Georgia's South Ossetia Conflict - Political Commentary

[jmm99]

The leader of SIP is one Abdullah Tammi aka Risto Tammi (family name means "oak:"), with an varied past.

It supposedly (per Tammi) has a few hundred supporters (registered members).

See (in Finn)

http://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suomen_islamilainen_puolue

I expect the Finnish CT boys are watching - at least, I hope so.

[UrsaMaior]

How tight are the ties within the SCO? Is it comparable to the NATO? Based on the above quotes its members do not want to settle their own territorial disputes (with each other or with other countries) -at least for now-.
Russia might easily get away with it (like the West has with Kosovo). If there is a vote in the UN sec council it surely can enlist an abstain from China.

A bit off topic but will the israelis risk their special connections to China (J-10 Lavi anyone?) by bombing her second biggest crude supplier (ie Iran?)?

[Ron Humphrey]

How tight are the ties within the SCO? Is it comparable to the NATO? Based on the above quotes its members do not want to settle their own territorial disputes (with each other or with other countries) -at least for now-.
Russia might easily get away with it (like the West has with Kosovo). If there is a vote in the UN sec council it surely can enlist an abstain from China.

A bit off topic but will the israelis risk their special connections to China (J-10 Lavi anyone?) by bombing her second biggest crude supplier (ie Iran?)?

How likely is it that Iran might be slightly more inclined to entertain suggestions from its newly found big bro in regards to its aspirations

[badtux]

I am a bit worried about Russia's reliance on western investors.

I don't worry about that. I hope that it gives Russia pause when considering doing more sabre-rattling for domestic political benefit.

The mutual reliance (between Russia and Europe) is IMHO another myth of the Cold War. The EU can hardly offer anything the chinese do not have

Well, except high technology. The Chinese do not have 1st-world technology, other than what they import or what is built in factories owned by Western investors for export. They have a lot of very, very bright engineers, I work with them on a regular basis and they're as good as any new college grad from elite U.S. universities such as UCB or Cal Tech, but they're green as grass and are not yet capable of the full product cycle. There are very, very few Chinese engineers with more than a few years experience, there is such a shortage of higher-level managers that Chinese engineers get promoted out of engineering swiftly, without ever having the opportunity to grow in the profession. I expect a lot from the Chinese in the future -- they are not idiots by any means -- but they're not there yet.

The EU, on the other hand, has an advanced technology already and the Russians are already increasingly dependent upon it. The SU30MKI, for example, has pieces sourced from France and Israel that Russia cannot make for themselves anymore with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the loss of the factories that were in the former Soviet bloc. The T-90 tank's Essa thermal sights are reliant upon technology imported from France. And so forth. Over the long term, integrating Russia economically into Europe proper is a strategy that will result in a Russia that panics at the very thought of a war affecting Western Europe, for fear of destroying its access to the technology upon which it has become dependent. And given Russia's demographic situation, it is not practicable for Russia to re-develop all of this technology independently. Russia has the geographic space and natural resources, but not the people.

In short, while domestic political considerations tend to encourage Russia's government to ramp up the paranoia level and engage in occasional small wars on its periphery, we are not dealing with an expansive philosophy such as Communism or Nazism here, and engagement is more likely to keep the situation as such than isolation. Choosing a strategy for dealing with Russia that ends up with Russia being isolated is thus, in my opinion, less likely to have favorable outcomes than a strategy which furthers their integration into the world economy and thus gives them more to lose by engaging in more than the occasional skirmish in their "near beyond". This of course only applies to nations ruled by pragmatic rulers, rather than nations ruled by ideologues or zealots. But nobody has ever accused Russia's current rulers of being anything other than pragmatic...

[jmm99]

Suojelupoliisi (SUPO), the Finnish Security Police, is self-described here:

The main tasks of the Security Police are
- counterespionage
- counterterrorism
- preventing threats to internal security
- preventive security work
- protection
- participation in fighting international organised crime.

http://www.poliisi.fi/poliisi/supo/h...pages/indexeng

It does not mince words on "radical Islamic terrorism":

In Europe, radical Islamic terrorism still constituted the most significant form of terrorism in 2007. This type of terrorism, which aims to claim as many victims as possible and cause very significant damage to the target country, affected an increasing number of European states. During the year, several terrorist plans were foiled in different countries. Had these plans succeeded, they would have claimed a great number of victims

http://www.poliisi.fi/poliisi/supo/h...8?opendocument

SUPO and its predecessors gained experience during the Cold War when Helsinki was a station for us and them (e.g., Sergei Ivanov was an officer at their residence there).

The immediate post-WWII VALPO was a real piece of work - almost managed a SovCom coup. That is a long story; but it cured most all Finns from trust in the bear - not that many had that trust, anyway.

[Ron Humphrey]

In short, while domestic political considerations tend to encourage Russia's government to ramp up the paranoia level and engage in occasional small wars on its periphery, we are not dealing with an expansive philosophy such as Communism or Nazism here, and engagement is more likely to keep the situation as such than isolation. Choosing a strategy for dealing with Russia that ends up with Russia being isolated is thus, in my opinion, less likely to have favorable outcomes than a strategy which furthers their integration into the world economy and thus gives them more to lose by engaging in more than the occasional skirmish in their "near beyond". This of course only applies to nations ruled by pragmatic rulers, rather than nations ruled by ideologues or zealots. But nobody has ever accused Russia's current rulers of being anything other than pragmatic...

I think most could probably agree with that in part, except apparently Russia as they seem to be spending their time trying to further isolate themselves rather than figure out how to get out of the mess they've gotten themselves in through some sort of political maneuvering which would allow for a less painful extrication of head from backside.

They're in position to be able to get integrated throughout the international stage and really be a major player, the problem seems to be that it has to be their way(which so far is still stuck in the bully and bash context) rather than ways that have been working for so many others who couldn't do it in such a manner and wouldn't even if they had been able to.

[kaur]

To continue badtux list. If I remeber correctly Catepillar engines were used for BMP export versions, a lot of details of GLONASS navigation system are from South Korea and Ukraine, etc

About SCO.

State Security Without Borders

Russia opens the doors for special services from China, Uzbekistan and other Asian countries and allows them carrying out special operations on her territory

http://en.novayagazeta.ru/data/2008/61/00.html

[badtux]

I think most could probably agree with that in part, except apparently Russia as they seem to be spending their time trying to further isolate themselves rather than figure out how to get out of the mess they've gotten themselves in through some sort of political maneuvering which would allow for a less painful extrication of head from backside.

I think what is perhaps confusing you is external politics of Russia vs. internal politics. The primary goal of the ruling regime in Russia, as with most other authoritarian regimes that have ever existed, is to preserve its rule over Russia. Its secondary goal is to improve the strength of Russia's economy and military so that Russia is better able to maintain the style of life that these oligarchs have become accustomed to, but that is a secondary goal. Now, unlike traditional authoritarian regimes that rule via terror, Russia has a very "new wave" authoritarian regime that rules, for better or for worse, via the support of a significant portion of the population. It is not a democracy by any means, but the way Russia's current political system works would not suffice to maintain control of the nation if the majority of Russians did not approve of Putin and the system that he has put in place.

The problem that this dependence upon popular support puts into play, from the perspective of Russia's rulers, is that they then have to come up from time to time with some way to appear heroic to their internal population. There has to be an external enemy which threatens the nation which only Russia's rulers can save the grateful population from. Thus South Ossetia, which gave Russia's rulers an opportunity to play hero insofar as the internal population of Russia is concerned. Wars always inspire national pride and a rally-behind-the-ruler effect, at least until the costs of wars become severe. Successfully concluded wars have even better outcomes from an internal politics point of view. Russia's rulers appear to have chosen their war carefully as one which would have minimal costs insofar as body bags go but have the maximum internal political effect.

They're in position to be able to get integrated throughout the international stage and really be a major player, the problem seems to be that it has to be their way(which so far is still stuck in the bully and bash context) rather than ways that have been working for so many others who couldn't do it in such a manner and wouldn't even if they had been able to.

But again, you are talking about external politics and disregarding the internal politics. It is much like how Saddam Hussein pretended to have a WMD program in order to maintain control over his population. From our perspective from a viewpoint of international politics it looks insane -- all it resulted in was the invasion of Iraq, his overthrow, and his eventual execution. From Saddam's perspective internal to that political system it made all the sense in the world. From his perspective, America might overthrow him, or might not, but if he appeared weak to his local population he *knew* they would overthrow him and hang him sooner rather than later. When you are talking about authoritarian regimes, local politics always takes precedent over international politics. From the perspective of Russia's rulers in Moscow, the invasion of Georgia was a stunning success, giving them not only new enemies to use to scare the populace into needing Putin and his cronies, but also making the leadership of Russia appear heroic in the eyes of the local population. This may all seem counterproductive if you look at it from an external political point of view and consider the effects upon Russia's relations with its neighbors, but if you look at the internal politics of Russia it all makes sense.

What does this mean regarding Russia's future behavior? First, I suspect we will not see any new adventures from Russia over the next couple of years. The Putin gang got their victory, and will be basking in its reflected glory for some time. There will continue to be rough talk for purposes of internal political consumption, but no external adventures. But at some point after that, we will see some other small nation in Russia's "near beyond" picked up, slammed against the wall, and given a mega-wedgie. I suspect it will be near the next Presidential election, when Putin undoubtedly will run for President again.

And one thing I can guarantee you: It will not take place against any nation which has the wherewithal to resist hard and strike hard. The whole point of these small wars is internal politics and the process of ginning up support for the ruling regime in Moscow. That point would quickly get buried under a tidal wave of body bags unless the nation in question had been engaged in significant rhetoric and action against Russian interests. Thus the strategy mentioned prior -- speak softly ("don't poke the bear") and accumulate significant defensive resources to make it expensive to attack you -- is decidedly recommended if you are one of the neighbors that Russia might decide to slam against the wall next.

[Ron Humphrey]

such terms as someone like myself can absorb it well.

It would seem though if I follow that line of thinking it would be very easy for things to get drawn out of control by such circumstances as those "likely candidates" for example doing what they must internally in order to justify " hardening" themselves against said threat (villifying) Russia.

It only makes political sense there as well. How long exactly do Putin and others expect to be able to balance that with what their working at before it ends up causing more trouble than it helps their cause.

LOT's of leaders have tried that throughout history and it almost never works for long. Things get out of control either inside or outside, often both.

Also I thought your example with Sadam was quite enlightening, Either way he's no longer in charge (and hes not breathing anymore either) It would seem no more advisable that they worry less about external politics than that the rest of us recognize the internals.

[jmm99]

Ron made a point - what about the non-bear leader who has to follow internal politics that are contrary to a more rational external policy ? Georgia would suggest that he and his country would be in trouble. If we are talking about that situation being bi-lateral pathological between two ICBM powers, then we would MIRV each other to MAD.

Ran into two different views of a small country meeting the bear - one from now and one then. Both are successive weekly commentaries from Sanomat. The first is dead serious; the second has its comic moments.

HELSINGIN SANOMAT
INTERNATIONAL EDITION - FOREIGN
19.8.2008 - THIS WEEK
COMMENTARY: The international emergency number is 56-68-79-08
By Unto Hämäläinen

When the current EU Englargement Commissioner Olli Rehn was a fresh-faced Finnish student politician-in-embryo in the 1980s, a Soviet politician asked him during some bilateral discussions if he happened to know what the international emergency number was.

Rehn confessed he did not.

“It’s 56-68-79", said the Soviet politician with a broad grin.
.....
The atmosphere in Finland, too, is changing.

Just under a year ago, when Defence Minister Jyri Häkämies announced in Washington that Finland's geographical location brings three main security policy challenges: "Russia, Russia, and Russia", he was practically lynched in the market square back home.

Were Häkämies to deliver the same speech today, it would not provoke such strong reactions.

In historical terms, Finland is now faced with a new and challenging situation.

In 1956, 1968, and 1979, the nation's leaders really did not have much alternative than to hunker down and remain as quiet as a mouse in their own foxholes.

Now Finland's position is rather different. Parliament, the president, and the government can choose between two alternatives: either to join NATO or continue along the old path. And this is also well understood in Moscow.

Russia's most important objective "in the Finland file" is that Finland should remain outside NATO. If Moscow were now to start exerting pressure on Finland, it would also be pushing an EU-member around.

The fear in Moscow is also that then the Finns would rapidly exercise their option of joining NATO.

http://www.hs.fi/english/article/COM.../1135238763197

So, the lack of restraint by the Russians (because of their internal politics) could lead to Finland being pushed to do something (NATO) that would be adverse to Russia's external policy (for Finland). Here, the risk seems to be Russia's, unless it wants to engage in a costly war for little gain.

The situation was far different in 1968, when the Finns believed they were a candidate for invasion. Then it was Prague Spring, which became KGB Autumn. Here's the Finnish story and the merits of restraint.

HELSINGIN SANOMAT
INTERNATIONAL EDITION - HOME
26.8.2008 - THIS WEEK
COMMENTARY: Fears of Soviet invasion in August and September 1968
By Ilkka Malmberg

In the stands at the Olympic Stadium, during the annual Finnkampen athletics meet between Finland and Sweden, the rumour started to go around: hundreds of Soviet tanks had appeared behind the border, ready to attack.

The Kymi Jaegers were in position to the east of Hamina ready to repulse an assault.

In Lappeenranta, Finland’s own tanks had been moved up to the border zone.

It was the last week of August in 1968. Czechoslovakia had been invaded and occupied just over a week earlier.

The news from Prague unsettled the Finns mightily.

The eternal fear raised its head once more.
......
Back in Helsinki, the ship of state tried to hold its course. The government expressed its sadness at the occupation of Czechoslovakia and hoped for a peaceful outcome. It promised to monitor developments carefully. There was no overt criticism of the Soviet moves.

Deep depression had overtaken President Urho Kekkonen.

”Why the hell did I have to go and agree to stand for re-election? Now I’d be a free man to say what I think”, Kekkonen wrote in his diary.
.....
In any event, the rumour-mill had to be stopped somehow.

The then Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto and his Foreign Minister Ahti Karjalainen called in the editors-in-chief of the largest daily newspapers and warned them against jumping to overly hasty conclusions.

Karjalainen stressed that the occupation in Czechoslovakia was not having an effect on bilateral relations with the eastern neighbour, and he warned against stirring things up on the foreign policy front.
....
Another who learnt at the time that one did not go antagonising a superpower just like that was a 21-year-old summer reporter with YLE named Paavo Väyrynen (yes, that Väyrynen, later the chairman of the Centre Party and long-serving Foreign Minister).

Väyrynen had been making a radio report of the demonstrations outside the Soviet Embassy on Tehtaankatu, and had interviewed people taking part in the protest.

But the piece was never aired.

“There was talk that the Ministry of the Interior had phoned the newsdesk”, recalls Väyrynen with some ironic amusement.

“They probably didn’t want to have it told just how large the demonstration was. Or what the mood on the street was like.” .....

http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Fea.../1135238966894

The various military "incidents" and "rumors of war" are quite humorous - today.

Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto, a Continuation War member of the famous Detachment Törni and a fierce anti-SovCom, must have pulled his hair at the un-readiness of the Finnish Defense Forces in 1968.

[davidbfpo]

The situation was far different in 1968, when the Finns believed they were a candidate for invasion.

Why would the USSR consider an invasion of Finland necessary in the autumn of 1968? I too have read the recent Finnish articles on the "invasion scare". Put them alongside the massive demo os the USSR Embassy against the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Finnish Communist party condemning the invasion.

I could be wrong, forty years on, wasn't the USSR reluctant to invade Czechoslovakia? Let alone it's Warsaw Pact allies.

One invasion under the Brezhnev Doctrine of a Warsaw Pact member was bad enough, to then invade a friendly, neutral neighbour who posed no threat, crazy IMHO.

davidbfpo

[jmm99]

Why would the USSR consider an invasion of Finland necessary in the autumn of 1968?

that we can see from the viewpoint of 2008.

The Finns of 1968, having lived in fear of the bear for 20+ years, overreacted to rumors which multiplied. The point of the 2008 Sanomat article was that the government exercised restraint and quashed the "rumors of war".

The Finnish people's reaction against the Russian operations in Czech was quite real - and rational. By that time, the Finnish far left was well on the way to EuroCom, and away from SovCom.

The primary component in the Russian Czech effort was the KGB - a classic political infiltration operation - it brought Andropov some standing in the Politburo. Re-read that story Friday (Mitrokhin Archive, p.247 et seq - then that book's binding fell apart ).

Just finished a 7-part book review post on another discussion board, involving the Mauno Pekkala government of the late 40's. So, my mind is in the wrong decade - and a bit swimmy.

Your 40-year recall is pretty good - want to lend me some ?

Regards to our UK friends.

Mike

[bourbon]

More from Thomas Goltz:

Of Georgia, Jamtland and the Texas Solution. Tbilisi/Baku, August 28, 2008. Pulitzer Center

[bourbon]

Georgia and the Balance of Power, By George Friedman. The New York Review of Books, Volume 55, Number 14 · September 25, 2008.

The Russian invasion of Georgia has not changed the balance of power in Eurasia. It has simply announced that the balance of power had already shifted. The United States has been absorbed in its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as potential conflict with Iran and a destabilizing situation in Pakistan. It has no strategic ground forces in reserve and is in no position to intervene on the Russian periphery. This has opened an opportunity for the Russians to reassert their influence in the former Soviet sphere. Moscow did not have to concern itself with the potential response of the United States or Europe; hence, the balance of power had already shifted, and it was up to the Russians when to make this public. They did that on August 8.

From Mark Galeotti's new blog In Moscow's Shadow:

August 26: Initial Thoughts on Russia’s Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia

August 28: The Intelligence War over South Ossetia

I don't know the rule about linking to a thread on another forum, if it's ok, I would like to link to a thread on Robert Young Pelton's Black Flag Cafe. RYP has been posting Thomas Goltz's dispatches a few days before they are published elsewhere, the latest:

Talking Turkey, or Oil Is Money But Gas Is Power, Istanbul, September 1st, 2008.

[Stan]

The US called on NATO to be better prepared to defend the three Baltic states from military attack, after Russia’s recent incursion into Georgia.

This should make for some interesting neighbors Hmmm, looks like the Nordstream pipeline may be little more than a pipe dream

In Brussels, Mr Volker said NATO was firmly committed to defending the Baltic states from attack because, unlike Georgia, they were signatories to the alliance’s Article 5, which guarantees defence of one ally by all the rest.

NATO must, therefore, send signals in the area of military “planning and exercising” that it intends to help shore up the Baltic states.

“Those countries are members of NATO; so if there is any attack on those countries we will all respond”

“We will have to make sure . . . that the Article 5 commitment is realisable not just as a political matter but as a military matter too.”

[jmm99]

Some differences of opinion have been developing between PM Vanhanen and FM Stubb over NATO, and perhaps as to the Finnish response in Georgia.

HELSINGIN SANOMAT
INTERNATIONAL EDITION - FOREIGN
1.9.2008 - TODAY
Vanhanen: Strong support for Georgia but no sanctions against Russia
.....
Finland is ready for a rapid increase in the role of the European Union in Georgia and in other areas of the Caucasus that have been hit by instability, said Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen (Centre) on Friday. .... On the other hand, Finland is not in favour of sanctions against Russia in response to the war in Georgia and to Russia’s recognition of the independence of the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhasia. ......

http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Van.../1135239093739

Specifically, on NATO, party politics enter the arena, with the SDP not chiming in officially.

HELSINGIN SANOMAT
INTERNATIONAL EDITION - HOME
2.9.2008 - TODAY
Stubb NATO comments raise questions
Vanhanen: Stubb spoke as party member, not Foreign Minister
.....
Recent comments by Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Stubb (Nat. Coalition Party) in favour of Finnish membership in NATO have raised questions in Finnish public debate. .... Last week Stubb said in a speech to Finnish ambassadors gathered in Helsinki that he takes a positive view of possible NATO membership for Finland. .... In a radio interview programme on Sunday, Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen (Centre) wrote off the comments, saying that they were “more statements of the National Coalition Party than the Foreign Minister”. .... The Finnish government does not currently plan to apply for NATO membership. .....

http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Stu.../1135239120512

This week's Sanomat commentary addresses the question of NATO as a defensive alliance - the point made by Stan's post above.

HELSINGIN SANOMAT
INTERNATIONAL EDITION - COLUMN
2.9.2008 - THIS WEEK
Would Georgian NATO membership have prevented Russian military action?
By Raimo Väyrynen

The war between Georgia and Russia will inevitably lead to a re-evaluation of the nature and mission of NATO. NATO has defined itself as being in a state of change. In recent years the emphasis has been on the alliance being more of a crisis management organisation, and possibly only secondarily a traditional defence alliance. This way of thinking was also seen in the NATO report published by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs last December. .....

http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Wou.../1135239124432

It also warns of limitations faced by minor members of the alliance, where a full-scale war would not be in the national interests of the major members; or if that were so, would not be in the interests of the minor member:

(same source)
Each of the minor members of the alliance need to take into account that the leader of the alliance is not necessarily willing to provide assistance in a war that is of secondary importance from its own point of view, especially if the war was started by the alliance partner. This is the strength of a military alliance: it prevents member states from engaging in policies that are unwise. On the other hand, it could draw countries into attacks that they do not want to embark on.

My two cents worth at end.

The FIIA report on Nato (in English), cited in the Sanomat column, is here, with a link to its .pdf file.

From Protecting Some to Securing Many - NATO's Journey from a Military Alliance to a Security Manager
Published 11.12.2007
Charly Salonius-Pasternak (toim.)
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. .... Finland’s relationship with NATO will also continue to change, whether or not it ever joins the Alliance. Finland must independently evaluate and make its defence and security policy related decisions. ....

http://www.upi-fiia.fi/en/publication/10/

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs publication archives (many in English) are here.

http://www.upi-fiia.fi/en/publications/

I ponder whether Finnish reluctance on NATO is due to:

1. A fear that the major partners would not come to Finland's assistance - in that case, a Baltic-Finnish-Swedish alliance (re-creating the 1640 picture, without Ingria) would serve as well; or

2. A fear that Finland would have to send substantial forces overseas - thus, reviving the issues raised by Swedish Crown adventures from Gussy Dullfish to Charles XII, which involved Finnish troops as near a majority of the Swedish forces; and reviving the opposition to forced participation by Finns in Russian adventures (ca. 1810-WWI), which led to the Independence Movement.

I suspect that 2 is more important than 1.

[kaur]

Policy Paper Svante E. Cornell, Johanna Popjanevski, Niklas Nilsson
"Russia’s War in Georgia: Causes and Implications for Georgia and the World",
August 2008


http://www.isdp.eu/files/publication...eorgia-PP2.pdf

ANALYSIS Niklas Swanström
"Georgia: The Split that Split the SCO" CACI Analyst,
September 3, 2008

http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4930

Couple more articles.

http://www.cacianalyst.org/

[kaur]

Europe stands up to Russia

Sep 4th 2008
From The Economist print edition

In fact the most useful cure for the Eurowobbles over Russia lies not in diplomacy but in Europe’s internal market: liberalising the EU’s energy markets and where possible connecting up its internal supply lines. It makes economic sense and does not involve picking a needless fight with Russia. As long as governments like Germany’s prefer to cut separate deals with Russia, Europe’s inevitable dependence on Russian oil and gas will always offer a tempting way for an opportunistic Kremlin to exert pressure on this country or that, by turning off the taps for “pipeline repairs”. Recent promises that Russia will remain a reliable energy supplier should be viewed warily.

But what Russia may come to regret losing most is something Mr Putin longs for: the opportunity to become an accepted European power. He likes to skip over communism’s mistakes and dwell on Russia’s tsarist grandeur. But what did for both was imperial overstretch, a rotten economy and, like Russia’s today, a mostly unaccountable ruling caste that led a proud country to disaster.

The last point is what educated Russians stress. They want to be treated in Europe as normal people, but now this is harder to gain again. This is the problem that even huge PR firms find hard to solve.

http://www.economist.com/opinion/dis...ry_id=12060201

[kaur]

No. 45: Russia and the Conflict in Georgia
4 Sep 2008

This issue of the Russian Analytical Digest features articles about the August fighting in the Caucasus from a variety of perspectives. Specifically, the authors discuss the stages of the conflict, the role of Russia, Georgia and Chechens and international consequences of the conflict. The issue also provides several interviews on the chronicle of military events and Russian public opinion on the conflict.

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/rad/index.cfm

[Jedburgh]

RAD, 4 Sep 08: Russia and the Conflict in Georgia

Dear Readers,

Th is issue of the Russian Analytical Digest presents articles about the August fighting in the Caucasus from a variety of different perspectives. Each article represents the views of its author, but not necessarily the views of the RAD editors. We have tried to be as comprehensive as possible in our selection of texts.

RAD Editors

■ ANALYSIS: Caucasus Conflict Breaks Old Rules of the Game

■ ANALYSIS: Eyes Wide Open

■ QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: Interview with Dr. Viacheslav Chirikba, Adviser on Foreign Policy to the President of Abkhazia

■ QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: Interview with Archil Gegeshidze, Senior Fellow at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS) in Tbilisi

■ DOCUMENTATION: The Russian-Georgian Conflict Chronicle of Military Events, August 2008

■ OPINION POLLS: Russian Public Opinion on the Conflict

■ ANALYSIS: The Role of Chechens in the Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict