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Thread: HUMINT, Informants and more (merged thread)

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    Default HUMINT-Centric Ops

    Military Review, Mar-Apr 07:

    HUMINT-Centric Operations: Developing Actionable Intelligence in the Urban COIN Environment
    ...Although HUMINT-centric operations and IO may appear distinctly different in terms of their aims, they are closely linked; in fact, they are mutually supportive. HUMINT-centric operations target the insurgent and the terrorist, but in doing so they produce precise and timely information that allows our Soldiers to locate and attack insurgent forces with surgical precision, minimum violence, and minor collateral damage. A corollary benefit is that our actions result in minimal harm and inconvenience to the local population, helping us to convince them that we have the intent and capacity to improve their security and daily lives by eliminating the insurgent threat.

    Likewise, IO synergistically supports our intelligence efforts by convincing the local population that it is in their best interest, personally and nationally, to tolerate and even support our efforts to improve their lives. Through IO, we share with the population the progress that is being achieved politically, economically, and socially, and we ensure that they know about the violence and harm the insurgents are wreaking upon their fellow citizens and their nation.

    Similarly, through IO we are able to let the population know that we can separate and protect them from insurgent-terrorist threats when they have the confidence to share targetable information with us. The more adept we become at conducting IO and influencing the population, the more information the population will provide to enable us to target the insurgents and terrorists. It’s a win-win dynamic....

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    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Default Absolutely

    ...Although HUMINT-centric operations and IO may appear distinctly different in terms of their aims, they are closely linked; in fact, they are mutually supportive. HUMINT-centric operations target the insurgent and the terrorist, but in doing so they produce precise and timely information that allows our Soldiers to locate and attack insurgent forces with surgical precision, minimum violence, and minor collateral damage. A corollary benefit is that our actions result in minimal harm and inconvenience to the local population, helping us to convince them that we have the intent and capacity to improve their security and daily lives by eliminating the insurgent threat.
    That is precisely why CALL Newsletter 05-27 Company-level Stability Operations and Support Operations Vol 3 Patrolling, Intelligence, and Information Operations states that at the company-level IO and INT are one and the same.

    Tom

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    Default HUMINT, Informants and more (merged thread)

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    The Fundamentals of Islamic Extremism: Psychological Considerations for Developing and Managing Counterterrorism Sources
    In this paper, several psychological considerations that may affect source development and management are identified and described. While a host of factors will influence any operation, the focus in this paper is only on the psychological factors that may be useful to those engaged in counterterrorism operations....

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    FM 2-91.6 Soldier Surveillance and Reconnaissance: Fundamentals of Tactical Information Collection, Revised Final Draft, June 2007
    This publication establishes the Army's doctrine in support of the Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2) initiative. The need for soldiers to be aware that basic observations are an important part of operations has led to the development of this manual....

    ...This manual is a compilation of tools to help all soldiers collect information through surveillance, reconnaissance, patrolling, interacting with the local populace, tactical site exploitation, tactical questioning and detainee handling, briefing, debriefing, and reporting in offensive, defensive, stability operations, and civil support operations. Most of the text was developed specifically for patrols and to conduct traffic control points (TCPs) or roadblocks and other missions where soldiers will interact with the local populace including site exploitation and tactical questioning after a planned or hasty raid.....

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    Council Member sgmgrumpy's Avatar
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    Is this FM 2-91.6? a replacment for ST 2-91.6 SMALL UNIT SUPPORT TO INTELLIGENCE Mar 2004

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    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Jedburgh View Post
    Argh! Another AKO restricted one that I'd like to read. Oh well, I'll just wait a couple of days and see if I can download it off one of the irhabist sites .
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
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    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

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    Quote Originally Posted by sgmgrumpy View Post
    Is this FM 2-91.6? a replacment for ST 2-91.6 SMALL UNIT SUPPORT TO INTELLIGENCE Mar 2004
    Here's what the manual itself says:
    This manual expands on the information contained in ST 2-91.6 and provides a foundation for developing tactical questioning and reporting and supersedes all other tactical questioning handbooks produced by the United States Army Intelligence Center (USAIC), specifically the Tactical Questioning Soldier’s Handbook and ST 2-91.6.
    However, the new manual is still a Draft (even if it is Final and Revised). So, despite that paragraph in the Preface, it won't officially replace the others until it becomes approved doctrine.

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    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by marct View Post
    Argh! Another AKO restricted one that I'd like to read. Oh well, I'll just wait a couple of days and see if I can download it off one of the irhabist sites .
    Yeah...gotta love some of the stuff they put behind AKO these days (Armor magazine...come on....).
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

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    AKO Log-in Required

    Note: Also requires access to the Draft MI Doctrine KC.

    TC 2-22.306 HUMINT Support To Targeting in COIN (Initial Draft)

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    SSI, 21 Aug 07: Negotiation in the New Strategic Environment: Lessons from Iraq
    U.S. soldiers in Iraq—from junior to senior leaders—conduct thousands of negotiations with Iraqi leaders while pursuing tactical and operational objectives that affect the strategic import of the U.S. mission in that country. As long as U.S. troops operate under conditions like the ones they currently face while at the same time conducting a counterinsurgency and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operation in Iraq, negotiation will be a common activity and an important part of achieving mission objectives. Lessons from experience negotiating in Iraq can be helpful in future operations.

    This monograph argues that the negotiations conducted in Iraq have tactical importance, operational significance, and strategic implications because of the daily role they play in the missions U.S. soldiers conduct while attempting to secure neighborhoods, strengthen political institutions, acquire information and intelligence, and gain cooperation. The aggregate effect of so many successful or failed negotiations has an impact on the ability of the U.S. military to accomplish its operational mission there efficiently and effectively as well as meet American strategic goals.

    The armed services have centers for lessons learned, combat training centers, and a variety of schools for continued training and development of their soldiers and leaders, but there has been no formal study of the negotiating experience that U.S. military officers and noncommissioned officers have gained and the lessons they have learned over the course of their tours in Iraq or Afghanistan that applies the broader field of negotiation theory and its literature to the practical needs of the U.S. military in conducting those negotiations. This monograph attempts to fill the gap by (1) analyzing negotiations described in narrative interviews with U.S. Army and Marine Corps officers recently returned from deployments to Iraq, and (2) examining the predeployment training currently conducted at the U.S. Army’s National Training Center....
    I put this under HUMINT because for several years this was a pet project of mine - the applicability of negotiation skills to military ops. As a HUMINT NCO operating in the MidEast, on too many occasions to count I found myself involved in negotiations with the indig; sometimes pushed forward by the commander simply because I spoke the language, sometimes by request of the indig as an American rep in an otherwise isolated area, and other instances simply by the exigencies of the situation.

    My opinion then, as now, was that negotiation is simply another facet of the key HUMINT skill of manipulative human communications - negotiation falls right in with interrogation, interview, debriefing, elicitation, mediation, etc.

    In-between deployments I sought out training and educational opportunities to explore that relationship in depth - business negotatiation and "alternative dispute resolution" courses along the lines of Harvard's Program on Negotiation, attending the Bureau's Crisis Negotiation course, and service as a volunteer on crisis hotlines and a community victim-offender mediation program as time and optempo permitted. My command supported me to a degree; but on a couple of occasions they just provided me time through permissive TDY, but all costs came out of pocket. I even wrote a couple of papers linking negotiation skills to operational HUMINT, but they just disappeared without substantive response. In the end, at no point during my time in service did I find real support for inclusion of negotiation training with other HUMINT skills.
    Last edited by Jedburgh; 08-22-2007 at 06:44 PM.

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    The armed services have centers for lessons learned, combat training centers, and a variety of schools for continued training and development of their soldiers and leaders, but there has been no formal study of the negotiating experience that U.S. military officers and noncommissioned officers have gained and the lessons they have learned over the course of their tours in Iraq or Afghanistan that applies the broader field of negotiation theory and its literature to the practical needs of the U.S. military in conducting those negotiations. This monograph attempts to fill the gap by (1) analyzing negotiations described in narrative interviews with U.S. Army and Marine Corps officers recently returned from deployments to Iraq, and (2) examining the predeployment training currently conducted at the U.S. Army’s National Training Center....
    Hmmm we have been doing negotiations STX lanes for 5 years now and we were doing similar exerciese for the Balkans MREs. He went to NTC versus JRTC so he went to the wrong place. So now he wants more training? Everyone wants more training on everything...

    The thing he misses completely is the same thing most miss on this subject:

    There is a very real difference between consult and negotiate. Most try and say negotiations cover consultations. They do not. Consultations may or may not have an agenda. I may want to sound some one out but I am not tring to win points in the process. That is a consultation or a conversation.

    The problem with negotiations "fits all" is that too many leaders do it by the numbers and on the negotiations "checklist" it says "get want you want." It is an art and it takes some time to develop one's style.

    Tom

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    Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom
    Hmmm we have been doing negotiations STX lanes for 5 years now and we were doing similar exerciese for the Balkans MREs. He went to NTC versus JRTC so he went to the wrong place. So now he wants more training? Everyone wants more training on everything...
    I was also able to include effective operational scenario-based negotiations exercises during various types of training exercises conducted at unit-level where I was assigned at different times. However, my point is that (in my personal, biased opinion) I feel that this is an integral part of the HUMINT skill set, and thus deserves to be covered by formal training at the schoolhouse.
    Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom
    ...The problem with negotiations "fits all" is that too many leaders do it by the numbers and on the negotiations "checklist" it says "get want you want." It is an art and it takes some time to develop one's style...
    As I stated earlier, negotiation being just one facet of manipulative human communications, it shares that key characteristic of interrogation and all the other related skills - not everyone can do it effectively. There are plenty of people that can go through all the training available, but when it comes down to it on the ground, they just can't do it effectively. And far too many with responsibilities working with the indig in this area tend to fall back on the worst type of positional negotiation - just hammer away and intimidate until you "get what you want".

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    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Jedburgh View Post
    I was also able to include effective operational scenario-based negotiations exercises during various types of training exercises conducted at unit-level where I was assigned at different times. However, my point is that (in my personal, biased opinion) I feel that this is an integral part of the HUMINT skill set, and thus deserves to be covered by formal training at the schoolhouse.

    As I stated earlier, negotiation being just one facet of manipulative human communications, it shares that key characteristic of interrogation and all the other related skills - not everyone can do it effectively. There are plenty of people that can go through all the training available, but when it comes down to it on the ground, they just can't do it effectively. And far too many with responsibilities working with the indig in this area tend to fall back on the worst type of positional negotiation - just hammer away and intimidate until you "get what you want".
    To borrow from Mark O'Neil, you and I are in violent agreement. My concerns are with this study and its clamor for more "negotiations" training when it is not clear what exactly the term "negotiations" means and who actually needs more training.

    Again we are are in 110% agreement on the issue of this is an art and it needs indepth training--HUMINT guys are natural candidates for it. Where I would broaden this is what I said earlier about consultations. Damn few officers I meet these days have good listening skills--and that makes them piss poor communicators/negotiators/interlocutors. Too many ask questions and then answer them preemptively without ever listening to the response. That is a CRITICAL skill and it is one fading from our ranks.

    Best

    Tom

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    For perfectly understandable reasons, there is not a lot openly available on managing human sources for the collection of intelligence. However, the June 2009 issue of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin does have a decent piece written from the LE perspective that provides some simple, clear lessons with wide application:

    (Note: The LEB does not provide links to individual articles; this article is on pages 3-11 of the linked pdf)

    It’s All About Them: Tools and Techniques for Interviewing and Human Source Development
    .....Because recruiting confidential sources for human intelligence collection constitutes a primary function of the profession and represents the key to any investigation—whether terrorism, counterintelligence, drug trafficking, gangs, or the myriad of other criminal violations—no professional law enforcement organization can succeed in its pursuit of securing the United States from all threats without this valuable commodity. Although the current professionals entering law enforcement are highly educated, technically savvy, and extremely intelligent, some have not had the opportunity to develop the human interpersonal skills that time and experience can provide. Compounding the challenge is the increasing workload that inhibits veteran professionals from devoting the necessary time to mentor incoming personnel.

    One solution that can help alleviate the difficulty of having less time to mentor involves breaking down the practice of relationship building into clear, understandable steps and phases. An effective law enforcement professional and leader can take the “art” of relationship building and make it “paint by number.” To illustrate this concept, the author presents a realistic interview and a followup explanation involving a veteran law enforcement professional and his less experienced colleague.....

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    Default A response to Mr. Owen's definition

    (Taken from another thread and reduced to developing sources point)

    The hardest part is determining whom to kill. The answer is intelligence. Intelligence can be coerced, paid for or freely given. The question is, what is the most accurate? Coercion is rarely accurate and paid for intelligence is frequently misleading. Therefore, the best intelligence is that freely given. And, the best way to get that intelligence is to convince locals you care about the best outcome. The way to do that is to try and wins hearts and minds.

    Michael C. at www.onviolence.com
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 07-11-2009 at 11:31 AM. Reason: Reduced to relevant point / paragraph

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    Michael C said:

    Intelligence can be coerced, paid for or freely given. The question is, what is the most accurate? Coercion is rarely accurate and paid for intelligence is frequently misleading. Therefore, the best intelligence is that freely given.
    This has certainly become the conventional wisdom but it doesn't square with my experience. Police make extensive use of paid informants and coercion is routinely used successfully in both law enforcement and military circles. My experience in Iraq further lead me to become automatically suspicious of anyone who provided me with "free" information. They usually had an agenda. People like to speak in absolutes like these but, in my experience, they rarely hold up to close scrutiny.

    SFC W

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    Quote Originally Posted by Uboat509 View Post
    Police make extensive use of paid informants and coercion is routinely used successfully in both law enforcement and military circles. SFC W
    This comment worries me a little. Please define coercion as it you believe it would apply in American police practice.
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

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    Default Waiting to update

    May drop into this thread comments on informants on the 'Kill Company' thread, before they are lost in that debate on wider issues. Consulting those who have posted first.

    davidbfpo

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    Quote Originally Posted by Uboat509 View Post
    An example I was thinking of might take the form of, "If you don't tell me who shot the victim I will charge you as an accessory." That is not the physical type of coercion that I suspect that original poster had in mind but I believe that the principle is the same. You are attempting to gain information from a source by threat of an unpleasant consequence.

    It would be nice if more people just did the right thing and freely provided information. It would be nicer still if life were like CSI and the suspect would just admit to everything once they were confronted with the evidence. Unfortunately, life is not like that, at least not in Iraq. We have to find other ways to get people provide information, whether that takes the form of paid informants or threats of greater charges or longer prison sentences, or whatever other means that they have within legal bounds.

    SFC W
    Ah so. Good. The old "I really want to help you but you have to give me a reason." argument; let the negotiations begin. I would just add that the principle may be similar to physical coercion, but morally the two courses are in different worlds.

    I don't know of anyplace where life is like CSI.
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

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    It is no secret that every successful UK COIN and CT campaign has been lead by good human intelligence, far more than any "hearts and minds" stuff. No "human terrain teams" either. 90% of intelligence activity was focussed on killing and capturing the enemy. I submit that this is because this is a fundamental premise of all irregular warfare operations.

    The UK COIN campaigns that failed (Ireland 1916-22 and Palestine 1946-48) did so to a great extent because the enemy counter-Intelligence was pretty good. In both these particular cases, former British or British trained intelligence officers and policemen were present in the enemy ranks.

    Moreover HUMINT techniques used in Malaya, Kenya, South Arabia, and Cyprus would today, be illegal by any measure. The activities of the "Research Unit" in Malaya were, as of 1993, still classified.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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