Should you merge Advisors with PRT's?

[jcustis]

The problem I see in both Afghanistan and Iraq is that the intense combat operations truly limit the interface between advisory teams and PRTs. It will be interesting to see how the PRTs embedded in Brigade Combat Teams work out.

Is that actually where we're headed? I'm a little behind on the literature when it comes to the status of PRTs. Last I read, there was still a ton of gnashing of teeth over where the staff were going to come from.

[John T. Fishel]

Hi Troufion--

This proposal - which I like very much - looks a lot like the old SAF and FIDAF from the 1960s - early 90s. It adds a civilian component a la CORDS (myth or reality doesn't matter). The mechanism for designating command needs work but the concept is there and right IMO.

What is missing, I think, is the political will. Would President Bush support? Probably, if it ever reached him. What about Secretaries Rice and Gates? Dunno. And General Pace and Admiral Fallon? Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus? And if they all supported it, how much political capital would they be willing to invest?

At the operational and tactical levels, to what extent would O-3 through O-6 commanders and willingly subordinate themselves to FSO-1 and 2s? Similarly, the FSOs?

Nevertheless, IMHO, this one is well worth trying.

Hooah! and Oorah!

JohnT

PS We still should remember that organization only can make things harder or easier; it never really is the solution.

[Jimbo]

No,

The roles and missions are different. The military units do operate outside of PRT AO's which tend to be fixed (for good reasons of comsistency). The Advisors are dealing strictly with security forces, answering to the national government.

[John T. Fishel]

Jimbo--

Are you referring to the way PRTs currently operate or to T's proposal?

JohnT

[Jimbo]

Both.

As somebody who has one more day in Foggy Bottom, I have seen what works and what doesn't. First, I would advise uniformed service member to drop any idea that the Office of the Coordiantor for Stability and Reconstruction is going to provide is going to provide any expertise in this area is flawed. They have marketed themselves as this, but they do not have the capacity or knowledge base to do this. furthermore, that office only exists by a National Security Council document, so they have a running clock, and are not a viable solution.

As fara as structur and roles. keep PRST focused on what they are. I would place local law enforcement under the justice guys with an undertsanding of their paramilitary role. regional forces and militias all have viability issues over governance strength. You don't want to create competing government structures. The military and interior forces are owned by the national government, and they do move around. You do not want them tied to a PRT that is trying to deliver very difficult development and governance issues.

As much as the proposal would create a unity of command structure, the USG ain't structured that way, and it isn't going to happen with the way Congress runs things. There is no capacity in any organization to support these kinds of manpower requirements.

I would counter that PRT's at the provincial level as coordination assistants/advisors with the HN government at that level in order to help synchronize they various projects throughout the province (think state in US model). I woul look at resourcing USAID to execute development and governance at the district and municpal level tied more with the US forces (if involved) than HN military.

[Rob Thornton]

T's proposal kind of looks like a component (possibly one of many sub commands) of a Joint Inter-Agency TF for Reconstruction and Transition. Jimbo points to some reality issues with "constructing" anything like this anytime soon. In this case putting everyone with a "T" in their acronym together would probably only breed confusion and infighting. Also as Jimbo points out centralized organizations tend to put down roots and run fiber optic and get all darn comfortable. The benefits you might gain by putting them under one roof would have to be weighed against their inability to function as seperate sub-elements on their own for an extended periods - if you negate the need for flexible sustainment somebody will probably turn off the tap & forget where the switch to turn it back on is when somebody needs it. I'd also say that living with (as close as the infrastructure will support - hopefully in the same compound if not the same building) is critical to advisor mission. There are so many things that can get identified and resolved before they become a show stopper by just being available. Put everybody under one roof - and probably only one element actually lives with their element - offices and compounds are pretty spread out there - some is due to where they need to be (a COP or IP Station) some is what the infrastructur will support.

That being said - I think T's idea deserves to be considered in terms of the capabilities we might want to deploy to other places, or say a more mature Iraq down the road (3-5 years?) when its systems are further along. My personal take is that we just have not reached the fundamental levels to consolidate the advisory mission in Iraq in such a manner - we'd wind up spending our efforts on the wrong things because we just would not really know what is going on (there are already in house disconnects amongst people who all speak single service language). Keep it up though T - I think you are on to where we'd like to be in terms of being able to deploy something to failing states in a major CMD's geographic AOR to work hand in hand with the country team in place that is in danger of being destabilized.
Regards, Rob

[TROUFION]

Ok,

I really appreciate the discussion. In particular the organizational theory vs. reality.

Now I'll alter the question just a bit. Again referring to the Bing's article. Relook this idea as a means to get the most from the least. If by FY2009 we have to be drawn down to 50% of the forces say around 80k as the Bing's discuss would a level of 'desperation' allow for stranger bedfellows?

In my proposal I was not placing the forces all in one fortress compound. It would be an administrative idea bent on keeping forces flexible, and perhaps it would be better to have liaison officers for advisor groups with the PRT's.

That said what structure would allow us to achieve maximum flexibility (suspend what you know of PRT and MTT/Advisor right now) with a reduced footprint of 80k on the ground. This could be a reality and the idea of brigades, regt combat teams and full battalions operating alone and unafraid will become a rarity. Advisors and PRT will have the preponderance of force on the ground for all SSTR components. In other words there may not be much choice other than to make it fit. Either by design or by accident.