Urban / City Warfare (merged thread)

[davidbfpo]

A sixteen pgs. paper from MWI @ West Point and near the start a passage:

At the most basic level, however, there is an obvious, but neglected tactical problem in city fighting:simply crossing the street.
The amount of damage and numbers of casualties in fighting in recent years in Raqqa, Aleppo, Marawi, and Mosul show how rudimentary urban warfare tactics remain, as well as the highly destructive nature of combat in cities. Without new tactics and tools for dealing with some of the basic challenges of urban combat, military units are forced to employ extremely destructive methods to reclaim cities from entrenched defenders.

Link:https://mwi.usma.edu/wp-content/uplo...the-street.pdf

I noted a reference to Hue Citadel in 1968, with 90mm tank cannon being found to be useless; my understanding is that the USMC realised only the "big guns" could breach the walls, so called up 155mm & 8" guns to batter a hole in the walls. When the ARVN mounted an assault the NVA/VC had left. Less certain is the tale that the USMC in Hue after a few days called the USMC Library @ Quantico, where a librarian explained how siege warfare had worked and so they reverted to those methods.

Plus the reference to defenders who were willing to die, citing ISIS in Mosul as an example. Yesterday I watched a YouTube documentary on the Canadians assaulting the walled city of Ortona, Italy in 1943 held by German paratroopers, as relevant today as it was then.
Link:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-SO7MoWh48g

[AdamG]

The perfect petri dish.

In 1998, as the setting for his election celebrations, Chávez chose the balcony of the Teresa Carreño, a spectacular, brutalist style cultural centre. Built during the 1970s oil boom and reminiscent of London’s Queen Elizabeth Hall, it has hosted stars such as Dizzy Gillespie, George Benson, Ray Charles and Luciano Pavarotti, and epitomised the country’s new ambition. “Venezuela is reborn,” Chávez declared.

Twenty years after that upbeat address, an economic cataclysm experts blame on ill-conceived socialist policies, staggering corruption and the post-2014 slump in oil prices has given Caracas the air of a sinking ship.

Public services are collapsing, businesses closing and residents evacuating on buses or one of a dwindling number of flights still connecting their fallen metropolis to the rest of the world.

https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2...-latin-america

[davidbfpo]

Discovered via a WW2 blog site and the first article concludes:

During the battle for Ortona, the Canadians innovated, improvised, and successfully exploited the effects of their personal weapons and supporting arms under largely unforeseen circumstances. Following a week of fighting in Ortona, the Canadian division became Eighth Army’s acknowledged street-fighting experts. In serving notice upon the Allies to expect further such battles, Ortona also carried implications. In Britain, armies composed mostly of untried formations waited to open the main ‘second front’ in northwest Europe, where they could expect an equally stubborn and desperate German defence. Ortona therefore merited close study, and received it from training staffs throughout the Allied armies.Canadian assessments figured highly, and they remain an instructive case study in the evaluation of battle experience.

Link:http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo8/...oderso-eng.asp

Amazing that the Canadians learnt so quickly.

The second article in part explains the learning:

The Canadians, recognizing that following standard doctrine would result in heavy casualties, swiftly indulged their tactical creativity, devising methods to make them more effective. The most notable of their solutions was the advent of mouse-holing, whereby soldiers would blow a hole in the wall separating two back-to-back buildings, either with explosive charges or the man-packed PIAT (Projector, Infantry, Anti-Tank) launcher, in order to avoid entering the streets and exposing themselves to fire. This inventiveness gave the Canadians a substantial advantage at Ortona, as the German forces were not only surprised by the switch from conventional tactics, but failed to adequately counter the improvised warfare, instead having to rely on conventional counterattacks, usually under the cover of night.

Link:https://www.seaforthhighlanders.ca/stories/470

The original website thread has other links, which include videos.
Link:http://ww2talk.com/index.php?threads...-ortona.55293/

[davidbfpo]

An Australian Army commentary that aims to:

describe the key tactical lessons the Australian Army can learn from the AFoP’s urban siege of Marawi City. Consideration of these lessons may inform and improve the Australian Army’s current approach to the force generation of close combat, combined-arms capabilities. It will identify the key tactical lessons learned by the AFoP fighting an intelligent, determined, disciplined and well-equipped terrorist threat in the extraordinarily difficult, intense and complicated terrain.

Not to overlook this:

The fighting drove over 400,000 people from their homes.

Link:https://www.cove.org.au/adaptation/a...e-close-fight/

[Bill Moore]

An Australian Army commentary that aims to:

Not to overlook this:
Link:https://www.cove.org.au/adaptation/a...e-close-fight/

I think the Aussies have this right.

Combat shooting, battlefield fitness, small team TTPs and battle craft are more important than any other skill, and must be prioritised. Above all else, the Australian Army must have the ability to deliver small combined arms teams to the fight who are capable of shooting faster and more accurately than their enemy out to 200 metres by day and by night; who can dominate and control complex spaces more rapidly and with fewer casualties; and who can operate seamlessly with other small teams or supporting elements in joint and coalition environments.

High levels of combat fitness, shooting skills, then tactical maneuver skills, and of course communication to facilitate coordination. (Shoot, move, and communicate)

Later in the article, they talked about the need for leadership that enables tactical innovation at the lowest levels.

Then add the game changing technology as the nation can afford it, night vision devises, explosive breaching, etc. A lot of good insights that validate much of the existing urban warfare doctrine.

[davidbfpo]

Another MWI paper (58 pgs), the author being Margarita Konaev; though this time id'd via Twitter and published by a French "think tank".
Link:https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/f...ities_2019.pdf