The Sole Survivor

[Eden]

I read Luttrell's book before I discovered this thread, and my reaction to the incident being discussed was a little bit different. Like most of you, it disturbed me that US soldiers could be so cold-bloodedly discussing murder of non-combatants; to me it is clearly a no-brainer that you abort at that point, and that killing is simply not on your options list. But that is not what disturbed me most. Two other things bothered me long after I put the book down.

1. Luttrell is brutally honest about his thought processes. As he reflects on his internal struggle, he continuously refers to his military training which he says clearly calls for killing the shepherds who have stumbled upon his team. Part of his burden of guilt rests on his not having followed his military training. Clearly this superbly trained warrior, a true elite member of the US armed forces, has either:
a. completely misunderstood whatever training he has received on this subject, or
b. has been trained in a way that undermines our common understanding of the law of war and its effect on military operations.

2. The fact that his lieutenant completely abdicates his leadership role and allows his subordinates to make such a momentous moral choice. It would have been fine, even wise, to ask their opinion, but to put it to a vote was wrong. It was a form of morale cowardice, and I do not say that lightly of a fallen soldier who displayed such formidable physical courage. He shifted a terrible moral burden from his own shoulders to those of his subordinates, a burden that still haunts Luttrell by his own admission.

I encourage all to read the book - you can't fully grasp the incident unless you have all the background - and I hope this incident will be used as a case study in the terrible choices men have to make in war a hundred years from now and how we prepare them to face those choices.

[Ken White]

if applied to a conventional unit, for some SOF missions one simply has to apply a different standard and Luttrell's quandry is but one example of many where there are differences in approach and training that must be applied.

Is it morally acceptable to shoot an innocent (if he is in fact 'innocent') shepherd, perhaps a child? Dunno. Is it moral to NOT shoot said child if his life being spared results in losing four or six or ten of your own people? Dunno the answer to that, either. METT-TC applies and I suggest that each person has to make their own decision when they are actually in such a situation. That creates a quandry and there is no 'right' answer.

You cite Luttrell's military training being abrogated and I agree -- if applied to conventional forces. In SOF operations of many kinds different rules apply; have to apply -- that's part of why they are called 'special operations.' You may disagree that such operations are conducted or that such organizations can have different rules. That is your prerogative but it doesn't change reality. Such organizations do exist, such operations are conducted, the rules ARE different and such quandries are a part of them.

You also condemn "his Lieutenant" for abdicating his leadership role. In most SOF units that line is not and absolutely cannot be as distinct as it is in a conventional unit. That, too is reality.

All the above factors are some of the many reasons there's a disconnect between the 'big Army' and SOF. You mention the incident as a "...case study in the terrible choices men have to make in war a hundred years from now and how we prepare them to face those choices." Good idea. Part of that case study could be used to educate the conventional force on some of the very knotty problems faced by their SOF brethren that conventional units rarely if ever face. We have not done that at all well.

[jcustis]

2. The fact that his lieutenant completely abdicates his leadership role and allows his subordinates to make such a momentous moral choice. It would have been fine, even wise, to ask their opinion, but to put it to a vote was wrong. It was a form of morale cowardice, and I do not say that lightly of a fallen soldier who displayed such formidable physical courage. He shifted a terrible moral burden from his own shoulders to those of his subordinates, a burden that still haunts Luttrell by his own admission.

There are others out there in the board/forum thread realm (whom I presume are the veteran SOF members they claim to be) who have damned Murphy for his actions, despite the resulting MoH citation. Bottom line, you aren't alone in this.

[Ken White]

.................

[Abu Buckwheat]

There are others out there in the board/forum thread realm (whom I presume are the veteran SOF members they claim to be) who have damned Murphy for his actions, despite the resulting MoH citation. Bottom line, you aren't alone in this.

I agree with Bill. We can't give any ground to anyone judging Lt. Murphy. The team guys have a different way about decision making it depending on the unit. I am not a team guy but I have trained ALLOT of them in prisoner handling and interrogation in the field. They have a weird "I'm-the-Surfer-in-charge-but-we-decide-this-together-based-on-all-of-our-experience" thing going on inside the platoons. If anything the Chief Petty Officers have equal authority but its their way of doing business and what makes them special. So Monday morning QB'ing Lt. Murphy or the platoon's discussion is not particularly fair. It has happened many times before and its going to happen again. God bless them all but its beside the point.

The discussion is about what guys are presuming they can do if they get compromised by civilians. The issue at hand is that the military needs to re-institutionalize honor and chivalry in arms. This "our enemy has no rules so we should have none" stuff is out of line and getting out of hand. The Army's seven core values (which all other services embody) seem to be modified for this fight so that that Honor and Integrity are not applicable in this "different" war.

The "Hard Deck" as we call it in the Navy is this: We NEVER intentionally kill civilians or captives. This is what Zip-ties are for and I don't believe for a minute no one in that section had 550 cord or zip ties or a dump pouch to use as a hood. That’s not SOP even for super light Alpine style LR Special Reconnaissance missions ... now there are many "unless’s" to be considered like shooting in Self Defense, planting munitions or anything that makes a Sheppard change from non-combatant to combatant ... and spies, recon et al are considered combatants but you had better have proof ... and lots of it. Saying a guy is a look out and shooting him means we will have lots of dead and a trail of hostility that will defeat the ultimate mission.

So as far as COIN goes this is right up there with AC-130s blasting 50-100 person weddings. We need to ensure that the ROE defaults to supporting the strategic objectives of the COIN mission. Failing that gets you Iraq-style atrocities. Look what Marine SOF did on thier first mission in J-Bad two years ago ... they got IED'd and shot every damn civilian for over a mile ... then then got kicked out of Afghanistan. The indiginous people are the mission. Remember it. Dig it. Right on.

We need to re-establish the hard moral deck here.

[Ken White]

...So as far as COIN goes this is right up there with AC-130s blasting 50-100 person weddings...

We need to re-establish the hard moral deck here.

Unfortunately, all war is not COIN. If I haven't learned anything else in the last 75 years, I've learned to avoid saying never...

[Abu Buckwheat]

Unfortunately, all war is not COIN. If I haven't learned anything else in the last 75 years, I've learned to avoid saying never...

By God Ken, even as I wrote it I thought "One should never say never ..." Good advice.

[Ken White]

"We are too zoon oldt und too late schmart." And I'm a living example of that...

I agree with you, got be careful on the judging -- but we have to train people to do the right thing to the maximum extent possible. Thankfully, we mostly do a good job of that. Hard deck is good, just gotta allow for the occasional and hopefully very rare hatch (being careful not to trip over the coaming...).

[William F. Owen]

Is it moral to NOT shoot said child if his life being spared results in losing four or six or ten of your own people?

I think the point here is context is critical, but guidance does have to be absolute when dealing with such an area. You never kill unarmed and/or innocent civilians and you must be prepared to risk own lives in order to stick by that. (- an area where I and some of the IDF part company on the ethical implications. No IDF commander cannot put the lives of his soldiers first.)

...but there are clearly situations where civilians may be killed because they are trying to kill you or aid others that will. It is their intent and actions that should seal (no pun!) their fate.

Technically, I should have no problem (never having had to do it) in dropping some 14-year-old girl, with pig-tails, who is driving an SUV full or armed men, attempting to retrieve a weapon, carrying mortar bombs, or spotting the fall of shot for mortars. She is clearly "hostile."

(Will the BBC show the bullet ridden body to the world? Yes. That's my CoC's problem, and part of the "Information Ops," effort to deal with.)

I submit that the test would reside in the realms of an action being "clearly hostile."

Having said all that, the Luttrell book (and the book on Operations Anaconda) leaves me asking a whole raft of questions about how the operation was planned and how SEAL's are trained, but that's something different.

As was shown with the Bravo-Two-Zero, and The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, it may be naive to believe that the written account is entirely accurate.

- and now seeing Ken's post I broadly concur.

[trident86]

1. he continuously refers to his military training which he says clearly calls for killing the shepherds who have stumbled upon his team.


2. The fact that his lieutenant completely abdicates his leadership role and allows his subordinates to make such a momentous moral choice.

This is what happens when you let a civilian write your story. I can assure you neither SEALs nor any other US SOF are taught that deliberately killing unarmed civilians is an option. In fact, the contemplation of this in the training pipeline or on actual operations would ensure dismissal from the unit and the SOF community.

What IS emphasized is that SOF are held to a higher standard, and we are a much more surgical option because of our discretion and judgment on the battlefield.

Having served with Michael Murphy and personally watched his development as a junior SEAL officer, I can assure you that once again, something was lost in the translation between Marcus and the author. I cannot imagine Murph "abdicating his leadership" under ANY circumstances. More likely and in accordance with Marcus' debrief to our Team once he returned from his convalescent leave, Murph polled his guys when he ran out of easy answers in order to gather any information he might not have previously considered, and in turn make the best decision under the circumstances.

This is where we cross the line--where we judge the men on the ground based on the (now obvious) turn of events. The operation should no doubt be thoroughly analyzed with the intent of educating our younger troops and making better decisions (if that's even possible in this case) on the battlefield.

As pointed out by several others, this single decision was only one of many made by the team on the ground and the leadership in the forward headquarters at several levels that ultimately led to the failure of the mission.

Regarding the Iridium Sat phone--it was a back up means of communication, rather than the primary means as implied in the previous post. In my experience, cell phones are normally an administrative vice tactical form of communication.