Iraqi Troops: The Thin Iraqi Line

[tequila]

Mixed marks for Iraqi security forces - LATIMES, 31 Aug.

The Iraqi National Police will need an overhaul to rid the ranks of sectarian bias, according to an assessment of the Iraqi security forces to be released next week.

The report -- commissioned by Congress and headed by retired Marine Gen. James L. Jones -- gives relatively good marks to the Iraqi army, according to an administration official briefed on the report. It says the army has been well-equipped and -trained and is now conducting operations effectively, the official said.

Its assessment of the police is far more pessimistic. The report suggests starting over with the National Police, possibly by reconfiguring it as a smaller force.

The Iraqi National Police, under the Ministry of Interior, number about 25,000. The report does not recommend such an overhaul of the 325,000 local and provincial police ...

[tequila]

Many Trainees are Complicit with 'Enemy Targets' - Washington Post, 4 Sep.

The platoon of American soldiers was pinned down in an alley outside the holiest Shiite shrine in western Baghdad's Kadhimiyah neighborhood. Machine-gun fire sprayed from apartment windows and rooftops with a deafening clatter. The troops were 15 yards from their Humvees, but they didn't know if they could survive the dash.

Less than a mile away, a powerful Shiite parliament member stood inside an American military base, in the office of the Iraqi army brigade commander responsible for Kadhimiyah. The Americans had called for Iraqi army backup, but according to the brigade commander and American officers, the lawmaker would help ensure that no assistance arrived from the Iraqis that crucial day.

"No Iraqi army unit, of the 2,700 Iraqi security forces that are in Kadhimiyah, no Iraqi army unit would respond," said Lt. Col. Steven Miska, a deputy brigade commander based in this Shiite enclave of 200,000 people on the western shore of the Tigris River. "It shows you how difficult it is to root out the militia influence when they've got political top-cover."

The two-hour firefight under the golden domes of the Musa al-Kadhim shrine on April 29 left at least eight Iraqis dead. While no Americans were injured, it marked the start of the deterioration of security in Kadhimiyah, once one of Baghdad's safest neighborhoods. It also made plain -- "the first time the complicity was staring us right in the face," as one American soldier put it -- that the Iraqi army's problem in the area was about more than just being under-trained or ill-equipped ...

[ali_ababa]

I actually thought the Iraqi army was getting a bit better but after reading some of the reports here - most of all my optimicism has been crushed .

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 13 Nov 07:

Fixing Iraq's Internal Security Forces: Why is Reform of the Ministry of the Interior So Hard?

In September 2007, retired US Marine Corps General Jim Jones led an independent commission to evaluate the state of the Iraqi security forces. His team concluded that:

“The Ministry of Interior is a ministry in name only. It is widely regarded as being dysfunctional and sectarian, and suffers from ineffective leadership. Such fundamental flaws present a serious obstacle to achieving the levels of readiness, capability, and effectiveness in police and border security forces that are essential for internal security and stability in Iraq.”

Given that an effective and law-abiding interior ministry will be critical to Iraq’s future security environment and political evolution, this stark conclusion is disturbing. Moreover, it raises the question of why the heavy Coalition investment in recruiting, training, and equipping the Iraqi civil security forces and advising the Ministry of Interior (MOI) since 2003 has apparently not had a more positive impact.

This paper examines the charge laid out in the Jones report, explains why institution building and reform at the MOI have proved so difficult, and notes flaws in the international capacity building effort that need to be addressed. The central argument is that Iraq’s political dynamics, combined with the unprecedented burdens being placed upon the MOI, will continue to make institutional development and reform terribly difficult. However, assessments such as the Jones report ignore the fact that the ministry is more functional than it may at first appear. Furthermore, there are signs of incipient, MOI-led reforms; these provide hopeful pointers. In order to take advantage of these incipient reforms, the international assistance effort needs to significantly raise its game. If this can be achieved, then, gradually and painfully, the ministry could become a more positive force in Iraqi society. However, even if technical institutional reforms are successful, it will be important to understand that the ministry will reflect Iraq’s political make-up; it cannot stand above national politics.....

[Jedburgh]

GAO, 30 Nov 07: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces’ Units as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are Not Fully Developed

...Although DOD has, in multiple reports, stated that a certain number of ISF units are either “independent” or “fully independent,” it is unclear how DOD arrived at this determination for three reasons. First, since spring 2006 the process that Coalition transition teams use to assess ISF units does not allow the option of giving a rating of independent or fully independent; according to Multi-National Corps-Iraq’s (MNC-I) Transitional Readiness Assessment Report Implementing Instructions Update, the highest rating any ISF unit can attain is “capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations.”8 Second, in each of the reports in which DOD asserts that a certain number of ISF units are independent or fully independent it apparently contradicts this assertion by appending significant qualifiers to the achievement of ISF independence. For example, DOD reported in June 2007 that a certain number of MOD units were either “in the lead with Coalition enablers” or “fully independent” but then added the qualifying statements that fielded MOD forces “often do not get the support they require without substantial Coalition assistance” and “MOD’s continued limited logistics and sustainment capacity is a key hindrance to Iraqi forces’ ability to assume missions from the Coalition.” Third, the MOD and MOI have yet to develop those support capabilities by which they can logistically sustain their forces, effectively command and control their forces, and provide intelligence to their forces—all of which are inherent to independence. As a result of DOD’s lack of clarity, Congress and other decision makers may not obtain a clear picture of the progress of the ISF and whether it is becoming capable of truly conducting its operations independently, i.e., without Coalition assistance and support. Therefore, we recommend that DOD clarify its use of the terms “independent” or “fully independent” as they relate to the assessed capabilities of ISF units, and particularly as they relate to the logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities of those units. We also recommend that it clarify the process it uses to make this assessment......

Complete 33 page report at the link.

[Ron Humphrey]

GAO, 30 Nov 07: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces’ Units as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are Not Fully Developed

Complete 33 page report at the link.

I am going to read through the entire report, but in so much as my own personal grain of salt that I take everything with I would ask this.

Considering how often we here in US tend to establish metrics to the umteenth degree for accepting anything as complete or finished, wouldn't it already be acceptable to believe that unless every single unit, with every little soldier had every little thing down to the extra pair of shoe laces, That those at the GAO would not consider them independant.

I couldn't say for sure but I'll bet 40 to 50 guys with weapons, leadership, and direction for a operation can be quite effective despite not having their complete standard issue.

From my own mil history I honestly remember almost never having everything I was supposed to , yet somehow I got the job done and so did others around me.

I for one will take what the commander on the ground tells me about their capabilities before I necessarily rely on check the bloc stuff from folks who aren't there.

Just another take on it...

[Xenophon]

I actually thought the Iraqi army was getting a bit better but after reading some of the reports here - most of all my optimicism has been crushed

Not yet. A lot of these reports are old. I've been attached to an IA battalion for about a week now, and the IA are pretty good to go. The biggest problem is, of course, logistics and outfitting. But they're getting by. They're not starving or running out of ammo, and more often than not they have fuel. The differences in how they operate and how we operate are strictly superficial. What an American sees as "wrong" is not necessarily wrong, it's just not how we would do things.

Best of all they are motivated as hell. They've got a pretty brutal operational tempo, in my opinion, and are handling it just fine. I wouldn't want to go up against these guys, and I feel very secure patrolling with them every day.

I'll have to let you know what I think of the IP when I have more contact with them. I live/hang out with the IA so I'm getting more exposure to them. All I've seen of the IP are their positions and occasionally a patrol.