Good Anthropology, Bad History: The Cultural Turn in Studying War

[marct]

Hi Tom,

his use of "good anthropolgy" is a strawman. He is arguing against emphasizing cultural factors and he is doing it as if those of (Ken, you, me) who look at cultural factors consider only cultural factors. Secondly he argues history and the use of history as if it is not culturally influenced, when the very patterns of thought and speech are culturally influenced and influencing culturally.

I always disliked strawman arguments . I think what really bugged me was that he was using such outdated models of Anthropology and History. If he wanted to do some type of cultural genetics, he would have been better to go back to Durkheim, but he didn't <sigh>.

Overall I found the article muddled and circular in presentation--he really is trying to say it is not all that clear when it comes to the influence of culture. And he took pages to do it.

I would also say that the article overlooks all of the debates in the 1970's and 1980's between Anthropology and History, as well as the entire tradition of ethnohistory. It may be an accurate reflection of current "thinking" in he strategic culture debates but, if so, then God help anyone basing policy on them!

I never say things are black and white. I hate simplistic power point models that make COIN somehow appear magically simple. And I cringe when I hear the phrase, "the first (or the most important) thing we have to do is..." when addressing complex issues like COIN, analyzing a global insurgency, or the role of culture in war. Such simplistic thinking ranks up there with the idea that we can train cultural understanding by handing out pointy-talky cards.

I'm torn on this one, Tom. I tend to dislike simplistic presentations of complex problems and yet, at the same time, I do like parsimonious presentations that have both predictive and postdictive value. I agree that a "black - white" dichotomy is silly (except in the negative ) but, occasionally, we actually do get models that are simple and, more importantly, work well.

There actually do appear to be some perceptions and processes that are, if not "hardwired" then certainly massively predisposed towards, within the human species - Turner's Rites of Passage model is one example, and Abbott's professionalization model seems to be another. One interesting property shared by both of these is that they are emergent properties models (i.e. processual models) that only operate in fairly clear environmental situations.

I would have preferred to see a model of "strategic culture" that was of this type rather than one based on outdated Anthropology and History.

Marc

[3c2dd]

I tend to strongly disagree with the broad east v west gernalizations about different ways of war. They are easy to discuss, however, they tend to overlook most of history. What is generally said to be the western way of war is actually more descriptive of the majority of US military thought in the last fifty years. It ignores hundreds of years of insurgancies, terrorism, small wars, and other variations in US and European history. Likewise, the so called eastern way of war overlooks much of military history in the ME, China, India, and Japan. It is based on a couple books and a handful of case studies.

That being said, there are clear distinctions between the way we think and the way that our enemies think. We need to understand these differences and their origins. I would argue that most are organizational and can be traced back through various social learning models.

There are also broader cultural differences that make it harder for us to communicate on social and political levels with natives of the ME. Our political culture with its Cartesian and Lockeian assumptions is vastly different that the worldview of the Arab and Muslim worlds. These differences not only influence our miscommunications in politics, but also influence the differences in warfare.

[marct]

Hi 3c2d,

That being said, there are clear distinctions between the way we think and the way that our enemies think. We need to understand these differences and their origins.

Can you unpack a few terms here, please? First, what, or who, do you mean by "we"? This is a rather crucial one to define, since it situates the level of analysis of your argument. Second who are "our enemies"? Do you mean solely those "we", whoever that may be, are engaged in active kinetic operations against? Do you include those who "we" might be actively engaged with as well? Do you include those with whom we are involved with in economic conflicts, but not kinetic ones?

Let me pull this out a touch more. If by "we" you mean the US, then the list of "our enemies", based one each of the three possible definitions I listed above (and there are others) would be:

1. AQ and the Taliban
2. + North Korea, Iran, China, Russia
3. + the European Union, Canada, and most of South / Central America

I would argue that most are organizational and can be traced back through various social learning models.

Again, it would probably help for you to define what you mean by the term "organizational". I'm also not sure about your model of causality here which seems to run from a social learning model to an organization. It strikes me that this may be a touch on the deterministic, rather than probabilistic, side and place too much reliance on a single cultural form.

There are also broader cultural differences that make it harder for us to communicate on social and political levels with natives of the ME. Our political culture with its Cartesian and Lockeian assumptions is vastly different that the worldview of the Arab and Muslim worlds. These differences not only influence our miscommunications in politics, but also influence the differences in warfare.

Can you give us your operational definition of culture? I don't disagree with your statement, but I'd like to be sure that we are using the term with at least roughly the same meaning .

Marc