GP vs. Specialized Capabilities -- COIN & Beyond

[Smitten Eagle]

fm SWC Admin -- this discussion spawned from this thread after this post. Definitely on to something, just not "Non Cents"...
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S.E. the whole idea of assigning assets whether they be air,land or sea based upon your mission makes a whole lot of sense as opposed to way it is done now. I think the concepts of Air force, Land force, Sea force are obsolete. As you suggest they should be mission forces and they should have any and all vehicles air,land,sea to accomplish the mission.

Pardon me for moving this discussion almost completely off topic...

However, an additional advantage is that it would likely lead to cheaper weapons systems. No longer would the Military-Industrial Complex be bent on producing a fighter-interceptor-bomber-reconnaisance-tanker-EW-FAC(A)/TAC(A) aircraft (like the F-18). Rather than have jacks-of-all-trades, we would have more lower-cost platforms with specialized somewhat specialized crews. Remember, the original F-16 was a reaction against the movement to "missionize" the hell out of aircraft so as to create a very basic, extremely lethal, agile, and lightweight fighter.

Not that Boyd is god, but he would have preferred simple, lightweight, and lethal to the missionized monstrosities of multipurpose aircraft we fly today.

Furthermore, the crews of these aircraft would be imbued with the ethos of the forces they support, rather than the bureaucracy that writes their fitreps and pays their bills. This is probably the greatest benefit

Allow me to heave this derailed conversation back on the tracks...

[Merv Benson]

As much as I appreciate my Leatherman, I would not want to have to rely on it in a knife fight.

As someone who used to race sail boats, one of the things you notice quickly is that boats built for cruising are rarely across the finish line first. The compromises one has to make to make any craft do too many things makes it less than perfect for any. Which is not to say that any craft can't be tweaked and improved. Keep it light and keep it smooth and it will be faster and more maneuverable.

Of course that rule does not apply to an Abrams tank which is better as a tank than a Humvee is.

[120mm]

Maybe the marines could be of help, here, but in my Army experience, it is "natural" for specialties like aviation and artillery to start to build their own, separate kingdom, completely cut off from the Army they are supposed to support. My very first CAV Squadron I belonged to, went through the extremely painful process of starting to act as a team, instead of two separate entities. When I became a Troop Commander, THAT squadron never did come together; it wasn't until I became an HHT Commander, and made the point of visiting the "guys at the airfield" that we started to act as a unit.

The problem is not entirely the Air Forces' fault. the Army abrogated their responsibilities vis-a-vis the tactical air arm prior to 1947. It was only after their little brother started playing with their old toys that they started to want them back.

[Ironhorse]

I think the Marine Corps can help a lot on this in many ways, but is falling prey in others to the same snake charmer. Maybe the Osprey, but look at the EFV in particular for an example of the complete opposite of specialization. It is being forced to do everything, but with such onerous ship-to-shore requirements (plane at ?? mph), that it is a ginormous engineering compromise and increasingly a pariah rather than our salvation.

However, there is a lot to be said for versatility. So while I will jump on the bandwagon for the KISS rule applied to equipment (Keep it Simple and Specialized), I am also painfully aware of how ineffective a force of one-trick wonders might be, especially given underlying U.S. assumptions and expectations about its force (e.g. it's not the yellow-horde / human wave).

The wicked problem is getting adequate versatility without excessive complexity. In particular when we factor in some more employment -ities, such as quanity, affordability, availability, deployability, affordability, it is enough to make your head hurt.

[Steve Blair]

Maybe the marines could be of help, here, but in my Army experience, it is "natural" for specialties like aviation and artillery to start to build their own, separate kingdom, completely cut off from the Army they are supposed to support. My very first CAV Squadron I belonged to, went through the extremely painful process of starting to act as a team, instead of two separate entities. When I became a Troop Commander, THAT squadron never did come together; it wasn't until I became an HHT Commander, and made the point of visiting the "guys at the airfield" that we started to act as a unit.

The problem is not entirely the Air Forces' fault. the Army abrogated their responsibilities vis-a-vis the tactical air arm prior to 1947. It was only after their little brother started playing with their old toys that they started to want them back.

Interesting thing with the Cav squadrons (this is a pet topic of mine going back some years...might have to tap you with some questions sometime, 120mm). That trend of stripping away the aviation units started in Vietnam. Division tended to yank the organic air troop away and stick it with the aviation battalion. Some squadrons kicked at this (I believe 1/4 Cav was one of the first to do so...but they got nowhere in the face of DePuy), but tended to lose the battle. After that the drift (in organization and thinking) seemed to have cemented itself.

I'm working on a paper now about the Vietnam-era division cavalry squadron as a reaction force, so that also got me thinking about this. I'll stop derailing the thread now....

[slapout9]

All, I think you should build specialized weapons systems for the various reasons mentioned and then combine them into a mission based task force. i.e. my old unit the 82nd Airborne should have there own planes not wait around to see what the Air Force will do. The 82nd has the mission to be able to conduct forced entry operations from the air so by that standard it should have it's own planes of whatever type they determine in order to be able to accomplish their designated mission.


Knife fightin (yea I spelled it right) go to www.gutterfighting.org to see how to use a real K-Bar and some others as well. Me personally I have been cut by a box cutter,a cheap steak knife stolen from a restaurant and a x-acto knife which I managed to stop about 3 inches before it went into my neck collar bone area. Knife attacks are usually concealed ambush type attacks and can be really nasty and bloody.

[Ski]

With today's cost of equipment, specialization is almost impossible unless the acquistion communities are forced to become more competitive, held to higher standards regarding actual capabilities, lead times and delivery times, and officers/defense contractors are punished for missing any capabilities, lead times or delivery times.

Sole source contracting has ruined any competition within the defense industry. The consolidation of defense contractors over the last 20 years has also hurt competitive bidding.

[Steve Blair]

The problem is not entirely the Air Forces' fault. the Army abrogated their responsibilities vis-a-vis the tactical air arm prior to 1947. It was only after their little brother started playing with their old toys that they started to want them back.

Ah...another thread-derailing possibility....

The change in the Army Air Corps was more in the lines of them following their own internal doctrine. Prior to World War II there was a fair doctrinal split between the unescorted bomber community and the fighter community. Guess what? The bomber generals won. So they ended up marginalizing the role and impact of CAS on their doctrine, to the point that by the late 1950s TAC was a shell of a command that could barely conduct its basic mission. The Army proper couldn't really have done much to stop this, since it was a political product of the Army Air Corps commanders. People like LeMay who rose to high rank during the war. Chennault was the only major fighter proponent from the pre-war period to assume a higher command position, and he was undercut during the war itself.

As an aside, it's also possible that the addiction to the multi-role aircraft began during this period. In an attempt to remain relevant within the AF political landscape, TAC began requesting aircraft that could deliver atomic munitions, turning themselves in the words of at least one author into a "mini-SAC." The F-105 was the first real example of one of these aircraft, though perhaps McNamara's F-111 (a supposed "do everything" platform that wasn't) is perhaps the best known. The Navy fought the push off for a time, but with the introduction of the F-4 the writing was on the wall. They did, however, hang onto specialized mission aircraft (the A-6 for one) longer than the AF did.

Personally, I've never been a big fan of multi-role, especially in a single-seat aircraft. You really risk crew overload, something that I don't think gets enough consideration. Some aircraft can pull it off, but when you look at the example of the A-10 and the performance of the A-6 and its crews over the years I really think there's something to be said for specialization.

[Sargent]

As much as I appreciate my Leatherman, I would not want to have to rely on it in a knife fight.

Funny that you say that. Recently, my husband was looking a new knife to carry on patrol -- the KaBar was just a bit unwieldy (but at least it had been used in combat, and he was proud of that). He laughingly said that the thing he used most was the Leatherman, to cut IED wires, and that what he should really get was a pair of wire cutters. He figured in a worst-case scenario, he could always stab someone with the things.

So the question would be, how many knife fights do you realistically expect to get into? That is, yes, if you train or buy a piece of gear that is mission specific, hopefully you're doing that because it's the most likely need or use. And if the odd "knife fight" comes along, are you smart and adaptable enough to use what you've got to get the job done?

[slapout9]

Smitten Eagle, yes we are drifting off the thread topic, but it it very interesting so may be you should start a new thread? I have some questions and comments. I have a couple of LE knife fight stories to

[Van]

I think Sargeant is on to something though.

In this forum, I don't think I need to walk to dog explaining that COIN/MOOTW/LIC/SASO/Small Wars are the norm and major conflicts like WW II are exceptional circumstances for U.S. forces.

Occasionally, soldiers have asked my thoughts on what kind of knife they should get for the field. One they can make a sandwich with. One they can open boxes and mail with. Because these uses are the norm. Granted, I'll recommend one sturdy enough to defend yourself with at need, but that is an exceptional circumstance.

Analogy is always a deceitful son of a biscuit, but if we don't get carried away with the word games, it might shed some light.

The analogy suggests that the U.S. military, including the Air Force, should be optimized for the norm, Small Wars, but ready for exceptional circumstances, mid- to high- intensity conflict. So in air power, the priorities should be (roughly) airlift, ISR assets, space-based comms, support to SOF, CAS, bombers, and at the very bottom of the list, fighters. Note that this is pretty much the reverse of the AF's current priorities (culturally, if note doctrinally).

And for the cutlery affeciandos; a Spyderco Endura is one I'll recommend, a Mission knives MPF Ti drop point folder is my deployment knife, but when my wife deployed last summer, she carried a Boker Arbolito hunting knife (a Bavarian style hunting knife) that I gave her. All designed for the norm, but suitable for exceptional circumstances in a pinch.