HUMINT, Informants and more (merged thread)

[Jedburgh]

Military Review, Mar-Apr 07:

HUMINT-Centric Operations: Developing Actionable Intelligence in the Urban COIN Environment

...Although HUMINT-centric operations and IO may appear distinctly different in terms of their aims, they are closely linked; in fact, they are mutually supportive. HUMINT-centric operations target the insurgent and the terrorist, but in doing so they produce precise and timely information that allows our Soldiers to locate and attack insurgent forces with surgical precision, minimum violence, and minor collateral damage. A corollary benefit is that our actions result in minimal harm and inconvenience to the local population, helping us to convince them that we have the intent and capacity to improve their security and daily lives by eliminating the insurgent threat.

Likewise, IO synergistically supports our intelligence efforts by convincing the local population that it is in their best interest, personally and nationally, to tolerate and even support our efforts to improve their lives. Through IO, we share with the population the progress that is being achieved politically, economically, and socially, and we ensure that they know about the violence and harm the insurgents are wreaking upon their fellow citizens and their nation.

Similarly, through IO we are able to let the population know that we can separate and protect them from insurgent-terrorist threats when they have the confidence to share targetable information with us. The more adept we become at conducting IO and influencing the population, the more information the population will provide to enable us to target the insurgents and terrorists. It’s a win-win dynamic....

[Tom Odom]

...Although HUMINT-centric operations and IO may appear distinctly different in terms of their aims, they are closely linked; in fact, they are mutually supportive. HUMINT-centric operations target the insurgent and the terrorist, but in doing so they produce precise and timely information that allows our Soldiers to locate and attack insurgent forces with surgical precision, minimum violence, and minor collateral damage. A corollary benefit is that our actions result in minimal harm and inconvenience to the local population, helping us to convince them that we have the intent and capacity to improve their security and daily lives by eliminating the insurgent threat.

That is precisely why CALL Newsletter 05-27 Company-level Stability Operations and Support Operations Vol 3 Patrolling, Intelligence, and Information Operations states that at the company-level IO and INT are one and the same.

Tom

[Jedburgh]

AKO Log-in Required

FM 2-91.6 Soldier Surveillance and Reconnaissance: Fundamentals of Tactical Information Collection, Revised Final Draft, June 2007

This publication establishes the Army's doctrine in support of the Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2) initiative. The need for soldiers to be aware that basic observations are an important part of operations has led to the development of this manual....

...This manual is a compilation of tools to help all soldiers collect information through surveillance, reconnaissance, patrolling, interacting with the local populace, tactical site exploitation, tactical questioning and detainee handling, briefing, debriefing, and reporting in offensive, defensive, stability operations, and civil support operations. Most of the text was developed specifically for patrols and to conduct traffic control points (TCPs) or roadblocks and other missions where soldiers will interact with the local populace including site exploitation and tactical questioning after a planned or hasty raid.....

[sgmgrumpy]

Is this FM 2-91.6? a replacment for ST 2-91.6 SMALL UNIT SUPPORT TO INTELLIGENCE Mar 2004

[Jedburgh]

Is this FM 2-91.6? a replacment for ST 2-91.6 SMALL UNIT SUPPORT TO INTELLIGENCE Mar 2004

Here's what the manual itself says:

This manual expands on the information contained in ST 2-91.6 and provides a foundation for developing tactical questioning and reporting and supersedes all other tactical questioning handbooks produced by the United States Army Intelligence Center (USAIC), specifically the Tactical Questioning Soldier’s Handbook and ST 2-91.6.

However, the new manual is still a Draft (even if it is Final and Revised). So, despite that paragraph in the Preface, it won't officially replace the others until it becomes approved doctrine.

[marct]

AKO Log-in Required

FM 2-91.6 Soldier Surveillance and Reconnaissance: Fundamentals of Tactical Information Collection, Revised Final Draft, June 2007

Argh! Another AKO restricted one that I'd like to read. Oh well, I'll just wait a couple of days and see if I can download it off one of the irhabist sites .

[Steve Blair]

Argh! Another AKO restricted one that I'd like to read. Oh well, I'll just wait a couple of days and see if I can download it off one of the irhabist sites .

Yeah...gotta love some of the stuff they put behind AKO these days (Armor magazine...come on....).

[Jedburgh]

AKO Log-in Required

Note: Also requires access to the Draft MI Doctrine KC.

TC 2-22.306 HUMINT Support To Targeting in COIN (Initial Draft)

[Jedburgh]

AKO Log-In and BCKS MI Net registration required

The Fundamentals of Islamic Extremism: Psychological Considerations for Developing and Managing Counterterrorism Sources

In this paper, several psychological considerations that may affect source development and management are identified and described. While a host of factors will influence any operation, the focus in this paper is only on the psychological factors that may be useful to those engaged in counterterrorism operations....

[Jedburgh]

For perfectly understandable reasons, there is not a lot openly available on managing human sources for the collection of intelligence. However, the June 2009 issue of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin does have a decent piece written from the LE perspective that provides some simple, clear lessons with wide application:

(Note: The LEB does not provide links to individual articles; this article is on pages 3-11 of the linked pdf)

It’s All About Them: Tools and Techniques for Interviewing and Human Source Development

.....Because recruiting confidential sources for human intelligence collection constitutes a primary function of the profession and represents the key to any investigation—whether terrorism, counterintelligence, drug trafficking, gangs, or the myriad of other criminal violations—no professional law enforcement organization can succeed in its pursuit of securing the United States from all threats without this valuable commodity. Although the current professionals entering law enforcement are highly educated, technically savvy, and extremely intelligent, some have not had the opportunity to develop the human interpersonal skills that time and experience can provide. Compounding the challenge is the increasing workload that inhibits veteran professionals from devoting the necessary time to mentor incoming personnel.

One solution that can help alleviate the difficulty of having less time to mentor involves breaking down the practice of relationship building into clear, understandable steps and phases. An effective law enforcement professional and leader can take the “art” of relationship building and make it “paint by number.” To illustrate this concept, the author presents a realistic interview and a followup explanation involving a veteran law enforcement professional and his less experienced colleague.....

[davidbfpo]

May drop into this thread comments on informants on the 'Kill Company' thread, before they are lost in that debate on wider issues. Consulting those who have posted first.

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

It is no secret that every successful UK COIN and CT campaign has been lead by good human intelligence, far more than any "hearts and minds" stuff. No "human terrain teams" either. 90% of intelligence activity was focussed on killing and capturing the enemy. I submit that this is because this is a fundamental premise of all irregular warfare operations.

The UK COIN campaigns that failed (Ireland 1916-22 and Palestine 1946-48) did so to a great extent because the enemy counter-Intelligence was pretty good. In both these particular cases, former British or British trained intelligence officers and policemen were present in the enemy ranks.

Moreover HUMINT techniques used in Malaya, Kenya, South Arabia, and Cyprus would today, be illegal by any measure. The activities of the "Research Unit" in Malaya were, as of 1993, still classified.

[Uboat509]

Michael C said:

Intelligence can be coerced, paid for or freely given. The question is, what is the most accurate? Coercion is rarely accurate and paid for intelligence is frequently misleading. Therefore, the best intelligence is that freely given.

This has certainly become the conventional wisdom but it doesn't square with my experience. Police make extensive use of paid informants and coercion is routinely used successfully in both law enforcement and military circles. My experience in Iraq further lead me to become automatically suspicious of anyone who provided me with "free" information. They usually had an agenda. People like to speak in absolutes like these but, in my experience, they rarely hold up to close scrutiny.

SFC W

[davidbfpo]

Michael C said:

This has certainly become the conventional wisdom but it doesn't square with my experience. Police make extensive use of paid informants and coercion is routinely used successfully in both law enforcement and military circles. My experience in Iraq further lead me to become automatically suspicious of anyone who provided me with "free" information. They usually had an agenda. People like to speak in absolutes like these but, in my experience, they rarely hold up to close scrutiny.

SFC W

The police can make extensive use of informants, but in the UK use appears to have reduced. Partly as there is no extensive legislation and procedures to follow. Secondly informant handling is now for specialists only. At one point experienced handlers were referring old informants to use Crimestoppers, as it was far more secure and paid just as well. In Northern Ireland, many of the police handlers have left and it is a moot point if the coverage Wilf refers to now exists.

An important point - for all law enforcement - is that everyone understands what to do when someone offers to help; usually referred to as "walk-in's". Many in the informant handling field refer to these being the best sources, usually as their motivation is easier to identify and develop.

It can also work in an opposite way. In Northern Ireland a UK Customs officer accompanied a friend to an Army base to complain about his friend being roughed up. The officer he spoke to was offensive and rude (understandably as his regiment had lost men in the days before). The Customs officer became the local PIRA intelligence officer, with an ideal cover to be in the South Armagh area and legally carried a gun.

davidbfpo

[Uboat509]

This thread demonstrates the problem that LE in this country runs into all too frequently. Sure it's great when a walk-in comes in and provides useful information. The success of police tip lines and shows like America's Most Wanted certainly demonstrate that valuable information can gained from "walk-in sources." But there are limits to that. The type of people who report information because it is the right thing to do aren't typically the type of people to be directly involved in the activities they are reporting on. They can only report what they see from the outside. That means that in order to get "inside" information LE still has to get people who are directly involved to give that information up, either by the carrot (money, shortened prison terms etc.) or the stick (lengthened prison terms, higher charges etc.)

It can also work in an opposite way. In Northern Ireland a UK Customs officer accompanied a friend to an Army base to complain about his friend being roughed up. The officer he spoke to was offensive and rude (understandably as his regiment had lost men in the days before). The Customs officer became the local PIRA intelligence officer, with an ideal cover to be in the South Armagh area and legally carried a gun.

Wasn't it James Connelly or perhaps Michael Collins who bemoaned the fact that Irish Republican movement was shot through with informants? In fact, if memory serves, part of the reason that the Easter Uprising of 1916 was such a debacle was that British Intelligence used their network of informants to spread some disinformation.

SFC W

[jmm99]

The intelligence war between the British and Irish Intelligence Services, CIA Studies in Intelligence, V13:1-69-78 (Winter 1969)

[Alsultani]

Michael C said:


This has certainly become the conventional wisdom but it doesn't square with my experience. Police make extensive use of paid informants and coercion is routinely used successfully in both law enforcement and military circles. My experience in Iraq further lead me to become automatically suspicious of anyone who provided me with "free" information. They usually had an agenda. People like to speak in absolutes like these but, in my experience, they rarely hold up to close scrutiny.

SFC W

Hello. I did outside the wire HUMINT in Iraq for 16 months, attached in direct support to a combat arms BN. For us it was a matter of finding people whose interests (self, family, tribe) coincided with ours at enough points to carefully time a pitch to cooperate. Sometimes this required the application of subtle but effective pressure. Arabs in general, but especially in Iraq, are experts in looking at angles for self preservation and are quick to detect bull####, while smiling to your face and telling you what they think you want to hear. Authentic self interest is the best motivator. Information in our AO was never given for altruistic reasons, or because it was the right thing to do. Ever. This is the hardest cultural lesson for beginning HUMINT folks to learn. In addition, less people over time will come forward to give accurate information to a unit whose actions derive from "movement to contact" command philosophy rather than "think to contact." Surgical and accurate kinetic operations, snatch and grabbing the right people with as small a footprint as possible, which begets more intelligence, which leads to more surgical ops....etc.. That's part of what gets people off the fence. I know S3's like to plan these large cordon and search operations, because they make great powerpoint presentations and have cool sounding code names, but shouldn't be done if smaller targeted ops are available. Again, just my experience: operations planned for the sake of operations. I've seen it. People won't risk coming forward if they don't think the unit can effectively act. 95% of our BN's kinetic operations were based on intel from my team, and were very targeted. The use of money: no problem. I don't mind paying thousands of dollars (MNCI Rewards program) to a source who is delivering HVT's. I have enough checks and balances in my AO to know when or if that is a bad idea and how to deal with it accordingly if it becomes a negative. I knew where my sources lived and who their enemies were. I wouldn't call it coercion, but we did eventually reach that point in our relationship where the source realized it might not be a good idea to screw us over. Like I said, mutual points of interest. It didn't have to be said, it was understood.

Knowing where to put pressure in a family/tribally oriented society can reap rewards, including getting members of the insurgency giving you information. Schoolhouses tends to teach in terms of black and white, which is a natural CYA motivated behavior. Counterinsurgency and, I would imagine, LE street intelligence operations should be seeing shades of gray. It was surreal at times meeting covertly with people on our HVT list, and we always made sure we had the right leverage, but the bigger payoffs are what we were looking for and what we got. I would imagine that much of what works best isn't talked about or formally taught. One tends to look at things a little differently when soldiers are dying around you.

I don't say my experience is normative for every HUMINT experience. I operated in a unique, isolated tribal area for 16 straight months, which gave me the opportunity to really master my AO and who was who. After we had proven ourselves, we had 100% support from our supported BN Commander. I'm talking in the context of actionable intelligence developed over months, which is a luxury I know many units do not have. I also had two very squared away CAT II American citizen interpreters who spoke native Iraqi Arabic - again, something that might not be normative.

By the way, sorry for jumping in here. You guys all seem to know what you're talking about and I know some of you have a lot more experience and historical perspective than I do.

[davidbfpo]

Alsultani,

By the way, sorry for jumping in here. You guys all seem to know what you're talking about and I know you have a lot more experience than I do.

We are all still trying to learn and some of our experience is rather dated, 10-20yrs plus. Yours is fresher, even if old "lessons" appear - as indicated - and few here until recently worked so hard in an Arab culture.

davidbfpo

[Dayuhan]

Arabs in general, but especially in Iraq, are experts in looking at angles for self preservation and are quick to detect bull####, while smiling to your face and telling you what they think you want to hear. Authentic self interest is the best motivator.

Interesting comments overall.

I think you might find that the above description does not apply only to Iraqi Arabs. I suspect you'd find similar phenomena wherever people have experienced extended periods of anarchy, or rule by violent and capricious dictatorships, or by sequential invaders or warlords, or other conditions of long term instability and violence. Under these circumstances there is little loyalty beyond the immediate: self, family, clan or tribe. Survival becomes the first interest and self-interest the second, and abilities like detecting bull#### and turning a situation to your own advantage become key survival skills.

Not saying this is a good or bad thing, only that it's something you can expect to find in places where insurgencies flourish.

[Alsultani]

Interesting comments overall.

I think you might find that the above description does not apply only to Iraqi Arabs. I suspect you'd find similar phenomena wherever people have experienced extended periods of anarchy, or rule by violent and capricious dictatorships, or by sequential invaders or warlords, or other conditions of long term instability and violence. Under these circumstances there is little loyalty beyond the immediate: self, family, clan or tribe. Survival becomes the first interest and self-interest the second, and abilities like detecting bull#### and turning a situation to your own advantage become key survival skills.

Not saying this is a good or bad thing, only that it's something you can expect to find in places where insurgencies flourish.

Exacerbated no doubt by the fact that I was operating in a primarly Shia environment in a country that had been run by Saddam. I would be very interested in any book or paper recommendations from council members on these sorts of sociological considerations. As a current DOD HUMINT training contractor I've requested access to the BCKS MI net system to read the paper listed at the top of this thread. Hopefully there is a lot out there.