Iraqi Troops: The Thin Iraqi Line

[Michael Shannon]

I noticed both here in Iraq and Afghanistan several flaws in the creation of local forces. The first was the failure to build a local leaders cadre first. In both campaigns we'd have been better off creating junior officer training units with programs of instruction at least as long as the equivilant courses in the west (i.e. one year for an infantry platoon commander) than running 3-4 week basic training courses taught by foreigners through poorly skilled translators. These very short courses left the graduates under trained or even resentful of our efforts.

Secondly we under paid recruits resulting in too many village idiots joining the colours while the pick of the litter stayed at home guarding opium.
In Afghanistan we could have cornered the market on the best troops available if we had simply paid as little as $300 per month.

Lastly, there is a tendancy, not doubt because the trainers are usually infantrymen, to ignore logistics and communications at anything more than a rudimentary level. With hindsight the first unit formed in the Afghan National Army should have been the leadership battalion and the second a logistic battalion. The Iraqi Army like the ANA, has been formed of almost nothing but various types of infantry and couldn't support itself without MNFI backing. Under this condition how could the US ever leave? The IA will distintegrate as soon as the US departs.

[tequila]

Tony Cordesman's latest on Iraqi security forces: Iraqi Force Development and the Challenge of Civil War.