Should you merge Advisors with PRT's?

[Rob Thornton]

T's proposal kind of looks like a component (possibly one of many sub commands) of a Joint Inter-Agency TF for Reconstruction and Transition. Jimbo points to some reality issues with "constructing" anything like this anytime soon. In this case putting everyone with a "T" in their acronym together would probably only breed confusion and infighting. Also as Jimbo points out centralized organizations tend to put down roots and run fiber optic and get all darn comfortable. The benefits you might gain by putting them under one roof would have to be weighed against their inability to function as seperate sub-elements on their own for an extended periods - if you negate the need for flexible sustainment somebody will probably turn off the tap & forget where the switch to turn it back on is when somebody needs it. I'd also say that living with (as close as the infrastructure will support - hopefully in the same compound if not the same building) is critical to advisor mission. There are so many things that can get identified and resolved before they become a show stopper by just being available. Put everybody under one roof - and probably only one element actually lives with their element - offices and compounds are pretty spread out there - some is due to where they need to be (a COP or IP Station) some is what the infrastructur will support.

That being said - I think T's idea deserves to be considered in terms of the capabilities we might want to deploy to other places, or say a more mature Iraq down the road (3-5 years?) when its systems are further along. My personal take is that we just have not reached the fundamental levels to consolidate the advisory mission in Iraq in such a manner - we'd wind up spending our efforts on the wrong things because we just would not really know what is going on (there are already in house disconnects amongst people who all speak single service language). Keep it up though T - I think you are on to where we'd like to be in terms of being able to deploy something to failing states in a major CMD's geographic AOR to work hand in hand with the country team in place that is in danger of being destabilized.
Regards, Rob

[TROUFION]

Ok,

I really appreciate the discussion. In particular the organizational theory vs. reality.

Now I'll alter the question just a bit. Again referring to the Bing's article. Relook this idea as a means to get the most from the least. If by FY2009 we have to be drawn down to 50% of the forces say around 80k as the Bing's discuss would a level of 'desperation' allow for stranger bedfellows?

In my proposal I was not placing the forces all in one fortress compound. It would be an administrative idea bent on keeping forces flexible, and perhaps it would be better to have liaison officers for advisor groups with the PRT's.

That said what structure would allow us to achieve maximum flexibility (suspend what you know of PRT and MTT/Advisor right now) with a reduced footprint of 80k on the ground. This could be a reality and the idea of brigades, regt combat teams and full battalions operating alone and unafraid will become a rarity. Advisors and PRT will have the preponderance of force on the ground for all SSTR components. In other words there may not be much choice other than to make it fit. Either by design or by accident.

[Rob Thornton]

T,
I think there is a bit of a chicken and egg thing in my mind. The conditions should dictate the organization. This also gets into one of the things we discussed awhile back - what is needed in one location is not the same as another - you might need 2 of one and 0 of another. This is useful in that it conserves resources, but difficult in that is not the way we like to do business - we like cookie cutters. Building botom up refinement requires asking good questions and having people who can understand the answers and articulate them into the right requiests.
I think one of the things we could be doing right now (and probably are) is getting a feel for how far along things are by region/province, ISF component in cities/provinces, and Iraqi government systems so that some forecasting can be done about where we anticipate them needing assistance.
Every area has its own challenges in regards to sustaining forces, but I think what you'll see is the areas with greater security conerns will be the ones with CF units still in a reinforcing role - we won't reduce all at once. Gauging where Iraq is along the road to recovery is tricky - metrics for security and stability are subjective, so applying resources is a bit of an art.
I know its not what you were asking, but that is what came to mind.
Regards, Rob

[jcustis]

The conditions should dictate the organization. This also gets into one of the things we discussed awhile back - what is needed in one location is not the same as another - you might need 2 of one and 0 of another. This is useful in that it conserves resources, but difficult in that is not the way we like to do business - we like cookie cutters. Building botom up refinement requires asking good questions and having people who can understand the answers and articulate them into the right requiests.

Spot on RT. Why send in a gazzillion-watt gas turbine generator when the area is doing just fine off of hydro?

I think there has to be a healthy hesitation instilled in everyone supporting a bigger organization like this, lest we get a reincarnation of the CPA in subscale.

[TROUFION]

no argument there, when talking about creating a larger organization. As has been clearly articulate by Jimbo, RT and others increasing the structure is not a player. Many reasons -manpower, red tape etc.

But I again address the situation of what do we do to fight the good fight if we are limited to half as many troops as we have at the end of the surge?

Would a PRT on this model function (also look at the origional PRT model that was 80% military with a military commander) if it where embedded within an Iraqi Bde?

I understand that no cookie cutters work. So take the basic framework and adjust it to what your local need is. But this thread was based on an assumption that by 09 we will still be in Iraq and be working on withdrawing down to 80k.

[jcustis]

T,

I'd have to argue that any PRT model will rely pretty much on the acquiesence of the host, sovereign state. From that, I'm afraid that the Iraqi ministries responsible for the various activities would not be able to be weaned from the development support. That remains a common theme in the friction sustained by the advisory effort - actually getting the ministries to routinely support the troops and police.

I know I'm not offering coherent answers...it's just a crushing problem.

[sullygoarmy]

I think both Rob and Jimbo hit on the head. In Iraq where you have such a large transition team mission focusing on so many different aspects of security (army, navy, air force, police, national police, border troops, customs, logistics, transport regiments, base support, etc), merging PRTs and TTs is not only a bridge to far, but I believe would be counter productive. The PRTs need to have the freedom of movement to continually get around to see all the various elements of their provience to build up infrastructure, and more importantly, trust. The MiTTs need to focus on not only their Iraqi counterparts, but also serving their higher master, the US BCT/Division they are attached (and therefore rated by) to. Trying to develop such a large amount of security forces really puts the two missions in two different camps. Hence Jimbo's point.

Rob, however, does bring out another good point. It should be considered and possibly resourced for a different conflict, one where we are not trying to rebuild a government, economy, and military from scratch. In a more permissive and structured environment, I suspect a joing PRT/TT would have more value and success, especially when the TT is doing more FID training with an already standing and established military. In this scenario, the TT has less of a building job and more of a coaching job. The PRT/TT would not only assist the military but integrate the civil aspects as well.



In Kosovo, our CA team had their own security and moved around all over our AO working different issues.