Non Kinetic surge capacity for COIN operations

[Jimbo]

DoD is implementing 3000.5, and that is the organization that the directive applies to. This is potenialy a systemic fix, that means it will take time and resources. 3000.5 does not apply to the state department and its organizations.

IGO involvement: Varies based on the role of the IGO. Furthermore, IGO members have a huge say in what the IGO does and does not do. Look at what the UN success rate is. As they say, all politics are local, so what is politically acceptable to IGO members dictates what they do, no matter how much of win-win others might perceive it as.

NGO's will do what their charter allows them tod. they will execute thekir charter provided they have the resources to do it. They will do this regardless of what we want them to do (as ICRC rep explained to me). With NGO's the best you can plan on is bringing them into planning at an acceptable level to enable resources to be used to more effectively.

Private sector: Preety busy right now. furthemore, there are not that many people out there. There are plenty, but the demand is even higher. Many private sector "development" organizations are enaged in other less high profile places. Furthermore, the private sector is going to want high price to surge for the USG.

The civilian side of the USG. Currently, the other other executive agencies all want to particiapte. Generally they are hampered by a lack of resources, particulary budget and personnel. Within some agenciess, there are bureaucratic squabbles over who will do what. These squabbles namely exist over a perception of who will become the penatgon's ne "bestest buddy" and reap the perceived budgetayr reward. USAID is great example, as an organization that should be in the forefront of the "non-kinetic surge", they are still squabbling over the concept that US foreign aid is no longer going to be strictly needs based. Furthermore, USAID has a total of roughly 2000 personnel of whom only 953 are available for overeas operations. 953 for any USAID project anywhere. Despite all of theis USAID is trying, however there budget got cut last year. So there is no short term fix to the non-kinetic side of the surge. I do know that an OSD representaive did state at a conference in Munich in April that the US Military was probably going to have to develop force structure to meet these needs in the future because of the amount of lead time the civilian side of government needs.

As a note (my.02), the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) has a lot of potential. However, the organization running the implementation of the program really does have the bureaucratic expertise to make it happen. They have made some huge errors in getting the program started. It is almost the proverbial you can lead a horse to water, but....

[BronwenM]

Jimbo,

Thank you for your response and I apologize for delay in responding. A couple of thoughts...

I understand Directive 3000.05 relates only to DoD and should have clarified my thought more fully. NSP 44 outlines the need for collaborative stability operations and reiterates the standard expectation that civilians agencies (State/USAID) take the lead on the long term goal to provide indigenous capacities in governance, economic development/viable market economy, and essential services.

The link in Directive 3000.05 to NSP 44 is the statement that DoD will take the lead on stability tasks "when civilians cannot"

My point of discussion is not so much about how NGOs or IGOs could assist DoD in their internal preparations for amping up non kinetic capability in order to fill potential civilian gaps (I agree wholeheartedly with all of your observations on NGOS/IGOs) but how private development contractors can contribute to assisting the DoD in their mandated directive to "take the lead" in these tasks.

I duly note that the use of private development contractors is not "the answer / be all and end all" but offer that this resource should not be overlooked when our military is on the cusp (whether we like it or not) of entering into a "new territory". General Sattler and many others have professed that "we dont have this expertise". I am just offering that there are resources that do have the expertise and those resources, private development firms, operate on contracts and as such strictly follow the direction of the client. Contracts have deliverables - if they are not completed - payment is not rendered for services. Very different from most if not all non profit NGOs or IGOs, as you point out, who operate under grants or cooperative agreements (that allows them to pretty much do what they want).

My thoughts on how development contractors can contribute bore out of discussions with military colleagues in the field. While many of you on this board are aware of development contractors (particularly former and current DATTs), many field commanders I or my colleagues have worked with did not understand who the heck USAID was let alone the variety of players - NGOs and contractors. As such, I just wanted to raise the profile / awareness of the existence of this "fifth pillar" resource to DoD.

There have been some profile awareness as it relates to coordination of efforts (but not so much on the existence of contractors that are willing to work directly for DoD....the assumption is all civilian development workers are NGOs - ie. non profits - who abhor working with the military - that assumption is wrong as some contractors have and do want to work with military - and not only to make a buck necessarily but to genuinely contribute to the current national security needs).

As we know, USAID and some civilian development workers have been periodically briefing outgoing field commanders for awhile now. Yet, there has been a decided upswing in the request for these types of briefings in light of the advent of CERP funds. My colleagues and I were/are invited to help brief outgoing field commanders on the "Civilian players in stability operations" and how the military may coordinate with them in their AORs.

As coordination has increased, there has been a recognition that our expertise can be tapped directly too - beyond these "one off" trainings/briefings. Discussions mainly center around the development of training guides and curriculum development for the various military education institutions but also in direct implementation of activities.

For example, recently, I have been in discussions with Special Ops on IMET requirements. Specifically, the requirement for Train and Equip assistance to establish Civil Affairs capabilities in various countries suffers from a current lack of MTTs. The USG Regional Commands dont have the staff to conduct this training, nor SME ( in some instances) or manage the various potential implementing regional partners.

In discussions with some Special Ops guys, eyes lit up when I mentioned to them my (and other) firms history of civil military relations assistance (mainly policy reform to civilian Ministry of Defense officials but also Role of Military in Democracy, Budgeting, transparent defense procurement, etc) and transitional community engagement programs in conflict or post conflict zones. These transitional community engagement programs (restoring essential services, basic infrastructure, micro-enterprise, public info campaigns, etc)generally were in the form of grants to local organizations, overseen by vetted local staff, and managed via a low profile or sometimes managed "remotely" by US or TCN personnel (ie. expat personnel were in permissive areas communicating with local staff who could travel and work in non permissive areas). This approach minimizes the need for heavy security to contractors. In many instances, central offices in permissive zones (where security is needed) were operating under extremely low profile "hidden" manners and often were assumed to be national companies.

The envisioned Civil Affairs training program objective encompasses both a global overview of the role of the military in a democracy (importance of separation of powers, roles in defining national security strategy, funding, etc) and a transfer of knowledge of "how to engage communities" in support of increased internal stability.

Our experience fit these objectives and it looks like we may be engaging with the military directly to help assist with implementation of these programs.

What I was trying to convey previously, is that if one would look at this collective experience and field operating capability one step farther (beyond MTT training and service member training), private development contractors "could" be brought on to help advise and or directly manage CERP funds, for example, or implement other functions like the conduct of "assessments". Given CERP funds are budgeted for 1 billion world wide for 08, the shortage of Civil Affairs or other trained Special Forces officers begs the question of how effectively these funds will be disbursed.

Regarding CERP funds, there have been many articles that recognize the obstacles current military personnel have with designing, managing and implementing CERP programs. The literature goes on to say that inexperience with selection of local contractors, sub-contract approaches, grant approaches, etc has led to poor program results. Nagl recommends in his writings for "advisors" but I STRONGLY disagree with the associated assumption that USAID officers or other USG agency personnel could do this type of work. They simply do NOT have the experience or expertise. While it may not be rocket science, community engagement approaches and contracting/regulations knowledge requires expertise derived from multiple years of FIELD level experience (rather than HQ national program scopes of work which is what USAID/State folks focus on).

** I would like to add here that I know that not all contractor (or NGOs for that matter) staff are equally talented, experienced, or effective. But, I would like to also counter that not all staff are opportunists bouncing from one country to another (although goodness knows I have met many too). As in any vocation, there are good and bad. And, I agree, that there are not enough "good" firms to assist the US military services across the board. However, I do believe that there are enough reputable firms (who have thorough vetting procedures) to bolster the current cadre of civil affairs officers (which to my understanding is not that many - 2 brigades?).

In terms of assessments, I also understand that there are simply not enough staff to conduct country or specific targeted area assessments (political, cultural, economic, etc) and funding has sat idle due to the lack of capacity to field teams. Currently, there are some traditional DoD contracting firms doing this work (generally open source intelligence) but too often they do not have the "cultural development angles". As an example, many "big" traditional DoD contractors have contacted my or other firms to conduct these assessments for them as they recognize they dont have all the skill sets.

Regarding the Civilian Reserve Corps, I am very skeptical. Plucking politically connected private technical subject matter experts or Dept of Ag or Dept of Commerce or other USG agency officials and plopping them in the middle of a conflict zone is grossly ineffective. Technical know how does not immediately transfer to an international assistance expert. DO some work out? well, yes, but by and large the results are poor. Folks with zero international experience, or internatioanl field experience, let alone conflict or post conflict zone experience, frankly freak out (dont blame them) or try to impose US practices and policies in their formulation of assistance strategies. It does not work. Think - CPA.

- I have written too much so I am going to continue in a separate posting - if you are not already asleep.... Bronwen

[BronwenM]

Also, the shortage of USAID/State personnel is not going to be solved by these USG agency personnel (or private experts - eg. ag professors - from Iowa etc). Why? USAID staff main function is to design national strategies but mostly the lion share of the work is contract management and specific technical program design approaches (do no harm principles, etc). I am continually confounded by the perception that many have that "anyone can do development work". I guess being the daughter of a superintendent and public school teacher makes me sensitive too as it smacks the same way - "I went to school so I can teach" or in some folks mind "I want to do good, so I can do it"

To me, it makes sense to bolster the ranks (therefore funding) of USAID and or in the interim continue to do what is being done to staff USAID missions in Iraq and Afghanistan - hiring more firms that provide the USAID profile personnel (IRG has over 500 folks in the field right now in these roles).

But, as we know, this is not going to happen soon by a long shot. The military appropriately sees that it needs to bolster its abilities so they can be responsive to their mandate. I believe private development firms can contribute to DoD effort to "get up to speed" on these new issues. Why ignore a potential resource available?

Finally, it confuses me why there is an accepted tradition to hire contractors to help with surge capacity in areas that military services are known to traditionally be experts in (Logistics support, camp management, etc) but yet, in an area where there is professed "inexperience", the idea of contractors makes people very uncomfortable? We seem to be "okay" with paying the cost of surge capacity in areas we know well, why not "pay the cost" for surge capacity in a crucial area the military does not know well?

Sorry for the ramble but am afraid I am jet lagged but did want to continue the discussion before too much time passed.

Look forward to your thoughts

Thanks and best regards, Bronwen