Future Peer Competitor?

[FascistLibertarian]

There is no reason the US Navy has to be as big as it is. The concept that it must be able to fight two wars at the same time is just there to justify military spending.
The American M.I.C. is big government spending to prop up the economy. I agree America must stay ahead of its rivals but right now there is not arms race.
It makes no sense that the Army is funded less than the Navy and the Air Force when its being asked to do the most.
Think how many infantry could be trained and equiped for one f22.
In general the US M.I.C. needs more oversight, goals, and less pork.
just my 2 cents.

[Ski]

Agree with Steve - DoD cannot even be audited at this point, so the comparison can (and has been widely) made that it's just throwing more money into a very deep if not bottomless pit.

Personally, I like simplicity and easy maintenance in equipment. I see millions of lines of code in new procurement programs and I shudder. I hear first hand reports of the difficulty in sustaining qualified people on some of the ABCS equipment and I get worried. I see hundreds of private contractors working as maintenance techs on certain pieces of equipment, and I start to wonder if we can sustain a fighting force in a high intensity war. I look at the time it takes to bring new equipment into the line units (especially major end items), and the lack of facilities and factories that actually create the equipment, and I understand why we have backlogs at the few depots that are up and running.

But the bottom line is that if I was to wargame the United States, the absolute last thing I'd do would be to fight us conventionally. You'd have to be a stone cold moron to do that when there is a proven record of success or at least a draw when someone fights the US in a counterinsurgency since the 1960's.

But again, what is a peer competitor?

[Rob Thornton]

From Facsist Libertarian:

There is no reason the US Navy has to be as big as it is. The concept that it must be able to fight two wars at the same time is just there to justify military spending.

Why don't you think the US Navy needs to be the size it is? There are plenty of arguments that our ship building capability is in danger, and that there are not enough ships and subs to do the work we ask them to do.

The Navy tends to be a bit more low key in their role in GWOT - although the CBGs in the Persian Gulf keeping it from being anything else but a designation for that body of water are related. Their humanitarian role in the Tsunami may have garnered us more positive IO then anything else we've done lately. Their EW and intercept use, their role as a secure base for C2 of operations, their ability to offer bases of operations when the neighborhood is tricky, their role in NEOs whne there are no friendly bases around, many people are still building and buying SSNs and will probably buy/build SSBNs - since everybody wants a nuke. Firing a cruise missile is a handy option for policy. It seems to me the Navy has a strong case for growth with all the foreign policy challenges we have.

Any Navy folks out there want to share their thoughts - certainly from a historic perspective they have played a large role in America's Small Wars. If anybody can do a ship to task list that indicates we need a Jeffersonian Navy - I'd be happy to hear it. Guarenteeing a Sea LOC is available when you need it (and we do allot of shipping) is pretty important for a capitalist economy.

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Ski -

But again, what is a peer competitor?

Rand Study on peer competitor

Excerpt

The potential emergence of a peer competitor is probably the most important long-term planning challenge for the Department of Defense. This report addresses the issue by developing a conceptual framework of how a proto-peer (meaning a state that is not yet a peer but has the potential to become one) might interact with the hegemon (the dominant global power). ...

Or you can take my Bog-tagz definition - its a guy who competes for the same things you do and threatens to fill your environmental niche using capabilities which can challenge you. There are four types as I understand it - near peer - which speeks to somebody who has exploited niche technologies ("exploited" has a wide definintion) which can offer you pain, and Peer - which means he's in the same grade as you. Also used are regional and global to describe the influence of said peer.

But the bottom line is that if I was to wargame the United States, the absolute last thing I'd do would be to fight us conventionally. You'd have to be a stone cold moron to do that when there is a proven record of success or at least a draw when someone fights the US in a counterinsurgency since the 1960's.

I agree with you, but I'm not sure that stops a potential enemy from building and retaining a conventional capability - they are useful beyond just preparing for us. Most of our enemies have natural enemies in their own neighborhood, and it might be nice to have some conventional stuff around when your own population decides you have stolen enough. I sort of like the Iranian model - You've got a little bit of everything - a well trained, dedicated and fanatic para-military that can also inform on the people and slip across the border to destabilize neighbors, an investment in reasonably good conventional hardware you are getting on the cheap through the promise of providing fossil fuels, and you are developing nuclear weapons so anybody who screws with you must contend with that - oh and as an auxillary you support a powerful non-state terrorist group through a partner state who stymied what most westerners consider to be a first rate military power. These guys have clearly done their homework. Anybody looked at the Zagros mountains as a place to go rock climbing - that is ugly terrain- unless you are defending in them, or using them as a base of operation for an insugency.

[LawVol]

I agree America must stay ahead of its rivals but right now there is not arms race.
It makes no sense that the Army is funded less than the Navy and the Air Force when its being asked to do the most.
Think how many infantry could be trained and equiped for one f22.
In general the US M.I.C. needs more oversight, goals, and less pork.
just my 2 cents.

I'm not so sure I buy into your statement that there isn't an arms race. Certainly it is not in the same vein as during the Cold War, but China has increased its military spending dramatically. Recently studies I've read indicate that China is looking beyond a Tiawan scenario. Whether this is global or only regional, it still presents a problem for us. They've increased their ballistic missle capability, are looking into a true blue water navy, and are now seeking to challenge us in space. Now some of this is really years down the road, but I don't really want to give them a head start. However, in the space realm, the anti-satellite shot is a significant development. They've destroyed a satellite with a moblie launcher. Imagine a non-state actor with that capability (it can be sold). Whether in a COIN environment or a big war, knocking out one of our comm or GPS satellites would cause significant problems. The AF is looking into ways to develop mini-satellites that can be more quickly launched to replace destroyed or damaged ones, but guess what it takes? That's right, money. You might have a fully trained division, but what are they going to do with no comm and no GPS?

I don't know how much it takes to train up a division (or what an F-22 costs for that matter) but let's assume they're equal for the moment. What's the shelf life of your division? My F-22 will last about 25-30 years. Sure this really isn't an equal basis argument but it makes my point. Your division requires an influx of new people that need new training. Yes, the F-22 will require upgrades, but in the long run I think we make out quite well. Besides, how many F-22s are you willing to trade? Our F-15s are already approaching the 30 year mark and the Chinese have a new J-10 and something on the way. If we do fight them, do you want to trust air superiority to a 30 year old plane? How effective is your division going to be without that?

And now to the "do the most" comment. While I certainly agree that kicking down doors has much more risk than fueling or maintaining a jet (and my old grunt side has much respect for those guys), let's not lose sight of the fact that everyone has a different job. Quite frackly, I do not want avionics mechanic tapped to an Army line unit. Its a wasted talent. This mechanic, and alot more like him, are needed to keep our aircraft flying. The same aircraft that provides top cover, airlift, ISR, etc.--all the stuff groundpounders tend to take for granted (I did). BTW, alot of these same guys were maintaining the same aircraft back in Desert Storm. Alot of folks like to forget that the AF has been fighting in Iraq since 1991. Sure it wasn't the same as it is now, but our aircraft don't know the difference between flying a routine patrol or actually dropping bombs. Flying is flying and it all provides wear and tear. I don't recall hearing AF guys saying anything about the Army not "doing the most" from 1992-2001. They simply understood that deploying to support no-fly zones was their duty.

As for oversight, goals, and less pork, I couldn't agree more.

[Steve Blair]

Just to bite onto this one...divisions and F-22s both require the same constant flow of cash. I was at Ellsworth when the B-1 came online, and they had to remodel many of the hangers to accommodate it. I expect that they are doing the same thing with the F-22. Add into that the training of the pilots AND the maintainers (which has to be reaccomplished every time someone leaves the service or there's an upgrade to the systems) and you see the same kind of rolling cost. That same division is most likely using the same equipment (at Fort Riley in the late 1990s an O-6 visited the motor pool and found the same 5-ton truck he'd driven as an O-1 in Vietnam, by way of an example) over the same span as the F-22 is in service. So everyone really faces the same issue when it comes to that. FL's comparison isn't really valid in that sense.

And the navy's been operating at more or less the same clip as the AF during the same period (possibly higher if you consider evacuations and disaster relief efforts in addition to normal cruises). I for one tend to worry about the retirement of things like the A-6 and F-14...all in hopes that the F-35 will be what it's advertised to be. If LV is correct that we take air superiority for granted, I'd say we have the same blind spot when it comes to control of the seas and the ability to project a pretty massive strike into a region (complete with a sizable ground force component) with very little notice.

[Granite_State]

Agree with Steve - DoD cannot even be audited at this point, so the comparison can (and has been widely) made that it's just throwing more money into a very deep if not bottomless pit.

Personally, I like simplicity and easy maintenance in equipment. I see millions of lines of code in new procurement programs and I shudder. I hear first hand reports of the difficulty in sustaining qualified people on some of the ABCS equipment and I get worried. I see hundreds of private contractors working as maintenance techs on certain pieces of equipment, and I start to wonder if we can sustain a fighting force in a high intensity war. I look at the time it takes to bring new equipment into the line units (especially major end items), and the lack of facilities and factories that actually create the equipment, and I understand why we have backlogs at the few depots that are up and running.

But the bottom line is that if I was to wargame the United States, the absolute last thing I'd do would be to fight us conventionally. You'd have to be a stone cold moron to do that when there is a proven record of success or at least a draw when someone fights the US in a counterinsurgency since the 1960's.

But again, what is a peer competitor?

I like Rob's definition. I'd basically say a peer is someone who is, maybe not an existential challenge, in the sense that I think invading the U.S. is virtually impossible, but someone who can fight you on your level, in terms of both technology and military size and effectiveness. I don't see how anyone is getting to that level anytime soon, and even if they do, I agree with Van Creveld that the advent of nuclear weapons has fundamentally changed the rules of the game. You don't see great power wars anymore, because the stakes are too high.

[Granite_State]

Hey Ski -

I sort of like the Iranian model - You've got a little bit of everything - a well trained, dedicated and fanatic para-military that can also inform on the people and slip across the border to destabilize neighbors, an investment in reasonably good conventional hardware you are getting on the cheap through the promise of providing fossil fuels, and you are developing nuclear weapons so anybody who screws with you must contend with that - oh and as an auxillary you support a powerful non-state terrorist group through a partner state who stymied what most westerners consider to be a first rate military power. These guys have clearly done their homework. Anybody looked at the Zagros mountains as a place to go rock climbing - that is ugly terrain- unless you are defending in them, or using them as a base of operation for an insugency.

Great observation. Be interesting to see if others (Chavez?) head in the same direction.

[120mm]

Two of the above posters included the words "more oversight" and "less pork" in a sentence. I wish you wouldn't do that. I would suggest that inverse is more likely. "more oversight" probably equals "more pork".

I am currently embroiled in a "paper scandal". The army is spending tens of thousands of dollars at my place of work, in order to save a few hundred dollars in paper.

Coincidentally, all my co-workers just spent nearly two weeks doing Local Quarters Allowance paperwork that probably saved the government $2000, total. 10 x 80 hours contract labor is considerably greater than $2000.

I would suggest that trusting people to do the best job possible, and prosecuting to the extreme those who violate public trust would be a more cost effective, and possibly just effective way to save public monies.

[Rob Thornton]

We had DR. Milan Vego from the Naval War College guest lecture this morning on Naval Theory and theorists. As the morning progressed it struck me how relevant the discussions (particularly the sidebars that were generated) were to this thread. One thing that really struck me was the question of: Does our pursuit of means (in our culture this might mean a quantum technological leap forward) determine the limits of our strategy, or should our strategy determine the means we pursue?

One of the things discussed was the Navy’s pursuit of the Littoral Combat Ship and nuclear submarines. Both are very expensive, and both have been debated in regards to futures type strategy – Seapower 21, Airpower 21, Force 21, NCW, etc. The idea that a vastly capable platform has “savings” over multiple technologically inferior platforms – read the LCS, a FCS BCT, JSF/F-22 because they are networked and can leverage technology.

Since we have hit the budget and that the amount of the Nation’s budget spent on Defense is hard to change (you’d probably need an existential threat to convince the public), then you have a choice to make in regards of quality (perceived or real) over quantity (generally proven and more affordable tech – but requiring more people). I think this is an important because while we are very engaged in a single theater, there are other strategic challenges that are evolving – you can call them peer or near peer, but what I think is important is that there are states and non-states who are looking to take advantage and have decided that this is a good opportunity because the one cop that is always on the beat is pretty busy.

We live in a world of finite resources. People covet those resources and as much as we’d prefer to come to an amicable co-usage of those resources, it seems biological to anticipate your greater needs and to try and secure an advantage, if for nothing else, out of fear. While we hope diplomacy and economic benefits will point out the advantages (first among them avoidance of the costs of war), it is a longer road, and there will probably be those who feel disenfranchised, or just don’t want to wait. Some will feel as though they should not have to wait for something they believe is inherently theirs. Some will mistake the reaction of others and see a bloodless gain bought by inability and apathy from others.

So no matter if we are discussing small wars or big wars, the imbalance brought about by pursuing an acquisition strategy which might allow us to gain superiority in a specific location while limiting our ability to respond to multiple challenges forces us into the uncomfortable game of guessing which place is more important to be. Given the multitude of competing state interests in pursuit of resources and given the viral spread of destabilizing non-state entities, are we building a force which we will be too scared to use/commit as an instrument of policy, and which once used will be too expensive (or too difficult) to reconstitute either through loss, or over-usage? I think a force that is too expensive in those terms may not be a very good policy tool, and may put us at a disadvantage as we try and respond to too much with too little.
Dr. Vego had a great observation about WWII. By the destruction of our battleships at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese forced us out of a Mahanian pursuit of a major capitol ship engagement, and into exploiting the advantages of the Aircraft Carrier. This is not to advocate the use of Airpower in the Pacific Theater, but that of breaking away from accepted notions that no longer conform to environmental realities. There is a danger in building your strategy to justify acquisition – it’s a leap of faith of an unknown height. Where national security is concerned, it may be a technological “bridge too far”. I thought about his observation and I wondered if OIF and OEF might be a sort of Pearl Harbor catalyst to consider how we wage war, and how to regain balance between investing in the people who fight war and the technology which provides us advantages.

[Rob Thornton]

Granite Slate's, Ski's and LV's discussion on "what is a peer" got me thinking along a different track. How do we see the threat, and why? Service cultures play a part in shaping our perspectives, but that does not mean they are irrelevant. In gunnery the crew is taught to engage the most dangerous threat first - there are characteristics given to help qualify that, but it’s still a matter of arbitration. However, let’s say you have a more lethal threat that can engage you, but also have a less lethal threat closer in. Both are lethal. You have some latitude, you can perform a simultaneous engagement, but still, its a divided effort.

The ground war in OIF and OEF has perhaps affected the thinking of the Army and Marines in regards to the nature of the threat more so then the Navy and the Air Force. Why - seems easy enough, but why is it important to acknowledge. In terms of relevancy and treasure, casualty rates and force stress on the Army and Marines are immediate and lasting. They have brought hard lessons to be re-learned about the nature of War, and that it is fought by people. The Army and Marines stand a little closer to the consequences of Ground Combat - so not just our tactical thinking has been challenged, but our operational and strategic thinking has been challenged. OR rates for combat vehicles, CL IX, 4th and 5th tours, armored protection etc. have taken precedence over pursuit of perfect technology to solve problems - give me good enough - COTs over R&D - buy more of these now, I can't wait - We need a larger service to meet our commitments, etc. Its a kind of Maslow's Law for ground components - "we enjoyed our romp with contemplating self synchronization, but right now we have to shoot this guy and convince this other guy to quit blowing things up."

The Air Force and Navy are also affected, but less – it’s the nature of their role in this war, perhaps in warfare. I say the last because wars are about people and of course as stated people live on the ground, not in the air and not on the sea. They may venture into the air or sea for different reasons, and of course from a military stand point they offer advantages, and for our policy they dictate requirements, but people live - on the ground. So the Air Force and the Navy have more limitations in regard to affecting the ground then the Army and Marines. Both the Air Force and Navy offer unique and complimenting advantages in regards to war (and I hope we retain all of them), but I'd say they are more limited (we are all limited in some ways).

So it should be no surprise that the view of the most pressing and dangerous threat should be different. The perception of those threats leads to arguments on how best to spend limited resources.

The challenge for us is to consider our threats and the different ways in which we can counter and overcome them while not short changing the others. Historically this is a very challenging time for us, as we deal with combating Non-State & State enemies, convincing the public of a threat which we ourselves have a hard time agreeing on, waging a war in a near instantaneous information environment, trying to keep the WMD genies in their bottles, practicing and funding Joint, Inter-Agency and Combined warfare, and many other challenges.

As an Army guy I struggle to look outside of my perceptions and biases about the war and what it means to security, but I am an Army guy, so I first have to think about the Army's core competencies and what that means for the soldier trading shots the enemy at hand. I expect the same from LawVol as the USAF guy and the sailors of the USN. However, from a strategic point of view, its prudent to reconsider where we are going in light of what we've learned so far, and what events we see unfolding in the world. Is the technologically brilliant but hyper costly force the way to go? We must find some type of strategic balance between man and machine to be an effective instrument of policy for the long haul in order to preserve the freedoms we've been charged to defend.

[Granite_State]

...are we building a force which we will be too scared to use/commit as an instrument of policy, and which once used will be too expensive (or too difficult) to reconstitute either through loss, or over-usage?

I tend to think so, we lose just four F-22s (sorry to keep harping on this) at $1 billion, how many more are we going to be willing to commit? Are we going to end up being like the ancient Indian armies whose war elephants were their most devastating weapon, but also their most precious, so they'd surround them with cavalry, and then protect the cavalry by surrounding them with infantry? Kind of defeats the purpose.

My understanding is that the genius of the F-16 is that it was cheap, effective, and versatile, thus we could build tons of them and focus resources and attention on training plenty of top-notch pilots. I've read that John Boyd used to say "People, ideas, and hardware. In that order!"

[LawVol]

How do we see the threat, and why? Service cultures play a part in shaping our perspectives, but that does not mean they are irrelevant. In gunnery the crew is taught to engage the most dangerous threat first - there are characteristics given to help qualify that, but it’s still a matter of arbitration. However, let’s say you have a more lethal threat that can engage you, but also have a less lethal threat closer in. Both are lethal. You have some latitude, you can perform a simultaneous engagement, but still, its a divided effort.

Threat perception is perhaps what differentiates the air and ground folks. IMHO, the ground guys tend to focus almost solely on OIF/OEF. Now this is to be excepted given the current fight and the fact that the OIF/OEF threat is staring you right in the face. As a result, I think you (generic use of the term) tend to enlarge that threat. However, OIF/OEF is not a catastrophic threat. No matter what al Qeada, et al. does, there is no threat to our existance.

When you discuss a rising peer competitor, however, there is a potential for an existential threat. The stuff I'm reading about China and Russia indicates that they are extensively reinvigorating their military capability. Russia just conducted a missile launch for a system they say will work against our missile defense system. Whether this is true or not is irrelevant; the fact is that they are trying. We air guys see this as a true threat and one for which we must prepare.

That is not to say that the Army doesn't need upgrades or even more people (I reserve judgment on this), but we cannot leverage our future against a short-term solution to a non-existential threat.

Also, I don't know anything about India's war elephants, but I do know that risking the loss of a 16 million dollar jet for an insurgent is not the same as risking one to take out China's air defense system. BUilding tons of them might have been the idea back in the 1970s when they were first produced, but I don't think we can rely on that now. How will one perform against a 5th or 6th generation fighter? Will the enemy simply be shooting fish in a barrel? I'm not willing to risk it.

[wm]

My understanding is that the genius of the F-16 is that it was cheap, effective, and versatile, thus we could build tons of them and focus resources and attention on training plenty of top-notch pilots. I've read that John Boyd used to say "People, ideas, and hardware. In that order!"

The more things change, the more they stay the same. I seem to remember the same argument being made about why we should have bought the F5 rather than the F16. And back then, we were looking at an adversary that had a huge superiority in numbers of systems. We relied on the technical superiority argument to make ourselves feel comfortable, but the hard fact is that we won the cold war by forcing a meltdown of our opponent's economy. The actual capabilities of what we bought didn't really matter as long as we spent very large amounts of dollars on things our opponents thought were technically superior.

[FascistLibertarian]

http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...d/spending.htm
US - $466 billion
China – $65 billion

http://www.policyalmanac.org/world/d...spending.shtml
Summary of the FY 2003 Defense Budget
(signed into law on October 23, 2002)
House Republicans: Committee Central

The bill reported by the Defense Appropriations Conference provides a total of $355.1 billion in new discretionary spending authority for the Defense Department for FY 2003, a reduction of $1.6 billion to the budget request (not including the $10 billion reserve). It is also an increase of $37.5 billion over FY 2002 levels (not including supplementals).

Note only the USN has supercarriers, no other country can touch the US here and really many of the countries with smaller carriers are allied to the US.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Current...craft_Carriers
[edit] Aircraft Carriers

The USN has 11 active duty aircraft carriers, all supercarriers: One each of the Kitty Hawk and Enterprise classes, and nine of the Nimitz class. It formerly retained two carriers of the Forrestal class and one of the Kitty Hawk class in reserve (all three were stricken for disposal between 2003 and 2005, with USS Ranger (CV-61) placed on donation hold), and one carrier of the Nimitz class is under construction (USS George H. W. Bush (CVN-77)). The USN's aircraft carriers are its capital ships, and the largest extant example of naval shipbuilding in the world.

Kitty Hawk class aircraft carrier
USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63)
Enterprise class (one-ship class)
USS Enterprise (CVN-65)
Nimitz class
USS Nimitz (CVN-68)
USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69)
USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70)
USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71)
USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72)
USS George Washington (CVN-73)
USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74)
USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75)
USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76)
USS George H. W. Bush (CVN-77) (commission anticipated for 2009)
Ford class
USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) (Awarded)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aircraf...carriers_today

Nine countries maintain a total of 20 aircraft carriers in active service: United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, Italy, India, Spain, Brazil, and Thailand. In addition the People's Republic of China's People's Liberation Army Navy possesses the former Soviet aircraft carrier Varyag, but most naval analysts believe that they have no intention to operate it, but instead are using Varyag to learn about carrier operations for future Chinese aircraft carriers.

If your seriouse about the Chinese as a threat you have to consider that in a war with them the US could have south korea, japan, australia.
Only two ‘empires’ have tried to run on a deficit, the Romans the the US.
The US needs to cut spending, the miltary is not the cause of this (you have to look at total of GDP). They dont want to end up like the USSR in the 1980's.
How much money has been wasted on projects that don’t work or arent working that could have been used elsewhere.
Another good ww2 compairson is the poor use of production and super weapons the Nazis did. Although it wouldn’t be such a bad comparison if they had won the war.
It is so important the the US stays ahead militarily and technologically of future peer competitors in the Naval and Air spheres. At the same time I think a lot of the spending could be trimmed.

[FascistLibertarian]

but I have trouble seeing any state realistically attempting to match the U.S. on the conventional battlefield, given the two Gulf Wars and the obvious supremacy of the U.S. at putting firepower on targets.

I agree with this 100%. I think in a lot of cases the military is preparing for wars it they will not have to fight for over 20 years at least.

[Rob Thornton]

Hey LV,

When you discuss a rising peer competitor, however, there is a potential for an existential threat. The stuff I'm reading about China and Russia indicates that they are extensively reinvigorating their military capability. Russia just conducted a missile launch for a system they say will work against our missile defense system. Whether this is true or not is irrelevant; the fact is that they are trying. We air guys see this as a true threat and one for which we must prepare.

Are you of the oppinion that China, Russia or even Iran would risk a nuclear confrontation & MAD?

Do you believe that AQ or a like organization would be willing to detonate a nuclear device in Washington D.C. if it were available?

The reason I ask is because you bring up existential threats. To be an existential threat goes beyond challenging regional supremacy, and even global supremacy (unless you are referring to a philosophical interpretation). After all Sparta may have torn down Athens’s walls, raped, pillaged and created a power vacuum in the Mediterranean, but Athens is still around today.

Detonation of a nuclear device in D.C. would be something of an existential threat to our government - I think.

My point - States will challenge us, but they will only go so far as the object in view and the risk associated with said object balance each other out - and so will we.

Non-States - are a different matter though. Their risk is minimized at the moment. They may seek a state like status - say a Caliphate, but they have little to lose and much to gain. OIF and OEF are just the most visible incarnations, but I don't believe they are the last

IMHO, the ground guys tend to focus almost solely on OIF/OEF. Now this is to be excepted given the current fight and the fact that the OIF/OEF threat is staring you right in the face. As a result, I think you (generic use of the term) tend to enlarge that threat. However, OIF/OEF is not a catastrophic threat. No matter what al Qeada, et al. does, there is no threat to our existence.

I disagree, ground components are torn - on the one hand we have this irregular war with all its unforeseen twists and turns that we've (all of us) have been charged to win, on the other we know that there are states out there still building tanks, artillery, and other conventional capabilities - since those are the tools by which you fall back own when you can't get what you want on the cheap. We've got enough sense of history to know that.

Now if you want to talk a "philosophical" existential threat to say American ability to move freely in the world without having to resort to military means to do so - say to pursue commerce, or exchange culture, etc. then I'd say terrorism and a peer competitor would be a threat (however, we buy an awful lot from China - so allot of the money they spend on hardware comes from making Happy Meal toys sold in the USA). Why terrorism, because it is often un-attributable to a state making it difficult to respond to. It shrinks from providing a physical target of which to bomb, shoot or shell. It mixes back into the masses and destabilizes from within - it has a viral quality in that it is able to mimic healthy cells while at the same time attacking them. Inciting insurgency using terrorist tactics in an environment where the rule of law and governance are lacking can be thought of as an operation in the context of a strategy to build a caliphate. It also drains our resources from hunting them down when you are trying to bring security and stability through COIN - the quicker we can resolve that and bring a credible HN government to the fight, the quicker we can move on - but this requires people.

In the end, it may not be military force at all that proves the cure, but a combination of economic, medical and diplomatic aid that changes the nature of the environment in which it lives - take away the conditions in which it breeds and it dies or goes sterile. In this way its a battle of ideas - an environment in which those things are possible displace the environment in which instability and terrorism breed.

Unfortunately, it is the largely the ground services (the AF and USN have other important tasks) who have been tasked with providing the representation for both the security in which stability can occur and the other elements required for stability - we don't have an expeditionary anything else, but the military. Perhaps instead of growing the Army and the Marines we should look at growing an expeditionary foreign service corps (we debated the value of such organizations) - but they are still going to have to get their hands dirty & that is what soldiers & marines do well and much cheaper - but the more ends thay are asked to fulfill, the more means they require.

[LawVol]

Rob: your point is taken. Although a nuclear detonation would be horrible, I do not think it would threaten our existence. We would recover. However, a conventional loss in a war with China might compromise our world position in a big way. It could potentially shut us out of the Pacific and rearrange the balance of power there. Such a loss could lead us to becoming a mere second-rate power, or worse.

While I agree that we need to face down the terrorist threat (and win in Iraq for that matter), I worry that we're sacrificing our future military capabilities in doing so. Our job is to protect against all enemies; that includes potential future enemies.

FascistLib: I enjoyed reading your statistics. I guess I don't trust Chinese transparency as you do. Everything I read says its reported defense spending is not only severely under-reported but growing fast. My point is that we cannot let them catch up not that we shoud maintain pace. I simply do not want anyone to be equal to us on the battle field. We should always bring a gun to a knife fight. It makes me sleep better at night.

[LawVol]

"The People's Liberation Army is pursuing comprehensive transformation from a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to one capable of fighting and winning short-duration, high-intensity conflict against high-technology adversaries," the Pentagon report said.

The Chinese government angrily rejected the Pentagon's assessment, saying it exaggerated China's military strength.

here's the link: http://aimpoints.hq.af.mil/display.cfm?id=19019

[120mm]

[QUOTE=FascistLibertarian;17264
Only two ‘empires’ have tried to run on a deficit, the Romans the the US.
[/QUOTE]

While I agree on the essense of your post, the above stated sentence is simply not true. Financing government debt was one of the reasons the British empire happened. I wouldn't doubt that all modern empires were made through gov't debt and lending.