Urban / City Warfare (merged thread)

[Rex Brynen]

All - sincere apologies for long absence from this forum, and for showing up now, only to toot our own horn.

Well worth tooting, Mike--you've done great things with the site, and the book and discussion look very interesting indeed.

[Mike Innes]

@Rex: Well, then, toot. I have to thank Dave D for being a good web-friend about this, too. A lot of time and effort's gone into putting it together, and mostly just saving money be learning all the webwork from scratch (which obviously means huge costs in terms of time and energy).

Anyway, I hope it fills a gap, can serve as a useful companion to what's going on over here.

@120mm: I assume the message I got offline was from you, so I think we got that sorted. Some institutional filters might block it as a blog, which is too bad. Thanks for the good words.

[SNW]

Sorry for the short notice, the ministry just sent this out:

http://www.geopolitics.ch/en/colloqu...n_conflit.html

No affiliation on my part, just passing it along.

[William F. Owen]

Has the US Solved the Urban Combat Problem

So was the 2008 battle for Sadr City a one-off, the result of unique circumstances? Or is it a model for future U.S. MOUT operations? If U.S.-led coalition forces can dominate urban terrain almost as cleanly and cheaply as open terrain, what are the consequences for irregular adversaries? And how might they adapt?

Readers, I welcome your comments.

Happy to comment. In my opinion it's a one off, because context is everything.
Sadr City is only 6 x 5 km laid out on a near perfect grid, and the US held all the cards, as concerns when and where to act.
Going by what was said at CNAS, what happened in Sadr City is what should happen if you prepare properly for that type of operation. Nothing the US did there was new, or original. It's all urban operations best practice from the last 10 years.

To try and draw lessons across to other circumstances may not give any useful insight, unless the same level of resources and preparation can be applied to circumstance that is substantially similar.

To assume that coalition forces can dominate urban terrain as cleanly and cheaply as open terrain, would be grossly misleading based on the quality of evidence to hand.

[slapout9]

1-I would try and hi-jack some of the US vehicles and use them against them.

2-IED's are just land mines to me and they could be exploited a lot further than they have been without having to use any type of remote or electronic ignition.

3-Animal/insect delivered bio-agent.

4-Scorched earth/ burn the place down since I couldn't get out alive.

5-A lot of off the shelf security technology could be altered/used to give me some of the same benefits you would have.

6-Hand held guided missiles that could be built locally, pretty much by hand.

[Schmedlap]

- Figure out how they gather their intelligence and then feed them information that leads them to conclude that raids or airstrikes must be conducted at x school or y mosque or z children's clinic. Then invite the media for the after-party.

- Sabotage or infect the water supply at the start of summer, creating a humanitarian disaster to blame on the occupiers

- Have 10-year-olds fire mortars and dare the US to fire counterbattery.

- Arrange outdoor meeting places for women only, where even the most conservative women could feel comfortable walking about unveiled only around other women and then accuse the US of using their UAVs to spy on the women to satisfy their perversions.

- Conduct peaceful demonstrations demanding that the US leave; turn it into a media circus where unarmed civilians shout at armed US Soldiers and throw shoes and rocks at them

- Arm insurgents with reflective belts

[Ken White]

- arm insurgents with reflective belts.

:d

[Fuchs]

So the 900 pound gorilla has finally learned how to hit a squirrel without hurting himself too much?
I doubt that this would work against another gorilla.

It's possible to adapt. Camouflage, concealment and deception would work just fine.

The army may have learned to copy police methods (police helicopter support) on larger scale. That's no solution, it's just some support.


Airpower has played an important role in urban warfare before without being a great solution.

(picture is on MY webspace)

[Massengale]

Sadr City 08 was a result of having plentiful and accurate ISR. Not exactly a one-off since if you can get the assets in those numbers (and even more importantly, the people who know how to use them), you can do it again...to the extent you have the resources. That's the rub.

[Massengale]

I wouldn't assume that the defenders going underground makes much of a difference...it might even make things worse...for them.

[Ken White]

Sadr City 08 was a result of having plentiful and accurate ISR. Not exactly a one-off since if you can get the assets in those numbers (and even more importantly, the people who know how to use them), you can do it again...to the extent you have the resources. That's the rub.

Perhaps even a great deal more.

As I often found out in earlier times, I'm also sure the plentiful and accurate ISR only told them of some of the problems they might face. Regrettably, that knowledge does not help much in dealing with those who object to your presence...

Nor does it help in digging out the large number who survive the fire and other support poured upon them -- above or below ground.

[goesh]

I'm not surprised kids got mentioned early in this thread. I'm not sure what role kids played in Iraq other than being light mules, Intel and spotters. Did they engage like the Palestinian kids did? If not, why not? What are the protocols for young teens engaging in non-lethal contact? If I were an enemy commander, I certainly would be exploiting kids more than they are.

Opinion: IDF empowered a whole new generation of Palestinian fighters by using rubber bullets and tear gas. The young teen Palis were psychologically blooded IMO. What rock chucker didn't go home and brag to his sisters and neighbors and mother that he had taken out an eye of an IDF trooper or knocked one down, when in truth he was probably hiding a bruise from a rubber bullet. Said kids after their first 'fight' fully realized that but in a few short years, they would have an AK in their hands and not some rocks. Can the unconventional take this edge way on the ground in real time and stay within the limits of Law? How do you identify personnel who have the knack for bending the unconventional to the upper limits? My hunch is that the Military is more open to this than they have been in a long time.

[jmm99]

goesh
Can the unconventional take this edge way [away?] on the ground in real time and stay within the limits of Law? How do you identify personnel who have the knack for bending the unconventional to the upper limits? My hunch is that the Military is more open to this than they have been in a long time.

I'd be interested in the view of the "Military" here (most of the folks here) on these questions, because the answers would inform my thoughts on the LOAC and ROE/RUFs, etc.

[William F. Owen]

Opinion: IDF empowered a whole new generation of Palestinian fighters by using rubber bullets and tear gas. The young teen Palis were psychologically blooded IMO. What rock chucker didn't go home and brag to his sisters and neighbors and mother that he had taken out an eye of an IDF trooper or knocked one down, when in truth he was probably hiding a bruise from a rubber bullet.

... but rubber bullets and tear gas get used by police and military all over the world. Those weapons don't have that effect on other populations. The other option is 5.56mm ball. That causes a lot more upset.

[Rex Brynen]

September 25, 2009
Cities and the New Wars

Time Friday, 1:00 pm
Type Conference
Location Avery Hall, Wood Auditorium, Columbia University

The conference addresses two major subjects:

The multiple meanings of the new urban wars: asymmetric armed conflict, US Army training for the "urban enemy," forms of economic violence that kill, cities and urban space as a technology for war, reapropriating the city of fear, civil war refugees and their flight from and to cities, measuring human rights violations during war.

The limits of power and of war: the role of the civic, war and law, the growing global web of interdependencies -- all can contest the most powerful states and all can undermine the idea of victory in war. Conditions under which powerlessness becomes complex and transcends mere victimhood.

[SWJED]

Need some help and expertise here in regards to urban military operations. While much work has been done over the last decade (as well as a whole lot of operational experience) to improve our capabilities to operate in an urban environment I need to get a handle on what still needs to be done and what we really need to be examining in future concept and doctrinal work as well as in experimentation. I know it is tough to separate urban into tactical and operational bins – but my request is to focus on operational / joint capabilities. But don’t that limit the discussion. Thanks in advance. Dave D.

[GI Zhou]

Interestingly the Chinese are wrestling with this very thing at the moment. They are in awe of US joint operational capability to hit targets using manned fixed and rotary wing aircraft and helicopters, UAS (or whatever UAV/RPVs are called this week), attacking with precision guided munitions (especially ones that create less collateral damage), and most importantly the speed in which US forces can get it brought in. I'm reading Chinese material on it at the moment. I can help that way but am writing a paper which I have to keep closed until late October.

The Chinese initiated a series of trials in the early years of the this century on high altitude and urban warfare. The two things of note in their force structure were:

a. The increase from three to four infantry veehicles in the mechanized infantry platoon. A dedicated HQ vehicle allowed for a smal engineer or fire control team to included in the platoon; and
b. an armoured comand vehicle at the company level to handle all the information and data expected on the modern battlefield.

The only thing I am concerned about, is a shortage/lack of armoured engineer vehicles, and bridge layers in many countries which become vital in urban warfare. The old Centurion AVRE and M728 had a lot going for them. The USMC Assault Breacher Vehicles based on the Abrahms may be too big for many streets and the infrastructure in developing countries.

Also in Vietnam, the 84mm/20pdr on the Centurion (and by association the 90mm on the M48) was found to be able to deal with most targets in villages and towns and still have a sizeable ammunition load. An M1, Challenger etc may not have sufficient onboard ammunition load and is too big for many urban infrasrtructures in the developing world. Is an AEV based on a medium tank chassis survivable in modern warfare?

[Seahorse]

It is my recommendation that experimentation consider adopting a failed (mega-)city scenario for future research rather than the current concentration on failed and failing states. It is my personal intuition that sees a large failed city as a higher potential threat and required national response which would invlove greater military requirements and capabilities, including whole of governement responses than most current concept development and emphasis.

These failures could arise from several causes such as natural (Haiti, New Orleans), resource based (oil, water, food), conflict (war, ethnic cleansing, religion, tribal), crime (Mexican border disputes), financial or demographic etc.

Such analyses may also go a long way towards informing pop-centric COIN strategies for more localized action and tailoring in places such as Afghanistan and Pakistan to deal with these insurgencies which have demanding local variances.

Fianally, a failed mega-city scenario would likely impell governments to act more directly and immediately than a potential failed or failing state scenario.

[slapout9]

This is a different idea....evacuate to a new city and let the old one die as opposed to fighting over it. The author thinks the idea is new but Buckminster Fuller talked about it years ago. It is sometimes easier and cheaper just to build a new city as opposed to fixing the old one.

H/T to Zenpundit for finding this.
http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/paul_romer.html

[SWJ Blog]

Urban Black Holes

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