Lebanon, Gaza, and the Syrian-Iranian Axis

[Sean Osborne]

For the most part, one can assume that the vast majority of OSINT on Imad Mughniyah 's movements are little more than RUMINT.

Rex,

Don't be too quick to dismiss this as RUMINT. That might be a bit of a rash assumption to make with respect to Imad Mughniyeh.

An article written by Magnus Ranstorp in July of 2006 ( counterterrorismblog.org ) might provide some insight. The first paragraph:

Hizballah’s decision to kidnap the two IDF soldiers was taken by Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah and the other six members of the Shura Karar, its supreme decision-making body. Additionally there are two Iranian representatives (from the Iranian embassy in Beirut/Damascus) that provide a direct link on matters that require strategic guidance or Iranian assistance or arbitration. The file for handling special operations of this kind is usually left to Imad Mughniyeh, the elusive terrorist mastermind for Hizballah, who stands with one foot within Hizballah (reporting to Nasserallah directly) and with one foot in Iran inside the architectures of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the al-Qods unit within the Iranian Pasdaran. Mughniyeh is strictly reserved for special occasions (like the Buenos Aires bombing in 1992 to avenge the Israeli assassination of the previous leader Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi) and his primary mission over the last decade has been to forge qualitative ‘military’ guidance to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives inside Gaza and the West Bank.

IF Imad Mughniyeh was in Lebanon and acting in the role reported in the linked Ya Libnon report, then something might be in the offing.

[Rex Brynen]

Don't be too quick to dismiss this as RUMINT. That might be a bit of a rash assumption to make with respect to Imad Mughniyeh.

No assumptions being made. As is widely acknowledged, a primary reason that Mughniyya is still alive and so effective is precisely because he practices very careful tradecraft.

“Mugniyah is probably the most intelligent, most capable operative we’ve ever run across, including the KGB or anybody else. He enters by one door, exits by another, changes his cars daily, never makes appointments on a telephone, never is predictable. He only uses people that are related to him that he can trust. He doesn’t just recruit people. He is the master terrorist, the grail that we have been after since 1983.”

Robert Bauer, "Shadow Warrior," 60 Minutes, 1 May 2002.

That ya Lubnan and Stratfor have cracked this seems, frankly, unlikely.

[Sean Osborne]

As is widely acknowledged, a primary reason that Mughniyya is still alive and so effective is precisely because he practices very careful tradecraft.

Absolutely.

When it comes to this terrorist I would ordinarily agree with you, his OPSEC most likely would have no chance of being cracked by the sources noted.

However, note that the cited report has beau coup specifics about people, places and itinerary that is extraordinary and almost certainly did not originate with Stratfor. I doubt they'd make such detail up out of the ether. I would tend to think that kind of info would almost have to be HUMINT-based.

Don't know if another dot connects, but Hezbollah concluded a massive 3-day exercise a couple of weeks ago which was clearly in violation of UNSC 1701. Something might be brewing. Not saying it is or isn't, but might be.

[Ron Humphrey]

Absolutely.

When it comes to this terrorist I would ordinarily agree with you, his OPSEC most likely would have no chance of being cracked by the sources noted.

However, note that the cited report has beau coup specifics about people, places and itinerary that is extraordinary and almost certainly did not originate with Stratfor. I doubt they'd make such detail up out of the ether. I would tend to think that kind of info would almost have to be HUMINT-based.

Don't know if another dot connects, but Hezbollah concluded a massive 3-day exercise a couple of weeks ago which was clearly in violation of UNSC 1701. Something might be brewing. Not saying it is or isn't, but might be.

As usual not trying to over simplify things but wouldn't it make sense that with the all the efforts in regards to this particular area right now, one would assume their not just going to sit on their duffs.

They'll try something now if we knew the what rather then the who,

[bourbon]

General Ali Reza Asgari was Mughniyah's primary Iranian contact in the 80's, and its been reported they had good relationship. I imagine Mughniyah has had to change some of the ways he operates after Asgari's defection. So maybe its a counter intelligence move by Mughniyah to test new support networks, a canary trap or something.

[Sean Osborne]

As usual not trying to over simplify things but wouldn't it make sense that with the all the efforts in regards to this particular area right now, one would assume their not just going to sit on their duffs.

They'll try something now if we knew the what rather then the who,

Ron,

Just my 0.02 worth... no doubt about it... virtually every category of I&W (and even harmonics of them) seem to be screaming that a conflagration from Gaza, to WB to the Lebanon-Syrian frontier is getting ready to kick off.

Israel has not fought a war on three fronts simultaneously in a very long time. Previous wars saw the IDF secure one front before moing to the next, and then the next. All three at the same time is what the IDF has been training up for this go 'round.

A result more spectacular for the IDF than '67 may surprise a lot of folks -- that's the gist of what some current and former IDF soldiers are hinting at lately.


bourbon,
The link you note between Gen Ali Reza Asghari and Imad Mughniyeh is an overlooked item at the minimum. It is much appreciated that you brought it up. Can't help but wonder if Ashghari's defection (if real and not an Iranian red herring) is really the intelligence coup some portary it to be. One might think a significant part of the Hezbollah-Iranian-Syrian C2 would be quite compromised as a result.

[Penta]

I am unwilling to believe that, Sean. (For one thing, if they could, WHY would Israel have bothered with Annapolis?)

Be careful to decouple wishes from probabilities.

[Sean Osborne]

I am unwilling to believe that, Sean. (For one thing, if they could, WHY would Israel have bothered with Annapolis?)

Penta,

Just relating what has been collected from several current and former IDF soldiers, some of whom are 'Hayal Boded' (Lone Soldiers). This info is as close to real HUMINT as I'm capable of collecting.

The IDF has been mobilizing by all accounts since at least early November. Some of that mobilization was in prep for possible terrorist action prior to the Annapolis Summit. Since then the units have not stood down. Israeli DM Barak has been hinting strongly that a major IDF operation against HAMAS in Gaza is possible to very likely. Circumstances will dictate. Several individuals have stated to me that a major IDF action in Gaza would not commence until after a mass-casualty rocket attack on the civilian population in places like Sderot or elsewhere in the western Negev. (Related to this is that terrorists have increased the lethality of rocket-borne warheads and appear to be attempting to strike an elementary school. Such an attack nearly succeeded today in Sderot.) It would seem that provoking such an IDF operation may be what HAMAS and its allies are attempting to do.

The IDF may be reluctant to lauch a full-scale operation in Gaza due to political considerations. Once the IDF takes all of Gaza from HAMAS to whom do they then give it to? Fatah? Not likely. The IDF has to have their post action planning done first and by all acounts this aspect is unresolved. Still, there is the toleration threshold that may make this point moot.

Remember the pattern from summer 2006 - HAMAS operations in the Gaza front were duplicated by Hezbollah on the Lebanese front and that led to a short but furious war which the IDF had not planned or prepared for. That mistake will not be repeated this time.

Be careful to decouple wishes from probabilities.

Nobody but the terrorist enemy appears to desire another major war. Attempting to murder school children enmasse makes this a fact. Therefore decoupling of the info I collect from the probabilities of another significant conflict in the Levant is not something which needs to be addressed. To the contrary, the dots require connecting.