Iraqi Troops: The Thin Iraqi Line

[Xenophon]

I actually thought the Iraqi army was getting a bit better but after reading some of the reports here - most of all my optimicism has been crushed

Not yet. A lot of these reports are old. I've been attached to an IA battalion for about a week now, and the IA are pretty good to go. The biggest problem is, of course, logistics and outfitting. But they're getting by. They're not starving or running out of ammo, and more often than not they have fuel. The differences in how they operate and how we operate are strictly superficial. What an American sees as "wrong" is not necessarily wrong, it's just not how we would do things.

Best of all they are motivated as hell. They've got a pretty brutal operational tempo, in my opinion, and are handling it just fine. I wouldn't want to go up against these guys, and I feel very secure patrolling with them every day.

I'll have to let you know what I think of the IP when I have more contact with them. I live/hang out with the IA so I'm getting more exposure to them. All I've seen of the IP are their positions and occasionally a patrol.

[Rex Brynen]

Not yet. A lot of these reports are old. I've been attached to an IA battalion for about a week now, and the IA are pretty good to go. The biggest problem is, of course, logistics and outfitting. But they're getting by. They're not starving or running out of ammo, and more often than not they have fuel. The differences in how they operate and how we operate are strictly superficial. What an American sees as "wrong" is not necessarily wrong, it's just not how we would do things.

Interesting insight. What's the level of ethnic/religious integration in your unit, and how does that relate to their area of deployment and primary targets? (In other words, does the motivation stem from a predominately Shi'ite or Kurdish unit operating in/against primarily Sunni targets, or does it appear to have gelled as a "national" military unit?)

If you can comment at all, you might prefer to do so in an email or PM.

[Jedburgh]

17 Jan 08 HASC testimony of LTG James Dubik, Cdr MNSTC-I, on Iraqi Security Forces.

....Just one final word about perspective here, if I may. When I was in command out at Fort Lewis, I was tasked to grow three Stryker Brigades. I encountered four main problems in doing so. It’s hard to produce leaders as fast as you stand up a unit. It’s hard to synchronize arrival of those leaders with soldiers. It’s hard to synchronize the training of those soldiers with the delivery of their equipment. And it’s a whole lot easier to build units than it is to build bases.....

[Presley Cannady]

Out of curiosity, does anyone know of any effort by the US and host nation to arm, train and supply communities of the internally displaced and minorities? With a pool of some 2 million people who voted with their feet not to participate in the insurgency, seems a bit of a waste to wait for some number of enterprising sheikhs to make good on the idea first.

[Jedburgh]

Out of curiosity, does anyone know of any effort by the US and host nation to arm, train and supply communities of internally isplaced persons? With a pool of some 2 million people who footed with their feet not to participate in the insurgency, seems a bit of a waste to wait for some number of enterprising sheikhs to make good on the idea first.

I don't believe that you can categorize the majority of IDPs as "voting with their feet not to participate in the insurgency". Most are simply families who were forced out of where they orginally lived by one sectarian militia or the other - or fled due to the violence brought down upon them by the presence of insurgents or foreign terrorists in their midst. If the violence had not come home to them, they were actually less likely to end up as members of any one of the spectrum of armed organizations that make up the insurgency.

The majority of unemployed unattached males of military age among the IDPs have already chosen to either serve with one of the opposition militias or with the ISF. Recruiting efforts for the ISF certainly reaches these people, although I can't state how effective it is. But I don't see the wisdom of recruiting, arming and training a militia made up solely of IDPs. Those who wish to exact revenge for their plight have already joined the opposing militia (more emotionally satisfying than ISF duty) - establishing such an entity under government sponsorship would appear to be counterproductive.

[Presley Cannady]

I don't believe that you can categorize the majority of IDPs as "voting with their feet not to participate in the insurgency". Most are simply families who were forced out of where they orginally lived by one sectarian militia or the other - or fled due to the violence brought down upon them by the presence of insurgents or foreign terrorists in their midst. If the violence had not come home to them, they were actually less likely to end up as members of any one of the spectrum of armed organizations that make up the insurgency.

No argument here.

The majority of unemployed unattached males of military age among the IDPs have already chosen to either serve with one of the opposition militias or with the ISF. Recruiting efforts for the ISF certainly reaches these people, although I can't state how effective it is. But I don't see the wisdom of recruiting, arming and training a militia made up solely of IDPs. Those who wish to exact revenge for their plight have already joined the opposing militia (more emotionally satisfying than ISF duty) - establishing such an entity under government sponsorship would appear to be counterproductive.

As I understand it, their choices are to fight for revenge wherever their militias ranges, to fight for the central authority where Baghdad chooses, or fight for spots in camps for the displaced. With the ISF, they can hope to remain in the same governorate for a long period of time, although this doesn't seem to me a guarantee that they'll ever play a part in retaking their homes and communities. With the militias, they can hope for the chance that regional will see things their way and make a stand against the opposing insurgents who forced them out in the first place--and that's only if the group they sign up with has the muscle to bring about that day. Given the anemic state of the provincial police forces, isn't there a fourth option available for these IDPs? Are there enough able bodies to organize municipal militias under the the national flag to return and push back the invaders?

[sullygoarmy]

Hey All,
Its been a while since I've been in SWJ...I promise to do a better job!

I've been doing some reading on how we organized our "Ministry of Defense" before, during and after WWII. When you look at the amount of time it took to get the DoD to where its (semi) functional, its almost no wonder there are so many issues trying to get the Iraqi ministries up to speed. Throw in the fact that after living under a dictatorship for decades, you are trying to overcome numerous obstacles. As good as our SF teams are, there really aren't any military units trained to get ministries up to speed. Heck, where are they in the federal government?

That being said, while you are seeing on the ground improvements at the IA battalion and BDE levels, until you get the ministries both functional and effective, its still a band-aid solution.