Special Warfare, Special Operations and SOF (US) before Trump

[Bill Moore]

That is the way IS will be beaten--by Sunni's themselves and no outsider can do that.

Concur, but for that to happen they need to believe they can win, and a demonstration of real political will (something airpower can never provide) on our part can provide significant motivation and hope in that regard. The impact of a raid, or any military operation, is rarely limited to its tactical effects in today's world. I haven't seen any evidence in the media of positive trends in Syria or Iraq. If you want to call a stalemate positive, then maybe an argument can be made that ISIL has lost its forward momentum in several locations.

I also agree that HVI targeting had limited impact in Afghanistan, but the fact of the matter was we confused anyone putting an IED next to the road as a HVI, so HVI in reality was just a term in vogue, it didn't actually mean the individuals were HVIs. In Iraq, they went after HVIs and just as importantly they killed a lot of foot soldiers, which greatly suppressed, not defeated, AQI. Any arguments to the contrary is simply twisting history around. It created so called political space to reach a more enduring solution, which we all know how that turned out.

AND it has not been Russian TOWs that made the turn-a-round but IMO the CIA is the unsung group in the sudden improvement--so why does DC need Putin--can anyone explain that to me?

Perhaps, but there are so many actors in Syria, both internal and external, I would be very hesitant to identify any particular actor the unsung group in the alleged sudden improvement. Sudden improvement of who exactly?

So while a great "demonstration of political will" do we see the same "political will" being "expressed" in the Ukraine-no.

I think we have plenty of political will for dealing with Ukraine, Ukraine is Putin's biggest strategic mistake (it is our OIF) that has backfired in almost every conceivable way. We have no obligation to defend Ukraine, yet we are providing significant support throughout DIME, and Putin is not making progress. Furthermore, Putin exposed his hand, so a repeat of this strategic approach against an actual NATO country will be very difficult if not impossible.

Again my question why is that?--it is because someone wants a "legacy" and the Ukraine is being left for 2017 for the next "legacy".

So again is it really "political will" or really a military necessity to get a "military win on the ground and force out Assad"?

From a policy perspective, I thought we dropped the idea of removing Assad? That is now a long term goal to be achieved through the political process, because we realize if it is done militarily it will look like Libya (not that it doesn't look that way already).

Brings me back to a statement often heard in DC--"you can't win militarily in the Ukraine"--actually right now even though it appears weird the Ukrainian military is actually "winning militarily" on the ground

.

You hear this statement about every conflict in D.C. lately. As you point out, it is only a partial truth. In reality it all depends upon how you define winning. As you pointed out yourself, our military successes in Iraq didn't lead to the desired end beyond removing Saddam from power. Most countries struggle with how to translate military power into desired political effect. I think that has been true throughout time. If you extend the logic on this thinking, if war worked, it would seem we would get to a point where we didn't have wars anymore. That hasn't happened, and it doesn't look like it will, so maybe we just need to accept the fact that war is a messy business that can achieve temporary aims, but it won't achieve an enduring utopia.

At the end of day, I still think this raid can signify a significant change in our approach to IS/ISIL, which in my view is a significant near term threat to our interests.

[OUTLAW 09]

Concur, but for that to happen they need to believe they can win, and a demonstration of real political will (something airpower can never provide) on our part can provide significant motivation and hope in that regard. The impact of a raid, or any military operation, is rarely limited to its tactical effects in today's world. I haven't seen any evidence in the media of positive trends in Syria or Iraq. If you want to call a stalemate positive, then maybe an argument can be made that ISIL has lost its forward momentum in several locations.

I also agree that HVI targeting had limited impact in Afghanistan, but the fact of the matter was we confused anyone putting an IED next to the road as a HVI, so HVI in reality was just a term in vogue, it didn't actually mean the individuals were HVIs. In Iraq, they went after HVIs and just as importantly they killed a lot of foot soldiers, which greatly suppressed, not defeated, AQI. Any arguments to the contrary is simply twisting history around. It created so called political space to reach a more enduring solution, which we all know how that turned out.



Perhaps, but there are so many actors in Syria, both internal and external, I would be very hesitant to identify any particular actor the unsung group in the alleged sudden improvement. Sudden improvement of who exactly?



I think we have plenty of political will for dealing with Ukraine, Ukraine is Putin's biggest strategic mistake (it is our OIF) that has backfired in almost every conceivable way. We have no obligation to defend Ukraine, yet we are providing significant support throughout DIME, and Putin is not making progress. Furthermore, Putin exposed his hand, so a repeat of this strategic approach against an actual NATO country will be very difficult if not impossible.



From a policy perspective, I thought we dropped the idea of removing Assad? That is now a long term goal to be achieved through the political process, because we realize if it is done militarily it will look like Libya (not that it doesn't look that way already).

.

You hear this statement about every conflict in D.C. lately. As you point out, it is only a partial truth. In reality it all depends upon how you define winning. As you pointed out yourself, our military successes in Iraq didn't lead to the desired end beyond removing Saddam from power. Most countries struggle with how to translate military power into desired political effect. I think that has been true throughout time. If you extend the logic on this thinking, if war worked, it would seem we would get to a point where we didn't have wars anymore. That hasn't happened, and it doesn't look like it will, so maybe we just need to accept the fact that war is a messy business that can achieve temporary aims, but it won't achieve an enduring utopia.

At the end of day, I still think this raid can signify a significant change in our approach to IS/ISIL, which in my view is a significant near term threat to our interests.

Bill--actually we did drop the get rid of Assad because the ground fighting was going nowhere and Hezbollah and the IRGC were so heavily involved the US never figured the ground fighting would reach a culminating tipping point which has now has been achieved and the Assad military is defacto now actually losing the fight all because someone is training and shipping a large number of TOWs into the fight--last rough count--there have been well over 300 fired with a high success rate--ie it has decimated the Assad armor and artillery and is being now used to crack open critical defensive Assad military positions.

Am a firm believer that the TOW is the great equalizer when armor is in play--even during the Cold War in Europe TOWs were mounted on just about anything that could shoot and scoot.With COIN it simply fell out of favor due to civilian loses when it was used.

The more interesting question--who are the trainers and who in the US is signing the purchase orders and more importantly who is flying them into country--SF or CIA??

Now that it appears Assad is actually losing the US feels they need Russia to figure out that he is losing and come up with an exit plan in order to save face basically for the Russians --while we seem to be so involved in "Russian face saving in Syria" we seem to be letting Putin continue along the lines of "let's let the Ukrainians fight 700 tanks even if the TOW is the critical weapon of choice" and can make a "non military win" or at least keep Russian troops and her mercenaries bottled up and allow no further territorial gains at the expense of the Ukraine--that is the least the US can do under the impression that the Budapest Memorandum really meant nothing even with a US signature.

I would argue that even Iran after watching the US basically run from their responsibilities on really what was a nuclear disarming memorandum fully understands they can violate the ongoing nuclear deal any time they want to with no back lash.

Just as long as we do not get involved and it does not cost us to much and it appears we really are involved in Europe--a kind of on the cheap approach that is basically not working after Sochi or why else is Nuland now in Moscow after Sochi?--did not Putin get the message the first time around in Sochi?

That is if we even provided a message--if we did then he did not understand it based on the massive shellings and ground attacks since Sochi costing the Ukrainians 17 KIA and 50 WIA in just this week alone.

BTW the supplier of choice for the more critical defensive systems ie night vision and counter battery radar/drones has been the Canadians----.

Just a second thought--WHAT the US is not noticing is in fact among the fighting groups and that includes FSA the US supported guys, moderate Islamists and al Nursa they recently held a joint planning council and have largely started taking on a form of council government without outside help--that has led to their suddenly attacking IS and basically pushing them out of previously held territory. After four years of fighting and largely losing and constant AF bombings they discovered the strength of a joint council---again who influenced that ---SF or CIA or actually the KSA? My tip is the KSA.

Something no one thought possible--defeating IS inside Syria his home turf.

Something missing from the conversation is the role of the young Saudi "hawks" ---Ft. Irwin trained officers now in the COL and early General ranks who feel that the KSA has to break out of the US shadow and formulate their own foreign policy and use force is necessary to back up that policy--really what we are seeing in the push back of Iran in Yemen and KSA support into Syria.

Next to Israel the KSA no longer trusts Obama to hold to anything he states--the Saudi snub to the Obama during the meeting he called for is a clear sign of the "hawks" taking control of Saudi FP--and the clear and distinct statements from them that we will go down the nuclear path as well simply because we do not trust the Iranians from our experiences to hold to the agreements. Notice that the Obama push to say the US will protect them in that event fell on deaf ears in the KSA--basically since the US has not backed up anything they have stated in the last six years the KSA simply no longer trusts them.

One cannot blame them.

[AdamG]

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Release No: NR-175-15
May 16, 2015
Statement by Secretary of Defense Ash Carter on Counter-ISIL Operation in Syria

Last night, at the direction of the Commander in Chief, I ordered U.S. Special Operations Forces to conduct an operation in al-Amr in eastern Syria to capture an ISIL senior leader known as Abu Sayyaf and his wife Umm Sayyaf. Abu Sayyaf was involved in ISIL's military operations and helped direct the terrorist organization's illicit oil, gas, and financial operations as well.

Abu Sayyaf was killed during the course of the operation when he engaged U.S. forces.

U.S. forces captured Umm Sayyaf, who we suspect is a member of ISIL, played an important role in ISIL's terrorist activities, and may have been complicit in what appears to have been the enslavement of a young Yezidi woman rescued last night.

No U.S. forces were killed or injured during this operation.

The operation represents another significant blow to ISIL, and it is a reminder that the United States will never waver in denying safe haven to terrorists who threaten our citizens, and those of our friends and allies.

http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Rele...eleaseID=17274

[AdamG]

U.S. Forces Seize Digital Trove in Syria Raid
Special-operations mission that killed Islamic State finance chief could yield information on group’s operations
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-forc...05925?mod=e2fb

[SWJ Blog]

The Only Thing Worse than Misusing SOF is Policy Makers Misusing SOF Operational Methods as a Strategy

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[SWJ Blog]

Reorganization is Imperative to Fixing Special Forces’ Bent Unconventional Culture

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[SWJ Blog]

Resist the Hype: Prevent SOF From Being the Next Victim of Too Much Attention

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[SWJ Blog]

Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond

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[Bill Moore]

Special Operations Today: FSR Interviews LTG Cleveland (Ret.)

http://www.fletchersecurity.org/#!lt...interview/c7ay

Our thinking at USASOC is that the security problems of the future will not necessarily resemble those of the past. It is in this context that we feel that SOF forces are uniquely capable, through our persistent global engagement, to shape things well before crises develop. The fact of the matter is, that we are in competition with various state and non-state actors for physical, cognitive, and moral security of populations and increasingly, in this hyperconnected world, the notions of sovereignty and identity”. We have to develop a portfolio of new approaches to impose a cost calculus on our adversaries in this space, but first we must recognize and accept that the security paradigm that we grew up with has changed fundamentally.

This is an outstanding interview, while I had my philosophical differences with LTG Cleveland in 2003, he was clearly the right man to lead USASOC and push U.S. ARSOF into the 21st Century. A lot of wisdom throughout this interview.

[Bill Moore]

Some of they key points:

An emphasis on manipulation of behavior, uses ISIL as example where it is imperative we dominate the influence fight. IMO this points to the importance of the emerging and hotly contested concept of human domain. Yet the fact remains we can dominate the physical domains (space, cyber, land, maritime and air) and still lose the fight the human domain. This is one of the principle changes in the character of warfare that is both tied to ancient history, yet enabled by modern information technology to the point it transforms it relevance, even dominance in modern warfare.

LTG Cleveland discusses the reality of constantly shifting interagency and DOD supported and supporting relationships in response to a question that attempts to limit the military to a traditional stovepipe role of applying conventional military power. The perception by traditionalists couldn't be further away from the truth.

He compares surgical strike (a term that overly limited and doesn't address the unconventional capabilities of our advanced special operations units that focus on direct action) with special warfare. He argues surgical strike is focused on eliminating uncertainty to the extent possible (true enough), while special warfare is conducted in the ever morphing world of uncertainity.

Special Warfare, is one that is defined by uncertainty, and for which we build units such as our Special Forces (or Green Berets) which are specifically designed for this type of operating environment. These teams, with their unique training, linguistic and cultural acuity, are designed to operate amongst indigenous peoples, gain a deep understanding of the environment, shape events, and report back.

He addresses the reality of the so called indirect approach of working through others. In fact, when conditions are not right it won't work no matter how much money and time we plow into it. This approach is not a panacea, it is appropriate when it is, and we need to recognize when it isn't.

What I am afraid of is that often progress is measured by spending a lot of money on equipment and training. You can’t spend enough, really, for training on these problems if the government doesn’t have the credibility. It doesn’t matter what you put on their back, it doesn’t matter how much training you give them, you are going to have serious problems when you encounter a serious enemy who is motivated. And so, I guess my concern is that we have to be very careful that we are judging the motivation and addressing the motivation issue and in some cases that means a different kind of policy. How good is that government on governing, and how respected are they by their people? You can only do so much, and you can’t fight your way out of bad policy.

He discussed the evolution from Field Manuals to real doctrine for Army SOF (ARSOF) as being essential to facilitate ARSOF achieving the vision laid out for them. ARSOF 2022 is the doctrine, and it is being taught to both SOF and conventional army forces to garner support. This seems to be a major step in the right direction, yes it is a step backwards towards our roots, but it is also a sprint forward to the 21st Century, which has different realities. As he stated,

Time will tell.

[SWJ Blog]

Special Operations Today

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[SWJ Blog]

Special Ops Brace for Release of Tell-all Book

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[SWJ Blog]

SOF Mediators: The Application of Understanding-Based Mediation as a Nonlethal Effect

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[SWJ Blog]

Author Chronicles Secret History of Joint Special Operations Command

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[pjb]

The Special Operations Research Association is pleased to announce the 2015 Annual Symposium, 11-12 December 2015, at Fort Walton Beach, FL. Events will be held on base at Hurlburt Field as well as at the beautiful Emerald Coast Conference Center on Okaloosa Island.

While we have several interesting events planned for the symposium, the primary focus is on the exchange of ideas through scholarly presentations by researchers, policy makers, and operators on the broad range of issues facing the SOF community today and in the future. We invite papers across the full range of issues related to special operations, both historically and today and in the US and globally. We encourage submissions from a diverse population of those with expertise and interests in special operations, including academic researchers, military practitioners, and policy analysts.

Potential topics include:
• National Strategy Implications of Special Operations
• The Global Proliferation of SOF
• The Debate of Special Operations Theory
• Educating SOF
• Unconventional Warfare and International Relations
• Special Operations and Non-State Actors
• Special Operations and International Diplomacy
• Comparative Perspectives on Special Operations
• Diffusion, Transformation, and Future Trends in Special Operations
• Special Operations as a Foreign Policy Tool
• Special Operations and Coercive Diplomacy

For more information, and to see the complete call for papers, please visit the website: http://www.specopsjournal.org/conference.html

[SWJ Blog]

Special Operations Research Association 2015 Conference

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Call for Papers - 2015 Annual Special Operations Research Association Symposium

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Behind the scenes with the commander of Special Ops (CNN)

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[SWJ Blog]

U.S. Weighs Special Forces in Syria, Helicopters in Iraq

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[SWJ Blog]

JCLIS Initial Special Topics Issue on Language, Region and Culture Assessment

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