Six briefing notes from Chatham House, 30 Sep 08:

Russia and Georgia: Culpabilities and Consequences
Culpability matters. We cannot be ‘forward-looking’ unless we know who we are dealing with, what is driving them and what they are capable of. We also need to know ourselves, particularly when we share culpabilities with others. Culpabilities are shared in this conflict, but they are different in scale and in nature.....
After the Battle: What the August War will mean for Russia's Domestic Politics
Within the past 15 years the Russian Federation has crossed three significant thresholds. When Boris Yeltsin shelled his own parliament in 1993 he launched a new era of personalized power in Russia. The arrest of oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky and destruction of his company, Yukos, in 2003 propelled Russia down the road to bureaucratic capitalism. The August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia — a proxy war between Russia and the West, with Georgia serving the role of whipping-boy — crosses the third threshold. It ends the Perestroika experiment begun by Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s. In so doing, it marks the end of Russia’s latest attempt to secure a firm place for itself within Western civilization.....
The Paradoxical Regional Implications of Russian Actions in Georgia
Several issues arise from Russia’s actions in Georgia that are relevant in the larger Caucasus region. Taking the North Caucasus first, arguably one Russian motivation for military action in South Ossetia was to address its security concerns in the North Caucasus. This has at least two dimensions. First, substantial flows of refugees from South Ossetia into North Ossetia risked the destabilization of the delicate relationship between North Ossetia and Ingushetia (specifically the Prigorodnyi Raion). The near-war between North Ossetia and Ingushetia in 1992 was in part a product of refugee movements from South Ossetia into areas populated by Ingush in this region. The dispute has never been fully settled. A similar movement of people risks generating a return to violence at a time when the situation in the North Caucasus region as a whole remains parlous.....
Russia and Europe in the Aftermath of the Georgian Conflict: New Challenges, Old Paradigms
....In the immediate future, Moscow will try to pursue a path of accommodation with the EU in order to help overcome the effects of August 2008. Russia’s leaders have already confirmed that Russia will continue to recognize that Crimea is part of Ukraine and that the 1997 interstate treaty with Ukraine remains valid. The authorities in Tiraspol, capital of Moldova’s breakaway region, Transdnistria, have demonstratively agreed to resume negotiations with Chisinau. Taking into account the reluctance of Russia’s closest CIS partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to express their full solidarity with Russia’s actions in South Ossetia, it behoves Russia to treat them as a special case, rather than the start of a new trend.

In the longer run, however, it would be in Europe’s interests to find the courage to face the new realities. After Georgia, Russia will feel emboldened to raise its geopolitical game in the region, and this promises to create new tensions not only with Ukraine, but also with Belarus, which seems to have started exploring the possibilities of moving closer to Europe. A Cold War response is neither feasible nor appropriate. But substituting new rhetoric for serious policy revision will not help the EU.
US-Russian Relations After the Events of August 2008
The US relationship with Russia – in steady decline since Russian ‘disillusionment’ over lack of reciprocal cooperation after 11 September 2001 – is now in a state of flux, following the Georgia crisis of August 2008. There are three reasons:

· a lame-duck US administration, with a focus elsewhere: the November presidential election and US entanglements in Iraq and Afghanistan.
· irritation at Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s unpredictability and rashness.
· genuine concern over the intentions of the current Russian regime, mixed with uncertainty over the most effective counter-policy.

This commentary will examine the last two reasons and then offer a brief analysis of Russian views of US policy.
The August 2008 Conflict: Economic Consequences for Russia
Russia’s intervention in Georgia in August 2008 has economic consequences. Some are short-term only; some are likely to be perceptible only in the longer term. In both cases, some effects are beneficial to Russia, and some are harmful.

The likely consequences are easy to list but impossible to measure. There are more negative effects than favourable ones for Russia. That is no guarantee that, in total, the damaging effects will outweigh the positive effects. All the listing can do is provide an agenda for future monitoring, and perhaps some guidance for policy.

One final caveat: several Russian economic indicators – growth, the stock market index and net international capital flows, for example – were already deteriorating before the conflict. Evidence about any negative economic development for Russia after mid-August needs to be interrogated with this in mind. Was that development already visible before 7 August? If it was, do we really have any indication that it was exacerbated by the conflict?