Plan B in Iraq

[SWJED]

From the SWJ Blog:

Plan B in Iraq
Beyond the Surge: Keeping the Military Relevant in an Asymmetric World

Major Fernando Martinez Luján

Regardless of “the Surge’s” outcome this summer, growing domestic political pressure will likely soon force American decision-makers to “pull the plug” on the large US troop presence in Iraq. Faced with this difficult situation, senior military and civilian leaders must act now to develop a viable “Plan B” as an alternative to precipitous, forced troop withdrawal. By necessity, this Plan B must incorporate both a smaller, sustainable troop presence and a series of sweeping organizational reforms to address the military’s badly outdated intervention strategies. Yet the stumbling in Iraq is only a symptom of a much larger problem: America’s military and civilian institutions, organized for Cold War conflict have grown increasingly incapable of dealing with today’s world of failing states, insurgencies, humanitarian crises, and non-state actors. Without a major reform of institutions—leveraging interagency elements, developing more nuanced and culturally-attuned forces, and recognizing the importance of the media—the changing dynamics in areas of conflict will make American power increasingly irrelevant...

[TROUFION]

As another frustrated 04 stuck in the 'supporting' element I feel your pain.

Let us hope that 'higher' reads this and gets it. Quickly.

Though I think 35K or less would be dangerous. Then again it is crazy enough it might work!

When you take this article and the Bings' I think you can start to see a solid and workable plan for Iraq. Which means no way we do it .

I can here the dissention now: too hard, too exposed, its dangerous, you mean live...with them uh no thanks. Etc...

Keep attacking, someone might listen!

[Cori]

I lack the qualifications to speak to the suggestions for restructuring, either of the military generally or the Iraq mission, but I have argued for some time that whether you're talking about the war in Iraq or the larger GWOT, the military needs to start thinking about this as a two-front war, where the "ground war" is a metaphor for the actual state of play on the ground, whether militarily, politically, diplomatically, in terms of intelligence, law enforcement, what have you, and the "air war" is a metaphor for the way the war appears on the nation's television screens and front pages. In a democracy, winning the one and losing the other is still losing, period.

That's why there has to be a far more effective strategy for Information Operations (a far more proactive one, IMHO), that's why it isn't enough to talk about this being "a war of ideas" without pumping sufficient resources into the MoSs that deal most directly with the problem -- IO, PA, and Psyops -- and why military-wide attitudes towards the press have to change. I get the critiques of the press (if there weren't legitimate critiques of the press coverage I'd be out of a job, yes?) but you all in uniform have to remember that the press are your conduits to the American people. Sorry, that's the deal. Blogs are critical, YouTube is great, but there are still 30million people a night watching ABC, CBS and NBC. If you think the press coverage does not reflect "ground truth" (and you'd better know -- ignoring the coverage is not an option) that disconnect, that gap, between ground truth as you see it and what people are getting from the coverage, well, that's the distance you have to overcome in the American people's expectations and understanding.

Part of the problem with COIN, to be honest, is that it puts an enormous emphasis on winning hearts and minds (since, after all, the "people are the prize") while largely ignoring the fact that the one Clausewitzing principle you can't get away from is that you still need to sustain support at home -- and, as this piece suggests, for cultural reasons (I'm talking American culture) that may well be more difficult during COIN operations.

Obviously the trick is how. I have no pat answers, although I have a number of answers on the margins I've been mentioning here since I've been dropping by. This has been the focus of my work over the last year, and I'm pushing as hard and as fast as I can, but it all starts with this -- if the military generally, and the Army especially, doesn't start by acknowledging the importance of the issue, no solution is going to get you very far.

[walrus]

With the greatest of respect "Plan B" has, I believe, a chance of succeeding, but for one critical factor - information operations.

In this respect, I'm afraid we are building on sand because the foundations of such information operations must be truth. It also helps to have a vision of what you want to achieve.

Without wishing to open up a debate on these points, I do not believe we have yet received a truthful and convincing explanation of why we invaded Iraq in the first place, assuming that such things exist. Nor has anyone shared with us a clear vision of what we wish our armed services to achieve.

For example, the clear objectives in WWII were to defeat Japan and Germany and remove their respective governments. The objective then almost immediately became to craft bulwarks against USSR type Communism.

To put it another way, now immortalised in every business school corporate strategy class, is the "business plan" of the Elves in a "South Park", to wit:

1. Steal underpants.

2. ???????????

3. Profit!

What is the 2. ????????? imperative in Iraq? Why are we there?

Absent these foundations, the information operations task is going to be extremely arduous, if it can be performed at all.

[Ironhorse]

Without wishing to open up a debate on these points, I do not believe we have yet received a truthful and convincing explanation of why we invaded Iraq in the first place, assuming that such things exist. Nor has anyone shared with us a clear vision of what we wish our armed services to achieve.

Why don't we put that debate that we "don't want to have" in a bit smaller box to try to NOT have it.

Any lofty "truth" behind "why we invaded Iraq in the first place" can take a damn back seat to "what now?"

IO needs a compelling message, not some epic truth per se. Whether that is some lofty neo-con confessional, or just something that plays well in Peoria, depends on which O the IO is supporting. There not only could, but should have been some mission creep in the past 5 years.

So let's not make this a referendum on the past, but a way ahead for the future.

[walrus]

I agree with you Iron Horse. There is no point in racking over the past and I'm trying to approach the problem from a business strategy approach.

To put it in narrative terms, every story needs a plot. And a plot has a starting point and an ending point. We cannot conduct coherent information operations without this "plot", otherwise they will not make sense.

For example, we can write a saccharin story about how life in such and such a town is now "better", but without a reference point its meaningless - ie: "Better than what? Better than it was under Sadaam Hussien? Better than it was before we bombed the sewerage plant? Better than it was before you shot my son? Better than it was before the death squads came? Do you see my point?

None of our information operations will link together into a coherent whole without some overarching vision of what we want to achieve and why we want to achieve it. I do not believe we have yet done this, although I believe there are skilled and intelligent military men that could.

It's not "over analyzing" the situation, its more of what was called in officer training as "selection and maintenance of the aim", or what Americans would perhaps call "The Mission". I always received the biggest toungue lashing from instructors when I led my troops into something without first getting it very clear what I was trying to achieve and resisting the urge to just "do something".