The House Armed Services Committee's Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee received testimony on the development of the Iraqi Security Forces on 12 Jun 07:
LTG Martin Dempsey, MNSTC-I
Mark Kimmitt, the Dpty Asst SecDef for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs also testified. However, the transcript of his testimony doesn't appear to be available.
One of the dichotomies I've noticed with both Iraq and Afghanistan is the call for bigger armies, police forces, security forces, etc...
It would be interesting to see the desertion rates from the beginning of the Afghan National Army and the Iraq Army by year to date, and then extrapolate the size of these two forces would be without any desertion or miniscule desertion rates, like 5%. I'm sure it's all classified...
But both armies would probably be quite large without the desertions. So calling for larger forces is somewhat of an exercise similar to pissing in the wind...
Gentlemen,
Is the problem really training at all? Is it not that there is no loyalty to a central government above their clan, tribe, or sect? It just feels like nobody really wants to fight for the Iraqi government.
Sort of like the Weimar Republic, the people who are really willing to fight--Freikorps or Spartacist League--they've got something else in mind if they are going to risk their necks.
I have zero ideas on how to build Iraq allegiance to the Maliki government. If you do, there is a job waiting for you in the White House.
No signature required, my handshake is good enough.
Here's my question: is this true? Virtually everything I've read leads me to believe it is, the words of two friends who have served there (one USMC, one PMC) seemed kind of ambivalent. Would love to hear from guys who are or have been over there recently on this, it's probably the central question of the whole war.Originally Posted by Tacitus
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