Nation-Building Elevated

[SWJED]

American Forces Press Service - Directive Boosts Priority of Stability Operations (reposted in full per DoD guidelines).

Stability operations are now a major priority for the Defense Department, on par with combat operations, and will receive more planning and funding, two DoD officials said here today.

The officials were explaining DoD Directive 3000.05, which was signed Nov. 28. The directive provides guidance on stability operations and assigns responsibility for planning, training and preparing to conduct and support stability operations.

The origins of the directive come from the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, said Jeffrey Nadaner, deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability operations. Before Sept. 11, many people within DoD thought of stability operations as optional, Nadaner said, but after the terrorist attacks, they were seen as a necessity.

The ability of the United States and its partners to conduct stability operations can prevent failed and failing states from becoming havens for terrorists and criminals, and can ensure the U.S. is safe at home and successful in its military missions, he said.

Stability operations are defined operations other than combat operations that involve violence or the threat of violence and can come in various sizes and forms, Nadaner said. Examples of stability operations are rebuilding institutions such as security forces, correctional facilities and judicial systems; reviving or building the private sector, including encouraging citizen-driven economic activity and building necessary infrastructure; and developing representative governmental institutions, according to the directive.

The directive lays out important policies, Nadaner said. Among those are that stability operations are a core military mission and shall be given priority comparable to combat missions, and that although stability operations are best performed by indigenous, foreign or U.S. civilian professionals, U.S. military forces will be prepared to perform all tasks required to maintain order when civilians cannot do so, he explained.

One of the key requirements in all stability operations is the need for indigenous security forces to be established quickly, Nadaner said. This is a lesson learned from the war in Iraq that will be incorporated into future operations, he said.

The directive includes a requirement that the stability operations portions of war plans are fully completed by the U.S. military, Nadaner said. The secretary of defense will receive periodic reports about these plans so his level of information about stability operations is equal with that of combat operations, he added.

Another important aspect of the directive is that it encourages different government agencies to participate in stability operations, Nadaner said. "The directive has a flavor throughout that's very inter-agency, because we recognize that stability operations are inherently and intensely inter-agency," he said.

DoD wants to help other government agencies develop their own capabilities for stability operations, Nadaner said. One plan is to develop civilian-military teams, much like the provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan, to be ready to deploy to stability operations, he said.

The State Department and DoD already work together and even share money when it comes to stability operations, Nadaner said. State Department officials participate in DoD exercises, and DoD is seeking authority from Congress to transfer $200 million to the State Department to prepare for a potential stability crisis, he said.

To implement the requirements of this directive will require a series of efforts within DoD and other government agencies, Nadaner said. Some of the initiatives are going to be difficult, he said, so all the changes won't be visible right away, but DoD is at a good starting point.

"We're looking to see the changes done right, and we think we have a good framework to do so," he said.

This directive should be considered initial guidance and will evolve over time, said Air Force Col. J. Scott Norwood, deputy director for international negotiations and multilateral affairs, strategic plans and policy directorate, the Joint Staff.

Norwood's office will oversee the implementation of the initiatives, he said, which will involve a range of activities. DoD will have to reassess its doctrine, training structure and processes, educational programs and war plans, he said. Also, officials will need to incorporate lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan, he noted.

Norwood warned against interpreting the directive to mean stability operations are the goal in themselves, Norwood said. The United States works hard to develop weak states and prevent failed states, he pointed out, so stability operations are not necessary. But measures need to be in place if that doesn't work, he said.

"We recognize those strategies may not work, and when we have to conduct stability operations, we don't want it to be a pick-up game; we want varsity capabilities from the onset," he said.

[SWJED]

16 Dec. Christian Science Monitor - New Military Goals: 'Win the Peace'.

With little fanfare during the past few weeks, the Pentagon has rolled out one of the most significant changes to military doctrine since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

The policy directive recently signed by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld declares that the job of planning and training to win the peace after a war is now virtually as important to the military as the conflict itself.

The document marks a sea change from the ideals of the past, when the military was loath to take on any responsibility beyond waging and winning wars. Indeed, it suggests that the Pentagon increasingly sees Iraq and Afghanistan as templates for wars of the future, with success hinging not only on military superiority, but also on the ability to reconstruct failed states...

[Jedburgh]

RAND, 8 Sep 08: After the War: Nation-Building from FDR to George W. Bush

Beginning with the post–World War II occupations of Germany and Japan, the United States has undertaken eight significant nationbuilding operations over the past 60 years. The planning for postwar nation-building in Germany and Japan began under President Franklin D. Roosevelt and was carried out under President Harry S. Truman.

Subsequent operations during the post–Cold War era were initiated and conducted by President George H. W. Bush and President William J. Clinton, respectively. The United States has subsequently taken the lead in post–September 11, 2001, nation-building under President George W. Bush in Afghanistan and Iraq. In each of the eight cases presented here, presidential decisionmaking and administrative structure have, at times, worked in favor of the nation-building goals of the U.S. government and military and those of its coalition partners and allies. In other cases, these elements have hindered the achievement of these goals or have had negative effects on nation-building outcomes.

This monograph assesses the ways in which the management styles and structures of the administrations in power prior to and during nation-building operations affect the goals and outcomes of such operations. It also evaluates the nature of the society being reformed and of the conflict being terminated. The findings presented here should be of interest to policymakers and others interested in the history of U.S. nation-building, lessons learned from these operations, and the outcomes of U.S. involvement in rebuilding various types of societies......

Complete 190-page monograph at the link.

[Jedburgh]

SSI, 1 Oct 08: Stability Operations and State Building: Continuities and Contingencies

....This volume contains the full range of intellectual theorizing, historical examinations, and practical engagement challenges which were so richly presented by the attendees of the colloquium held as a result of the Strategic Studies Institute’s collaboration with Austin Peay State University. In addition, the appendices contain not only the final principles, policies, and procedures determined by the plenary, but also the full list of nominated principles with which the attendees worked. The Strategic Studies Institute and Austin Peay State University are pleased to offer this important compilation of knowledge on the most immediate challenge facing our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan today.....

Complete 280-page paper at the link.

[Surferbeetle]

Nation Building defined by Wikipedia

Traditionally there has been some confusion between the use of the term nation-building and that of state-building (the terms are sometimes used interchangeably in North America). Both have fairly narrow and different definitions in political science, the former referring to national identity, the latter to the institutions of the state.

Nation-building refers to the process of constructing or structuring a national identity using the power of the state. This process aims at the unification of the people or peoples within the state so that it remains politically stable and viable in the long run. Nation-building can involve the use of propaganda or major infrastructure development to foster social harmony and economic growth.

State Building defined by Wikipeda

There are two main theoretical approaches to definitions of state-building. Firstly state-building is seen by some theorists as an activity undertaken by external actors (foreign countries) attempting to build, or re-build, the institutions of a weaker, post-conflict or failing state. This is a view of state-building as the activity of one country in relation to another, usually following some form of intervention (such as a UN peacekeeping operation).

Approach #2

This work has tended to draw heavily on political science. It has produced definitions that view state-building as an indigenous, national process driven by state-society relations. This view believes that countries cannot do state-building outside their own borders, they can only influence, support or hinder such processes.

Rand's The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building By: James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Beth Cole DeGrasse

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States, NATO, the United Nations, and a range of other states and nongovernmental organizations have become increasingly involved in nation-building operations. Nation-building involves the use of armed force as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms, with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors. This guidebook is a practical “how-to” manual on the conduct of effective nation-building. It is organized around the constituent elements that make up any nation-building mission: military, police, rule of law, humanitarian relief, governance, economic stabilization, democratization, and development. The chapters describe how each of these components should be organized and employed, how much of each is likely to be needed, and the likely cost. The lessons are drawn principally from 16 U.S.- and UN-led nation-building operations since World War II and from a forthcoming study on European-led missions. In short, this guidebook presents a comprehensive history of best practices in nation-building and serves as an indispensable reference for the preplanning of future interventions and for contingency planning on the ground.

Sweat Equity defined by Wikipedia

Sweat equity is a term used to describe the contribution made to a project by people who contribute their time and effort. It can be contrasted with financial equity which is the money contributed towards the project. It is used to refer to a form of compensation by businesses to their owners or employees. The term is sometimes used in partnership agreements where one or more of the partners contributes no financial capital. In the case of a business startup, employees might, upon incorporation, receive stock or stock options in return for working for below-market salaries (or in some cases no salary at all).

In a successful model used by Habitat for Humanity, families who would otherwise be unable to purchase their own home (because their income level does not allow them to save for a down payment or qualify for an interest-bearing mortgage offered by a financial institution) contribute up to 500 hours of sweat equity to the construction of their own home, the homes of other Habitat for Humanity partner families or by volunteering to assist the organization in other ways. Once moved into their new home, the family makes monthly, interest-free mortgage payments into a revolving "Fund for Humanity" which provides capital to build homes for other partner families.

SWC thread From Maneuver Warfare To Maneuver Welfare

[Dayuhan]

This reminds me of how much I dislike the term "nation-building", and why.

[rant]

You can't build a nation, any more than you can build a tree. These are not things that are built, these are things that grow. It's a semantic distinction, but semantic distinctions do influence perception, discourse, and eventually policy. The idea that a nation can be built is what leads us to the absurdity of nominally rational adults talking about "installing" a democracy, as if it were a light bulb or spare tire, and we have a warehouse full of neatly stacked crates labeled "democracy, functioning, one" just waiting to be screwed into place.

Treating nations and states as growing entities that need to be cultivated rather than engineering challenges awaiting the correct blueprint is not going to solve the problems, but it might provide a more effective foundation for developing solutions.

We have to accept that the growth of nations is an inherently disorderly process and that conflict is usually going to be part of it. Our own nation undertook one of history's great genocides and fought one of history's great civil wars before defining itself as a nation. Western Europeans see themselves at the pinnacle of human civilization, but the warring tribes of western Europe went through many centuries of gory and destructive conflict before they could even figure out where one nation ended and others began. When we look with horror on the wars and abuses of Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East we would do well to reflect that all they are doing is settling their business in exactly the same way we once settled ours. Colonial powers may have suspended the process by imposing order at the expense of stability, but when they left the process continued.

None of this means we have to simply sit back and accept whatever happens. It means we have to accept that we can only manage situations to the greatest extent possible (which may at times be a very minimal extent), not control them. We have to accept that the needed process of growth may not always be compatible with our perceived self-interest. We have to accept that borders left behind by retreating colonists do not necessarily constitute "nations", and that at a certain point people may have to work out for themselves what "nations" actually make sense, and that this process will involve a certain amount of disorder. We have to accept that creating or recognizing a government does not necessarily endow it with the capacity to govern.

We cannot build nations, or states. We may be able to help cultivate them, if we recognize that an organic growth process is involved and start working with it instead of trying to control it to achieve our own immediate goals.

[/rant]

[Ken White]

Truly excellent post, Dayuhan.