Iraqi Troops: The Thin Iraqi Line

[SWJED]

15 May NY Times - Iraqi Military Faces Hurdles in Its Quest to Take Charge by Alissa Rubin.

... General Pittard, who oversees training for the Iraqi Army, elite police and border guards, travels five days out of seven, tracking the progress of Iraqi forces as they prepare to eventually take charge of the country’s defense...

Of the Iraqi Army’s 10 divisions, eight are under Iraqi control. Only two, the Fifth Division in Diyala and the Seventh Division in western Iraq, are still under American control.

The Fifth Division is well equipped now and almost at full strength, but it has had a tough fight...

[SWJED]

9 June National Journal - The Thin Iraqi Line by James Kitfield.

Even to the trained eye, Iraq is a land of deep shadow and blinding light. And shades of moral ambiguity are as infinite as the ever-changing russet tones of the desert. Look closely past the bright smiles and pleasantries of some Iraqis in uniform and you will find dark deeds and blood-soaked hands, just as many a stern visage hides acts of courage and selfless patriotism. Each day, U.S. commanders in Iraq try to decide where between those extremes lies the true face of the Iraqi forces they are constantly training...

[davidbfpo]

Excellent description of the Iraqi 'thin line' and particularly the police. One sad part about two American advisers falling victim to an IED at a deserted Irqai Army checkpoint. Note, no recommendations or solutions made.

davidbfpo

[SWJED]

13 June Washington Post - Big Boost In Iraqi Forces Is Urged by Walter Pincus and Ann Scott Tyson.

A senior U.S. military commander said yesterday that Iraq's army must expand its rolls by at least 20,000 more soldiers than Washington had anticipated, to help free U.S. troops from conducting daily patrols, checkpoints and other critical yet dangerous missions.

Even then, Iraq will remain incapable of taking full responsibility for its security for many years -- five years in the case of protecting its airspace -- and will require a long-term military relationship with the United States, said Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey, who until recently led the U.S. military's training effort in Iraq...

[Jedburgh]

The House Armed Services Committee's Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee received testimony on the development of the Iraqi Security Forces on 12 Jun 07:

LTG Martin Dempsey, MNSTC-I

Mark Kimmitt, the Dpty Asst SecDef for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs also testified. However, the transcript of his testimony doesn't appear to be available.

[Ski]

One of the dichotomies I've noticed with both Iraq and Afghanistan is the call for bigger armies, police forces, security forces, etc...

It would be interesting to see the desertion rates from the beginning of the Afghan National Army and the Iraq Army by year to date, and then extrapolate the size of these two forces would be without any desertion or miniscule desertion rates, like 5%. I'm sure it's all classified...

But both armies would probably be quite large without the desertions. So calling for larger forces is somewhat of an exercise similar to pissing in the wind...

[Tacitus]

Gentlemen,
Is the problem really training at all? Is it not that there is no loyalty to a central government above their clan, tribe, or sect? It just feels like nobody really wants to fight for the Iraqi government.

Sort of like the Weimar Republic, the people who are really willing to fight--Freikorps or Spartacist League--they've got something else in mind if they are going to risk their necks.

I have zero ideas on how to build Iraq allegiance to the Maliki government. If you do, there is a job waiting for you in the White House.

[Granite_State]

Gentlemen,
Is the problem really training at all? Is it not that there is no loyalty to a central government above their clan, tribe, or sect? It just feels like nobody really wants to fight for the Iraqi government.

Sort of like the Weimar Republic, the people who are really willing to fight--Freikorps or Spartacist League--they've got something else in mind if they are going to risk their necks.

I have zero ideas on how to build Iraq allegiance to the Maliki government. If you do, there is a job waiting for you in the White House.

Here's my question: is this true? Virtually everything I've read leads me to believe it is, the words of two friends who have served there (one USMC, one PMC) seemed kind of ambivalent. Would love to hear from guys who are or have been over there recently on this, it's probably the central question of the whole war.

[SWJED]

25 June NY Times - U.S. Generals Doubt Ability of Iraqi Army to Hold Gains by Alissa Rubin.

Iraq faced more troubles on the military and political fronts on Sunday: some American commanders expressed doubts about the ability of Iraqi troops to hold the gains made in areas north of the capital last week, and two Sunni Arab blocs boycotted a Parliament session, demanding the reinstatement of the speaker...

The American commander in Baquba, Brig. Gen. Mick Bednarek, and his counterpart south of Baghdad, Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, pointed to a variety of problems with the Iraqi forces, including a shortage of trained troops and a lack of basic supplies like ammunition, radios and trucks.

“They’re not quite up to the job yet,” General Bednarek said in an interview with The Associated Press in Baquba.

American troops are at the forefront of the offensive in Diyala Province, north of Baghdad, which has become a haven for Al Qaeda. Baquba is the provincial capital. But the understanding has always been that Iraqi troops would hold the ground as the Americans leave.

Commanders have repeatedly voiced concerns that there are insufficient well-trained Iraqi troops and say that many units remain undersupplied...

[SteveMetz]

Apologies if this has already been linked, but here is the HASC report on building Iraqi security forces. I just killed half a forest printing it.

[Jedburgh]

GAO, 31 Jul 07: DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces

As of July 2007, DOD and MNF-I had not specified which DOD accountability procedures, if any, apply to the train-and-equip program for Iraq. Congress funded the train-and-equip program for Iraq outside traditional security assistance programs, providing DOD a large degree of flexibility in managing the program, according to DOD officials. These officials stated that since the funding did not go through traditional security assistance programs, the DOD accountability requirements normally applicable to these programs did not apply. Further, MNF-I does not currently have orders that comprehensively specify accountability procedures for equipment distributed to the Iraqi forces.

DOD and MNF-I cannot fully account for Iraqi forces’ receipt of U.S.-funded equipment. Two factors led to this lapse in accountability. First, MNSTC-I did not maintain a centralized record of all equipment distributed to Iraqi forces before December 2005. At that time, MNSTC-I established a property book system to track issuance of equipment to the Iraqi forces and attempted to recover past records. GAO found a discrepancy of at least 190,000 weapons between data reported by the former MNSTC-I commander and the property books.....

[tequila]

Lack of equipment hampers Iraqi Army - LATIMES, 28 Aug.

Although Washington has made the readiness of Iraqi forces a key benchmark of progress, the Baghdad government is still failing to supply Iraqi commanders in this northern city with adequate equipment to go it alone, U.S. commanders say.

Equipment shortages are a major concern in Mosul and other areas as U.S. offensives in Anbar province in the west and belts of cities surrounding Baghdad drive Al Qaeda in Iraq fighters and other militants north.

"Bottom line, things are just not getting here," said Lt. Col. Stephen Twitty, commander of the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division ...

[Rob Thornton]

First a couple of corrections to the LA Times article - Its not LTC Twitty, but COL Twitty; its not a BKC, but a PKC and Wathiq is not an IP (Iraqi Police) SGM, but the IP General over all IP forces in Mosul.

You also have to understand there is a difference in the IP and IA in terms of how they are structured and how they are supplied. IA get their supplies from MOD (Ministry of Defense), the IP get their supplies through the MOI (Ministry of Interior). This is fundamental to the problem.

The AIF understand that the IP are poorly equipped and paid less then the IA. As such they are a more tempting target and routinely are out-gunned and out manned. IP stations often are the primary targets of assaults and VBIEDs. Where the IA have some up armored HMMWVs mostly LVL II 998s and 1025s (but they are starting to get some 1114s), and are outfitted, organized and paid better, the IPs mostly have Ford or Chevy PUs with minimal, homespun ballistic protection.

I disagree with the admiral's observation, IMHO I don't think he understands the situation on the ground at every single location throughout Iraq - this is a staff problem of not being able to effectively communicate problems and needs so that the ADM can take action and influence his Iraqi peers to rectify deficiencies. I dealt with this allot trying to get M76 rifles and Ammunition so that the IA could conduct sniper overwatches of Tier 1 IED sites and counter sniper operations. You have to explain the rational as though the person who approves what should already be there by MTO&E is a million miles away, because if you are in Mosul and they are in Baghdad, that is often the case.

However, for all they lack I have some some incredible acts of bravery and some major scores by the IPs in Mosul - often my IA counterparts and I would lament over the IPs situation. I'd also add that while the IA have dedicated TTs that offer more thorough coverage, COL Twitty's BCT (when I left in MAR) did not have the resources to provide the same level of coverage to the IPs. This is important because unless you have some dedicated TT members who can identify and articulate the problem (hopefully the type of staff work that IDs a potential problem before it becomes a show-stopper) so that it gets up the CoC and is understood and addressed, you wind up with no clear cause and effect that allows you to fix shortfalls in performance.

I'd say the IPs and IA I know in Mosul are further beyond the tribal loyalties we typically generalize them to be - however, tribal society is a fact of life in the Middle East. The more senior IA and IP officers I knew want and understand the need for a stronger central government in Iraq - this went for Arab & Kurd) - because they have a grasp of regional politics. The few I knew who did not and pursued their own agenda were asked to retire.

With the IA its a little different. These guys are aggressive in going after AIF. I absolutely mean that. COL Twitty remarks about the drawdown of CF forces in Mosul - the IA can be credited with that. It really started about the time we got them up-armored HMMWVs, started evacuating them to our CSH, and got them some good training - much of this can be credited to the efforts of the BCTs and TTs in Mosul, but some credit should go to the MOD generals who came down and interviewed IA BN CDRs, TT members, CF partners and went out on patrols.

The biggest problem here is CL IX flow and major end item replacement. Since the IA are more aggressive, they are taking more casualties and more of their hMMWVs are being blown up and not repaired. Creating a LOG system in the middle of a war is hard work.

The IA and IP do many of the same tasks, but they are controlled by different ministries. MOD does a better job of meeting the needs of the war Iraq is in. Somehow the wall that separates the 2 ministries needs to be breached until such a time that the Army can do Army missions, and the IP police missions - until then, they are both doing kind of a para-military mission to combat the gamut of terrorists, insurgents and organized crime (and I might add in foreign support and interests). Take a look at the article in VOL 8 I did up about building Indig Sec Forces - I tried to explain in more depth the challenges faced by the Iraqis there. I'd also add that at least some of the IA and IP BNs/BDEs, and stations have established relationships with their counterparts to provide support.

COL Twitty nails the problem - until ISF can conduct continuous operations independent of CF assistance, our presence will be what sees them through the rough spots. The biggest hurdles to realizing this are 1) bringing the IPs up to the standard of the IA in terms of effectiveness - which means better equipment, better pay, better training and more advisers; 2) Establishing a LOG system for all ISF which allows them to anticipate their needs and support an operational tempo which allows them to retain the initiative.

Hope that clarifies things some, Best Regards, Rob

[tequila]

Mixed marks for Iraqi security forces - LATIMES, 31 Aug.

The Iraqi National Police will need an overhaul to rid the ranks of sectarian bias, according to an assessment of the Iraqi security forces to be released next week.

The report -- commissioned by Congress and headed by retired Marine Gen. James L. Jones -- gives relatively good marks to the Iraqi army, according to an administration official briefed on the report. It says the army has been well-equipped and -trained and is now conducting operations effectively, the official said.

Its assessment of the police is far more pessimistic. The report suggests starting over with the National Police, possibly by reconfiguring it as a smaller force.

The Iraqi National Police, under the Ministry of Interior, number about 25,000. The report does not recommend such an overhaul of the 325,000 local and provincial police ...