The US & Interrogation (catch all)

[SWJED]

2 Jan. Baltimore Sun - Military Aims to Bolster Language Skills.

The Pentagon plans to spend hundreds of millions of dollars over the next five years to bolster foreign language skills within the military, a move to correct what is considered a critical handicap as soldiers pursue missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to documents and defense officials.

The effort is part of a broader plan, expected to be unveiled by President Bush this week, that will also include new language programs through the State and Education departments, officials said. There was no immediate estimate on the total cost of the plan, although officials expect it to range in the hundreds of millions of dollars from fiscal 2007, beginning in October, to 2011...

[Jedburgh]

That speaks to my personal nettle - the fact that HUMINT Collectors are no longer required to learn a language at initial entry level (PVT - SPC) and most will be waivered for promotion to SGT without a language, and the requirement only really coming into effect for promotion to SSG.

The demand for HUMINT in the field is very high. However, once again, we are sacrificing quality for quantity. Non-language qualified HUMINT personnel are extremely circumscribed in the missions they are able to accomplish effectively, and require the use of an interpreter as a crutch for much else. I say "crutch" because a HUMINT Collector who cannot speak the language of the operational area is crippled in his abilities (Not to mention the loss of the regional and cultural knowledge the soldier gains during acquisition of the language - especially critical to the HUMINTer).

Instead of taking the hard road to mission effectiveness, and improving language and operational skill training, a critical tool in the HUMINT skill set was simply cut in order to put more bodies in the field.

This will have long-term implications. 97Es used to leave DLI as a PFC or SPC with fresh language skills, and by the time they achieve SSG they matured in their linguistic abilities and became comfortable in using in the manipulative human communications skills that are at the core of HUMINT.

Although there are still a few initial-entry 97Es arriving at DLI, the die has been set. It will take a while for the full effects to be felt, but this was a very damaging decision.

[SWJED]

11 May Los Angeles Times - Army Rules Put on Hold.

The Pentagon has been forced to delay the release of its updated Army Field Manual on interrogation because of congressional opposition to several provisions, including one that would allow tougher techniques for unlawful combatants than for traditional prisoners of war.

The Defense Department's civilian leaders, who are overseeing the process of rewriting the manual, have long argued — along with the Bush administration — that the Geneva Convention does not apply to terrorists or irregular fighters. The United States needs greater flexibility when interrogating people who refuse to fight by the rules, they have said...

[Jedburgh]

The "new" interrogation manual has been under development for far longer than the year that the article states. The supposed "Final Draft" of FM 2-22-3 HUMINT Collector Operations (AKO log-in required for the link) was published back in Apr '04. I also have a "Final Approved Draft" version published in Sep '04 - but it seems to have disappeared from AKO. I haven't seen any '05 versions. In any case, the FM has yet to make it into approved doctrine.

I don't recall any provisions in the drafts that specifically approve "tougher treatment" for unlawful combatants. In fact, the Drafts I saw went into greater detail on the Geneva Conventions than did the previous FM, in a manner I thought was intended to address the concerns raised by Abu Ghraib.

That FM is intended to replace the old FM 34-52 Intelligence Interrogation, published in '92. The newer pub addresses a broader spectrum of HUMINT collection than is dealt with in the previous FM, and updates the role of HUMINT in today's force structure.

What seems to have been completely ignored as a resource by the current writers of HUMINT doctrine is the US Army's Vietnam Era interrogation field manual (published in 1969). It's available for download in two parts:

FM 30-15 Intelligence Interrogation

FM 30-15 Part II

In the second link, Chapter 4, Interrogation Support for Stability Operations is of particular interest - both the Draft FM 2-22.3 and the current FM 34-52 do not go into this subject in the same degree of detail.

[SWJED]

According the LA Times of 6 Sep - Army to Use Geneva Rules for Detainees by Julian Barnes.

Bowing to critics of its tough interrogation policies, the Pentagon is issuing a new Army field manual that provides Geneva Convention protections for all detainees and eliminates a secret list of interrogation tactics.

The manual, set for release today, also reverses an earlier decision to maintain two interrogation standards — one for traditional prisoners of war and another for "unlawful combatants" captured during a conflict but not affiliated with a nation's military force. It will ban the use of such controversial methods as forcing prisoners to endure long periods of solitary confinement, using military dogs to threaten prisoners, putting hoods over inmates' heads and strapping detainees to boards and dunking them in water to simulate drowning, defense officials said.

The manual and its related policy directives — the legal framework for interrogations — originally were to be released in the spring. But when State Department officials and Republican senators on the Armed Services Committee raised objections, they were pulled back.

The Pentagon's decision to drop the objectionable provisions appears to mark a victory for advocates of closer U.S. adherence to the protections of the Geneva Convention, an international agreement on the treatment of prisoners and others during wartime. Human rights groups said they planned to study the manual carefully to see what parts of the international treaty it included and what it left out...

[Jedburgh]

The Army states that "The manual has been published in the interest of full transparency, and does not bear "For Official Use Only" markings.". (but when you open the doc, you'll see the FM still has the markings in bold print top and bottom)

FM 2-22.3 Human Intelligence Collector Operations, Sep 06

Edit: Updated the link, and the FOUO markings are now gone, replaced by Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

[Jedburgh]

An interesting collection of essays, published by NDIC in Dec 06:

Educing Information: Interrogation Science and Art

...Educing Information is a profoundly important book because it offers both professionals and ordinary citizens a primer on the “science and art” of both interrogation and intelligence gathering. Because this is a book written by and for intelligence professionals, it starts exactly where one might expect it to start – with Dr. Robert Coulam’s superb discussion of the costs and benefi ts of various approaches to interrogation. For those who are (like me) unschooled in the art and science of intelligence gathering, careful study of the table of contents is perhaps the best way to decide which of the papers would provide the most convenient portal through which to enter a realm that is, by the admission of the authors themselves, both largely unexplored and enormously important to our national security. Steven M. Kleinman’s excellent paper on the “KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation Review” provided just the historical and theoretical background I needed to feel comfortable with the other papers. This book “works” either way....

[SSG Rock]

Three prominent Republicans who either have presidential aspirations or have an axe to grind with the administration disagree with Bush and it is an "Open Revolt?" Sheeesh.

I don't know what all of the hubub is really about. I read this article http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...091400160.html and I'm still not sure what the debate is. The Washington Post dedicates more space to the fact that there is a disagreement between Republicans than the issue itself. Someone who knows about this clarify please?

[Tom Odom]

Quite simply, do we relook Geneva convention statutes on interrogation or not.

Senators and GEN Powell: No

Adminstration: Yes

[SSG Rock]

I tend to come down on the side of the administration don't you? The Geneva Convention doesn't adequately address asymetrical warfare. Obviously it needs to be updated. I think part of the reason Bush has so much trouble prosecuting the GWOT is that we have no precedent for almost anything concerning it.

These arguments make no sense to me. Why should we fear that Islamic radicals would treat our captured troops any worse than they already have? Didn't the SC ruling suggest that the administration go back to the Congress to clarify this issue?

[LawVol]

As I see it, the problem is not how terrorists will treat our troops in response to this proposed program (they do not respect law and that won't change), but how our actions are perceived in the world community. Speeches regarding our fight for democracy and the rule of law ring hollow in the face of legislation designed to strip away fundamental legal rights. Rightly or wrongly, it has been determined that captured terrorists will be tried criminally for their actions. If we are going to do this, it should be done the right way. Our society does not tolerate a kaflaesque trial wherein the accused is merely permitted to show up. If we are to champion the rule of law and advertise our desire to bring it to Iraq and other such places, we must not disregard its tenets simply because it suits our immediate needs. This serves only to weaken our position and support in the world community.

Part of the issue with GWOT is world support. Many countries do not see the legal justification for the war in Iraq and the Bush administration has not adequately confronted this issue. Similarly, the Bush administration often attempts to redefine or invent law to fit particular situations (tribunals, etc.). This has caused a number of countries (and our own citizens) to doubt our sincerity when we profess to come from the side of law and righteousness. The problem with this is that it has a negative effect on our chief center of gravity.

Since at least Vietnam, our enemies have recognized that to beat us, they need to influence US public opinion. This is done a number of ways, from body counts, to spent treasure, to a feeling that we cannot win, to convincing the public that we are on the wrong side both morally and legally. All of these things contribute to what I call the attrition point, i.e. the point at which US public opinion determines that the costs are no longer worth the benefits conferred. By seeking to circumvent law (or create such a perception), we merely step closer to the attrition point.

Yes, it is rather difficult to obey the rule of law when the enemy does not. However, if we are truly in a war of ideology we cannot afford to foresake more than 200 years of being a nation of laws to defeat the current enemy. We must wear the white hat not because others say we should but because it is who we are.

[SWJED]

... let's assume we are not engaged in a "war of ideology" but a "war of civilizations".

Does that change the equation?

One assumption here is that world opinion really does not matter much, as it is inevitable that lines are being drawn and there is nothing we can do in the information operations arena that can change Islamist ideology and its increasing acceptance in the Muslim world.

The only variable is when each Western country will realize they are in a fight for survival of their way of life.

[Merv Benson]

Andrew McCarthy, who prosecuted the first World Trade Center bombers, gives some of the details of what al Qaeda learned from the process.

Under discovery rules that apply to American criminal proceedings, the government is required to provide to accused persons any information in its possession that can be deemed "material to the preparation of the defense" or that is even arguably exculpatory. The more broadly indictments are drawn (and terrorism indictments tend to be among the broadest), the greater the trove of revelation.

In addition, the government must disclose all prior statements made by witnesses it calls (and, often, witnesses it does not call).

This is a staggering quantum of information, certain to illuminate not only what the government knows about terrorist organizations but the intelligence agencies' methods and sources for obtaining that information. When, moreover, there is any dispute about whether a sensitive piece of information needs to be disclosed, the decision ends up being made by a judge on the basis of what a fair trial dictates, rather than by the executive branch on the basis of what public safety demands.

It is true that this mountain of intelligence is routinely surrendered along with appropriate judicial warnings: defendants may use it only in preparing for trial, and may not disseminate it for other purposes. Unfortunately, people who commit mass murder tend not to be terribly concerned about violating court orders (or, for that matter, about being hauled into court at all).

In 1995, just before trying the blind sheik (Omar Abdel Rahman) and eleven others, I duly complied with discovery law by writing a letter to the defense counsel listing 200 names of people who might be alleged as unindicted co-conspirators--i.e., people who were on the government's radar screen but whom there was insufficient evidence to charge. Six years later, my letter turned up as evidence in the trial of those who bombed our embassies in Africa. It seems that, within days of my having sent it, the letter had found its way to Sudan and was in the hands of bin Laden (who was on the list), having been fetched for him by an al-Qaeda operative who had gotten it from one of his associates.

Intelligence is dynamic. Over time, foreign terrorists and spies inevitably learn our tactics and adapt: consequently, we must refine and change those tactics. When we purposely tell them what we know--for what is blithely assumed to be the greater good of ensuring they get the same kind of fair trials as insider traders and tax cheats--we enable them not only to close the knowledge gap but to gain immense insight into our technological capacities, how our agencies think, and what our future moves are likely to be.

...

Some of our best information is obtained from foreign intelligence services. Naturally, those services are much less forthcoming if they think that what they tell us will have to be revealed in court because of U.S. legal rules. Historically, that was not much of a problem when dealing with the CIA; it is, however, always a concern for a country weighing whether to share some sensitive or potentially embarrassing information with the FBI.

The Saudis' infamous obstruction of the FBI's efforts to investigate the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing is an exquisite example.

In the Clinton years, no matter how many times we were attacked, all the world knew that our approach was to have the FBI build criminal cases.

Indeed, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39, issued in June 1995, announced that prosecuting terrorists and extraditing indicted terrorists held overseas were signature priorities of the administration.

Nearly three years later, after several other attacks and public declarations of war by bin Laden, Clinton issued a press release that both trumpeted as a ringing success his strategy of having terrorists "apprehended, tried, and given severe prison sentences" and announced a new directive, PDD 62. This purported to "reinforce the mission of the many U.S. agencies charged with roles in defeating terrorism," including by means of the "apprehension and prosecution of terrorists." The embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed less than three months later.

There is much more analysis of intelligence failures of all types, but it is hard to deny the importance of the damage done to our efforts when we have to give the enemy our sources and methods of collecting intelligence on enemy operations and operatives.

[Bill Moore]

Yep, the whole process is self defeating and it presents us with a strategic dilemma. We either follow our laws and suffer the consequences or we break the laws and suffer the consequences. I agree with the President that terrorists don't deserve legal protection, but there must be some degree of legal protection (presumed innocence) until they are proven to be a terrorist, and that appears to crux of the matter. Locking up a suspect for potentially years on faulty intelligence, and providing him or her no legal protection is definitely going too far. Any of us, or our family members, potentially could be arrested under suspicion of being a terrorist or a facilitator based on a set up, and we wouldn’t want to surrender our legal rights to prove our innocence. However, if proving our innocence somehow equates to Bin Laden and his ilk getting the latest dump of our intelligence products it will obviously encourage administration officials to look for ways to bypass the law. The law makers got us into this mess, and they need to get us out of it. Americans will accept special measures for known terrorists, but for the most part they don’t accept surrendering our legal principles. We have to be careful that the fix doesn’t start us down going down the wrong road where there may not be an opportunity to make a U-turn.

[SWJED]

23 September Washington Post - As Army Adds Interrogators, It Outsources Training by Walter Pincus.

Since the Iraq war began, the U.S. Army has quadrupled the number of soldiers it trains each year to be detainee interrogators, according to Army officials involved in the program.

Next year, 1,200 interrogators are set to be trained at the Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., up from about 300 in 2003. "The number being trained is based on the current need of interrogators in theater," said Angela Moncur, deputy public affairs officer at the intelligence center...

The Army is gearing up for the effort by hiring private companies to handle the training. Last month, the service awarded contracts that could grow to more than $50 million in the next five years to three private firms to provide additional instructors to the 18-week basic course in human-intelligence interrogation at Fort Huachuca.

"If you are qualified as interrogator, you now are either in Iraq or teaching others how to do it when they go there," said Pat Gromek, who spent 23 years as an Army intelligence officer and now handles business development for Integrated Systems Improvement Services Inc. in Sierra Vista, Ariz., the site of Fort Huachuca. ISIS is one of the firms selected to supply interrogation instructors.

The contracts call for the companies to provide outside instructors who would train "selected enlisted soldiers in the skills and knowledge required to perform . . . tactical human intelligence collection," said a government notice published earlier this month. Subjects to be covered include how to interrogate and debrief enemy personnel, potential threat forces, warrior skills, intelligence analysis, and military justice and intelligence law, according to a statement supplied by the center. "The laws of land warfare and the Geneva Convention" are specifically listed in an article on the course in Military Intelligence, an Army publication...

[Jedburgh]

Army News Service, 29 Mar 07: NCOs Sought for Human Intelligence

..."Our goal is to quickly infuse 100 staff sergeants and sergeants first class to our HUMINT force from all other career fields," said Sgt. Maj. Fernando Martinez-Irizarry, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2.

"They will be provided accelerated training on basic and advanced HUMINT skills and be assigned to units deploying in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom," he said....

Piss poor post-Cold War reductions led directly to current critical supply and demand problems with tac HUMINT, which - as this additional measure illustrates - continue to be addressed by knee-jerk quantity over quality short term solutions.

You can't shake and bake a senior HUMINT NCO in 24-27 weeks, then immediately deploy him to Iraq or Afghanistan and expect him to effectively manage HUMINT collection ops or conduct any of a myriad of other HUMINT missions, let alone that most critical task of any senior NCO - mentor and train junior soldiers.

The 97E field has already suffered in quality of NCO leadership recently by too-rapid promotion of soldiers as the previously-tiny field has expanded so quickly. So now the Army is fixing the problem of filling mid-to-senior NCO positions by inexperienced personnel within the MOS by filling them with NCOs from outside the field with zero experience....

[Bill Moore]

There are principles, truths, and there is reality.

A close parallel to Jed’s point is one of our SOF truths: You can't mass produce SOF in response to a crisis.

Of course SF, Rangers, and SEALs are doing just that. The pipelines are spitting the kids out in large numbers. I can only speak for SF, the training is still high quality, but as everyone knows the training is only the first step, then you enter the seasoning phase where you are mentored by the gray haired fox for a few years. That doesn’t happen when you change the demographics of the force this quickly. Some think a rotation into OIF or OEF-A will make up for that, but I don’t see that happening. You don’t make up for years of COIN, UW, SASO (old term) earned lessons with one or two rotations into OIF.

Obviously the MI world is experiencing a similar challenge with their HUMINTers. MI was devastated after Desert Storm. I worked closely with MI at the time and I recall a number of experiences Officers and NCOs getting their walking papers. We also starting deactivating units (this was under Bush Senior), and it only got worse under Clinton. The current administration, until relatively recently, didn’t see the need to start expanding the force, so now we’re faced with the reality that we have to mass produce and put a lot of young guys and gals on point without mentors. Life will be their mentor, and “eventually” they’ll get good.

[Jedburgh]

...MI was devastated after Desert Storm. I worked closely with MI at the time and I recall a number of experiences Officers and NCOs getting their walking papers. We also starting deactivating units (this was under Bush Senior), and it only got worse under Clinton...

I still remember quite clearly how the drawdown affected 97Es - they were offering NCOs generous bonuses to get out for a few years in the mid-'90s. NCO promotions were also virtually frozen for quite a while; one or two token promotions a year at the senior levels. Not to mention unit deactivations and reduction of slots overall significantly affecting assignment options. At the time I didn't care; I was sufficiently engaged with deployments for OPC and UNSCOM. It wasn't until the period just before 9-11 that the stagnation of the field reallly started hitting me.

...The current administration, until relatively recently, didn’t see the need to start expanding the force, so now we’re faced with the reality that we have to mass produce and put a lot of young guys and gals on point without mentors. Life will be their mentor, and “eventually” they’ll get good.

Bill, I agree with your last statement. There are already a few natural talents shining amongst the chaff. Unfortunately, the "mass production" mentality produces a helluva lot of chaff, much of'em unable (or prevented by command misuses) to learn the right HUMINT lessons from the COE, and thereby ending up perpetuating the wrong ones. Hopefully the good ones will rise to the top, and have the necessary influence over the field in the long term. I have doubts about that, however, being all too familiar with the MI TRADOC bureacracy. If the future ends up being a reflection of the past, the good ones will end up slugging away operationally, while the incompetent parasites end up running the schoolhouse. In any case, it will be too late to affect the current fight.

[Ski]

The other problem, and I saw this from my time in Afghanistan, is that everyone wants more 97E's. At one point I had to call every command that was under our umbrella and tell them not to request any more THT's or 97E's..there weren't any to go around.

[Jedburgh]

The issue has obviously been decided for the Army HUMINT field:

Updates as of 11 OCT 2006

ATTENTION: THE LANGUAGE REQUIREMENT FOR MOS 97E HAS BEEN SUSPENDED FOR ALL RANKS AND WILL BE REVIEWED ON AN ANNUAL BASIS. ALL SOLDIERS RECLASSIFYING INTO THE MOS WILL NOT PCS TO DLI, BUT WILL INSTEAD BE DIRECTLY ASSIGNED INTO A PRIORITY UNIT. DURING THE SUSPENSION PERIOD, DLI WILL REMAIN AN OPTION FOR 97Es WITH SIGNIFICANT TIME IN THE MOS, BUT ONLY AS A REENLISTMENT INCENTIVE.

ALL 97Es WHO CURRENTLY POSSESS A LANGUAGE ARE STILL REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN PROFICIENCY IAW AR 611-6. ALL SOLDIERS RECLASSIFYING INTO THE MOS MUST STILL EITHER PASS THE DLAB IAW DA PAM 611-21, OR HAVE A CURRENT, PASSING DLPT SCORE IN A FOREIGN LANGUAGE.

SEE MILPER MESSAGE 06-159 FOR FURTHER DETAILS.

Long-term capabilities were already significantly affected when the language requirement was done away with for entry level soldiers (and junior NCOs were able to obtain waivers). This will have a truly crippling long-term effect upon the HUMINT field.