Non-Muslim GG Aid to Al Qaeda

[Granite_State]

I know Robb has written in the past that the increasing power of non-state/criminal forces offers Al Qaeda potential allies, hired or otherwise, in an attack on America. Thinking southern border. He's referring to MS-13, Mexican drug cartels, and U.S. gangs as well.

This thread is probably more speculative than anything, but does it make sense for mainly criminal, non-Arab enterprises to be aiding Al Qaeda and its ilk, given potential consequences?

[TROUFION]

Gang support to AQ doesn't make sense to me. They work at cross purposes, gangs intent: to get rich, gain power, live fat. Can't do those things if you destroy your bread and butter. Gangs need the wealth of America to remain for them to feed on. AQ desires the destruction of said wealth to create a power vacuum into which they can insert themselves and their archaistic way of life.

[Stevely]

Gang support to AQ doesn't make sense to me. They work at cross purposes, gangs intent: to get rich, gain power, live fat. Can't do those things if you destroy your bread and butter. Gangs need the wealth of America to remain for them to feed on. AQ desires the destruction of said wealth to create a power vacuum into which they can insert themselves and their archaistic way of life.

I don't quite agree - AQ desires the destruction of the political order; destruction of wealth is a means to an end. A weakened or hollowed out political order would suit 3rd generation gangs just fine. And even while AQ would attempt to cause great harm to the American economy, that wouldn't necessarily, or even likely, hurt the business prospects of the gangs. Their sources of wealth are different than those on Wall Street, their "business" could easily flourish in times of general economic hardship. They do already in the slums. So I think alliances of convenience are not out of the question... in the short term it could be profitable, and in the long term we're all dead, right?

[Ski]

At first, the one group I thought AQ would try and ally with would be the Colombian or Mexican drug cartels. The supply system they've established is second to none.

The more I thought about it, the less sense it made. The cartels are there to make money primarily. If AQ was found to be involved with them, I'm certain we'd have started hitting the drug lords infrastructure and personnel whenever possible. Then the drug cartels would have an even worse persona than they already do, and it would likely destroy their business.

[MaxL]

They work at cross purposes, gangs intent: to get rich, gain power, live fat. Can't do those things if you destroy your bread and butter.

I'm unconvinced of this point. That American 'gangsta' rappers remain immersed in a culture that not infrequently kills them after they've become fairly rich suggests their goal is not, in fact, merely to become rich and live a fat, happy life. If it were, they'd leave the 'game' after they made a few million. It's not as though rich men who aren't gangsters have a difficult time acquiring the sort of perqs the rappers enjoy.

I suspect, though cannot prove, that the rappers are fairly representative of the average gangster in this regard.

Sociology tells us that the socialization process is vital to the formation of identity. If one grows up in a gang-infested area, it stands to reason that the values one internalizes will not, by and large, be typical of 'mainstream' western society.

To reinforce Stevely's point, that certain gangs are classified as national security threats in Latin American countries suggests that they're not particularly concerned with preserving the integrity of their 'host' nations.

Additionally, this paper suggests linkages--some actual, most theoretical--between gangs and terrorism (start with page 9 for the relevant bits).

[Granite_State]

At first, the one group I thought AQ would try and ally with would be the Colombian or Mexican drug cartels. The supply system they've established is second to none.

The more I thought about it, the less sense it made. The cartels are there to make money primarily. If AQ was found to be involved with them, I'm certain we'd have started hitting the drug lords infrastructure and personnel whenever possible. Then the drug cartels would have an even worse persona than they already do, and it would likely destroy their business.

That's my problem with the idea as well. That assuming we can figure out which gang or cartel aided Islamist terrorists, we would come down on them like a hammer. Just seems like you'd have to be an incredibly short-sighted criminal to aid America's major enemy.

[TROUFION]

Perhaps I should have used the coloquial 'phat'. I never stated 'happily'. From my view, opinion, the desire to get rich and live phat doesn't mean live long. It is a desire to live in a decidedly decadent style if even for a short time. The style of living is at odds with the religious extremist viewpoint, it is what AQ-UBL was rising up against in his own country. Of course I understand the 'enemy of my enemy' concept and the idea that short sighted monetary gains can drive some cooperation. But it would seem a stretch for religious puritan fanatics to side with irreverant drug running self-indulgers. However, The pursuit of power has made stranger bedfellows.

[slapout9]

Ding, Ding, Ding, I think we have a winner folks at least closer to my experience anyway. Gangs and Criminals in general do not operate under the same logic as normal people.

I'm unconvinced of this point. That American 'gangsta' rappers remain immersed in a culture that not infrequently kills them after they've become fairly rich suggests their goal is not, in fact, merely to become rich and live a fat, happy life. If it were, they'd leave the 'game' after they made a few million. It's not as though rich men who aren't gangsters have a difficult time acquiring the sort of perqs the rappers enjoy.

I suspect, though cannot prove, that the rappers are fairly representative of the average gangster in this regard.

Sociology tells us that the socialization process is vital to the formation of identity. If one grows up in a gang-infested area, it stands to reason that the values one internalizes will not, by and large, be typical of 'mainstream' western society.

To reinforce Stevely's point, that certain gangs are classified as national security threats in Latin American countries suggests that they're not particularly concerned with preserving the integrity of their 'host' nations.

Additionally, this paper suggests linkages--some actual, most theoretical--between gangs and terrorism (start with page 9 for the relevant bits).

[marct]

I know a few people who have done fieldwork with a variety of gangs and, from what they have told me, gangs seem to be organized along an analog of tribal lines complete with the ritual aspects. I don't have much difficulty in seeing them operating with AQ, at least in some areas, although I doubt that they would be involved with anything that would destroy their turf.

[MaxL]

Perhaps I should have used the coloquial 'phat'. I never stated 'happily'. From my view, opinion, the desire to get rich and live phat doesn't mean live long. It is a desire to live in a decidedly decadent style if even for a short time. The style of living is at odds with the religious extremist viewpoint, it is what AQ-UBL was rising up against in his own country.

Gotcha. I read 'fat' and my mind added 'and happy'.

I'd point out that the extremists haven't been reluctant to take Saudi money, and the Saudis--or at least the ones with the money--enjoy a rather opulent lifestyle.

[Jedburgh]

I believe that thinking of Al Qa'ida obtaining support from this direction in the manner of an "alliance" or even overt aware coordination and cooperation is mistaken. I also feel that delving as deep into the socio-cultural aspect of it as some appear to be doing is an exercise in futility.

The real potential for adding value to Al Qa'ida ops isn't through an alliance or even in establishing a steady, trusted cooperative relationship. It is simply in exploiting those criminal elements within the organizations that can provide needed support for cash. Weapons, explosives, vehicles, money laundering, target information - all of this can be accessed in a one time deal that does away with the necessity for a dedicated support element. This is a great method of creating damn near fool-proof operational cut-outs in the lead up to an attack.

For Al Qa'ida it is a pure no-strings engagement. It's like sex with a whore - one party wants to get laid, the other wants cash, neither wants a relationship, and, in most cases, neither will see or contact the other ever again. If the guy gets the itch again, different girl - usually completely different location as well. Less chance of the wife getting wise. Dumb, careless or overeager guys get caught - dumb, careless or overeager terrorists get rolled up or killed.

To keep going with this analogy, hubby can also get caught if he brings something unwanted home to the wife. That can get really ugly. Same thing goes for our bad guys - they understand that if they are compromised at any point in the transaction, they will most likely be carrying some sort of persistent surveillance back to the rest of the network. For the John the fix is simple - wrap it. For the Jihadi the fix is a bit more complex - wrapping the entire transaction from start to finish with comprehensive countersurveillance.

Luckily, although the crime-terrorism nexus certainly exists across the spectrum, the more complex and professional methods that I allude to above have not yet been leveraged fully by the bad guys. They may never be. But we have to be aware and prepared to disrupt this type of activity.

[Mark O'Neill]

I believe that thinking of Al Qa'ida obtaining support from this direction in the manner of an "alliance" or even overt aware coordination and cooperation is mistaken. I also feel that delving as deep into the socio-cultural aspect of it as some appear to be doing is an exercise in futility.

The real potential for adding value to Al Qa'ida ops isn't through an alliance or even in establishing a steady, trusted cooperative relationship. It is simply in exploiting those criminal elements within the organizations that can provide needed support for cash. Weapons, explosives, vehicles, money laundering, target information - all of this can be accessed in a one time deal that does away with the necessity for a dedicated support element. This is a great method of creating damn near fool-proof operational cut-outs in the lead up to an attack.

For Al Qa'ida it is a pure no-strings engagement. It's like sex with a whore - one party wants to get laid, the other wants cash, neither wants a relationship, and, in most cases, neither will see or contact the other ever again. If the guy gets the itch again, different girl - usually completely different location as well. Less chance of the wife getting wise. Dumb, careless or overeager guys get caught - dumb, careless or overeager terrorists get rolled up or killed.

To keep going with this analogy, hubby can also get caught if he brings something unwanted home to the wife. That can get really ugly. Same thing goes for our bad guys - they understand that if they are compromised at any point in the transaction, they will most likely be carrying some sort of persistent surveillance back to the rest of the network. For the John the fix is simple - wrap it. For the Jihadi the fix is a bit more complex - wrapping the entire transaction from start to finish with comprehensive countersurveillance.

Luckily, although the crime-terrorism nexus certainly exists across the spectrum, the more complex and professional methods that I allude to above have not yet been leveraged fully by the bad guys. They may never be. But we have to be aware and prepared to disrupt this type of activity.

Jed, I think that is a useful analogy. I would add that I think it can go beyond the potential relationship between criminal elements and terrorists such as AQ to account for some of the linkages between regional terrorist groups and AQ.

The case of the Philippines and US and Australian enthusiasm to support the fight against the ASG and MILF elements once a link between JI /AQ was established is, I think, a case of the 'be careful what you bring back' example that you have outlined above.

There as been an seperatist, largely Moslem insurgency in the Southenr Philippines for decades - and it did not really draw any response from the West. Likewise the ongoing communist insurgency in the north. Post 9/11, and establishment credible evidence that there are links between the ASG and JI /AQ and look what happened. (I think that at one level the MNLF, a rival group, must be secretly delighted at the what the ASG have inadvertently unleashed on themselves).

I also think that the view that the relationship is primarily transactional(funds, equipment, training, techniques), rather than ideological, provides a better way of understanding some of the 'globalised' ties that we see. It further deconflates the 'Global Islamic Insurgency' rhetoric and suggests a plausible alternative. That alternative being that what we are seeing is still essentially regional / local issues being pursued by these regional insurgent groups, but taking advantage of ties with organisations such as AQ where there is some percieved benefit. I go back to the example of the PIRA and the Libyans as illustrative of my point. No one would claim that the PIRA were Arab socialists, yet they were all too willing to align with anyone who could help.