The team assessed Urban Operations in all stages; namely, Understand, Shape, Engage, Consolidate and Transition (USECT). Findings from the panels were consolidated and vetted through vignettes generated by the SC&I panel. Generally, these findings could be viewed as capability shortfalls, or gaps, in the current Air Force. The team next created visions of Air Force capabilities with all of those gaps resolved and then looked at what steps in capability would get to those capabilities. Those steps became the study recommendations.
General Conclusions
There were some very clear and fundamental conclusions that became evident as the study progressed. Those conclusions were as follows:
a) Urban Operations (Urban Ops) is a three dimensional scenario,
b) The USAF brings a critically important vertical dimension to Urban Ops,
c) The USAF is essential in all five USECT phases of Urban Ops,
d) The USAF has some “star performers” (AC-130 Gunship and Predator/Hellfire) that are highly regarded and frequently requested by Ground Commanders,
e) Unit size for typical ground maneuvers is typically small, either a platoon (40 personnel) or a squad (8-13 personnel),
f) Air support in Urban Ops is not a lesser included case of Conventional Close Air Support (CAS),
g) The desired response time to a call for support from a ground maneuver unit should be in single digit minutes (ideally, one to two minutes),
h) Communications and some forms of ISR are considerably less effective in urban environments because of obscuration, multipath and interference in dense signal environments,
i) While rapid response time in support of ground maneuver units is critical, the number of aircraft (A/C) capable of delivering the desired effects in the airspace over an urban area is severely constrained by airspace management procedures, and
j) When the USAF is able to upgrade capabilities for Urban Ops, many of those capabilities will also enhance other missions (Urban Ops is the “most stressing case” for several capabilities).
Recommendations
As the study progressed through the stages of analyzing shortfalls and generating visions,
the team was then able to identify some specific recommendations that are near term, quantitative steps toward an ultimate capability. Those recommendations are summarized below:
a) Support Joint CONOPS, TTPs and training—At this time, there are no USAF or Joint
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) or Tactic, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) for Urban Ops. There are “practices” that have evolved as Urban Ops continue, but it is extremely important to generate CONOPS and TTPs and make them a part of the overall structure of the Air Force. When those are in place, Urban Ops should be incorporated into the training curriculum and we will then be able to send both Air Force and Joint command personnel to the field fully trained in Urban Ops.
b) Lead Development of a Joint Automated Control Capability (JACC)—To resolve the procedural limitation of the number of A/C over an urban area and to dramatically reduce timelines for delivering effects when called for by ground maneuver units, the team recommends that the USAF lead an effort aimed, in the long term, at an automated, man-on-the loop system that performs airspace management, ISR platform positioning/sensor management, management of an integrated “information system”, weapon-target pairing and modeling and simulation based planning/rehearsal. In the near term, the team recommends that the Air Force work jointly with the Army to integrate real time USAF weapon platform data into the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) to enhance joint fires capability. Another near term recommendation is to define the JACC architecture as a first step toward implementation of JACC.
c) Augment Mobile ad hoc Urban Ops network—To resolve many of the communications problems for ground maneuver units, the team recommends that the USAF build on existing USAF Roll-On Beyond-line-of-sight Enhancement (ROBE) communications node capability by expanding the functionality to include key waveforms used by the ground forces. Then as ground forces transition to more advanced waveforms, the ROBE system can be upgraded correspondingly. In the near term, the team recommends that the Air Force select a platform for this communications node capability and begin upgrading ROBE for this application.
d) Deliver Urban-Tailored ISR—To enable progress toward a multi-sensor Joint Battlespace Information Enterprise Service (JBIES) system the team recommends that the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) be viewed as a point of departure. By utilizing data from DCGS, we can evolve toward an accessible all-source information database and we will have enhanced near term capability that will provide valuable experience in serving various echelons of users in a responsive manner. The team further recommends that all USAF sensors be upgraded to have autonomous geo-registration capability so the information they provide can be properly registered in an all-source database. Further, the team recommends that the on-going Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) sensor management system address cordoning as an important function of a sensor platform. Additional recommendations are to proceed with three dimensional (3-D) mapping capability for urban areas using active laser technology and to proceed with the next phase of “staring ISR” as being developed at Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL).
e) Improve Operations via Modeling, Simulation and Training (MS&T)—The team observed that current efforts in the area of MS&T, particularly as it relates to Urban Ops, are quite dispersed among and between the services and generally not well coordinated. Therefore, the team recommends that the Air Force take a proactive role in ensuring that urban MS&T is pursued as a Joint R&D Development Activity, and that special emphasis be placed on incorporating realistic urban infrastructure models and cultural/social/behavioral models. It is reasonable to expect that capabilities will evolve as spirals and they should be incorporated in operational systems as they become available. Models should be designed to be adaptive and responsive to feedback so they can be used operationally in a “learning” mode. MS&T will also be extremely useful for training/rehearsals, for prediction of outcomes and for evaluations of various courses of action (COAs).
f) Develop weapons tailored for Urban Ops—Legacy USAF weapons are typically highly lethal but, in many cases, are inappropriate for use in urban environments where limiting collateral damage is vitally important and where friendly forces and non-combatants may be nearby. The urban environment is ideal for non-lethal weapons and the team recommends them whenever they can be effectively employed; but, there is still a clear need for kinetic weapons with yields considerably lower than currently available. The team recommends development of a low yield, precision weapons that can be used effectively against targets within 150 meters of friendly forces or non-combatants. The team also recommends that AFRL look at techniques for achieving a cockpit-selectable yield weapon and for a maneuverable air dropped munition capable of vertical decent at low speed into urban canyons. Continued work on non-kinetic weapons such as Directed Energy, Laser and Information Operations (IO) are also important and should be institutionalized so they are considered by a warfighter or planer on an equal footing with more conventional weapons.
g) Develop Joint Urban Ops S&T Plan—For each of the capability visions addressed in the study, there are key technologies required to enable their implementation. As a part of the study, the team worked with AFRL and determined that 30 development areas apply to Urban Ops and that three of AFRL’s eleven future long-term challenges also apply to Urban Ops. The team recommends that AFRL coordinate with the other services and development agencies to develop a Joint Urban Ops Science and Technology (S&T) strategy.
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