Georgia's South Ossetia Conflict - Political Commentary

[Stan]

Yet more competing analysis; contrast this one with the EDM article Kaur posted above....

Window on Eurasia, 13 Aug 08: Was There a Russian Intelligence Failure in Georgia?

Ted, an intriguing spin. After that read I still wonder about the convenient absence of both Medvedev and Putin. Recent history with conflicts puts both the Russian President and PM firmly at the helm. Estonian news had a fantastic clip of Putin explaining to a very red-faced Medvedev, "I was there in the middle of all of it!" with Medvedev just shaking his head to the affirmative.

What might have happened in the Russian intelligence services had worked more effectively? Moscow could have raised an alarm diplomatically and reinforced its position on the ground in Ossetia militarily. Tbilisi would certainly have denied that it planned to do anything and complained yet again about what Moscow was doing.

There is of course one possible justification for Putin to hand out these awards to his colleagues in the intelligence business: Some of them may have been involved in “convincing the Georgian leader and his generals that Moscow would not risk introducing forces on the territory of Georgia.” For such an effort, Yermolin says, it is of course “possible to give awards.”

The latter seems to be the correct version.

[Ken White]

...The Russians are playing well!

Innate paranoia, concern for the 'near abroad' and an extremely strong central directive ability that need not consider domestic politics contribute immeasurably to that.

...I believe that our politicians (impatient Sarkozy, opportunist Berlusconi, weakened Brown, uninterested Merkel, neutralized Bush) are no match at this level of well-planned Great Power contests.
Thy wasted their energies at completely different, unnecessary affairs and neglected real national security and foregn policy.

Possibly. It is also possible that, unlike Vladimir and due to the turnover factor in democracies, they lack the continuity of hanging around for years and years and getting smarter and more powerful. Even worse, they have voters and legislatures to whom they must answer every day. Vlad has some significant advantages...

Not least his will. And being unencumbered with a western sense of what's right. And interior lines. And the FSB...

[Fuchs]

I do still not see how a Russian threat to UK or US might be reduced by Georgian membership in NATO. And I don't believe that you described it.

If France and Germany are not particularly fond of that development, then like France did during the Cold War, they have the right to withdraw from the organization.

It's actually different.
1st: France did not withdraw (completely), but it did not accept its troops to be under NATO command.
2nd: There's actually no reason why members that can veto proposals should leave. They have the right to do so, but why should they do so?
It would make slightly more sense to expect that the member that fails with its ideas would leave.

the US and UK, being the prominent NATO members, have the right to push forward Georgian membership for their own interests, and the right to chastize France and Germany for opposing it.

The have the right, but no point in doing so. They're obviously simply failing on both accounts. The treaty apparently does not give them the right to accept new members on their own, so who cares about what new members they want as long as they fail to get the agreement of the allies? It's just hot air.
The legal situation is obviously such that countries like Germany have a right to say "no". That's completely natural, as a new member state wold mean a new assistance obligation for Germany. There's no way how a state could invent obligations for another, sovereign state.


What you write is correct, but misleading.
The outcome of the last NATO conference clearly shows that US/UK do NOT have the right to accept new NATO members on their own, and to insist otherwise is close to hubris imho.

Do the priorities of the EU and NATO conflict?

It's pretty much the same story as it was in Korea
(or Turkey/Iran - ever wondered why the Turks have so little problems with the Iranians despite being neighbours?).
The USA as a distant country that never really suffered much in war and has only dispensable interests at stake behaves much more aggressive in foreign policy than the regional powers who prefer co-operation over aggressive, pressureful foreign policy.
That's not so much a EU/NATO issue than it is a recurring USA/foreign regional allies issue.

[Ron Humphrey]

Of course that could be because I'm an American

OK, that's an understandable U.S.American point of view, but imho quite superficial.

NATO is first and foremost a collective security organization/treaty/alliance.
It serves its members' interests in national security affairs.
It is not a payment method of U.S. foreign policy.
It is not the United Nations, has no real reason to care for distant countries' national security.

NATO has an open door policy on enlargement. Any European country in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area can become a member of the Alliance, when invited to do so by the existing member countries. For more information on NATO enlargement: http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/

Directly from the NATO website

Maybe you can provide me any hint how a membership of Georgia could improve the national security of European NATO members.

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, formerly the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, allows Allies and Partners to consult jointly on questions of common interest, increasing mutual confidence and reducing the risk of conflict. For more information on the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council: http://www.nato.int/issues/eapc/

Also from NATO site Nato Partnerships

If Georgia had been a part of NATO already would it have reduced the risk of Russia barging in to whip the snot out of them?

It would be a buffer zone for Turkey, but at the same time a buffer that Turkey doesn't need as long as Georgia isn't a member.
Its military strength is negligible.

And I'm sure thats fine unless Russia just happened to decide it didn't want to stop with just the two little areas.

About the Iraq thing; that's not NATO business, but US/UK business. There's no reason for countries like Germany or Italy to thank Georgians for playing auxiliary troops for GWB in Iraq.
The USA is free to agree on a bilateral alliance with Georgia if it desires to do so. That's something that the Europeans couldn't veto against (afaik).

Not sure I hinted there was, that question was directed towards us.
Although I'm quite sure the endgame in regional trade might tend to benefit at least one or two of the NATO countries

Afghanistan is highly exaggerated in regards to NATO politics. Americans might believe that it's a litmus test for NATO, but Europeans do (usually) consider NATO as a collective national security alliance, not as a club for joint overseas expeditions.
The connection between 9/11 and fighting Taleban in 2008 in an Afghan civil war is extremely weak. The initial declaration that NATO collective defense was being activated due to 9/11 was already questionable an considered as a symbolic gesture by many Europeans.

Only question I have here is how exactly does a security alliance that only feels its necessary to exist but not actually physically secure something work. Maybe I mis-understood your premise
I might also guess that perhaps not all members of NATO view it that way.

NATO is the stabilizing (multi)national security institution in Europe (WEU/EU being the backups) and highly successful as such (even keeping peace between greece and Turkey). It is easily justified.

And yet the idea right now is for its backup(EU) as you put it to work out the Russia/Georgia thing.

The USA can leave it if it desires, of course.
(But that would end the US's status as superpower because it depends more on its allies than Americans imagine - remember UN security council veto rights of UK/France & the lack of U.S. bases in Europe, Africa, South America and Western/Northern Indian Ocean without European support?)

Not exactly sure how totally likely that all is but definately food for thought.

[Fuchs]

Your NATO quotes don't seem to be conflicting or be related to me.

Only question I have here is how exactly does a security alliance that only feels its necessary to exist but not actually physically secure something work. Maybe I mis-understood your premise

It secures its members from being attacked since decades. The only imaginable failures were
- 9/11; not covered by initial intentions at all, no real failure
- Falklands: no European UK territory, therefore not covered by NATO treaty; no failure
- Colonial insurgencies liek Algeria: not European territory, therefore nto covered by NATO treaty; no failure
- U.S. embassy in Iran; again, terrain not covered by NATO treaty

A defensive alliance works fine as long as there are no news about it.
NATO does not have the job to secure non-members. That's the UN's job.

And yet the idea right now is for its backup(EU) as you put it to work out the Russia/Georgia thing.

The EU is slightly less threatening, not the least because it lacks the USA as member.

Actually, I don't hink that the EU really influences the Georgia problem. The ceasefire happened when both Georgia and Russia wanted it to happen, and no-one influenced when that happened. It was completely Russia's choice.
And I don't think that the EU will do very much about it in the future.
The EU countries don't have much at stake in this conflict. Georgia could become Russian, and that still wouldn't hurt the EU much. It could become EU member and that wouldn't help the classic EU members much.
It's prety unimportant. There are two oil/gas pipelines and we might need to actually move our asses and build some LNG port facilities to replace Caucasian natural gas, but that might even be benefitial in the long run.

Any involvement in such distant conflicts is really a kind of luxury for NATO members, whereas it's a matter of national price, self-esteem and power for the Russians.
Luxury foreign policy entertainment vs. vital interest foreign policy; the outcome is almost predictable.

Maybe this helps;
Russia has been a distant player in European history. It's been quite irrelevant till about early 18th century, and influential only since the Napoleonic wars. It's been a kind of semi-Europpean people, not really connected to Central or Western Europe because of few waterways till the railroads finally shrunk Europe and created better connections.
The Soviet Union had been detached from European affairs till WW2, and was opposing power in Cold War. Russia is barely 'European'.
The Caucasus is even behind Russia, so distant that it rarely if ever had any impact on Central/Western/Southern Europe.
This kind of cultural/historical/psychological distance is probably greater for Europeans than for U.S.Americans (some of which emigrated from the Caucasus).
Maybe this explains why I consider Georgia as pretty non-vital in EU foreign policy (once the excitement about the current war has settled down).
Georgia isn't much more Europe-connected than Iran or Turkey.

[Ron Humphrey]

Your NATO quotes don't seem to be conflicting or be related to me.

Sorry, I kind of left it to an assumption that it would trace back to why and How NATO got started and where and how it has progressed

http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/index.html

which led me to google where I find-

http://www.mod.uk/defenceinternet/ab...sationnato.htm

First line just the initial understanding I had of NATO

NATO was created as a counterpoint to the expansionist policies and methods of the USSR.

Consider the Georgians own requests for membership and why they were or were not valid:
http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cacheusicjdnm6AJ:www.gipa.ge/public_relations/data/l_tsutskiridze_01.pdf+principles+North+Atlantic+Al liance&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=6&gl=us

It secures its members from being attacked since decades. The only imaginable failures were
- 9/11; not covered by initial intentions at all, no real failure
- Falklands: no European UK territory, therefore not covered by NATO treaty; no failure
- Colonial insurgencies liek Algeria: not European territory, therefore nto covered by NATO treaty; no failure
- U.S. embassy in Iran; again, terrain not covered by NATO treaty

A defensive alliance works fine as long as there are no news about it.
NATO does not have the job to secure non-members. That's the UN's job.

Sorry., my bad I was under the apparently mistaken impression that NATO has actually been moving towards doing more of the latter, due partially to the fact that the UN has had so much on its plate lately.

The EU is slightly less threatening, not the least because it lacks the USA as member.

Actually, I don't hink that the EU really influences the Georgia problem. The ceasefire happened when both Georgia and Russia wanted it to happen, and no-one influenced when that happened. It was completely Russia's choice.
And I don't think that the EU will do very much about it in the future.
The EU countries don't have much at stake in this conflict. Georgia could become Russian, and that still wouldn't hurt the EU much. It could become EU member and that wouldn't help the classic EU members much.
It's prety unimportant. There are two oil/gas pipelines and we might need to actually move our asses and build some LNG port facilities to replace Caucasian natural gas, but that might even be benefitial in the long run.

I'm confused you make it sound like Having the EU negotiate it is about the same as having Russia self mediate. If that really were the case(which I'm not quite sure it is) wouldn't it be even more important that the UN or NATO or all of the above be working it?

Any involvement in such distant conflicts is really a kind of luxury for NATO members, whereas it's a matter of national price, self-esteem and power for the Russians.
Luxury foreign policy entertainment vs. vital interest foreign policy; the outcome is almost predictable.

It's easy to see how much it means to Russia but the first part about Luxury is somewhat baffling to me considering that what happens there does impact many of the Countries around

Maybe this helps;
Russia has been a distant player in European history. It's been quite irrelevant till about early 18th century, and influential only since the Napoleonic wars. It's been a kind of semi-Europpean people, not really connected to Central or Western Europe because of few waterways till the railroads finally shrunk Europe and created better connections.
The Soviet Union had been detached from European affairs till WW2, and was opposing power in Cold War. Russia is barely 'European'.
The Caucasus is even behind Russia, so distant that it rarely if ever had any impact on Central/Western/Southern Europe.
This kind of cultural/historical/psychological distance is probably greater for Europeans than for U.S.Americans (some of which emigrated from the Caucasus).
Maybe this explains why I consider Georgia as pretty non-vital in EU foreign policy (once the excitement about the current war has settled down).
Georgia isn't much more Europe-connected than Iran or Turkey.

Thank you for the education I am hate to go through a day without learning something I didn't know the day before.

[davidbfpo]

The Georgia crisis / war has highlighted the dangers posed to NATO member's security by expansion. Expanding NATO is commendable, largely for it's political impact, very different from national security, even national interest; take for example the impact on Spain's development post-Franco.

I question extending NATO membership further. Some of the recent members could safely remain outside.

NATO as a collective defensive alliance is spread thin already and watching the fringes can be an absorbing factor, e.g. Greece -v- Turkey over Cyprus.

Elsewhere I have read comments that Germany has more national interest(s) at stake in Georgia than most. Yes, smell that oil and gas.

If anyone in NATO wants to accept the liability of proving security to a country like Georgia, have a bilateral alliance and leave the others out.

davidbfpo

[selil]

In some ways it seems as if NATO has run it's course and the EU has subsumed the original intent. Perhaps NATO as an idea makes sense, but as an active participant in the Eurasian sphere has not part. I don't really know. But, the evidence is not looking good.

[AmericanPride]

There's no way how a state could invent obligations for another, sovereign state.

Sovereignty is just a way of saying "don't screw with me while I'm down" because states generally have zero problems screwing with each other. It's also a license to say "I have no obligation to help you". Your statements would be more accurate if sovereignty were an invioable principle but the consistent actions of states demonstrate otherwise. There are many reasons why state's willingly and knowingly violate the sovereignty of others -- from the incredulous to the ridiculous. Now if the United States manages to maneuver its "friends" into a position in which they're obligated to help - great. And if that position happens to tug a little at their moral center, even better. If not, it's no big deal. So as far as France and Germany refusing to tag along with US/UK intentions, they're welcome to disagree to the extent they are capable, but the governance of the NATO alliance is no different than any other political relationship in history. Guarding oneself with principles reveals that one has no power -- it's an inverse relationship taught very cruelly by the Athenians to the Melians. So I very much doubt that France and Germany are at all concerned with issues of sovereignty. Their central position in the continent's power structure is the main issue -- which means unfortunately for NATO evading its security priorities in favor of national economic priorities.

The outcome of the last NATO conference clearly shows that US/UK do NOT have the right to accept new NATO members on their own, and to insist otherwise is close to hubris imho.

I did not suggest as much. States have rights as far as their power extends them.

The USA as a distant country that never really suffered much in war and has only dispensable interests at stake behaves much more aggressive in foreign policy than the regional powers who prefer co-operation over aggressive, pressureful foreign policy.

I doubt the accuracy of your claim about the relationship between proximity and war tolerance as the overwhelming majority of wars take place between neighbors -- and, just a guess and my personal opinion, your idea is probably a W. European explanation originating from its World War and colonial experiences (it's also a nice way to absolve Europe of any of its responsibilities and laying them at the feet of the US, since you know, all of Europe is a collection of "regional powers"; see again my statement about principles and power). States are aggressive when domestic and international pressures compel them, or capabilities enable them, to be; it's not a function of proximity. If it were, Hitler would have been like a pet rock and Saddam a teddy bear. Historically, the up and coming "regional powers" have offered the most difficulty as far as maintaining the peace is concerned. Nobody wants to be dethroned.

[Fuchs]

Your essay about sovereignty is pretty much unrelated to what I wrote.
One country cannot create alliance obligations of a 2nd country.
That's why an alliance member cannot accept new members into an alliance unless the original treaty offered this possibility (and the 2nd country obviously agreed to the treaty).


And you misunderstood the thing about distance a lot.

The USA can play politics and accept risks overseas because most of the time it risks very little.

Koreans whose relatives would be killed in a Korean conflict are much more eager to co-operate with NK than to exert pressure.

Europeans who had their continent devastated by two World Wars and lived decades with the prospect of annihilation in the 3rd edition are much more eager to create an environment of co-operation than to exert pressure on Russia for very minor issues.

The USA is behaving like a broker at a stock exchange who trades with other people's money - with little regard to and understanding of risk. That happens to crash sometimes.

U.S. foreign secretarties can meddle in Central Asian and Causcasian affairs at will - the money spent is taxpayer's money and foreign countries will be devastated by war if the game is lost. There's not really something important that they could lose - that allows for a very risky policy.

Europeans are closer, have more at stake and tend to behave differently.

----

The simple fact that most countries are between neighbours is explained by the fact that most countries have their very real conflicts with their neighbours and don't go around half the world to play war where they don't belong to. That habit is - thank God - limited to only about four countries.

[jmm99]

Good work, Sergei & Co.....

[Russian-Georgian Accords from NY Times]
....
4. Georgian military forces must withdraw to their normal bases of encampment.

5. Russian military forces must withdraw to the lines prior to the start of hostilities. While awaiting an international mechanism, Russian peacekeeping forces will implement additional security measures (six months).

http://graphics8.nytimes.com/package...GIA_ACCORD.pdf

Nice to have Russian peacekeepers in charge of "additional security measures"; and Georgians under "house arrest".

Perhaps, the ICJ will come to Georgia's rescue - and gum Ivan to death.

NY Times
Georgia Files Suit Against Russia, Charging Racial Discrimination
By MARLISE SIMONS
Published: August 13, 2008

PARIS — Georgia has filed a lawsuit against Russia at the International Court of Justice in The Hague for its actions in and around the territory of Georgia from 1991 to 2008, the court said in a statement.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/14/wo...ll&oref=slogin

[SWJED]

Russia-Georgia: Early Take
By Bob Killebrew, SWJ Blog

The impact of the Russian attack on Georgia is still being assessed around the world, in that slow-motion way that global events have on governments. Getting the full picture of what's going on will take a few weeks yet. But this much seems to be clear.

First, there's no illusion about who's running Russia. Vladimir Putin is clearly the effective head of state, flying from the Beijing Olympics to southern Russia to oversee military operations and to dominate Russian TV. The return of strongman rule to Russia, and particularly one who regards the demise of the Soviet Union as a historic catastrophe, is now a fact of international life to which we will all have to adjust to.

Second, Putin and his government are attempting to establish the legitimacy of a Russian sphere of influence that looks very much like a reestablishment of the old Soviet empire. This is the core of an enormously sophisticated information campaign that is having some success -- at least around Washington -- in appealing to the realpolitik crowd who look for excuses for inaction in the case of a Russian invasion of their democratic neighbor. The invasion of Georgia was accompanied by an information campaign based on the idea that Russia has a right to intervene anywhere that the "dignity" of Russian minorities is threatened. Since there are Russian minorities in every former Soviet state of the old empire, this is an attempt to establish a "sphere of influence" precedent that must chill newly independent states still struggling with democracy.

From a military perspective, the first impression is that the Russians laid an effective "strategic ambush" for Georgia President Mikhail Saakashvilli, inciting anti-government attacks in South Ossetia by local militias and then responding to the Georgian offensive with a well-planned and rehearsed offensive of their own. Even when viewed through the imperfect lens of news media scrambling to catch up to events, military experts understand that the joint and combined-arms attacks Russia staged in the opening hours of the war were anything but spontaneous. For historians, a retrospective on Nazi Germany's offensive to "protect" the Sudaten Czechs shows a striking similarity of purpose and method...

Much more at the link.

[Ron Humphrey]

Russia-Georgia: Early Take
By Bob Killebrew, SWJ Blog



Much more at the link.

I just hope the main message there is heeded where it needs to be

[Fuchs]

It's "Sudeten", not "Sudaten", and the comparison is nonsense anyway.
Even Bosnia would make more sense as comparison.


The article is clearly a U.S.-only article, with no different point of view included.

Two assumptions are questionable:

1) To cofront Russia is a good idea. Actually, it doesn't even question whether Russia should be confronted. It simply assumes that it needs to be done, for whatever reason.

As scholar Fred Kagan said recently, there is a "new axis" of anti-Russian democracies around the edge of the old Soviet empire. Supporting those states and securing their future must be a top priority for the U.S. and NATO

This would require an article-long explanation. Instead, he assumes it as true.
It may sound cynically, but what's the damage to USA/NATO if all of Caucasus and Ukraine even became Russian?

2) The author assumes that the USA is in a position to confront Russia through proxies in Russia's periphery and pretty much ignores Europe.

--------------------------------

The Georgia/SouthOssetia/Russia War (however that will be called by historians) tells us a bit about Russia and its periphery, and about a half-hearted commitment of the USA in the region.

But there's more.
Even though the arrangement of a cease-fire most likely (tempted to write "certainly") only happened at the time set by Russia, it was done by EU council president/French president Sarkozy, not by Olympia spectator Bush.
The U.S. government fell awfully short of the typical American asumption of relevance to foreign conflict several times in the past years; remember Kenya crisis and Zimbabwe crisis?
A Georgian government felt backed by the Western world because it gave GWB some auxiliary troops and got some U.S. advisors and equipment.
That was an awful mistake.

The red line that Russia won't step over is called "NATO", not "friend of USA".

That will have implications in Central Asia (where the USA cannot establish any meaningful military presence without Russian persmission simply due to logistics). Uzbekistan, Kasachstan, Kirgizistan... - that are and will be firm CIS countries, and cannot be very Western-friendly without Russian permission at all.

The U.S.'s ability to influence the Caucasus depends on Turkey. As long as the Turks are occupied by domestic politics and not eager to wage a Caucasian Cold War, there's no real power base for the USA in the Caucasus region. Romania could be discussed as possible substitute, but it's clearly inferior to Turkey as a base.

The Western ability to influence the situation of Ukraine is very open to discussion. Significant (and wealthy) parts of Ukraine have a strong Russian majority. A Western (NATO) Ukraine would be a mortal threat to Russia (check the distance to Moscow - Russians demonstrated the inability to accept foreign powers being close to Moscow repeatedly).
Ukraine's ties to Western Europe are very thin - culturally, economically, politically.

[AmericanPride]

One country cannot create alliance obligations of a 2nd country.

"The strong do what they can while the weak suffer what they must." It's a basic principle of power politics. What the on-going drama in NATO demonstrates is not that "one country cannot create alliance obligations of a 2nd country" -- it's that the United States has lost significant influence to France and Germany in regards to NATO governance, and for a variety of reasons. But let's consider this scenario in creating security obligations of a 2nd country: the US enters a bilateral agreement with Georgia to provide for its defense. Knowing this, and motivated by whatever imperial intent, Russia strikes Georgia and preemptively strikes US assets in the region to cripple an American response. Since the NATO agreement requires members to come to the aid of any other member under external attack in the greater European region, all NATO members are now indirectly obligated to respond to Russia's assault on Georgia via America. So -- yes -- one country can create obligations for another country through political maneuvering. Here's another: China strikes Taiwan, and hoping to cripple possible US intervention, aims its missiles at US naval and air forces in South Korea and Japan. By defending Taiwan, and placing its forces in those two countries, the US has created de facto security obligations for the RoK and Japan to Taiwan's advantage. A real example: French withdrawal from the NATO integrated command and removal of NATO headquarters from Paris. The French understood that a Russian attack on France, for whatever reason, would necessarily involve West Germany. There was no reason for France to commit to the alliance in any meaningful way. Thus, France created de facto alliance obligations for Germany, the UK, the US, and ultimately NATO through political maneuvering. So your assumption that a country cannot be manipulated into new obligations is wrong. Georgia's (and Ukraine's) membership bids failed in NATO because Germany and France, to the detriment of the alliance, can no longer maintain the collective security obligations vis-a-vis managing the Russian threat. It's not because they are weak-willed, or are somehow more prone to peace because of their history, or some other ideological non-sense. It's because they presently have a greater pay-off at home continuing to cooperate with Russia than to jump on board with the general opinion of their NATO counterparts. Intentional or not, Russia has taken advantage of the divisions within NATO enabled by France and Germany's great power ambitions. Germany is more interested in Nord Stream than reigning in Russia's own ambitions.

EDIT: Ask yourself this: if Russia had "intentionally" (it's quoted because intentions and accidents are interchangeable in politics based on need) killed US advisers in Georgia, would the US have the right to activate the NATO treaty in its own defense and consequently obligate NATO to challenging Russia?

Europeans who had their continent devastated by two World Wars and lived decades with the prospect of annihilation in the 3rd edition are much more eager to create an environment of co-operation than to exert pressure on Russia for very minor issues.

I would accept your assertion if it weren't clearly rejected by the actions of East European countries which not only suffered more than W. Europe in the World Wars, but also experienced the plight of Soviet so-called government. The Baltic States, Poland, and Ukraine have taken a very confrontational and firm stance against Russia -- and I would bet that Poland's recent decision to accept the US missile defense was in part pushed by Russia's invasion. They are not eager to cooperate with Russia, having now seen what happens when you try. So there's another reason why France and Germany are reluctant to engage Russia, and it has very little to do with historical experience.

[selil]

It's "Sudeten", not "Sudaten", and the comparison is nonsense anyway.
Even Bosnia would make more sense as comparison.

Is there any particular reason why you have taken to being so rude to other people? Is there a particular reason why you can't make an intellectual case without resorting to being arrogant and disrespectful. I enjoy your posting and point of view but recently you've been fairly inconsiderate and it reflects poorly on your message and information.

[Fuchs]

I feel this deserves a separate reply.


My conclusions based on the recent War in Georgia:

1)
Great Power games are back, publicly.
2)
Russia under Putin is willing to re-establish its regional dominance with military means.
Russia re-established itself overtly as Great Power and regionally dominant power. It's willing and capable to compete with Western influences in its periphery.
3)
Turkey is the key geo-strategic nation. It's at the crossroads between the Arab world, Iran, Europe and the Russian influence zone.
It's the premier place for forward deployment of military power in peacetime.
4)
Russia/Putin has played brilliantly. The state of Georgia seems to be politically defeated in the struggle for its separatist regions.
The best (but still realistic) scenario for Georgia is a neutralization. It could become a 2nd Finland - sitting as a neutral power between NATO and CIS.
A mediocre scenario is a Georgia as a firm CIS member in exchange for at least formal sovereignty over South Ossetia and Abchasia.
The worst scenario would be an ongoing struggle.
5)
Ukraine is the real prize, but the ethnic struggles and its geo-strategic position close to Russia's core regions make a NATO membership almost unthinkable.
Again, neutralization with guarantees by NATO AND CIS/Russia (and at the very least some autonomy for the three Russian-dominated Ukrainian regions) seems to be most promising for Ukraine's future.
6)
Moldavia might become the limit for EU expansion due to now overt Russian hostility to Western expansion into its periphery.
7)
NATO membership appears to be a a much more reliable national security asset than mere friendship with the distant USA.
8)
Plenty opportunities to waste resources on a Great Power games in Eastern European conflicts became visible.
9)
Conventional war is back, looking even more conventionally than the ex-Yugoslavian Civil Wars.
10)
The UN is useless in Eastern European conflicts due to the involvement of at least one UN Security Council veto power.
11)
Western European diplomatic attempts to tame Russia were only successful during Russia's weakness phase (and had great success in flanking NATO & EU expansion into Eastern Europe).

--------------

I personally favour a neutralization of Ukraine and Georgia.
The same applies for Byelorussia if it becomes democratic sometime.
Central Asia is irrelevant for us and will be firmly in CIS in the future.
The other Caucasian states are at this time CIS members and will likely part of CIS/Russian zone of influence.

That would avoid a 2nd Cold War / costly Great Power games.
Russia could then attempt to gain influence over these states by cultural, economic and political means instead of by costly & risky military & political confrontation.

[Ken White]

It's "Sudeten", not "Sudaten", and the comparison is nonsense anyway. Even Bosnia would make more sense as comparison.

I suspect that he meant to compare it only on the grounds that it was a pre-planned and the Ossetians were acting as had the Sudeten Germans in that instance.

The article is clearly a U.S.-only article, with no different point of view included.

Yes.

...It may sound cynically, but what's the damage to USA/NATO if all of Caucasus and Ukraine even became Russian?

Cynical? Or Selfish? I suspect that there would br little or no damage to the US or NATO. How the Caucasus states and the Ukraine -- the non-Russian inhabitants -- feel is possibly a different matter.

...The author assumes that the USA is in a position to confront Russia through proxies in Russia's periphery and pretty much ignores Europe.

Er, no; I suspect he's aware that the Baltic States, Poland, Slovenia and Romania are in Europe...

The Georgia/SouthOssetia/Russia War (however that will be called by historians) tells us a bit about Russia and its periphery, and about a half-hearted commitment of the USA in the region.

True.

But there's more...The U.S. government fell awfully short of the typical American asumption of relevance to foreign conflict several times in the past years; remember Kenya crisis and Zimbabwe crisis?

We don't intervene in Africa believing all the former Colonial powers ought to clean up their own problems.

A Georgian government felt backed by the Western world because it gave GWB some auxiliary troops and got some U.S. advisors and equipment. That was an awful mistake.

Agreed.

The red line that Russia won't step over is called "NATO", not "friend of USA".

I'm not sure I'd bet the farm on that "won't" but I agree that's generally correct.

The Western ability to influence the situation of Ukraine is very open to discussion. Significant (and wealthy) parts of Ukraine have a strong Russian majority. A Western (NATO) Ukraine would be a mortal threat to Russia (check the distance to Moscow - Russians demonstrated the inability to accept foreign powers being close to Moscow repeatedly). Ukraine's ties to Western Europe are very thin - culturally, economically, politically.

True on the former; the latter is also true but that is as much due to Western Europe -- the Austro Hungarian Empire in particular -- and the aftermath of WW I as anything; it certainly isn't due to Ukrainian wishes...

[Fuchs]

Is there any particular reason why you have taken to being so rude to other users? Is there a particular reason why you can't make an intellectual case without resorting to being arrogant and disrespectful. I enjoy your posting and point of view but recently you've been fairly inconsiderate and it reflects poorly on your message and information.

I consider "nonsense" as a quite neutral word here. It's no description of a person anyway.
It is a very accurate description of the association between Georgia 2008 and Czechoslovakia 1938.

There is no similarity between the Russia-Georgia and the Germany-Czechoslovakia case that justifies such an association:

Neither South Ossetians nor Abchazians are a Russian minority in a foreign country.
Czechoslovakia wasn't part of a common, disintegrated empire with Germany for about 130, in practice 300 years in 1938. Georgia was part of Russian-dominated Soviet Union less than 20 years ago.
There were no significant (para)military actions in Sudetenland prior to its annexation.
Putin is no a Nazi.
Czechoslovakia had no foreign military advisors on its territory in 1938.
South Ossetia was still not annexed by Russia.
Nor did Western powers agree to such a move yet.
There's no danger of a major European war because of the conflict in Georgia.
Germany and Czechoslovakia had no history of 16 years ongoing violent conflicts about minorities by 1938.
Czechoslovakia did not invade Sudetenland with its military, violating an 16 y.o. cease-fire agreement. Its manned border fortifications were all the time in the Sudetenland.
Germany did not achieve the annexation of Sudetenland with a previous military action/victory.
Germany threatened with air attacks in 1938, Russia FLEW air attacks against Georgia in 2008.


OK, I could have written "wrong" or used other weaker descriptions.
The appropriate description is in my opinion "nonsense", though.

Maybe it's just a translation issue. I can't imagine a German being offended by someone calling his statement "Unsinn" (=nonsense).
That would happen if "Schwachsinn" (=moronic) was used.

[Ken White]

Russia-Georgia: Early Take
By Bob Killebrew, SWJ Blog

Cross posted from the blog:

Aggressive proposal. I could quibble around the edges. Georgia's very decentralized Air Defenses worked fairly well, for example and PGM require sophisticated ISTR or aircraft. Agility and competence beat computers -- and mass. Particularly marginally trained mass...

However, I suspect the biggest problem is that the likelihood of Congress supporting the ideas is beyond slim. Not to mention the EU reaction...