Georgia's South Ossetia Conflict - Political Commentary

[kaur]

Svante E. Cornell, "Pipeline Power: The War in Georgia and the Future of the Caucasian Energy Corridor", Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, vol. 10 no. 1, Winter 2009

http://www.isdp.eu/files/publication.../GJIA-2009.pdf

[kaur]

18.06.2008

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANIEL FRIED, ASSISTANT

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

A good start would be the peace plan proposed by President Saakashvili that Prime Minister Putin has publicly supported. Georgia, meanwhile, must consider to resist the temptation of any military reaction or unwise political demand, even in the face of provocations.

Page 10.

http://www.internationalrelations.ho.../110/43066.pdf

[kaur]

Former Russian minister published in his blog list of South Ossetia officials. Most of them have KGB/FSB/military backround.
This is in Russian. Would you use Google Translate.

http://aillarionov.livejournal.com/75970.html

Russians have made movie about the war.

http://rutube.ru/tracks/1673082.html...8dbbdcaa7dafbf

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 22 Jun 09: Georgia-Russia: Still Insecure and Dangerous

....The Georgia-Russia war ended with ceasefire agreements that ordered an end to military action, a pullback to pre-war positions and access for humanitarian and monitoring missions to conflict areas, but the security situation on the ground remains tense. Russia has not complied with the main points of the truce, and the sides have not engaged in meaningful negotiations to stabilise the situation. These factors create a potentially explosive situation in which even small incidents could spark a new conflict. Russia’s veto on 15 June in the Security Council of the extension of the sixteen-year-old UN military observer mission in Georgia, combined with its apparent determination also to force out the OSCE mission at the end of the month is an unfortunate, potentially grave development that could further destabilise the situation and lead to a new outbreak of full-blown hostilities....

CSIS, 19 Jun 09: Georgia: Why We Should Be Watching

Buried on page A8 of the June 16 Washington Post was a short article entitled “Russia Vetoes Georgia Monitors.” The article briefly outlined Russia’s veto of an extension of the 15-year-old mission of United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), which had been monitoring the situation in the breakaway region of Abkhazia. Coming close on the heels of Russia’s rejection of an extension of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) observer mission in Georgia’s other breakaway region of South Ossetia, Russia’s veto of UNOMIG’s presence in Georgia must be seen for what it is: an attempt to legitimize its recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but more ominously, an attempt to eject all foreign presence—and therefore foreign eyes—from Georgia’s conflict regions. True, there is still a European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia, but it has been denied access to the conflict regions and must be content with monitoring the Georgian side of the conflict line. It would be a relatively simple matter for Russia to manufacture enough instability along the conflict line to chase the EUMM back to Tbilisi. This would leave the borders of the contested zones completely unobserved by members of the international community, making it all too simple for Russia to manufacture a “provocation by the Georgian side” to which it is “compelled” to respond, the same way it was “compelled” to “force Georgia to peace” last August. A resumption of Russia’s war in Georgia, which would be a disaster for the United States and Europe, is not out of the question.....

[Jedburgh]

IFRI, 23 Jul 09: Russia and the "Eastern Partnership" After the War in Georgia

Russia’s military intervention in Georgia in August 2008 sent a shock wave across the post-Soviet space, particularly the republics to the west and south of Russia. In December 2008, the European Union formalized the Eastern Partnership initiative, directed at Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. In order to understand the impact of this war both on Russia’s bilateral relations with these countries and on the Eastern Partnership area as a whole, this article analyzes the reactions of these former Soviet republics to the Russian offensive. Three types of response are observed: keeping distance from Russia; maintaining a balance between Moscow and the West; and, finally, changing course (from rapprochement to keeping a distance and vice-versa) vis-à-vis the former center of the Soviet Empire.

[kaur]

IF JUSTICE were the ultimate goal, Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s president, and Mikheil Saakashvili, his Georgian counterpart, should appear together in court in The Hague. As their countries’ commanders-in-chief, both violated international law during the war in Georgia. So suggests this week’s European Union report on the war. Behind them should sit Vladimir Putin, the mastermind of Georgia’s dismemberment, and the leaders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia who also acted illegally.

http://www.economist.com/world/europ...ry_id=14560958

EU report.

http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 1 Nov 10: Georgian Lessons: Conflicting Russian and Western Interests in the Wider Europe

Russia’s invasion, occupation, and partition of Georgia in August 2008 initially sent shock waves throughout Europe and NATO and appeared to signal a new confrontational phase in Moscow’s relations with the West. This volume places the conflict in the context of Russia’s broader objectives, its internal weaknesses, the limitations of EU and NATO policies, and America’s security priorities.

First, the Georgian conflict underscored Moscow’s determination to reclaim an extensive zone of dominance corresponding with the former Soviet territories. Second, it displayed a shrewd calculation by the Kremlin about the fractured and ineffective Western response, and Moscow continues to test the Obama administration’s rapprochement in pursuing its expansionist ambitions. Third, the 2008 conflict had a lasting impact on the Central-East European and post-Soviet states most exposed to pressures from Moscow. While the former demanded more tangible security guarantees from NATO, the latter either sought accommodation with Russia or intensified their protective strategies. Additionally, beneath the veneer of success, the conduct of the war, the economic recession, escalating separatist sentiments, and faltering attempts by Moscow to make the country more globally competitive revealed Russia’s long-term weaknesses in the midst of its attempted neo-imperial restoration. The study concludes with succinct recommendations on how the transatlantic alliance can more effectively handle Russian ambitions and prepare itself to deter or manage future crises......