Urban / City Warfare (merged thread)

[SWJED]

Need some help and expertise here in regards to urban military operations. While much work has been done over the last decade (as well as a whole lot of operational experience) to improve our capabilities to operate in an urban environment I need to get a handle on what still needs to be done and what we really need to be examining in future concept and doctrinal work as well as in experimentation. I know it is tough to separate urban into tactical and operational bins – but my request is to focus on operational / joint capabilities. But don’t that limit the discussion. Thanks in advance. Dave D.

[GI Zhou]

Interestingly the Chinese are wrestling with this very thing at the moment. They are in awe of US joint operational capability to hit targets using manned fixed and rotary wing aircraft and helicopters, UAS (or whatever UAV/RPVs are called this week), attacking with precision guided munitions (especially ones that create less collateral damage), and most importantly the speed in which US forces can get it brought in. I'm reading Chinese material on it at the moment. I can help that way but am writing a paper which I have to keep closed until late October.

The Chinese initiated a series of trials in the early years of the this century on high altitude and urban warfare. The two things of note in their force structure were:

a. The increase from three to four infantry veehicles in the mechanized infantry platoon. A dedicated HQ vehicle allowed for a smal engineer or fire control team to included in the platoon; and
b. an armoured comand vehicle at the company level to handle all the information and data expected on the modern battlefield.

The only thing I am concerned about, is a shortage/lack of armoured engineer vehicles, and bridge layers in many countries which become vital in urban warfare. The old Centurion AVRE and M728 had a lot going for them. The USMC Assault Breacher Vehicles based on the Abrahms may be too big for many streets and the infrastructure in developing countries.

Also in Vietnam, the 84mm/20pdr on the Centurion (and by association the 90mm on the M48) was found to be able to deal with most targets in villages and towns and still have a sizeable ammunition load. An M1, Challenger etc may not have sufficient onboard ammunition load and is too big for many urban infrasrtructures in the developing world. Is an AEV based on a medium tank chassis survivable in modern warfare?

[Seahorse]

It is my recommendation that experimentation consider adopting a failed (mega-)city scenario for future research rather than the current concentration on failed and failing states. It is my personal intuition that sees a large failed city as a higher potential threat and required national response which would invlove greater military requirements and capabilities, including whole of governement responses than most current concept development and emphasis.

These failures could arise from several causes such as natural (Haiti, New Orleans), resource based (oil, water, food), conflict (war, ethnic cleansing, religion, tribal), crime (Mexican border disputes), financial or demographic etc.

Such analyses may also go a long way towards informing pop-centric COIN strategies for more localized action and tailoring in places such as Afghanistan and Pakistan to deal with these insurgencies which have demanding local variances.

Fianally, a failed mega-city scenario would likely impell governments to act more directly and immediately than a potential failed or failing state scenario.

[slapout9]

This is a different idea....evacuate to a new city and let the old one die as opposed to fighting over it. The author thinks the idea is new but Buckminster Fuller talked about it years ago. It is sometimes easier and cheaper just to build a new city as opposed to fixing the old one.

H/T to Zenpundit for finding this.
http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/paul_romer.html