Not only no, but hell no.Originally Posted by Granite_State
Future Peer Competitor?
In the debate about small wars, the long war against Islamic extremism (I'm not a big fan of the "GWOT" label), and where the defense budget should be going, can anyone really point to a plausible peer competitor even twenty years down the line? I'm probably too influenced by Martin Van Creveld, Bill Lind, and the current environment, but I have trouble seeing any state realistically attempting to match the U.S. on the conventional battlefield, given the two Gulf Wars and the obvious supremacy of the U.S. at putting firepower on targets.
Even the Chinese, as much as they're spending, are still decades behind us, some of you guys probably know that better than I do. As much as people were justifiably pissed about the Israeli help in their newest fighter, I think it was the J-10, it was still outdated before it even entered service. If you're scared of Russia, look at their demographics. Not too many future soldiers coming down the pipeline.
Not saying we can ignore conventional warfare obviously, and we have to prepare for the "unknown unknowns," but does it make sense for us to be spending a quarter of a billion dollars per F-22 (not Air Force bashing, just the best example that springs to mind) when we're struggling to fight two small wars and staring at the huge readiness issues SWJED has posted about?
Let the ground forces eat cake...
Not only no, but hell no.
As a reasonably enlightened "Bo-Tagz" or whatever it was land power component members were referred to in MG Dunlap’s AFJ article, I'd say it depends on who you ask. The Air Force will tell you its worth it, and from their perspective they have some valid reasons. As was pointed out to me recently - the Air Force relies greatly on technology as their environment requires it - you can't get and stay airborne without it.
The question I think is, how much should we invest in maintaining that edge when we are in a fiscally constrained environment, which by the way so are they (the AF) - they have allot of fighters and attack AC in need of refit - not to mention their lift frames.
I'd say it also is in their strategic culture - the theory of Air Power goes back to Douhet and "Command of the Skies" which we translate into Air Superiority. Frankly, like the American Express, I believe its preferable not to leave home without it. It may not be an immediate concern, but given the opportunity, somebody would eventually make you pay for not having it - think of the idea of securing your rear, or route.
It also provides policy makers & war fighters options (go to the "non-cents" thread for that discussion). The trick here is knowing when to play to short term gains vs. long term consequences - its not as cut and dry as just killing folks any more for all kinds of reasons, and ultimately somebody has to take responsibility for the decisions.
The problem as you point out is the price tag - the best technology (or the best of anything) is usually the most expensive. The Chinese example (or you could use Russian subs, or several others) is interesting because the advertisement does not always reflect the end product. Other cultures often come up short for a number of reasons even when they have the blueprints. Our own Defense Industry takes a different tack that seems to be more in line with Capitalism, the "we've run into some difficulties and are going to need more $$$" line seems to drive up the projected costs. They then offer bargains by reducing the amount per copy if the buyer agrees to buy more - think Sam's Club.
My personal opinion is that we require balance, and probably need to adjust the way we do business with the Defense Industry. Allot of the technology we pay for seems to create non-military dividends in other products, so they get additional benefit - if we (the government) invest in the development of a technology, then we should receive some benefits - call it an end of the year return, a discount or what have you. I'd also say that if the seller does not or cannot live up to the terms of the contract, then they are penalized - we are actually getting better at that. We need Industry to better balance their obligation to their shareholders and CEOs with their obligation to the national defense - again personal opinion after working some on "future" technology.
I think often we can gain short term edges by adding new payloads to existing platforms and by investing in people to get more out of an existing technology. However, these are short term gains, and the trick is knowing when to (and when you can) invest in a new technology that provides the long term edge you require to remain viable on the battlefield. Constantly investing in new technologies creates ignorance and expectations that create their own problems though as there are some problems that technology just can't solve, or can't solve without a cost ineffective strategy.
I'm not in favor of ignoring all of one type of advantage in favor of developing out of proportion another. We have four services (5 for you CG types), and they all fulfill critical roles in our national defense, and in the pursuit of winning small wars as well as big ones. What we have to understand is when the tail is in danger of wagging the dog.
Regards, Rob
The problem is not the cost, but what is the cost/benifit anaylisis. When weapons systems like the F-22 where developed and some systems that are still being developed the brass where looking to fight conventional battles agianst armies that looked like us, fought like us, and held to similar conventions.
The problem is that senirio isn't around for now or the forseable future. So, weapons system like the F-22 which was developed as a purely air to air fighter in the current sit-temp are stupid when we can't even afford money for training, re-manning units, and weapons systems that we need.
An example: I just recently graduated Ranger School. In ranger school normally you got twice the ammo you requested and then some. Now, we barely had enough to conduct our patrols during each phase i.e. 40 rds 5.65 mm per rifle man, 300 rds 7.76 mm lk, and 400 rds 5.56 mm lk. Further, we were shorted on equipment during mountians training, slashed air assualt missions due to cost, and verious odds and ends throughout the course. But, it's not just happening at ranger school. Its happening at every school I've been to over the past couple of years.
Beyond training look at the state of any units MTOE. Crap, we are balking on better small arms for the cost of one F-22. Where refurbishing Saws and M240B that are in a bad state just to fill units requirments cause their wearing out in the dessert sand. I'm not putting on bitch session. But, it makes no sense. You have to look ahead and keep our military strong, but we can't keep procuring weapons systems for the wars we wish to fight over the ones we are fighting and then sacrifice training dollars to fill the gaps in the operational budget just to keep us going.
Therefore, trying to out-gun a future competitor like a resurgent Russia or trying to counter-act China's surge in weapns programs is a waste. The roll down effects of trying to maintian that kind of attitude are having and could continue to have hurts everybody. We need to fund training for our current operational eviroment, man our forces for the fight were in, and then look to procure the best guess technologies that fit our strattiegic goals and the furture as we see it. Not the other way around.
The better where maintianed, trained, and equiped with mission essiental tools, the better we can intergrate new solutions and technolgies to aid in the fight. However, if we keep straining our forces, equipment, and resources we won't be able to effectively integrate any new technologically weapons system that comes into our forces. Thus, we want be more prepared for future competators, will be less prepared, and then will have endless rounds of debates on why our high tech forces failed us. Just like with our current problems in OEF and OIF.
If the cost/benifit anaylis were different, I'd say go for it, but I just don't see how they are considering the current situation where in and have been put in by that type of thinking and policy.
I think the key with technology and the AF is that they tend to want "super-systems" or something akin to a silver bullet platform. When they complain about the extended development cycle of their airframes, they really can only blame themselves. And with the F-22, I would have expected that they would have tested the navigation system...remember a few months back when they had to ground the entire fleet for a few days when the nav system went ####-up when they crossed the international date line?
Once the AF gets its teeth into what it considers a world-beating technology (stealth is the current flavor of the month), they want it on every aircraft built from that point on. I've spoken with some F-22 maintainers, and they have some harsh comments about the plane's actual availability rate. Others have commented on its sheer size (it's slightly bigger than an F-15)...it may not show easily on radar but you can see it coming.
What seems to cause the most confusion is that fact that you don't always need a stealthy, world-beating system to get the job done. Look at the A-10. Or the C-130. Even the F-16 was a program the AF didn't really want at first. They passed on the F-16XL, which had all the makings of a superb ground attack platform (a cranked delta design with more payload than the F-16 and if memory serves slightly better maneuverability). Don't get me wrong...the F-15E is a great attack plane, but I believe the F-16XL would have been cheaper and could have filled some of the roles (SEAD for one) that they've had to stretch the F-16 to fit.
Lift and tankers are two areas that the AF shorted to allow for the F-22 and F-35 (don't get me started on that one), and now they're paying the price for it. Sooner or later there will also be a need for an E-3 follow-on. These assets, which cut across communities and services, strike me as being more valuable than another "stealth" fighter that fills a need that is 20 years old.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
The Army's Future Comabt System comes to mind...Crap, we are balking on better small arms for the cost of one F-22.
When the next big war rolls upon us, you'll thank God and the AF for all that new technology. And if that big war never happens, I'll still be satisfied with the insurance. Perhaps we should be complaining about ear marks for bridges to no where and the like rather than technology that could possible be needed one day.
"Flying high, into the wild blue yonder... Oh, I digress
-john bellflower
Rule of Law in Afghanistan
"You must, therefore know that there are two means of fighting: one according to the laws, the other with force; the first way is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first, in many cases, is not sufficient, it becomes necessary to have recourse to the second." -- Niccolo Machiavelli (from The Prince)
I think the Army is going through its own reality check with FCS. As one who worked it, and was part of COL Roy Waggoner's "Thin Green Line" I can agree that there was a tendency of many to see only what they wanted. Many however fought for balance between reasonable technological improvements and the sacrificing of fundamental, proven, cost effective alternatives that could be trained with. That does not even get into my belief that the best tech can be out-fought with out the best people employing it.The Army's Future Combat System comes to mind...
The best example I can think of was how COL(P) Robert Brown grew the SBCT under the premise that the platform and C4ISR payloads was the side show - the real Transformation was an investment in people, or as he wrote, coached, taught and mentored, building agile and adaptive leaders that identify and solve problems under tough conditions with available resources. A SBCT itself is pretty big in terms of people - about a 170 man rifle company, has a great deal of mobility for that much Infantry and relies on placing Combined Arms at the company level.
FCS is now partly under the auspices of COL Emmett Schaill (the EBCT CDR down at Bliss), a great leader who knows when Industry is putting the soldier at risk, and is not afraid to hurt feelings, and has a good feel for the future of warfare based on recent experience.
I think in the end what you'll see is the only technologies that survive the first cut of spirals will be those that are reliable and make sense. The rest will probably be put back in the oven. This will happen on reduced funding for R&D and hopefully we'll make use of commercial technologies that make are life easier down the road - hopefully DARPA will pick up some of those monies, since by experience I find them far less interested in profit.
Two things I'd add.
First, the Air Force funding provides allot more then we credit them for off the top. While fighter, bombers and cargo come to mind as the most visual of symbols, their influence in near or inner space and the EW spectrum allows us distinct advantages we enjoy in our "away" games. In fact many of the EWOs who help with ECM technologies to combat IEDs are USAF personnel (many are also USN) - Land components are just taking baby steps in these areas.
Second, not all our problems or decisions come directly from lack of funding. Take the 5.56 debate - what all would go into going to a new battle rifle? Lots I think, consider all the training (from doctrine to ranges), standardization & qualification impacts to re-tooling the ammunition industry. when you are talking about changing what appears to be a small thing, it often turns into a big thing quickly. Consider BRAC - somebody probably said - "what we need is a "maneuver center" - we'll put it at Benning - but then after they'd announced it all sorts of things like, environmental impact studies for moving 400 additional tanks to Benning, new ranges in order to allow both the students and the BCT there to sustain gunnery skills, AHA impacts, Motor Pool space, and the list goes on crept into the plan - friction!
I guess my point is the only way this problem is easy is if you only consider an individual perspective. Nobody has enough money to do what they'd like right now because protracted war is expensive. Law makers have to provide the means from a long term perspective that considers all the possible threats, and they prefer to do it with the constraints of the established budget - we may pass supplementals (and even they are subject to political dispute), but they don't have to renew that or live with the domestic and economic consequences for quite so long. The profiteers and the lobbyers they (Industry and proponents) employ add more friction, and Active Duty parochial heavy weight hitmen and retired senior leaders turned lobbyist/acquisition officer attempt to influence spending as well. Even Industry must be considered - what does it take to create and sustain a military industrial complex that can continue to provide the best technology, or even consitent quality of older tech (once you quit making something, often its just gone)? Anybody who does not think our Military Industrial/Info complex just runs itself does not understand the gears of war. This stuff is complicated.
Where does this leave us? I'd say with the obligation to attempt to understand the problem from multiple perspectives while acknowledging that we won't get everything we want, or cry we need. We live in a world of constraints so we have to figure out how to succeed where others might fail with the means we've been given. This does not prevent us from discussing shortfalls and their impacts, but we need to do so in a constructive manner that provides leaders and lawmakers with good information. It helps if you can acknowledge something other then a singular point of view. The SWJ forum is superb for that (and people know it) because it provides a very public discourse on a wide range of tough, relevant issues by professionals with a diverse background and experience range.
Last edited by Rob Thornton; 05-28-2007 at 12:06 AM.
We never get the future right
Our technological advantage gives us an asymmetrical advantage that I would hate to lose. The fact that our Navy and Air Force can dominate the seas and the sky provides a superb level of protection from the more conventional types of attacks, which are still possible. Russia, China, North Korea, and emerging countries in our own hemisphere provide potential examples of possible conventional conflicts. I think States will have to go to war over precious resources whether it be oil or water within the next 20 years, and we'll probably get drug into the conflict, and having a dominating Navy and Air Force puts the Army in a better position to complete its task.
Of course the threat dujour is unconventional/irregular, and it will be around for the forseeable future, but that isn't the only threat. The problem is if you quit making those F22s, fast ships, etc., you lose the industry base, because those workers (high tech, high skill) will migrate to where the money is. The Companies will regear their machines to make something else (commercial not military), etc. and we run the risk 50 years down the road of losing that edge.
All that said, the investment right now needs to be weighted towards the ground forces and strategic lift to get them to the fight.
Let me be the first to surprise everyone by saying that, "Yes, Virginia, we need the F-22." Precisely because that airframe was designed to fight an unlikely war scenario, we need at least a few of them "as insurance". When we get surprised by an irrational state actor in the future, it will give us the time/space necessary to turn this rig around and face the threat.
But what we ALSO need is for the Air Force to acknowledge the actual, ongoing threat and support it with their heart and soul, and not just treat it as a distraction.
A big +1 for LawVol's pointing out the FCS.
Last edited by 120mm; 05-28-2007 at 06:22 AM.
Great point on the FCS. And it is certainly true that we generally take the Air Force for granted, I think the U.S. and/or its allies have had air superiority in every war since 1914, we've never had to fight without that tremendous advantage.The Army's Future Comabt System comes to mind...
When the next big war rolls upon us, you'll thank God and the AF for all that new technology. And if that big war never happens, I'll still be satisfied with the insurance. Perhaps we should be complaining about ear marks for bridges to no where and the like rather than technology that could possible be needed one day.
"Flying high, into the wild blue yonder... Oh, I digress
Agree with you about the industrial base, and some brief research I did on the subject a couple of years back said they're already facing a significant brain drain as the class of 60s era engineers and scientists retires.
I didn't mean to turn this into an F-22 thread, though my sympathies are with SWJED and the rest of the skeptics. We'll probably face conventional war again in the near future, as you noted, but will it be a peer competitor? Whether it's China, Russia, Iran, North Korea...none of these countries can match us in terms of technology and ordnance delivery. Being able to defeat them strikes me as being vastly different from devoting the majority of our procurement budget, and maybe the majority of the defense budget period, to arming for some Pacific showdown with the Chinese. Can anyone provide a halfway plausible peer competitor within 20-30 years?
FCS will never see the light of day. It's just way too expensive, and I don't see much applicabilty in a "system of systems" where one BCT will cost more than the entire equipment requirement for the National Guard. Soldiers will always form the backbone of the Army, equipment is tertiary importance.
BRAC - actually, any move of unit requires a massive process to understand the move of a unit. All those things you mention Rob - and many more, BTW - are spot on. Even a single piece of a major end items being fielded requires a ton of analysis. When I was fielding tanks to the Guard, we were about to field a battalion of M1A1's to Michigan, and I went up to the environmental bubbas to see if Camp Grayling had ranges and an environmental impact statement for 120mm ammo. They didn't, so it took a year for the EIS to get approved, and in one of the drafts that I reviewed, the EIS writers stated, "The 120mm round is made of depleted uranium..." and they didn't realize that training rounds were made of steel. The complexity of all this is immense...
Good points about money. There are millions of great ideas, but the ones who can find the keys to the vault for their ideas are the winners.
Define peer competitor first. Then a comparison, if any, can be made.
To deter, coerce or compel?
I thought about this last night since I think this is a much bigger question then on of F-22s or new riflemen – I believe it gets to the question of technology vs. people. Its not that this is an either or, but is a question of how much you invest into one vs. the other to meet our security needs now and for the future (for the sake of defining the future, lets stay inside the 2025 time frame).
Before considering that question though let’s consider the way in which military (and if you want to, you can include diplomacy and economics) force is applied toward policy ends. If you are a state (& I think these days we can include non-state) there are three agreed upon uses for behavior modification of people we can’t get along with, or whose own policy or goals are at odds with your own – you can deter, you can coerce, and you can compel. We’ll define deter by saying you have taken actions which portray your strength and indicate that your interests will support your willingness to cross from passive to active. Coerce is more difficult because for me it floats between deter and compel – but these are actions that can be rescinded more easily but still hold the potential that you are willing to compel behavior. In my mind air and sea power are great tools for coercion. Compelling someone has to offer the threat of physically removing them – this is where I’d argue that to compel requires a robust land component capability. Some will take issue with the definitions – that’s healthy, and certainly different advocates & acolytes may put their services’ capabilities in all three blocks – but I believe in order to take and hold ground indefinitely requires physical occupation of it – not with a sensor and not the airspace above it. Put simpler my physical size can deter, my anger might coerce, but to compel I need to lay hands on somebody.
Now let’s consider Iraq, Iran, small wars & big wars. Personally if we have to have wars then I prefer small wars as an alternative to big wars – there is historical evidence that big wars kill more people and destroy more stuff then small wars. So limited wars with limited means kill less people. This is not to say they don’t have big consequences, especially for the people involved.
Is it coincidence that the White House is exploring the possibility of reducing troops as early as 2008? I’d submit that while Senator Reid is willing to call it a political victory brought about by Democratic pressure, it is probably more of a national security concern. I’ll come back to this at the end.
By our own writings on this site, writings in the press by retired and active duty military professionals and civilian security experts, our land component (and the other components in supporting them) capabilities are stretched to a great degree in their policy role (compelling the insurgents, terrorists and our enemies) in Iraq, Afghanistan and other places around the globe. We can go back to the decision to request more troops and the request and subsequent decision to increase the size of the Army and Marines to acknowledge that. I’d propose that our enemies and friends can read and come to their own conclusions, and that our ability to compel is constrained at the moment by our policy objectives in Iraq (I use Iraq since sustaining significant troop levels there raises OPTEMPO and induces strain on every aspect of our means & will to compel). Our current object of policy – a stable Iraq that is U.S. friendly and can ease the strain on global energy needs by both producing and not destabilizing the Persian Gulf region is worth the effort in terms of preventing larger security concerns in the future. It also speaks to the moral aspect of war and our commitment to our ideals – an ally that is not willing to see it through is kind of a self-interested fair weather friend.
So, what are the tools available currently to deter, coerce or compel the Iranians from realizing and employing a nuclear weapon (or acting through a third party like Hezbollah), other states seeking advantages, or even non-state organizations seeking to exploit the current situation? If we look at Iran, which components would we rely on right now to move from deter to coerce? Is it a ground component that is sprinting to maintain its current commitments? Or, is it the USAF and USN who we’d task to conduct limited strikes against targets deep within Iran in order to signify our intolerance for their goals?
Following that line – don’t you think Iran knows that? What has been one of their largest investments in military acquisition recently (we are speaking conventionally, not nuclear)? The answer is, front line, state of the art (by anybody’s technological standards but perhaps our own) Anti-Aircraft technology in massive amounts and phased throughout the country enroute to their dispersed nuclear sites to deter us from that option (I'd add that they include curring favor through trade benefits with powerful states, cooperation on Iraq, and an immense IO campaign for the will of the U.S. Public by denying their true reason for pursuing nuclear power). They understand that in order to get to their sites we’d have to invest an awful lot of something to make it credible. They understand that as we weigh that out, it may not be worth it for us – all they have to do is show us the stakes to make it a difficult decision. To remove the ADA threat will require massive amounts of sorties by survivable A/C to first neutralize the ADA threat – to that end the Iranians are also investing in other capabilities. To know for sure if the ADA is neutralized I think you’d have to occupy the ground for SAM sites surrounding the Air LOCs with ground forces to (something we’d be hard pressed to do right now without changing the scope of our commitment to Iraq). I think DoD understood that when they were pursuing the use of ICBMs with conventional war-heads as a deterrent – its hard to defeat an ICBM – but that has its own problems – how do you know what’s inside if you are say Russia, China or India trying to decide on a reaction?
Given that line of thought – and the likelihood that we are going to be caught up in small wars, COIN & COIN like activities in order to prevent extremism and other Non-State threats which are also national security issues of prime importance, then the USAF and USN require the best technology to mitigate the lack of being able to commit a credible ground component to that action. In my view having to compensate for lack of fully rounded capability with technology is a tough row to hoe, but at least it is an option. On the other hand, ignoring the use of technology to gain an advantage by solely investing in a large ground component is also very dangerous – go back to comparing armor in WWII, or how we deterred the Soviet numbers in the Cold War.
This is not an easy question, but we do have to look beyond the moment and consider how we employ military force and to what ends in order to decide what capabilities to invest in. We have competing requirements – mass and technology. As I’ve said before, I believe the best investment is in quality people because without them you get a mass of automatons and technology that is unusable. Without quality people the reason we use military force is subject to being lost for want of a nail. What we need to do is look for innovation where possible and feasible, and uses that adapt existing materials and technologies in ways that offers us advantages and cost less then pursuing a totally new line of thought. It is not always the case – you can only adapt on old idea so far, but in many cases it is possible. This provides us options where we can pursue other technologies or COAs at a more affordable rate. To use a great planning cliché, perfect is often the enemy of good enough.
Last edited by Rob Thornton; 05-28-2007 at 01:36 PM.
Of note: Annual Pentagon report - Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2007.
They can't match us now, but they continually invest in this technology. If we don't stay ahead of them, they will match or beat us in 20-30 years.
Rob makes good points. If we don't invest now, the technology will go elsewhere. The point is that our enemies have not only adapted their strategies (think COIN and China's "total war" concepts), but they are also trying to catch us in the technology realm. Why do you think China keeps trying to steal our information? If we ignore this, then we may one day be playing catch up in the conventional war sense like we are now in the COIN sense. Only when it comes to conventional war, we may be risking our very existence (or at least the world as we know it).
Perhaps the problem is that DoD needs a bigger piece of pie? I think funding is under 4% of GDP, why couldn't it be higher?
-john bellflower
Rule of Law in Afghanistan
"You must, therefore know that there are two means of fighting: one according to the laws, the other with force; the first way is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first, in many cases, is not sufficient, it becomes necessary to have recourse to the second." -- Niccolo Machiavelli (from The Prince)
COIN capability as a deterrant
Hey there LV,
Great question. Your back to two concrete options - cut from somewhere else to raise the %, or increase taxes - both of which have side effects.Perhaps the problem is that DoD needs a bigger piece of pie? I think funding is under 4% of GDP, why couldn't it be higher?
Here is something else to chew on - if COIN and COIN like functions/operations are going to be required (I beleive they are), then they are going to consume resources. Does COIN/and like operations fit into a strategy of detering unwanted behaviour by demonstrating our commitment and resolve - i.e. we have successfully done this before and are willing to risk the consequences of having to do it again - so the threat of regime change is an expensive, but viable option/consequence. We are dabbling in the strategic OODA here.
I'd also say many of the functions found in COIN can be used in conflict prevention - such as identifying the causes of conflict and applying TTPs and operational concepts to resolve the problems that cause people/states to go to war.
I've always through the FCS was a waste of money, at least once the decision was made to turn it into something other than a test case. There's no harm in developing a few systems to see if they work, to push tech forward, and so on...but there needs to be a limit and an understanding that we can't bank the entire force on platforms that take 20 years to develop (that's where in my view the AF is constantly shooting itself in the foot).
Technology isn't always an answer. In fact, it can become a major weakness if taken to extremes. What happens when all your batteries die? How many do you need to lug into the field to remain effective? What would have happened if the flaw in the F-22's nav system hadn't been found during peacetime? Much as I like the idea of the Osprey, is it really worth saddling troops with a helicopter that has had problems since its introduction into service in the early 1960s (the CH-47/46 family) while we wait for the silver bullet to finish development?
I really think that 4% of the GDP is sufficient for defense...provided that the waste is actually CUT and not shifted to other black budgets or areas that don't come under review. Given DoD's poor record in this area, I think the question would be turned to "why SHOULD it be more than 4%?"
Rob makes good points regarding the longer-term benefits of being able to "do" COIN. You would have thought we'd learned our lesson about putting all our strategic option eggs in one basket during the era of Massive Retaliation, but perhaps we didn't.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
I agree that DoD needs better oversight when it comes to spending money. I'm new to the acquisitions area and I'm constantly surprised by the fact that programs are constantly undervalued when it comes to bidding. It's almost like abait and switch routine. However, this problem does not eliminate the need for new technology. The pols are going to spend money anyway (have you heard some of the promises the prez candidates are making?), so it might as well be on something that could ensure our national security rather than millions for a bridge that 100 people and a few moose are going to use. Maybe defense contractors simply need to diversify their plants when it comes to location (more locations=more votes in congress; sad but true).
BUt I'm digressing again. My point is that I simply do not believe that the overall strategy of increasing our technological advantage is wrong. WHile specific programs, and possibly timing, may be at issue we simply cannot afford to let out potential competitors gain ground. The stakes are way too high.
Maybe we should have two air forces. One could be like the old Army Air Corps, focus on COIN, and work in tandem with the Army (i.e. the Army doesn;t get control, but gets a bigger say) while the other could focus on the big war. I'm sure costs would rule this out, but maybe it's worht considering?
-john bellflower
Rule of Law in Afghanistan
"You must, therefore know that there are two means of fighting: one according to the laws, the other with force; the first way is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first, in many cases, is not sufficient, it becomes necessary to have recourse to the second." -- Niccolo Machiavelli (from The Prince)
In terms of the two air component discussion, I'd think we'd do better to either increase Marine or Navy air assets to fill the COIN role. By chopping A-10s to Marine Air, and increasing the amount of medium and light lift aircraft they can operate (airframes of C-130 and smaller size) I think you'd hit a good balance. You could do the same with Navy air, although it would have to be land-based (which would cause a different set of problems to be sure). Giving the Army an increased medium to light lift capability would help, and also free up AF project funds for their own uses.
My fear with splitting the AF in that way is that you'd see the SAC vs. TAC mentality all over again, with MAC left out in the cold to get by with what was left over. If the AF doesn't want to deal with COIN now (and I have yet to be convinced that the majority of the service really DOES want to deal with it...there are of course exceptions), I can't see how splitting the funding between two "branches" of the AF would improve the situation. Keep the AF ready for major conflicts (as in more conventional engagements) and strip some of their small wars capability away and chop it to services (or branches) that have it as a day-to-day concern.
We may have to agree to disagree on some of these points, because I still do think that some of the AF's problems when it comes to airframe age and the like are of their own making (banking the future of the force on high-tech that takes decades to come down the pipeline and is subject to silver bullet design theories...an issue that in all fairness does impact the other services as well...like the Osprey, FCS, and other programs).
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
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