A Thin Blue Line in the Sand

[Mark O'Neill]

Steve,

I think that you are right about the need to maintain recruits and fighters at the tactical and operational level in order to have some success.

Arguably the South Africans were pretty good at this and, through turned guerillas in various operational theatres (working for both Koevet and various recces) and bribery (such as the black politicians they got to run the so -called 'Bantustans') could have 'played on' for a lot longer than they eventually did. The point I am suggesting is that maintenance of the 'fight' and 'order' ultimately do little to address issues of rectitude and (that ill defined and contested term) legitimacy. They get so aroused by their operational succes at turning belligerants (which I guess is what you are saying) that they forget about why folks are fighting them in the first place. This is often reflected in their IO.

The RSA, demonstrably, did very well at the maintenance of the fight, but ultimately never addressed the other. This is what eventually unhinged them strategically. There is a remains a large difference between turning warriors in the fight , and convincing the wider public who may be against you. The CDF of the SADF recognised this when he advised his generals that they were not fighting for 'total victory' but for sufficient time for the politicians to 'wake up' to the fact that apartheid was never going to be acceptable and negotiate an appropriate compromise.

I suspect, from my very limited knowledge, that the same might apply in Iraq. Carter's point about the Sunni does seem to offer an operational boost. But, and he concedes this, it does not resolve the strategic end. As has been pointed out, it might even further complicate things in the long run.

Concluding, I think you are right, if the time bought is used to undertake the necessary reforms. Historical example suggests that the hubris of operational success takes over and that this falls by the by.... illogically, the operational success actually convinces them that they can win by mainitaining the same strategic path

Regards,
Mark

[SteveMetz]

Steve,

I think that you are right about the need to maintain recruits and fighters at the tactical and operational level in order to have some success.

Arguably the South Africans were pretty good at this and, through turned guerillas in various operational theatres (working for both Koevet and various recces) and bribery (such as the black politicians they got to run the so -called 'Bantustans') could have 'played on' for a lot longer than they eventually did. The point I am suggesting is that maintenance of the 'fight' and 'order' ultimately do little to address issues of rectitude and (that ill defined and contested term) legitimacy. They get so aroused by their operational succes at turning belligerants (which I guess is what you are saying) that they forget about why folks are fighting them in the first place. This is often reflected in their IO.

The RSA, demonstrably, did very well at the maintenance of the fight, but ultimately never addressed the other. This is what eventually unhinged them strategically. There is a remains a large difference between turning warriors in the fight , and convincing the wider public who may be against you. The CDF of the SADF recognised this when he advised his generals that they were not fighting for 'total victory' but for sufficient time for the politicians to 'wake up' to the fact that apartheid was never going to be acceptable and negotiate an appropriate compromise.

I suspect, from my very limited knowledge, that the same might apply in Iraq. Carter's point about the Sunni does seem to offer an operational boost. But, and he concedes this, it does not resolve the strategic end. As has been pointed out, it might even further complicate things in the long run.

Concluding, I think you are right, if the time bought is used to undertake the necessary reforms. Historical example suggests that the hubris of operational success takes over and that this falls by the by.... illogically, the operational success actually convinces them that they can win by mainitaining the same strategic path

Regards,
Mark

The South African case also illustrates what is, I think, an important strategic element of insurgencies: they often start with both sides seeking decisive victory, i.e. the annihilation of the other. But as they drag on, they become "ripe for resolution" when both sides are willing to accept less than total victory. An argument could be made that the white South Africans were strategically successful in that they ended up with a better deal than they might have.

That leads me to wonder whether Iraq is ripe for resolution now--whether the Sunni Arabs and the Shiites are willing to accept less than total victory. I find the leadership of the Sunni Arabs repulsive and am badly bothered by the idea that a group might interject itself into a democratic government but force, but Iraqis may be at the point where they have to decide whether they 'd rather be right or safe. Life is often sad, forcing people to made very difficult choices.

[SteveMetz]

Steve,

I think that you are right about the need to maintain recruits and fighters at the tactical and operational level in order to have some success.

Arguably the South Africans were pretty good at this and, through turned guerillas in various operational theatres (working for both Koevet and various recces) and bribery (such as the black politicians they got to run the so -called 'Bantustans') could have 'played on' for a lot longer than they eventually did. The point I am suggesting is that maintenance of the 'fight' and 'order' ultimately do little to address issues of rectitude and (that ill defined and contested term) legitimacy. They get so aroused by their operational succes at turning belligerants (which I guess is what you are saying) that they forget about why folks are fighting them in the first place. This is often reflected in their IO.

The RSA, demonstrably, did very well at the maintenance of the fight, but ultimately never addressed the other. This is what eventually unhinged them strategically. There is a remains a large difference between turning warriors in the fight , and convincing the wider public who may be against you. The CDF of the SADF recognised this when he advised his generals that they were not fighting for 'total victory' but for sufficient time for the politicians to 'wake up' to the fact that apartheid was never going to be acceptable and negotiate an appropriate compromise.

I suspect, from my very limited knowledge, that the same might apply in Iraq. Carter's point about the Sunni does seem to offer an operational boost. But, and he concedes this, it does not resolve the strategic end. As has been pointed out, it might even further complicate things in the long run.

Concluding, I think you are right, if the time bought is used to undertake the necessary reforms. Historical example suggests that the hubris of operational success takes over and that this falls by the by.... illogically, the operational success actually convinces them that they can win by mainitaining the same strategic path

Regards,
Mark

And another thought--the success of the South African outcome illustrates another point that I've come to believe: the empowerment of women is a crucial part (and greatly overlooked) component of strategic success in counterinsurgency. South Africa broke from African tradition in this. It also does not bode well for Iraq.

[Ski]

Question - why are you lumping Sunni and Shia into two recognizable blocks when it is clear that there has been and will continue to be significant fragmentation of these two groups?

I've found one open source that identifies 77 different terrorist groups in Iraq alone...http://www.terrorismknowledgebase.or...oup&regionid=1

I understand there is ebb and flow to the importance and even existance to these groups, but none the less, it seems that Iraq is much more complicated than just lumping these groups into Shia and Sunni categories. Yes, this might be the easiest way to identify insurgent groups, but I don't think it creates a situation where any type of negotiation will satisfy either one of these two blocks.

I think the situation there is like two layer cakes - one Shia and one Sunni. There are layers of different groups infighting amongst themselves, and they have to come to some kind of inner solution and form a block of political worthiness first. Then the Sunni and Shia problem can be tackled, and then once that is done, the Kurd issue can be addressed.

[slapout9]

Ski,Here is a link to paper about how to use tribes across the entire DIME spectrum to achieve our goals. It was written by a civilian member of the army corps of engineers. One of the best papers I have ever read about the risks and rewards for forming alliances with tribes or Gangs from my point of view. This fits right in with the article on the thin blue line blog article.


http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute...les/PUB619.pdf

[Mark O'Neill]

And another thought--the success of the South African outcome illustrates another point that I've come to believe: the empowerment of women is a crucial part (and greatly overlooked) component of strategic success in counterinsurgency. South Africa broke from African tradition in this. It also does not bode well for Iraq.

Steve,

I am with you on your last two posts. (all this agreement probably doesn't make interesting reading....) I think the South African 'compromise' is a useful case study. The only problem in that case (as you know) is getting people from both sides to talk on the record about what really transpired. I think it certainly offers an interesting example of what can happen if you can quote negotiate with terrorists unquote.

There are many other examples of compromise that led to peace. One might argue, for example, that the success in Malaya was at least partially built upon a compromise from the start - that the British had already conceded independence to the Malays , which then made the fight not about anti-colonialism but the form of the independent Malaysia. It may have been a very different fight if the insurgents ahd been able to motivate the wider ethnic Malay community by efefctively using the independence argument rather than just the socialist workers paradise one.

I do not know anywhere near enough about Iraq to even presume to offer an opinion as to whether some form of compromise is a possibility there , but I daresay that there are people on this forum who do and would be willing to offer a view!