Nation-Building Elevated

[jmm99]

In many cases (your case), we are looking at islands in the sand or boats on the sea. The question is how to link the islands or boats and draw them closer - an example that worked, the Iroquois Confederation (originally five, very warring tribes) - Wilf calls that "diplomacy" and I'm fine with that; but that begs the question of who does the "diplomacy".

As to this:

from MA

I think you are targeting the right level. But it appears that we want to first fixe the 500 m target before going to the 25 m target. Funding also come into the question. It's much cheaper to fix the State apparatus before fixing the problematic of all the small villages.

Afghanistan is a very good example of this. The assembly was created to bring together all the potential Elite that could enter our definition of it and ease the establishment of a centralized State. But we did not look at the lower level: do those people represent more than a village or a fragile structure based on violence domination a combination of Stateless entities and Charismatic/traditional domination.

Afghanistan like many others failed States is like an onion. You have several layers of complex societal organization and we come to impose another one, just because it is the one we are familiar with.

I can see "technical" problems also. It's difficult to build both State administration and Nation at village level. But not impossible, just more expensive.

Were that Astan and other problem "states" like an onion - at least that is a compact entity with defined layers.

I agree that what you say seems to be what is usually done (shoot the 500m target), which is the "quick and cheap" fix approach. If you are the practitioner tasked with doing that by your "boss" (US, UN or Coalition), you have to do your best with what you have to work with.

Generally, you get what you pay for. So, the 500m target may be great (low decimal MOA groupings ), but the 500m shooter may find that all the other targets from 25m up are occupied by other shooters.

So, this is not a knock on the practitioners, but on the bosses.

Regards

Mike

[Steve the Planner]

Mike:

Generally, when yopu go into a store to pruchase a good, you get what you pay for.

When you go into a country to nation-build, quite often you end up with a $53 Billion Fiasco, the term usually applied to the Iraq Reconstruction effort.

The numbers, to date, programmed for Afghanistan are $60 billion, an amount which, of well spent, should have long ago begun to demonstrate substantial change---but has not.

Afghans argue that ll the money gets absorbed by overhead and contractors, and only a fraction ever reaches the ground in Afghanistan. A convincing argument, by all accounts.

Now, if you want to change Afghanistan---even if by linking islands--- you really have to create a plan to link Afghan islands, and not foreign NGO contract islands. Otherwise, you can expect nothing.

Poor Sec. Vilsack went to Nawa the other day, beaming about the $20 million ag program that, as he found out, is simply US specialists giving animal vaccinations, and no Afghan gov agencies engaged.

That, at least, is better than most aid (that never reaches the ground), but follows the giving out fish mode with little possibility of progress---other than to expect the US specialists to come again next year with more shots.

Why, one might ask, can't an Afghan HS grad be trained to go around giving shots? Obviously, there are a lot more considerations to answering that question than many would like to know about (mobility, safety, cultural/tribal/language compatibility, and on...). But, for our dream state to be reached, the goal must be to get an Afghan to deliver the shots, on a sustainable basis, or the effort is merely a fish.

Where is the capacity-building component of this? (Notwithstanding the huge risks, commitments, and hardships endured by the brave US ag person giving the shots that his boss (Vilsack) sent him there to administer.

Steve

[jmm99]

and have been saying it in 400+ posts. Leviathans are created and used in an attempt to solve problems that could be solved by minnows. However, it is easier to create one Leviathan than mobilize thousands of minnows.

In civil affairs, the problems (past and present) certainly can be indentified. The solutions are another thing entirely - there are barriers (rice bowls, venal politicians and a huge chattering class who depend on Leviathans); and there is no neat generalized cookbook that will work in every case.

I'm getting kinda busy here with a stack of minnow problems that can be solved by this minnow; but am still following this and other threads.

Regards

Mike

[M-A Lagrange]

Generally, you get what you pay for. So, the 500m target may be great (low decimal MOA groupings ), but the 500m shooter may find that all the other targets from 25m up are occupied by other shooters.

So, this is not a knock on the practitioners, but on the bosses.

Mike,

I totally agree with you, it's a knock to the bosses. But can they hear us?
They are shooting my minus 2 000 000 km target… The one I can't see but who's harming me each time I try to shoot my 500m target. And I am quite close to the top already. But the top of the field layer, not the top of the decision layer.

So what if Iraq decided, when all was said and done, to basically return to a city/region structure, loosely bound by national trappings and exigencies? Would that be an unraveling, or just a further refinement on a long-standing historical pattern and practice.

Steve,

My comment would be only that it's not what we (the US, UN, coalition, the Martians…) want. What you're saying goes against his Majesty Rostow.
More seriously decentralization has been a not so successful experience in most of the developing countries. It may look appealing and has good points but it also implies that you have a large and strong reserve of educated people and a central State apparatus which is capable to overpower and regulate the decentralized entities.
South Africa, which is far from being a developing country, is crawling backward from decentralization. The main issue is mostly financial and tax related in the end.
With a country as Iraq, I can see were you come from and Kurdistan is already a de facto application of this "ultimate" decentralization. But you have to integrate the Westphalia consensus in the equation.
Basically, you do not dismantle a country after you conquered it. Kosovo is a good example of why nobody is really ready to break it: look at the mess.
So for world security reasons, in fact the people are not really free to choose what kind of State they want to have. That's also one of the reasons why we end up doing State Building based on the construction of Weberian model.

But yes, we should be able to conduct something which is less "plug and play" and more clients oriented.

What is interesting is that China is entering in the game now. This should push us to really rethink the cooking book. Cause the main principle of State building was to be a ready to use democracy state creation based on human rights and multi parties.
With China in the dance, that's another story which is starting. We may have to be quality oriented now. (Let's dream)

[Surferbeetle]

M.A., Mike, Dayuhan, STP, Beelzebubalicious, Wilf, Ken, and anyone else who is interested...

Step 1. A SWC thread is created for an opensource multidisciplinary attempt in digital problem solving at a Afghan Village. (Perhaps taking cues from a website like the Engineers Without Borders - Research Projects Page )

Below is a list of research project ideas in Appropriate and Sustainable Technologies and Community Development. These ideas are only meant to give chapters a feel for some of the pressing needs in the realm of international development. EWB-USA does not have staff to provide support on these projects, and can not respond to research project inquiries.

Step 2. Doctrine and ground rules are identified, established, and agreed to.

Step 3. Contact is established with a 'neutral' Afghan (Ashraf Ghani ? mentioned in an article from today's edition of Wired )...tricky, but doable.

Step 4. Digital Civil Affairs/Development work is attempted...

[jmm99]

why not - it at least could be a means to vent frustrations.

Dunno about an Astan village (simply current OpSec issues ?)

This:

Step 2. Doctrine and ground rules are identified, established, and agreed to.

IIRC, you once posted that you actually enjoyed staff work, though prefering team as more fun. So, go to it.

Regards

Mike

[Steve the Planner]

Mike:

Same here---I am swamped with expert reports for a really confusing 10-year-old Class Action case (on remand for final determination of damages)---so I pop on here for a break from that morass. Afghanistan looks simple by comparison.

There are no easy answers to Afghanistan, but I know we are, at present, still cahsing an errant path. It needs to change fast, even though we know fast change isn't consistent with large institutions, or with vast deployments of little minnows (or cats to be herded)---just damned hard.

Steve's idea of the demo is great. We have the same thing for Planners. Maybe we can hot wire something together.

MA: My actual views on Iraq are quite a bit more complex than just a city-state. Some things, like managing water on a strong national basis, is key to assuring the the "Land Between Two Rivers" doesn't starve.

But reality is that there is really nothing inconsistent or ahistorical with Kurdistan as a separate region (or city-state); even Salah ad Din and the Ottomans left some places,like Basra and Mosul, to their own devices. But Iraqi need to, and will, try their own solutions (with many experiments in their historic toolkit to draw from). It's up to them to figure out and live their future. But oil will keep them all together.

My guess is that, like you said, sometimes, progress is going to go through violent times, too. (US Civil War?)

[Steve the Planner]

There is no military solution (Defeating the enemy vs. minimizing opposition, threats).

There is no civilian solution. We can not send enough civilians to accomplish the job (security, resource constraints, logistics, hiring, etc..).

There is a civil solution delivered by military, but, to accomplish it, the military needs to reconceptualize its approaches, build a different kind of information/engagement base, develop some new core skills & operational command center resources to define, manage and support a larger civil framework consistent with national/regional strategies, evolve (with training and support) a military capacity to deliver synchronized and focused civil support operations.

In urban studies, the original downtown-centric model log ago gave away to various distributed models as a result of communication/transportation resources that unlocked the walkability constraint. This is more regional than classical cities, and more sophisticated (yet distributed) in its connections and associations built to support dynamic and shifting opportunities/competitive advantages. Oil spot or city-based are confusing---more like MA's linking islands where and when you can.

My version of targeting places we can be successful with least effort and most underlying potential (rather than just accidental involvement in places of high conflict) would look at factors like whether there is a big batch of grads in the pipeline before expanding industry. If not, focus more on hand-skill and traditional activities (farming, roadwork, tertiary stuff). Try to find some pattern out of potential areas that can allow prioritization to underlying strategies of encirclement of bad areas.

Focus as much on creating some examples of "shining city" on the hill models to sell the idea and build interest from adajacent areas. Models may differ widely...

Can the US military become an effective civil stabilization force, including policy/strategy decision-making, engagement and synthesis with national and NGOs. Can somebody like Ashraf Ghani effectively advise the US military without undermining his (and its) credibility?

Perfect ain't around, but I think there are ways to re-tartget the military's actual strength in these types of countries---see, move, convene, logistics---to do a better and more effective job of what it is presently doing on an ad hoc, space-by-space basis.

Doesn't take much in some areas: like providing the knowledge, training and support base to make soldiers (after clear) more able to "manage" first and second level ag support strategies with centralized mentoring and support systems: Example: coordinate which farmers switch to wheat to avoid market massing and price collapses, but break the system down into deliverable components which post-clear forces can understand and manage as clear shifts to hold.

Schools can still be built at the local level, but with better integration with district/provincial systems for teachers, sustainability post-occupancy, streamlining and improved focus of education to economic drivers and regional needs, rather than generic K-12 models (more flexibility of training, more non-traditional applications, more vo and tech than academic).

Military serving more in the capacity of substitute local governments until the locals or national are ready to boot you out (reverse engineering of the Indian anti-British movements). Ghandi can't oppose US colonial control if we have no control, and he has nothing but chaos to organize in.

Do we really care whether those whodon;t wnat to be "governed by us" opt out (as long as they are not against us)? More effort at highly targeting Taliban---not to coopt but to disengage, have their own thing (with constraints).

A lot more Rory Stewart approaches, engagement, open-ended analysis, learning, and cooperative solutions.

Move rapidly away from large and expensive projects to lots more homespun, and locally appropriate efforts.

End state, military control is turned over to civil authority when it is read.

I remember Louis Black's comedy routine about electing a Dead President like Reagan. If we really want to scare our adversaries in the world, we should do somethign crazy....

Maybe we should stop saying we are not here to occupy. Does "we are here to dominate, control and occupy" scare up some folks who will be glad to do what is necessary and possible to actually take us out. Going forward sideways???

There's some dream stuff....

[Surferbeetle]

All,

Dunno about an Astan village (simply current OpSec issues ?)

It's always wise to listen to lawyers

Some thoughts:

a) We could define a 'typical' Afghan village using agreed upon assumptions and work from there.

b) We could use opensource info on a village in Helmand Province frequently in the news which we all agree upon.

c) We could use opensource info on a Haitian village frequently in the news which we all agree upon.

IIRC, you once posted that you actually enjoyed staff work, though prefering team as more fun. So, go to it.

Some thoughts/disclaimers: take everything with a grain of salt, recognize that we all have clay feet, there is never enough time to fully accomplish what we would like to all do, and how pretty are prototypes?

Despite these disclaimers I believe it's possible to accomplish something of worth using this forum. I base this statement upon a few of my experiences

• Today's brick and mortar MBA coursework consists of significant digital interaction with fellow students and teachers.

• I led a group of ~100 folks over three weekends ~48 hours total and came up with a militarily acceptable assessment for approximately 10 different locations using only opensource materials.

• On a daily basis I lead small groups of engineers and other multidisciplinary experts who work using one or two face to face meetings, ftp sites, vtc conferences, emails, and telephone calls to build multimillion dollar projects.

I would propose that due to everyone's myriad responsibilities this should be a joint effort, using a network/boundary-less/virtual structure with a very lax schedule, and limited deliverables...however I am just one team member...what does everyone else think and suggest?

The Military Decision Making Process may be worth considering for planning purposes,

1. Receipt of Mission
2. Mission Analysis
3. Course of action (COA) Development
4. COA Analysis
5. COA Comparison
6. COA Approval
7. Orders Production

...however I am not wedded to it and am willing to surf any staff 'wave' suggested to include balanced scorecard, work breakdown structures, and J. Sachs' differential diagnosis...again I am just one team member...what does everyone else think and suggest?

For doctrine, FM 3-24 (digital and hardcover) is opensource, so is Jeffery Sach's book The End of Poverty, and Walt Whitman Rostow makes sense to this simple mind...however I am just one team member...what does everyone else think and suggest?

Best,

Steve

P.S. For your consideration from today's WSJ NATO Eyes New Top Civilian Post in Kabul By YAROSLAV TROFIMOV

KABUL—The North Atlantic Treaty Organization plans to create a new top civilian post in Kabul to flank its military chief in Afghanistan, and the British ambassador to Afghanistan is the leading contender, according to senior officials familiar with the matter.

The announcement could be made as soon as Jan. 28, the day of an international conference on Afghanistan to be held in London, the officials said.

The new appointee would head the civilian pillar of the U.S.-led coalition's work here, directing the flow of funds and aid to the provinces, and—if necessary—bypassing corrupt Afghan institutions. The official would play a prominent role in the effort to get insurgents to switch sides and to reintegrate them into society.

A British government official said the United Nations and European Union will also likely announce new special representatives to Afghanistan at or around the London conference. The British government wants the London meeting to result in a new strategy for reversing Taliban advances and for steering President Hamid Karzai's administration toward more efficient and competent governance.

[jmm99]

from this guy:

SB's link to WSJ
The new appointee would head the civilian pillar of the U.S.-led coalition's work here, directing the flow of funds and aid to the provinces, and—if necessary—bypassing corrupt Afghan institutions. The official would play a prominent role in the effort to get insurgents to switch sides and to reintegrate them into society.

since the villages are far beneath his scope -

Back to the experiment.

I posit that the thread (realizing that it could easily turn into a separate forum, just looking at all the potential subject matter areas) will focus on civil affairs, as to which STP has roughed out a start to a tasked mission:

from STP
There is a civil solution delivered by military, but, to accomplish it, the military needs to reconceptualize its approaches, build a different kind of information/engagement base, develop some new core skills & operational command center resources to define, manage and support a larger civil framework consistent with national/regional strategies, evolve (with training and support) a military capacity to deliver synchronized and focused civil support operations.

Now, if this could be stated in plain English (STP, you have been dealing too much with those high-priced lawyers) ....

-------------------------------
As to whether this or that:

from SB

a) We could define a 'typical' Afghan village using agreed upon assumptions and work from there.

b) We could use opensource info on a village in Helmand Province frequently in the news which we all agree upon.

c) We could use opensource info on a Haitian village frequently in the news which we all agree upon.

As to (a), I expect that we, the herd of cats, would take too long to agree on what a "typical" village is, whether in Astan or elsewhere. A real open-source village eliminates that barrier - and allows use of open-source maps, sats, records (if any exist), etc. Where in the world, I don't care - my cat is not in that mouse hunt - and I probably will be equally armchair-ignorant of whatever locality is selected.

--------------------------
MDMP (FM 5-0) or MCPP (MCWP 5-1) probably would be OK and most familar for most here. And in checking the bullet points:

1. Receipt of Mission
2. Mission Analysis
3. Course of action (COA) Development
4. COA Analysis
5. COA Comparison
6. COA Approval
7. Orders Production

I concluded that I used all those with my 1pm (1300 on my watch) initial client conference - great minds run in the same channels, whether whales or minnows (my world); and MDMP is not necessarily "slow and burdensome at lower levels" per the Wiki.

---------------------
As to doctrine, we can go well beyond FM 3-24 in terms of "doctrine" - lots of good, bad and indifferent stuff in open-source manuals, monographs and articles. Of course, only the "best" is enshrined on my HD.

As to doctrine and some other points, and recognizing that we are a herd of cats (but with situational awareness of what the others are saying or trying to say), I'd suggest adopting a few of Evans Carlson's precepts:

1. As to doctrine: "don't obey, think"

2. As to "lead": "ability, knowledge and character"

3. As to everything: "work together" (gung ho).

PS - totally immaterial to the experiment: As to brothers Rostow, Walt and Gene, I'll leave them on the shelf (Vietnam Era prejudice).

Best to all; et Bonne Chance re: La Expérience

Mike

[William F. Owen]

M.A., Mike, Dayuhan, STP, Beelzebubalicious, Wilf, Ken, and anyone else who is interested...

OK, but...

a.) What's the policy?
b.) Why and how will we use violence or threat of violence to make it happen?
c.) Do we understand how the use of threaten use of violence in support of policy may change the policy?

[M-A Lagrange]

Ok, I’m with you on this. Let’s try it. Sound fun!

Here are some inputs of my pure civilian approach:

Doctrine:
"don't obey, think"
Yes, yes and yes! (I’ve the same pb). I would add: “Do no Harm”. No need to go up to the roof with the R2P (responsibility to protect) but just the simple field oriented ICRC guideline: never endanger people.
What we do must be articulated/smart/brilliant/what ever lead by a brain and must be positive effect oriented.
Wilf, that does not mean that violence is banished. It just mean that non military operation should not put people in danger but may participate to create a safer environment.

2. As to "lead": "ability, knowledge and character"
Not sure I completely got your point.

3. As to everything: "work together" (gung ho).
Definitively but if we do not want to end up in a crazy trotskyist no one take decision stuff (Just try to work with Medecins Du Monde one day…) we need a board and some decision making process.

PS - totally immaterial to the experiment: As to brothers Rostow, Walt and Gene, I'll leave them on the shelf (Vietnam Era prejudice).

OK, let’s go for field manuals, most of them available on line (It’s a pick up list not the bible):
Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, Civil-Military Operations
Livelihoods & Conflict: A Toolkit for Intervention (USAID)
Land & Conflict: A Toolkit for Intervention (USAID)
Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks (U.S. Department of State)
Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes
Guide to Rebuilding Public Sector Services in Stability Operations: A Role for the Military
Combating Serious Crimes in Post-Conflict Societies: A Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners
Model Codes for Post-Conflict Justice
Stability Operations and State Building: Continuities and Contingencies.
Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations
Peacemaker’s Toolkit
Issue Brief: Perspectives on the Peacebuilding Commission’s Coordination Role
Peacebuilding: IPI Blue Paper no. 10
The State vs. the people (Part 1: see below for part 2)
The State vs. the people (Part 2)

Some more to come. DFID made a great job on that.

[M-A Lagrange]

Let's add:
Jp3-076
Council on foreign relation; Independent Task Force; In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post Conflict Capabilities; July 2005
Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, Security and Stabilisation: the military contribution; November 2009

My favorites being:
Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, Security and Stabilisation: the military contribution; November 2009
Guide to Rebuilding Governance in Stability Operation: A Role for the Military? ; Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute; June 2009

That's all folks for the moment

[Dayuhan]

Step 4. Digital Civil Affairs/Development work is attempted...

"Digital Civil Affairs/Development Work" is a concept unfamiliar to me... what exactly are we trying to accomplish here? What problem are we trying to solve? Is this a COIN scenario or a sort of virtual Peace Corps small-scale development effort?

Let me just toss out an example, as food for thought, of how a project intended to promote economic development and alleviate the impulse to insurgency can have the opposite effect.

Many years ago on Mindanao (the eastern side, not the Muslim area) a foreign aid agency funded a road, which was intended to traverse a quite remote area. The project was sold as a farm-to-market road, though it was generally understood that it would also make it easier for the military to gain access and deny the area to the NPA.

The farmers in the area opposed the road vigorously, sabotaging equipment, shooting at workers, causing all kinds of problems and eventually stalling the project. The foreigners involved couldn't understand it. One of them, almost in tears at the collapse of his project, moaned to me at length over how the farmers were such fools to fall for the commie propaganda, how the road would benefit them, etc etc... it took some doing to get it through his damn fool head that none of those farmers had legal title to the land they were tilling, that they'd been left alone because their land was remote and inaccessible, and that when that road was complete their land would become valuable, and when it became valuable men with guns would come and drive them off it so somebody with money and power could take over. This was the conclusion the farmers had reached, and they were absolutely right.

It pays to be very careful when proposing solutions to other people's problems.

A few things to remember...

Never assume a village to be homogenous, and never ask what "the people" want. They want different things. There are factions and there are rivalries, and all of them will want to get the inside track on working benefits out of the naive outsider who offers assistance. The articulate guy who speaks development jargon and tells us what we like to hear does not necessarily speak for the community.

Villages tend to be conservative places. Change can be perceived as a threat, especially if one faction is perceived to be working the situation to drive changes that benefit them. Aid that is delivered without full awareness of internal rivalries and issues can destabilize a situation and provoke conflict.

People generally don't insurge because the government isn't providing services. In most insurgency environments the idea of a government providing services would be considered absurd; many have never seen or known a functional government. People who insurge are more likely to do so because they are or believe themselves to be threatened.

I could say more, and probably will, but enough for now.

[jmm99]

How many times in recent history have we had this:

from Dayuhan
Many years ago on Mindanao (the eastern side, not the Muslim area) a foreign aid agency funded a road, which was intended to traverse a quite remote area. The project was sold as a farm-to-market road, though it was generally understood that it would also make it easier for the military to gain access and deny the area to the NPA.

The farmers in the area opposed the road vigorously, sabotaging equipment, shooting at workers, causing all kinds of problems and eventually stalling the project. The foreigners involved couldn't understand it. One of them, almost in tears at the collapse of his project, moaned to me at length over how the farmers were such fools to fall for the commie propaganda, how the road would benefit them, etc etc... it took some doing to get it through his damn fool head that none of those farmers had legal title to the land they were tilling, that they'd been left alone because their land was remote and inaccessible, and that when that road was complete their land would become valuable, and when it became valuable men with guns would come and drive them off it so somebody with money and power could take over. This was the conclusion the farmers had reached, and they were absolutely right.

Serious question. Perhaps, some road examples could be found in Vietnam - many general examples exist where farmers with shaky or no legal title joined or at least supported the VM or VC out of fear of land possession loss.

What has been the reaction to improvement of Highway 1 in Astan ?

The military road tradition goes back to Rome where it certainly had an impact on the local populations - as in Rutherfurd's novel Sarum for a more fun read than the more scholarly works on the same topic.

So, agreed as to this:

from Dayuhan

It pays to be very careful when proposing solutions to other people's problems.

A few things to remember...

Never assume a village to be homogenous, and never ask what "the people" want. They want different things. There are factions and there are rivalries, and all of them will want to get the inside track on working benefits out of the naive outsider who offers assistance. The articulate guy who speaks development jargon and tells us what we like to hear does not necessarily speak for the community.

Villages tend to be conservative places. Change can be perceived as a threat, especially if one faction is perceived to be working the situation to drive changes that benefit them. Aid that is delivered without full awareness of internal rivalries and issues can destabilize a situation and provoke conflict.

People generally don't insurge because the government isn't providing services. In most insurgency environments the idea of a government providing services would be considered absurd; many have never seen or known a functional government. People who insurge are more likely to do so because they are or believe themselves to be threatened.

In effect, are the "masses" "voting" for the insecurity they know and have adapted to; as opposed to what is thought by developers to bring more stability, whereas to the "masses" it represents greater insecurity ?

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

from MA
The best approach, according to me for a start, is something looking like NGO status. It's quite "simple", allows to access funds "easily" (Government, USAID, DFID... large range of donors) and provides a legal status less complexe than corporates and companies. (And is less taxed)

You are saying here something beyond a pilot project or a simulation - you are talking real life NGO status under domestic and international law. Doable (actual legal work is beyond my SME); avoids "Neutrality Acts".

So, we look to 3 levels: funds, coordination and field, don't we ? Indeed, at times, you are the son of a scorpion. And, I thought I was the only one descended from François Villon & La Grosse Margot.

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

Serious question. Perhaps, some road examples could be found in Vietnam - many general examples exist where farmers with shaky or no legal title joined or at least supported the VM or VC out of fear of land possession loss.

In my time I've had close prolonged exposure to 3 insurgency situations. All were driven by actual or threatened loss of land exacerbated by abusive behaviour by local elites supported by national military forces and absence of any option for peaceful redress. People might complain about not having a well or an irrigation system, but they don't start shooting. When thugs start coming around forcing people off their land and stomping or killing those who object, people fight.

In effect, are the "masses" "voting" for the insecurity they know and have adapted to; as opposed to what is thought by developers to bring more stability, whereas to the "masses" it represents greater insecurity ?

If people know it and have adapted to it, it's no longer insecurity.

There's often a rather pedantic assumption that "economic development" brings "stability" and that the combination brings "security". That assumption often does not take actual conditions into consideration.

Specifically, you have to look at competing agendas. Even in a small village you're likely to have competing elite factions. If you're looking at a village and seeing consensus and unanimity, with no internal conflict or dissent, you're not looking hard enough or you're looking at a different species.

If a dominant faction, often associated with formal government positions, is perceived as abusive by some part of the population, that provides a lever for the insurgent, and for competing factions. NGOs have their own agendas. If you choose to work with or through the local government, you may be perceived as aiding and supporting an abusive elite. Choose to work outside that elite, and you may be perceived as supporting a rival faction, which may cause problems with the local governing elite. Economic development efforts in environments where the rule of law is absent and the style of governance is feudal are likely to be manipulated for the benefit of a small minority, and cause proportional resentment among others.

Bring resources in, bring plans in, announce plans to change things... that will always destabilize. Of course every community has its own mechanisms to manage instability, but those mechanisms can be overwhelmed if the change is too large or too abrupt to manage, or if it is locally perceived as a change that will favor one faction over others or will otherwise upset an existing balance.

Let's not kid ourselves, we have an agenda too. If we go into an Afghan village looking to "help", we're not doing it because our hearts bleed for the poor Afghans, we're doing it because we want them to support us rather than the Taliban. We know it, they know it, and the Taliban know it, so why pretend otherwise?

I was thinking about contacting a friend in Jalalabad, and somebody else might have contacts or be there at a place where there is a definable problem to solve. Something where somebody needs more help than the random clutter we carry around in our brains that could be put to a specific use. Afghanistan is digitized to the Nth, and available through univ links in open source format (imagery/shapefiles), but google earth ain't bad either for basics.

If only there was a Google Earth for social geography, mapping all the overlapping patterns of alliance and rivalry, loyalty and resentment, etc...

If I look out my window I see a moderately remote mountain village populated by an indigenous tribe, which was a hotbed of insurgency not al that long ago. I've been here 11 of the last 15 years, and I'm still figuring out the local power/conflict dynamics.

I asked this before, but I have to ask again: what are we trying to accomplish with this project? Whether it's Afghanistan, Haiti, central Africa, Colombia... what's the goal?

It helps to know.