experts. It also effectively captures scores of lessons-learned from COIN history, and will surely prove invaluable in many future situations. Still, it is not the solution for the U.S. military in today's Iraq.

Why not? At its core FM 3-24 calls for a traditional, land-component solution: pour lots of Soldiers onto the problem. How many? An astounding ratio of 20-25 counterinsurgents per 1,000 inhabitants. As an otherwise fawning article in a January 2007 issue of Time magazine concedes, this means deploying 120,000 troops to Baghdad alone. To pacify all of Iraq? According to U.S. News and World Report, 500,000 or more.

Wow. With that large a force, the Coalition would enjoy as much as a 25-to-1 advantage over what the Brookings Institution has reported as the insurgents' strength of 20,000-30,000 fighters. Such lopsided superiority over any opponent ought to ensure victory regardless of the doctrine employed.

Besides sheer numbers, FM 3-24 requires counterinsurgents who are not only effective warfighters, but also highly trained in language, culture, and history. Moreover, they must be ready to perform such sophisticated duties as building civil institutions and commercial enterprises.

Such specially-talented people do not exist in uniform in anywhere near the numbers FM 3-24 wants. Nor is there any likelihood of recruiting them. As retired General Barry McCaffrey points out, the Army is already lowering standards just to find enough volunteers to meet existing recruiting goals.

To acquire the kind of scholarly, versatile soldier FM 3-24 insists on in the numbers the doctrine demands, the only option is to grasp the electrified third rail of national security politics: the draft. This alone dooms FM 3-24 as a solution for Iraq.

Real innovation for 21st century conflicts calls for devising techniques that avoid exposing thousands of young Americans to the hazards of combat. Achieving this often requires the creative application of America's technological genius, much of which is in the air and naval components' way of war.

Strangely, the innovative high-tech/low-cost approaches that worked in Kosovo and toppled the Taliban in Afghanistan are shunned. For example, airpower is marginalized into a mere five-page annex in FM 3-24's lengthy 282-page text. Instead, the doctrine insists that only masses of troops on the ground can defeat insurgents. Thus, it is much premised on conventional COIN theory of winning hearts and minds through ground-level engagement of the population by thousands of U.S. troops.

Whatever merits that approach may have in other settings, it is much too late for the United States to implement in Iraq. The mindset of entire generations of Iraqis is already poisoned by, among other things, Abu Ghraib and related scandals, not to mention Islamic extremism's innate antagonism to people and ideas from the West. How bad is it? A recent poll by World Public Opinion.org shows that 61 percent of Iraqis actually approve of attacks on U.S. forces. Sadly, more personnel in theater simplifies the enemy's ability to do just that.

This raises another key point: the tragedy of each U.S. death erodes what is left of American support — and the enemy knows this and exploits it. Accordingly, while a short-term troop surge might give some needed breathing space for Iraqis to solve their own problems, the long-term presence of American ground forces as FM 3-24 suggests is not the answer, as inevitably rising casualty figures will generate insuperable political difficulties.

Given such grim realities, it is imperative that we think out-of-the-box and look to solutions beyond merely adding troops. The complexities of counterinsurgency require the talents of the full joint warfighting team, and not just the designs of the ground component. Despite real merits, FM 3-24 regrettably falls short of a practical strategy for winning in Iraq.

PHOTO (COLOR): The author believes that the main drawback of FM 3-24 is that it focuses too much on traditional techniques of winning hearts and minds by using ground forces such as U.S. Army Major Jennifer Bailey of the 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion, here reading to Iraqi childern in Tikrit.


~~~~~~~~

By Charles J. Dunlap Jr.


Major General Dunlap is the Deputy Judge Advocate General of the Air Force and a Distinguished Graduate of the National War College.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright of U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings is the property of United States Naval Institute and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.

[Ski]

Every time this guy writes something, my contempt for the Air Force grows a little bit stronger.

[120mm]

Is he related to the three star that doesn't think "collateral damage" includes any civilians in Afghanistan? I mean, HE hasn't seen any "proof?"

[WVO]

It seems that many air power theorists are comfortable with the idea that victory is as simple as toppling the ancien regime. Without a doubt, air power has played a primary, sometimes exclusive, role in destroying opposing governments as seen in Kosovo 1999 and Afghanistan 2001. However, air power cannot control populations. By 1999 Serbia was already significantly weakened and a formidable resistance existed in Kosovo. Air power turned the tide against the Taliban in 2001, but again a significant resistance already existed. Furthermore, both have required significant, long term presence of foreign troops (16000 are currently deployed in Kosovo and however many tens of thousands in Afghanistan). True believers in air power love to point at Kosovo as the model of success. Maybe I'm just not at a high enough altitude to see the whole picture, but it seems to me it's another example of why air power is not the solution to all our problems.

[wm]

This excerpt is from a story is on the BBC's web site

Afghans' anger over US bombings

. . .

"When the Americans came the people started fighting them back, and then the planes came and started bombing us.

"Even under the Russians we haven't witnessed bombardments like it before."

The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) investigated the accounts and identified that at least 25 of those killed in Shindand were women and children.

But the commander of US operations for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, Brig Gen Joseph Votel, denied these reports.

"We have no reports that confirm to us that non-combatants were injured or killed out in Shindand," he said, justifying the use of 2,000lb bombs against mud houses.

"If there are insurgents that are effectively engaging our forces and they happen to be coming from a building we would make every use we can of technology we have, and precision weapons, to eliminate the threat and minimise the effects of collateral damage."

. . .

Full story is here:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6705607.stm


. . .

[Tom Odom]

At the risk of sounding like a pompous pundit, I offer the last 2 paragraphs of my article in Vol 8 SWJ magazine.

In contrast, collateral damage has remained the word of choice for civilian casualties. As it is used in FM 3-24, the term collateral damage largely reflects the idea of non-combatants or "civilians" wounded or killed in military operations. In a realm of conflict where the civilian population is the objective for insurgent word choice is more than a matter of semantics. Going back to Dr. Sepp's admonition that "priority to "kill-capture" enemy, not on engaging population" as a key indicator for unsuccessful COIN operations, describing civilian deaths or injuries as "collateral" damage only confirms that the COIN forces were focused on killing or capturing the enemy and the civilians were in the way.

Put another way, strategists have long warned that military forces are in support to diplomatic, political, and police forces in COIN operations. No police force in the Western world would try to kill a gang leader in a housing complex with a Hellfire missile. Why? Because the action against the gang leader is to protect the people in the housing complex from him. It is not to kill him at whatever cost to those same people. Any loss of civilian life is a friendly loss. The same rule applies to COIN.

I would also repeat what I said earlier in this thread: that the debate on COIN is not a ground pounder versus air power issue, because both sides of that debate get wrapped up in the issues of lethal versus non-lethal when it comes to COIN. Ultimately the correct or incorrect decision is the responsibility of the commander on the ground because COIN is inherently ground-centric.

Best

Tom

[jcustis]

Why not? At its core FM 3-24 calls for a traditional, land-component solution: pour lots of Soldiers onto the problem. How many? An astounding ratio of 20-25 counterinsurgents per 1,000 inhabitants. As an otherwise fawning article in a January 2007 issue of Time magazine concedes, this means deploying 120,000 troops to Baghdad alone. To pacify all of Iraq? According to U.S. News and World Report, 500,000 or more.

Call me ignorant or slow, but I never got to "the core" and came away with the same understanding. The emphasis is on developing those internal security structures as well, not just front-line forces.

Wow. With that large a force, the Coalition would enjoy as much as a 25-to-1 advantage over what the Brookings Institution has reported as the insurgents' strength of 20,000-30,000 fighters. Such lopsided superiority over any opponent ought to ensure victory regardless of the doctrine employed.

That is unfortunately a very cumbersome analysis. It also speaks to a misunderstanding of the nature of COIN, asymmetric warfare, etc., etc.

Besides sheer numbers, FM 3-24 requires counterinsurgents who are not only effective warfighters, but also highly trained in language, culture, and history. Moreover, they must be ready to perform such sophisticated duties as building civil institutions and commercial enterprises.

Such specially-talented people do not exist in uniform in anywhere near the numbers FM 3-24 wants. Nor is there any likelihood of recruiting them. As retired General Barry McCaffrey points out, the Army is already lowering standards just to find enough volunteers to meet existing recruiting goals.

Such qualifications are certainly the objective, but we can get by with the threshold. I'm confident I can get by with a grasp of 50-100 control words during kinetic ops. And as problematic as they are, linguists (even if contracted) can suffice during those softer times if employed properly.

Strangely, the innovative high-tech/low-cost approaches that worked in Kosovo and toppled the Taliban in Afghanistan are shunned. For example, airpower is marginalized into a mere five-page annex in FM 3-24's lengthy 282-page text. Instead, the doctrine insists that only masses of troops on the ground can defeat insurgents. Thus, it is much premised on conventional COIN theory of winning hearts and minds through ground-level engagement of the population by thousands of U.S. troops.

Hmmm. The last time I checked, our opponents in Kosovo tended to mass themselves and their equipment, making for lucrative targets that could be planned against. And as for the Taliban being toppled...isn't the jury still out on that? We still have a long row to hoe even there.

Given such grim realities, it is imperative that we think out-of-the-box and look to solutions beyond merely adding troops. The complexities of counterinsurgency require the talents of the full joint warfighting team, and not just the designs of the ground component. Despite real merits, FM 3-24 regrettably falls short of a practical strategy for winning in Iraq.

I'd enjoy learning about the "solutions" proposed to counter (or is it enhance?)
the ground component's designs. And last I checked, FM 3-24 and its doctrinal progeny weren't written to be the silver bullet for Iraq. Their concepts have wide application across all COIN environments. Some are more relevant than others, but it's the smart leader who takes what he needs from the doctrine, employs it to shape his force's thinking, and builds a roadmap from it.

It sound like someone wants to take their ball and go home because they were picked last on the pitch.

[Steve Blair]

Strangely, the innovative high-tech/low-cost approaches that worked in Kosovo and toppled the Taliban in Afghanistan are shunned. For example, airpower is marginalized into a mere five-page annex in FM 3-24's lengthy 282-page text. Instead, the doctrine insists that only masses of troops on the ground can defeat insurgents. Thus, it is much premised on conventional COIN theory of winning hearts and minds through ground-level engagement of the population by thousands of U.S. troops.

One time-honored tactic for some airpower enthusiasts is to declare victory when they wish and go home. Hence the Afghanistan reference above, which it should be noted doesn't mention the guys on the ground marking targets for those lovely high-tech approaches. And innovative? Many of the techniques used in Kosovo were pioneered in Vietnam (airborne FAC and so on), and the main platform was the A-10 (which the AF doesn't like in the first place). This struck me as a very snippy piece. And I have yet to see any real solutions put forward by the author. Our own LawVol has done more in that regard, and he's published less (I believe...correct me if I'm wrong, LV).

I have yet to see anything worthwhile regarding an airpower solution to COIN. "Bombing 'em all back to the stone age" doesn't work.

[LawVol]

Our own LawVol has done more in that regard, and he's published less (I believe...correct me if I'm wrong, LV).

I have yet to see anything worthwhile regarding an airpower solution to COIN. "Bombing 'em all back to the stone age" doesn't work.

Thanks for the plug Steve. Yes, he is infinately more published than I am. But, I'm working on some other things.

Maybe I'm wrong here, but it seems like most of the problem with Dunlap's articel is the perception that he thinks airpower can do it alone. Not only do I not believe this (I think my posts attest to that), but I don't think he does either. JCustis say that FM 3-24 wasn't written to be the silver bullet in Iraq. I agree and I don't think that is what Dunlap is saying. From the media reports, it appears as if there is a campaign to say it is the silver bullet. All he appears to be saying is that we need to keep an open mind and explore all options that every branch brings to the fight. Perhaps there is some form of airpower (or naval or ground power for that matter) that we can use in some novel way that we haven't though of before. Closing our minds simply because the argument comes from an airmen shouldn't be a knee-jerk reaction.

Take this comment from Ski:

Every time this guy writes something, my contempt for the Air Force grows a little bit stronger.

I don't know what AF guy peed in your wheaties, but we're on the same team. It is exactly this sort of parochialism that inhibits a joint response to the fight. Relax.

wm references an article regarding a single incident as apparent support for the theory that airpower causes more collateral damage (sorry Tom) than ground power. One story from the BBC (YGBSM) doesn't prove a theory. I've said this before and I'll say it again: I deal in facts. Show me concrete facts to support this theory and then we can talk. The recent incident involving Marine Spec Ops comes to mind; and there are more examples (the report regarding a slip in ethical thinking by ground troops continually exposed to combat also comes to mind). Sure airpower causes civilian casualties, but some of you want to conveniently apply a standard to airpower that you seem unwilling to apply to ground power. Moreover, recent research and development has allowed the AF to come up with smaller bombs capable of severely reducing blast patterns and thus civilian casualities (oh but we need to cut the AF budget because we just waste it on crap that doesn't help the COIN fight, I forgot).

Okay, I'll sit back and let you guys get in your licks. Maybe I'm just feeling combative today.

[Steve Blair]

I'll just repeat something I said earlier: the only precision weapon in COIN is a good sniper with a well-sighted-in rifle. ANYTHING else causes a level of collateral damage. Period. A five-foot margin of error with a precision artillery shell may be acceptable in conventional warfare (in fact it might be considered a Godsend there), but in COIN that's damage you don't need. The same rule applies to air-delivered ordnance. I don't favor either service there: the Army in the past has relied far too much on artillery for COIN-style missions (H&I fire in Vietnam is but one example).

Dunlap's presentation has always appeared to be that there is a better way to do things, and it's normally couched in airpower language. That conveys a message that he may not intend to a general readership. It's a style of writing I've seen from many military writers (both AF and Army) dating back to the 1950s and its goal is usually to corner a level of funding or support for their particular service or branch. I don't close my mind to his ideas...the problem is that I haven't seen any from him. References to past campaigns (that bear little resemblance to Iraq) and word counts aren't the same thing as ideas or proposals.

[Tom Odom]

wm references an article regarding a single incident as apparent support for the theory that airpower causes more collateral damage (sorry Tom) than ground power. One story from the BBC (YGBSM) doesn't prove a theory. I've said this before and I'll say it again: I deal in facts.

Law,

Again I am not talking collateral casualties as a purely airpower issue. If you insist that you are dealing in facts, then when you mention me in a response to WM, cite me factually.

As for airpower in COIN, I understand that the AF is developing smaller weapons and all that. Even when those weapons are developed, the use of them in COIN will be decided on the ground. COIN is ground centric because its ultimate success or failure depends on human beings looking each other in the eyes and coming to an understanding.

Here I will offer an opinion: General Dunlap's glib writing on this reminds me of an equally glib AF one star I met as a Major one evening in early August 1990. The general was in Checkmate and he gave 3 of us a briefing for how the AF was going to take down the Iraqi regime. I had another Army guy--an Apache driver--and an AF A-10 driver with me. We listened and the general pitched us. I asked one question, that is what airpower was being put against the Iraqi forces in Kuwait. We the Army and Marine forces on the ground--were short on anti-tank munitions and any attacks against Iraq could prompt the heavy Iraqi corps in Kuwait to attack south. The answer to my question was "none," and with a wave of the hand the AF general added he didn't think that was necessary. I told him he was nuts, an opinion supported by the A-10 driver. Needless to say we were not invited to stay longer. General Dunlap offers examples that don't apply to the situation in Iraq or Afghanistan, those being Kosovo and the opening phases of OEF, then waves the reality of COIN away just as dismissively as the one star in 1990 regarding an Iraqi heavy corps.

Regards,

Tom

[120mm]

As an Army type who has always been fascinated with Aviation, I can't help feeling quite a bit like Charlie Brown, getting ready for Lucy to pull the ball away at the last minute.

The Air Force keeps telling us that "it doesn't matter how many times we've screwed you in the past vis-a-vis CAS, THIS TIME we're really, really, really going to provide the best CAS possible."

Unfortunately, our inter-service history does not support any current assertion that 1. The Air Force will genuinely commit to CAS as a mission, or 2. They have some super-de-duper method for winning "small wars."

Perhaps the answer is to "de-purple" the process and cut CAS back to the Army. I doubt there is any truly satisfactory solution.

[wm]

wm references an article regarding a single incident as apparent support for the theory that airpower causes more collateral damage (sorry Tom) than ground power. One story from the BBC (YGBSM) doesn't prove a theory. I've said this before and I'll say it again: I deal in facts. Show me concrete facts to support this theory and then we can talk.
Okay, I'll sit back and let you guys get in your licks. Maybe I'm just feeling combative today.

My post was not meant as an AF slam nor was it meant as proof about what type of attack causes more collateral damage. The point I was trying to get you all to extrapolate was based on the perception presented by the Afghans in the article. Which form of attack causes more collateral damage does not really matter. What does matter are the perceptions of the civilian populace. In a battle for the support of the populace, that populace's perception is reality--it is all that really counts. Anytime that the "defended" do not feel defended, than the mission is not being accomplished.

If the Afghans duck and cover every time they hear a plane overhead (and the Coalition is the only one flying planes in Afghanistan), we have a serious problem in arguing that we are making their country safer for them.

Here are a few non-war related examples on the issue of perception=reality.
--A family could live in a town with the highest crime rate in the nation. But, as long as no one in the family has been a victim, those statistics mean nothing to them. They will be behind their chief of police 100% because he is doing a great job by keeping crime away from them.
--In a town, the high school almost loses its accreditation. Collectively, all of the neighbors are up in arms about the school administration's competence. But, each, individually, also feels that their sons and daughters are getting a great education because they ae getting good report cards.

For what it is worth, I happen to think that in his last piece, Maj Gen Dunlap is arguing for a much more joint approach, one that is less likely to require us to deploy in harm's way those 500,000 ground troops that some cite as what we need to win in Iraq. But the good general does not get off scot free here. I also think that he seems to have misread some of the FM. I never got the impression (as he seems to) that we need all of our deployed forces to be linguists, anthropologists, and generally all-around Jedi masters of cultural sensitivity. What we do need in a COIN fight is a cadre that has those skills. We also need for this cadre to have the ear of the leadership and the planners to make sure our operations build popular suport rather than eroding it. And the leadership needs to listen and heed this cadre's advice. If (and this is a big "if"), for example, BG Votel made the remarks quoted in the BBC article, that is a problem. It would reflect major insensitivity to the defended populace's concerns. I think it represents something akin to the very misguided "bomb them back into the Stone Age" thinking expressed by some during the Viet Nam conflict.

BTW, we have that same problem with perception being reality both in the AOR and here at home. Much of the caterwauling about MSM biased reporting reflects the problem that the ground truth known by warfighters and their supporters is not a perception shared by those who are sitting snugly in front of their 52" plasma TVs, watching the nightly news in Anytown USA.

[Ski]

Law Vol,

No one pissed in my Wheaties, cornflakes, Apple Jacks or Golden Grahams this morning.


He references FM 3-24 as if it was the Magna Carta of counter-insurgency. It's not - it's a manual - a guide so to speak on how to conduct counter-insurgency operations. I could easily take a an Air Force manual on precision bombing (or any other manual from any other service) and say it doesn't act as a COIN winning be all.

He then uses Kosovo and Afghanistan as examples of "getting it right." The last time I checked, there were significant ground forces in both locations, one of which is still an active combat theater. The Air Force bombed both places with significant fire power, and yet we still don't have a decisive outcome in either location. So his examples are flawed to begin with.

I'd offer that using air power helps enhance that 61% of the population against us. It's rooted in historical fact - did the British surrender because of the German Blitz of 1940 and 1941? Did the Germans surrender due to the 8th Air Force firebombing Dresden and other cities? Did the North Koreans, North Vietnamese, or Iraqis surrender because of air power? There is historical evidence to suggest that airpower enhances the enemies morale and will to fight. I don't have time to get into specific details at the moment but they are there.

Finally, MG Dunlap does not offer any solutions other than "let's do what we did in Kosovo and the beginning stages in Afghanistan." Airpower will not create a legitmate government, nor will create services that are needed to sustain basic human existance such as security, potable water and electricity. Humans, specifically ground forces in the case of security, have to be on the ground and defeat the will of the enemy.

It is because MG Dunlap is a 2 Star General that I offer contempt against the Air Force. He should know better. He is obviously an intelligent man, but I think he is seriously misguided in his attempts to label FM 3-24 as a cure all for insurgencies. No one book is ever going to take the place of human interactions and the human experience of war. He seems to overlook the complexities that are required to rebuild shattered nations in the cases of Afghanistan or Iraq.

It's also worth mentioning that you accuse me of what MG Dunlap is guilty of with this essay. He is looking for a technological solution for a decidely non-technological conflict. He will not find one. Do I agree that it would be great if we could reduce the number of casualties on the battlefield? Sure. I've had three friends killed and one crippled in Iraq. I'll be the first to sign up for that solution, but MG Dunlap never provides one that is realistic. He states, "It also effectively captures scores of lessons-learned from COIN history, and will surely prove invaluable in many future situations. Still, it is not the solution for the U.S. military in today's Iraq." I have not heard one senior officer ever state that FM 3-24 was a solution for any conflict, but that is what MG Dunlap is suggesting.

I'm disappointed that he does not offer any solutions to very real, and very ugly situations on the ground, and tries to reduce COIN to a state where war ends once the bombing stops. If we haven't learned this simple lesson yet, I shudder to think what the future holds for our military.

[LawVol]

I guess when you ask for it, you get it. WooHoo!

Tom: apparently, I've just committed the classic email error of assuming humor is easily conveyed through the typed word. I was not citing you but referencing your comments in vol 8 of the SWJ wherein you discussed word choice for civilian casualties. Since you just posted the comments on this thread, I thought an apology for using the term again would be humorous; maybe it would have been in person.

I've heard you mention the AF general from checkmate before and I agree that his comments were unfortunate. Some AF guys do tend to forget about the grunts and that should not happen. There is more that the AF can do for the Army and there are plenty of us that want to do what we can; so much so that, contrary to the AF party line, we'll volunteer to go ILO ("in lieu of," the term to describe AF filling an Army tasking in case some don't know).

My whole argument here is that many are quick to dismiss AF contributions or ideas and this does nothing but stifle the thought processes. Could it be that some AF guys are loathe to present ideas because they assume they'll be immediately shot down by Army/Marine folks? You guys are clearly aware of the AF party line when it comes to airpower and some of us are challenging at least part of that. Sure we face resistance within the AF, but why give us a two-front war? I'll still hang in there though.

wm: your perception vs. reality argument is well taken. If we AF guys can't convince our sister services of the utility of lethal airpower, we certainly won't be able to overcome indigenous perceptions that we're trying to bomb them to the stone age. This is probaly due to our woefully inadequate IO strategy, something we can all improve on.

I'm not sure Dunlap was saying that the manual required all ground troops to be cultural experts or anthropologists, or whatever, but maybe that could have been more clear. Personally, I think having a cadre of area specific experts might be the way to go. If memory serves, I think the Corps is experimenting with this concept. This is an area in which I believe the AF can also help. We could easily strengthen our foreign area officer program that could allow AF "experts" to deploy with Army units to act as liasion officers (sort of like our TAC-Ps go with Army units).

Ski: Gen Dunlap said in the blog section that his proposed ideas are forthcoming. I'll give the man a break and take him at his word. I can wait. Although I don't normally get the Proceedings magazine, the section that published his opinion looked to be more of a shot across the bow piece rather than one for in depth discussion. However, I think that if you reread his article you'll find that he is saying that the manual is being perceived as the solution for Iraq. Like wm says, perception is reality.

Did I cover everything?

[slapout9]

Hi, LawVol send some rain to Alabama we are drying up down here.

Did I cover everything?

No, give the Army back it's Missiles!!!! The Air Force has no right being in the Missile Artillery business. That is Army business and they need to get out of it.

[LawVol]

I have no rain to give brother. We're dry as a bone in my area. I can send those missiles though. You want the business end. I'll trade missiles for helicopters. The helo guys always seemed cooler.

[slapout9]

LawVol, no.... trade missiles for planes Actually the air force had a very good helicopter the Hiller. It had angle mounted counter rotating blades so it didn't need a tail rotor. On a more factual note did you read the report that tequila posted about an Israeli Air Force officer and his review of the Air Force in the recent Lebanon fiasco? He explains in detail what is wrong with the basic air force concepts they got from the USA. It is worth the read. I will have to find the link but it was posted by tequila fairly recently.

Here is the paper tequila found.
http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda/memo89.en.pdf