Powell-Weinberger & COIN/Stability & Reconstruction Ops

[Tacitus]

"that we can clearly state objectives far more easily than we can measure attainment of them;"
Is the small wars council comfortable with this statement? If this is true, I’d question the utility (or even existence) of an objective so vague that its attainment could not be measured. How do you even know if you have the proper strategy, if you can’t measure whether you are getting anywhere near accomplishing it? I’d wager that most wars people have ever thought worth fighting in history have objectives clear enough that the people can identify progress or the lack thereof: wars of independence, punitive expeditions, repelling invasion, seizing territory for annexation. I’d also bet that such vague objectives lead to unfocused activity in the war, itself.

“AND that we may well have to operate without consensus support of either our own citizens or the international community.”
Is the small wars council comfortable with this one, too? In a political system where the voters are ultimately sovereign and politicians must answer to them at regularly scheduled elections, how does a government realistically expect to conduct an extended war without maintaining substantial public support? Has any representative republic ever been able to pull that one off?

[Lastdingo]

As I pointed out before, P-W makes a good point of departure for discussion. Tom makes very good points regarding the weaknesses of P-W.

To modify P-W for our current environment, you'd have to accept the fact that some operations will be undertaken without wide popular support (both domestic and international). You'd also have to be prepared to let some situations remain as they are if it's not safe to send in humanitarian aid and you're not willing to back it with military force. I'm also not at all sure that our political system is strong enough to deal with long-term humanitarian operations.

COIN missions without strong popular support are determined to fail, that's the experience of western forces since WW2 (since Indochina, to be exact).

Small raids can easily be done without popular support and missions of 1993

Somalia-scale can easily be done if the president is in a firm position (not known as dumb, not failing everywhere, decent popularity...).

Lack of international support is a hint that youu're wrong with your intention. You collide with others' strategies, alienate others and spend political capital instead of accumulating or at least preserving it.
Come on, didn't the americans learn something of Iraq?
I mean, after all we told your people it was a dumb idea. All Europeans believed that the idea was dumb - only a couple of governments followed against the preference of their people.
Well, it probably requires a nuclear war or something until the Americans learn the same bitter lessons the Europeans learned - war is bad and should be avoided if that's anyhow acceptable. Going to unnecessary wars is plain stupid and a waste. The collective memory over here contains this information, but this probably requires that the nation was at least once on the receiving end of warfare.

[Steve Blair]

COIN missions without strong popular support are determined to fail, that's the experience of western forces since WW2 (since Indochina, to be exact).

Small raids can easily be done without popular support and missions of 1993

Somalia-scale can easily be done if the president is in a firm position (not known as dumb, not failing everywhere, decent popularity...).

Lack of international support is a hint that youu're wrong with your intention. You collide with others' strategies, alienate others and spend political capital instead of accumulating or at least preserving it.
Come on, didn't the americans learn something of Iraq?
I mean, after all we told your people it was a dumb idea. All Europeans believed that the idea was dumb - only a couple of governments followed against the preference of their people.
Well, it probably requires a nuclear war or something until the Americans learn the same bitter lessons the Europeans learned - war is bad and should be avoided if that's anyhow acceptable. Going to unnecessary wars is plain stupid and a waste. The collective memory over here contains this information, but this probably requires that the nation was at least once on the receiving end of warfare.

I wouldn't say that all European nations are war-adverse...they just tend to pick their spots differently (look at France's record in Africa). And given the flow of international events, they can also wait behind America and clap if it works and boo if it doesn't. They haven't had to act on their own for some time now. I'd say that's more an accident of political events than collective memory. In the case of Germany (and Japan) it's a matter of legalities due to their respective constitutions in addition to international events.

And I'd be careful about generalizing about ALL Americans. But that gets to the heart of my opinion about the political system not being strong enough to sustain a prolonged operation (military or otherwise) of any sort these days. There are too many politicians (and others) who are all too willing to exploit any situation for short-term gains (be they political or monetary) and not consider long-term effects. It's that reality that hampers US policy planning more often than not.

[Lastdingo]

I wouldn't say that all European nations are war-adverse...they just tend to pick their spots differently (look at France's record in Africa). And given the flow of international events, they can also wait behind America and clap if it works and boo if it doesn't. They haven't had to act on their own for some time now.

That's the common myth.

In fact, the USA did not really have to act at all for a long time either.
It's just the propaganda that tells people that wars are needed to keep the world together.

Most U.S. interventions with force had very little relevance (Grenada, Panama, Bosnia, Sudan). Others had much overstated impact (1991 Gulf War for example - without it, we would have had the present capacity shortfall oil price crisis in 199-1994 and not today).
Even Afghanistan is an intervention of doubtful value.
- As long as they're the only nation-wide force that opposes the foreigners, the continuing occupation does only strengthen the Taleban
- The AQ mercenaries/holy warriors in Afghanistan weren't the kind of troops that can be used for terror acts in the western world
- AQ obviously just moved to other countries; they were not completely dependent on that safe heaven
- Without religious zealot Taleban that forbid drugs, opium production did expand greatly.
- More christian troops in muslim countries as occupiers just provoke even more holy warriors... (same in Iraq)

It's also worth to note that without billions of USD each year for Israel and political backing against every UN security council resolution concerning Israel as well as US troops in the Gulf area (on land), there would most likely be no such perpetual conflict as we all (also the allies) are in today.

[Tacitus]

Well, it probably requires a nuclear war or something until the Americans learn the same bitter lessons the Europeans learned - war is bad and should be avoided if that's anyhow acceptable. Going to unnecessary wars is plain stupid and a waste. The collective memory over here contains this information, but this probably requires that the nation was at least once on the receiving end of warfare.

Hello Lastdingo,

No Americans ever on the receiving end of warfare? I can't tell from your profile where you reside, and I don't know how familiar you are with American history.

But not two miles from my front porch is a statue dedicated to the local dead soldiers of the Confederacy. This is not a rare thing. You'll find one in just about every town and hamlet that was around at that time. There's a trilogy written by Shelby Foote on the American Civil War, which will give you a good history of the conflict. Short version: The South was very much on the receiving end of an invasion and destruction of the economy and its armies. I'm not saying their cause was just, but I feel the need to correct any popular impression where you are that no Americans have ever suffered catastrophes in their own towns from war.

Regards,
Tacitus

[TROUFION]

I don't have the time or inclination to engage in the rhetoric of capitulation. irhabi-mufsiduun....

[TROUFION]

I fail to see the “short comings in every aspect.” Let’s review and break it down:

Military action should be used only as a last resort and only if there is a clear risk to national security by the intended target;
--(why would we choose military action as the first resort? Why would we engender the risk to ourselves if there was no national security issue at stake? One could argue in cases like Rwanda and Darfur that the stability of the region is a vital national interest, as well as the argument that supporting the UN Charter on Genocide could also be viewed as a national interest)

The force, when used, should be overwhelming and disproportionate to the force used by the enemy;
--(again we review what is meant by ‘force’. True the force in Weinberger’s terms was military, but then we have SOF (not the DA stuff but FID type), Civil Affairs and Medical units in the military why not consider leveraging these as a use of ‘force’. I again state that force is not all kinetic, it is whatever we need to use to achieve the intended goal of coercion that is military action. As far as disproportionate goes, the counter-insurgent, the government forces, will always need some level of disproportionate effort to overcome the asymmetric adversary: closing bank accounts, massing satellites, buying informants, building schools. These are all things we need to do better than the adversary. It doesn’t matter if P-W was not originally focused on this, what does matter is that it does work for it. Look at the B-52 bomber, originally designed to nuke Russia and today it flys in support of SOF units riding horses in Afghanistan.)

There must be strong support for the campaign by the general public;
--(Strong support, why is this not a solid example of a goal. I totally disagree with Pvebber here, it can be gained, it will almost certainly be gained at the outset of conflict. Steve Blair hits hard on the sustainability side, it will be hard to sustain in the long run, BUT why is it a bad doctrinal goal just because it is hard?)

There must be a clear exit strategy from the conflict in which the military is engaged.
--(Alright why would you commit to military action without an idea of why you are going in, branches and sequels included? To get in a fight with no idea why or how to get out of it is a bad policy. I ask again why would this be poor doctrine or ‘fantasy’.)

1. Is a vital national security interest threatened?
--(again this is a solid criteria for military action, we need to have a reason that is valid. Support of the UN, Genocide prevention, Strategic Lines of Commerce and Communications etc)

2. Do we have a clear attainable objective?
--(When planning to initiate a military action why would you not establish an objective? This is no fantasy, if you cannot articulate why you are doing something, why do it.)

3. Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
--(Risk vs Gain, why would any person let alone a nation, engage in risky activity without estimating the risk vs gain. Your analysis may be wrong and as with any plan, it may change upon contact BUT to not at least try would be foolish)

4. Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted?
--(Military action is a BIG DEAL, it is not used lightly, it should be a last resort, and if you can solve the problem without resort to military action why wouldn’t you?)

5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
--(The key word here is PLAUSIBLE, meaning fair or reasonable, why would any nation engage in a military action without a reasonable end state in mind, a viable solution, that the coercive application of military force is not going to be wasted. You have to have an idea of what you want to achieve.)

6. Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?
--(In particular when you enter a military action by choice having weighed out the potential consequences cannot be viewed negatively. Does this mean you will be right in your assumptions, NO. But to not even consider the ramifications would be negligent.)

7. Is the action supported by the American people?
--(This is a democracy and the people have a say in when and where their military and tax money goes. If when you plan a military action you do not take steps to gain and maintain public support you are already lost. If your doctrine ignores the public the public will drop support fast. A concerted effort to achieve support and maintain it has to be a part of the plan. It will be hard, but in the most media savy country in the world there has to be a way for the Military to achieve ‘overwhelming force’ in the media. But you’d not know if you did not try or put it into doctrine.)

8. Do we have genuine broad international support?
--(Similar to popular support, if you don’t try to get it you won’t get it. If you plan for and try you have a shot, a long shot, but you have to try.)

In summary, The Powell_Weinberger doctrine IS a valuable tool for strategic planning. It has not lost its relevance. It can apply to the full spectrum of operations from raids to humanitarian missions to COIN. I see strength in every aspect. I see a flexible doctrine that will achieve the Nation's goals and interests while also placing us in better stead around the world. It is clear, decisive and coherent. It is not fantasy or naive. It addresses War that a Democracy can wage, it addresses the depth and breadth of conflict AND reconstruction operations.

-T

[Lastdingo]

@Tacitus

Oh come on. I know very well about that Civil War. My history and military history knowledge is good enough for that, but that war is - let's calculate - 142 years in the past.

I'm citizen of Germany, close to Cologne.

When I drive into the city, only about 1% of all buildings look like 50+ years old. That's because it was destroyed by more than 90% in 1945, inhabitants reduced from about 800,000 to 100,000. Comparable cities in neutral European countries look very different, for a reason.
Here are still bunkers sitting around, often with graffitti on their walls but nevertheless easily recognized.
The effect of the fallen heroes monuments in each village about the huge loss of lives in the Great War is pale in comparison to that of the monuments next to them - listing the dead of WW2, a list several times longer in every village.
When I went to horse racing circuit as boy, I always saw a monument that told about how 29 boys of my age were killed when a Flak battery was hit there.
My parents annoyed me with stories about how bad it was in the late 40's and even in the 50's when much of Germany was still destroyed since I was about five.

That was not because of a civil war, but because my nation had invaded others - the link between invading other nations and suffering is clearly visible for everyone growing up here at the age of six.

Our history lessons in school are to a large part about how the bastards got the power, why nobody stopped them and that the big asshole decided to go to war to take away what wasn't ours.
Our history lessons about war are not about generals doing this or that in set-piece battles with fancy colours, half of our nation fighting for freedom and earning glory and such.
It's about drawing lessons from history.

(And I'm a history/military history freak, so I know even more than set books content by orders of magnitude).

The Italians learned as much. Russians, British, French all had their special lessons in the suffering caused by war.

Can you tell me what exactly your family suffered in the Civil war? How often did they rebuild their house? Did one half of your family have to flee and looks at old photos that show their old homes and property ... things that are now part of another country?

The U.S. Civil War didn't teach a strong lesson. Many U.S. families cannot even trace their american tradition back to 1865 because their grandparents came later to that country. Others lived far away from the fighting.
As early as 1898 the lesson about war and suffering were obviously gone in the USA as a completely needless war was begun at that time, marking the end of isolationism.

[Steve Blair]

You make some good points, but it still (IMO) ignores the thrust of the P-W doctrine, which was to AVOID any sort of intervention unless it was a slam-dunk. P-W was pretty much a "yes-no" checklist, and some of those points (like public support) are very hard to get a firm "yes" in. As I recall, if you had more than a couple of "nos" (or questionable "maybes"), P-W called for an automatic "no go" on any sort of intervention.

I think what needs to be done is take some of the basics of P-W and move BEYOND it to something new. Overwhelming force of any sort (including economic or aid) can be easily "spun" by an enemy IO message into "American Imperialism." How do we deal with that concept within a P-W framework? And any sort of COIN is a lengthy operation. Given the political climate as it exists in the US, how does one sustain momentum AND popular support over more than one two-year election cycle? Is it possible to do so?

I'm doing a bit of devil's advocating here, T, because I feel that you're looking for the good in P-W and ignoring or marginalizing its shortcomings. I don't dismiss it out of hand, but I really see it as a basis for something new...taking the parts that do work or can be adapted and chucking those that don't work. P-W was very much a reaction against Vietnam and how that involvement grew over time. It's calculated for small, quick operations.

In reference to your comments in Point 7, given the way the military has bungled a number of media operations (Tillman for one) I'm not sure that they're especially media savvy. Their idea of overwhelming force in the media might do more harm than good.

With reference to genocide, we have to consider national interests beyond physical for a moment. If the US claims to be the defender of human and civil rights (which was a major part of our rhetoric during the Cold War and after...which is what many remember), then defending those rights becomes in a way a part of the moral or metaphysical national interest. This is more Marc's area than mine, but with all the talkin' we do, people will expect us at some point to either do the walkin' or shut the hell up. The UN isn't really equipped to do much about genocide, and one could possibly argue that they aren't interested in doing much aside from passing resolutions.

It's complex...much more so that P-W allows for. That's why I again view it as a starting point or line of departure.

Is the small wars council comfortable with this statement? If this is true, I’d question the utility (or even existence) of an objective so vague that its attainment could not be measured. How do you even know if you have the proper strategy, if you can’t measure whether you are getting anywhere near accomplishing it? I’d wager that most wars people have ever thought worth fighting in history have objectives clear enough that the people can identify progress or the lack thereof: wars of independence, punitive expeditions, repelling invasion, seizing territory for annexation. I’d also bet that such vague objectives lead to unfocused activity in the war, itself.

With reference to the vague objectives statement that generated this reply from Tacitus, I'd say that Americans are obsessed with metrics (as in Vietnam-style body counts, villages fitted with flush toilets, and so on). This can make it difficult to measure the attainment if it's looked at in only numeric terms. There's always that temptation to declare victory when X number of people are housed or Y number of children have been vaccinated. Is that a true measure of success? Possibly, depending on the situation, but not always. This may in fact cloud our strategic thinking...especially when the search for "measurable objectives" becomes an objective in itself.

[Steve Blair]

@Tacitus

Oh come on. I know very well about that Civil War. My history and military history knowledge is good enough for that, but that war is - let's calculate - 142 years in the past.
<snip>
The Italians learned as much. Russians, British, French all had their special lessons in the suffering caused by war.

Can you tell me what exactly your family suffered in the Civil war? How often did they rebuild their house? Did one half of your family have to flee and looks at old photos that show their old homes and property ... things that are now part of another country?

The U.S. Civil War didn't teach a strong lesson. Many U.S. families cannot even trace their american tradition back to 1865 because their grandparents came later to that country. Others lived far away from the fighting.
As early as 1898 the lesson about war and suffering were obviously gone in the USA as a completely needless war was begun at that time, marking the end of isolationism.

I don't intend to continue this past this one response, but I really don't think you have a good grasp of what impact the Civil War had on parts of the US, Lastdingo. Or continues to have to this day. And the suffering of two world wars certainly didn't stop the Russians from going into Afghanistan. Or the Vietnamese from invading Cambodia just a few years after their own decades-long bloodletting. Immediate experience with war doesn't necessarily lead to some sort of greater knowledge, or an inclination to avoid conflict. Look at Africa.

If you wish to blame the US for every problem in the world, that's fine. But don't support it with platitudes about nations experiencing war. If you want to talk about your ideas regarding the European experience of war and how it might have changed the foreign policies of some countries, we can do so in the History forum. But if you want to understand history, you need to look past the slogans and nationalistic generalities and get to the deeper meanings.

Now let's get back to P-W.

[Tacitus]

@Tacitus
Can you tell me what exactly your family suffered in the Civil war? How often did they rebuild their house? Did one half of your family have to flee and looks at old photos that show their old homes and property ... things that are now part of another country?

The U.S. Civil War didn't teach a strong lesson. Many U.S. families cannot even trace their american tradition back to 1865 because their grandparents came later to that country. Others lived far away from the fighting.
As early as 1898 the lesson about war and suffering were obviously gone in the USA as a completely needless war was begun at that time, marking the end of isolationism.

Greetings Lastdingo,

I hesitate to hijack a thread dedicated to an unrelated topic. I can't be sure if you are asking me rhetorical questions about my family history in the Civil War, or you really want to know what kind of impact this war had and continues to have, on this region.

The date was April 6, 1862, before dawn. The place was Shiloh Church, on the banks of the Tennessee River. The man was Private William A. Avery of the 21st Alabama Volunteer Infantry Regiment. My name is Brock Avery. It was not a good place to be for Private Avery and his pals, that day.
http://www.rootsweb.com/~alcwroot/in...st_ala_inf.htm
Later in the morning they were given orders to move the Yankees out of the Hornet's Nest. The 21st Alabama lost 6 color bearers in succession. Needless to say the losses were pretty severe in the ranks. I've walked the battlefield, from one end of the Hornet's Nest to the other. I've stood in front of the Confederate burial trench in that area. Those boys are laid 7 layers high in a mass grave. Somehow, Private Avery lived to tell about this battle, those that made it, those that didn't.

I have more stories like this of other ancestors on my mom's side of the family, and on my wife's, too. One on my mom's side began the Vicksburg campaign weighing 180 pounds. He came out of the siege there weighing 130 pounds.

After the War my dad's people left Alabama altogether. I've never seen any photographs. I don't think there was much of value left to leave. They moved westward into Texas and settled there. They felt the area would be depressed for a long time, and wanted a new start in a place with more wide open opportunities. My mom's people left Mississippi for Texas. The rest is history. That is where I was born and raised.

Often when I drive back from Tennessee to Texas to visit family, I will stop and vist the Shiloh battlefield or the fortifications in Vicksburg. I think alot about my ancestors at such times, and how this war changed their whole world

I will concede your point that Americans in California, for example, and probably most even in the North do not know much about how this war affected their family histories. Down South, though, it is a different story. The past casts a longer shadow. I've spent more than a few evenings on a neighbor's front porch with a drink and a cigar discussing aspects of this war (political, why they fought, military, diplomatic, slavery, social), if you can believe it!

Cologne. I have been there. I only spent a couple of hours there waiting for the train to Koblenz, where I spent a few days of vacation. I was stationed for a while in your country and really enjoyed it. Of course I visited the awe inspring Cathedral. I walked across that bridge over the Rhine to get a good look, to put it in perspective. It is amazing how it survived the kind of destruction rained down on the rest of the city. That's quite a Mardi Gras celebration they have in Cologne.

Regards,
Tacitus

[TROUFION]

You make some good points, but it still (IMO) ignores the thrust of the P-W doctrine, which was to AVOID any sort of intervention unless it was a slam-dunk. P-W was pretty much a "yes-no" checklist, and some of those points (like public support) are very hard to get a firm "yes" in. As I recall, if you had more than a couple of "nos" (or questionable "maybes"), P-W called for an automatic "no go" on any sort of intervention.

its shortcomings. I don't dismiss it out of hand, but I really see it as a basis for something new...taking the parts that do work or can be adapted and chucking those that don't work. P-W was very much a reaction against Vietnam and how that involvement grew over time. It's calculated for small, quick operations.

I do have a question here, you say the P-W is designed to avoid any intervention except the slam -dunk, earlier you said it was designed to avoid conflict. But basically you see it as a doctrine designed to avoid foriegn entanglements. I see that too, to an extent. But I'd like to here a little more as to why or how much more interventionist the US should be.

IMO I see the P-W as a good limiter of intervention (and I am an 'interventionist') it is a good sanity check prior to intervention.

Further, I refer to the B-52 analogy, built for the Cold War and adapted due to the airframe versatility to the GWOT. I see P-W in a similiar vein. In the realm of popular support I see it this way. The general public, and the legislators, like to see military activity in neat bundles. Unrealistic in 99% ofthe cases true. But here with P-W we have an opportunity to influence the people in a positive manner. With it you have a doctrinal jump off point, an avenue to say to them we have a strategic doctrine and we have a strategic plan what we need is your backing. This is easy (generally) at the outset. It is harder to maintain over a long period, but with a solid doctrine as its genesis we are on much more solid footing. P-W was not used prior to the invasion of Iraq, it was expressly set aside as old and antiquated & probably becuase the 8 wickets would not have been achieved.

Another point, the P-W is a strategic doctrine, meaning a very high level, President, JCS, COCOM levels. It should not be translated or devolved down to operational and tactical levels.

-T

[Steve Blair]

You seem quite wedded to P-W, T, as opposed to using it for a point of departure for future doctrine. That's fine...not slamming you for it. Just an observation...

That said, the question of HOW interventionist the US SHOULD be is really a matter of higher policy. I don't think that P-W should be the checklist in the corner that determines that point. And I understand that P-W is strategic. That's the main reason I consider it an isolationist doctrine. In a strategic sense many of its points cannot be reached with 100% certainty unless you're in a total conflict.

Personally I'm not a huge fan of intervention. We don't do it well even when it's necessary to prevent genocides, because our political system isn't stable enough to support it for more than one of the slam-dunks I mentioned earlier. If you think about it, the US goes through some sort of mini-revolution every two years or so. We can't even get some larger disaster aid projects done within our own country in that time (no matter who's president or whatever).

Let me turn that question back at you. How often do you think the US should intervene and in what situations? I'm in favor of intervention in the case of humanitarian disasters provided that the US isn't the one carrying the main load. Political interventions I'm not as crazy about, as our system doesn't translate well many other places and our record here is really bad (due more to the time involved and the above-mentioned political issues within the US). And if we become less intervention-minded, our rhetoric needs to change. "In a time and place and with the means of our choosing" seems a better guiding point to me.

Just rough thoughts at this point, I'm afraid.

[TROUFION]

Not wedded to it necessarily or entirely. I just see utility in it (that and I enjoy a good debate). Ive heard a lot of criticism of the P-W and I believe it tends to be unwarranted, it was a successful doctrine for its time. What I'm looking at is how we take the principles and move them on, I don't see a need to scrap it to create something entirely new. Evolutionary vice revolutionary.

As far as interventions are concerned, I see several types. The best kind is what we are playing with in Africa now, (needs much refining) low level, civ-mil support to governments and peoples on the fence, a mature FID, that approaches internal defense on a mutli-lateral level, meaning it addresses social/medical issues as well as military issues (here I see the plan a s comprehensive or 'overwhelming'). These we should initiate, in a preventive maintence manner. I see P-W as a utility tool here, for instance the POTUS has determined that Africa is a Vital National Interest. From that point we then review the doctrine. Overwhelming 'force'--1 Billion Dollars for AIDS prevention and medication. Show me a terrorist organization that can top that one.

BUT I also see the type of intervention that is thrust upon us by the rogues of the world, when we have no real option but to repsond-911 is the prime example. I prefer the old days when parking a CVBG off the coast would pucker the bad guys into restraint. Unfortunately the new 'enemy' doesn't care about CVBG's threat or deterent effect. We need to be prepared to respond to these vigorously and immediately, in general we are.

It is the interventions in between these two spectrums that are problematic. These are interventions by choice. Making this decsion to intervene (or not to) in cases like iraq, Rwanda, Darfur, Somalia, these are the difficult and tricky decsions. Here is where P-W doctrine works, if it causes the US to AVOID involvement militarily so be it. But at least what can be said is that all options have been weighed.

-T