Iraqi Troops: The Thin Iraqi Line

[Presley Cannady]

Out of curiosity, does anyone know of any effort by the US and host nation to arm, train and supply communities of the internally displaced and minorities? With a pool of some 2 million people who voted with their feet not to participate in the insurgency, seems a bit of a waste to wait for some number of enterprising sheikhs to make good on the idea first.

[Jedburgh]

Out of curiosity, does anyone know of any effort by the US and host nation to arm, train and supply communities of internally isplaced persons? With a pool of some 2 million people who footed with their feet not to participate in the insurgency, seems a bit of a waste to wait for some number of enterprising sheikhs to make good on the idea first.

I don't believe that you can categorize the majority of IDPs as "voting with their feet not to participate in the insurgency". Most are simply families who were forced out of where they orginally lived by one sectarian militia or the other - or fled due to the violence brought down upon them by the presence of insurgents or foreign terrorists in their midst. If the violence had not come home to them, they were actually less likely to end up as members of any one of the spectrum of armed organizations that make up the insurgency.

The majority of unemployed unattached males of military age among the IDPs have already chosen to either serve with one of the opposition militias or with the ISF. Recruiting efforts for the ISF certainly reaches these people, although I can't state how effective it is. But I don't see the wisdom of recruiting, arming and training a militia made up solely of IDPs. Those who wish to exact revenge for their plight have already joined the opposing militia (more emotionally satisfying than ISF duty) - establishing such an entity under government sponsorship would appear to be counterproductive.

[Presley Cannady]

I don't believe that you can categorize the majority of IDPs as "voting with their feet not to participate in the insurgency". Most are simply families who were forced out of where they orginally lived by one sectarian militia or the other - or fled due to the violence brought down upon them by the presence of insurgents or foreign terrorists in their midst. If the violence had not come home to them, they were actually less likely to end up as members of any one of the spectrum of armed organizations that make up the insurgency.

No argument here.

The majority of unemployed unattached males of military age among the IDPs have already chosen to either serve with one of the opposition militias or with the ISF. Recruiting efforts for the ISF certainly reaches these people, although I can't state how effective it is. But I don't see the wisdom of recruiting, arming and training a militia made up solely of IDPs. Those who wish to exact revenge for their plight have already joined the opposing militia (more emotionally satisfying than ISF duty) - establishing such an entity under government sponsorship would appear to be counterproductive.

As I understand it, their choices are to fight for revenge wherever their militias ranges, to fight for the central authority where Baghdad chooses, or fight for spots in camps for the displaced. With the ISF, they can hope to remain in the same governorate for a long period of time, although this doesn't seem to me a guarantee that they'll ever play a part in retaking their homes and communities. With the militias, they can hope for the chance that regional will see things their way and make a stand against the opposing insurgents who forced them out in the first place--and that's only if the group they sign up with has the muscle to bring about that day. Given the anemic state of the provincial police forces, isn't there a fourth option available for these IDPs? Are there enough able bodies to organize municipal militias under the the national flag to return and push back the invaders?

[sullygoarmy]

Hey All,
Its been a while since I've been in SWJ...I promise to do a better job!

I've been doing some reading on how we organized our "Ministry of Defense" before, during and after WWII. When you look at the amount of time it took to get the DoD to where its (semi) functional, its almost no wonder there are so many issues trying to get the Iraqi ministries up to speed. Throw in the fact that after living under a dictatorship for decades, you are trying to overcome numerous obstacles. As good as our SF teams are, there really aren't any military units trained to get ministries up to speed. Heck, where are they in the federal government?

That being said, while you are seeing on the ground improvements at the IA battalion and BDE levels, until you get the ministries both functional and effective, its still a band-aid solution.

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 28 May 08: Iraqi Force Development 2008

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) remain very much a work in progress, and MNF-I reporting continues to sharply exaggerate the real-world readiness of Iraqi Army units, and the ability of the ISF to takeover security responsibility in given governorates. Congress and outside observers, however, need to recognize that very real progress is being made and that the exaggerations and flaws in MNF-I and US government reporting do not mean that the ISF cannot steadily reduce the need for US and allied forces over time. The development of the ISF faces a number of uncertainties:

Battle of Basra: The poor performance of some elements of the ISF in Basra should come as no surprise. Even the most capable force needs adequate preparation and planning.....

Performance outside Basra and in Baghdad: The ISF performed better in smaller operations outside of Basra in southern Iraq. The ISF did not, however, initially perform well in Baghdad, particularly in Sadr City. Only US forces were ready to deal with the threat posed by the Mahdi Army (JAM).....

The Battle of Mosul: The city of Mosul, and parts of Ninewah province, are the last major stronghold of AQI. There are relatively few US forces located in Mosul, and operations to destroy this stronghold are being led largely by the ISF. There are also almost no Sons of Iraq groups in Mosul, so the IA and IP must face AQI largely by themselves. Progress in launching the battle was slow although AQI remained on the defensive.....

Localization of Security in the forces of the MoD and the MoI: The regular Iraqi armed forces seem to be gradually becoming a more national force, with fewer highly Kurdish and Shi‘ite elements, and fewer problems with Sunni officers. This progress, however, is slow and uncertain. No such progress is taking place in the regular police.....

Iraqi Police Force: Progress in developing the IP is extremely uncertain. There has been little useful official reporting on the progress of the Iraqi Police Force.....

Slow Progress in the Local Rule of Law: There has been some progress at the highest levels in establishing courts and some rule of law. Yet the central government lacks an effective presence in many areas, and the criminal justice and courts system is unable to support the police.....

National Police: Until 2007, the National Police acted largely as a Shi‘ite force within the MOI, and were responsible for much sectarian violence against Sunnis. Far from being a central-government run nationwide police force, they more often resembled a government funded tool of sectarian intimidation. MNF-I instituted a massive reform program in the NP in 2007.....

Sons of Iraq: This large mostly Sunni and tribal force is supposed to be temporary, and the ultimate destination of the over 90,000 men in these units is a major uncertainty. While MNSTC-I believes that 20-25% of the Sons of Iraq will be absorbed into the ISFii, progress has been slow in this area. What will become of the other 75-80% of these heavily armed men, accustomed to their relatively high salaries, is also a major concern....

Political and militia influence in the ISF: The "competition among ethnic and sectarian communities" that Gen. Petraeus believes is at the heart of conflict in Iraq includes the struggle for control of the MOD and MOI.....

Intelligence: Iraq‘s intelligence apparatus remains divided between a CIA-supported "official" agency (the Iraqi National Intelligence Service or INIS) and a Shi‘ite-run agency (under the auspices of the minister of state for national security, Shirwan al-Waely).....

Provincial Powers Law: The balance of power between the central and Provincial governments remains undecided. How power shifts between the provinces and Baghdad will affect the ISF is also unclear.....

Equipment and Logistics: The ISF has made significant progress in the areas of logistics and equipping forces in the field. However, many units, especially in the IP, remain critically short of equipment.....

Metrics: MNF-I and the GOI continue to provide misleading and optimistic public reporting and metrics on ISF performance. The ISF is making progress in many areas, but MNF-I and GOI reporting and metrics sharply understate the real-world timelines and efforts needed to deal with problems and delays in shaping credible force plans, getting proper training facilities and throughput, embedding competent advisors, providing effective equipment, getting competent Iraqi leaders and force retention, and dealing with ethnic and sectarian issues. Official reporting on the MOI and the IP in particular is extremely misleading.

Complete 71 page paper at the link.

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 11 Sep 08: How Soon is Safe? Iraqi Force Development and Conditions-Based US Withdrawals

No one can be certain whether setting a timeframe for US withdrawals that ends in 2011 will lead to instability in Iraq, or that such a timeline will lead the US to hand over responsibility to Iraqi Security Forces before they are able to do the job. There also is nothing wrong with setting broad goals for withdrawing US forces from Iraq. The US wants to leave as soon as this is feasible, and at least since 2004, Iraq's Kurds have been the only group in Iraq that showed a consistent desire for the US to stay.

It also is impossible to be certain that the risks of early withdrawal will really be greater than the risks of trying to stay longer than Iraqi politics permit. There are good reasons to extend the US military and advisory presence at steadily diminishing levels until Iraq has developed security forces that are fully ready to take over key missions without US support, and Iraq has achieved a greater degree of stability.

It is at least possible that setting early timelines will force Iraqis to move towards political accommodation, to take hard decisions, and to develop security forces that are more effective. In fact, if all goes well in Iraq, deadlines like 2011 may prove practical – particularly if such deadlines do not preclude a large number of US military advisors. Moreover, the US ―occupation‖ is so controversial and unpopular that the cost of staying long enough to do every job right could be far higher in terms of Iraqi resentment and political backlash than the security benefits would be worth.

At the same time, it is not a good idea to bet a country -- and the outcome of a war -- on the strategic equivalent of filling an inside straight. Political rhetoric often makes such "bets on the outcome;" it also often loses the bet. Iraq still faces a large number of risks and problems where a US military presence does more to stabilize the situation than destabilize it, and where both Iraqi and US leaders will need to be careful and realistic about how quickly they can move......

Complete 166-page document at the link.