Number 1 requires stability, a clever strategy -- and time. We seem to lack the first and last items and the second is suspect. Not to base all on the here and now; there have been more failures than successes using that approach over a good many years, most failing due to a lack of a clever strategy. Regrettably, all strategies -- all strategists -- are not created equal. Perfection is just harder to find than it should be.

Number 2 requires none of those things and is quick but as a participant in the great night fights and frolics of 1951 (not 1950) in South Korea, I have to tell you there are down sides and in todays world of nice talk touchy feelingness and constant media presence, it's probably not a good approach.

Number 3 requires an extremely large number of people (over 1.5M Viet Namese, US and allied troops could not do it in Viet Nam with a quarter of the area and half the people of Iraq), is rather hard on adjacent and possibly innocent civilians -- not to mention real estate -- and is almost as politically unacceptable today as is the Alexander model. Aside from Veet Nam, the Brits didn't have enough troops and police in Malaya and we do not seem to have enough today...

Alas, we live in an imperfect world.

And I still submit that both the first and last will result in an 'acceptable outcome' not success as in a total cessation of the insurgency and a guarantee there will be no recurrence; some people are just determined to hold a grudge.