Asking the Right Question in Counterinsurgency

[SteveMetz]

I've just returned from a major irregular challenges wargame and it reinforced a point that I've been struck with for several years: when we Americans craft a strategy for counterinsurgency support or foreign internal defense, we often diagnose the problems that gave rise to insurgency correctly but fail to ask what may be the most important question: Why are things like they are in the country facing insurgency?

To give one example, we normally identify weak security forces, inadequate intelligence systems, and corruption as problems that allow insurgency to emerge and fester. That is undoubtedly true. But--and here's the key point--our solution to these problems is "advice." Without stating it explicitly, we assume that these problems exist because our partner doesn't have the knowledge and expertise to fix them. So we will give them the knowledge and expertise. Such hubris and condescension makes us ineffective, often irrelevant. We are like a doctor who fails to identify the real cause of an ailment and instead prescribes painkillers and antibiotics for everything. That often brings improvement in the short term, but can also allow the patient to die.

In reality, there are very good reasons that corruption exists in many states, or that they keep their security forces and intelligence services ineffective. The political systems of many states run on patronage, and corruption is the fuel for patronage. Take it away and the system collapses. Similarly, many regimes consider their own militaries and intelligence services more of a threat than insurgents. When Americans preach to them about augmenting the effectiveness of security forces and intelligence organizations, our partners simply conclude that we are clueless. And they are right.

So until we know what the real reasons are for the systemic weaknesses which allow insurgency to emerge and fester, we cannot find solutions.

[Mark O'Neill]

Steve,

Your post has resonance when I look at the region I live in. I find that we (Aussies) have, to a certain degree, mastered the statements of the obvious and the hubris that you describe (although I admit to believing that the US are the blue ribbon / gold medallists in this event and we have a way to go to catch up).

My discussions with a range of members from friendly regional militaries support this. When you get to know them enough to get beyond the unfailing politeness most possess, it becomes very apparent that they are more than aware of the critiques you describe - and some.

I am starting to think that it is also all to easy to lump all these issues into the 'cultural awareness' or knowledge basket. The assumption that if we just 'understood' the culture better we would do better is trite. To me it increasingly is becoming just another 'silver bullet' that will prove ephemeral. Of course, we need to lift our game in this regard, I just do not see it as the answer in itself.

I have been grappling (literally, some of prose rivals 'On War' for density) with a book that you are probably aware of called why men rebel by Ted Robert Gurr. It is over 35 years old now, but elements of his argument ring true. To my mind at the moment his analysis of relative deprivation seems to make a better fit with many of the insurgent situations we see today than many of the other theories (Islamism as a root cause, economic deprivation etc) that are often tossed around. ( I will also admit at this point to favouring the view that regional issues rather global ones as the root causes of most, if not all, insurgencies. That is not to say that there isn't inter-regional 'trade').

I am not sure that it is the answer to your question - It just makes a bit more sense to me at the moment than a lot of the other stuff I am reading.

Cheers

Mark

[Tom Odom]

I've just returned from a major irregular challenges wargame and it reinforced a point that I've been struck with for several years: when we Americans craft a strategy for counterinsurgency support or foreign internal defense, we often diagnose the problems that gave rise to insurgency correctly but fail to ask what may be the most important question: Why are things like they are in the country facing insurgency?

To give one example, we normally identify weak security forces, inadequate intelligence systems, and corruption as problems that allow insurgency to emerge and fester. That is undoubtedly true. But--and here's the key point--our solution to these problems is "advice." Without stating it explicitly, we assume that these problems exist because our partner doesn't have the knowledge and expertise to fix them. So we will give them the knowledge and expertise. Such hubris and condescension makes us ineffective, often irrelevant. We are like a doctor who fails to identify the real cause of an ailment and instead prescribes painkillers and antibiotics for everything. That often brings improvement in the short term, but can also allow the patient to die.

In reality, there are very good reasons that corruption exists in many states, or that they keep their security forces and intelligence services ineffective. The political systems of many states run on patronage, and corruption is the fuel for patronage. Take it away and the system collapses. Similarly, many regimes consider their own militaries and intelligence services more of a threat than insurgents. When Americans preach to them about augmenting the effectiveness of security forces and intelligence organizations, our partners simply conclude that we are clueless. And they are right.

So until we know what the real reasons are for the systemic weaknesses which allow insurgency to emerge and fester, we cannot find solutions.

Steve,

Amen. My classic example of this was the Dem Rep of the Congo where for a lot of reasons that had some relevance in the country (strategic minerals) but for the most part exterior, we spent millions of dollars, intervened repeatedly, and made Mobutu and cronies obscenely rich.

Our security assistance efforts in the Congo reflected all of that. The French had the 31st paras and aviation. The Egyptians had the Guarde Civile. The Israelis had the DSP. The US did log with general support aviation and PME. The PRC played on the side, occasionally stealing a show.
None of these various branches and services cooperated with each other. Mobutu never wanted them to. He had the FIS and the SARM and other intel/police agencis to make sure that did not happen. Instead, each branch was a cash cow until expended. Some got expended more quickly than others. The Zairian AF was a good example of that--run into the ground (literrally), the same crooks wasted Air Zaire and the created ShabAir and did the same thing.

All of these problems were and still are symptoms of the real issue. The Congo is a region, not a country; all politics are tribal and zero-sum. To win, I must win all and you must lose absolutely. I tried as best I could to convey that inside the country team in Kinshasa and back to DC in IIRs. It was amazing to see the resistance and consternation within the embassy and from Washington when I would say such things in person or in cables. Classic case: Arlene Render comes to K-Town on her "democracy in Africa crusade". At a CT meeting she looks at me and demands/asks, "Colonel Odom when and what are you going to do about downsizing and professionalizing the FAZ?" I actually started laughing and then told her that we had been trying in 1993 (when this meeting occurred) to to that for 33 years. The FAZ had only gotten bigger on paper and worse in behavior.

After the genocide and the Rwandan refugee crisis spilled over into Zaire/The DRC, the county team continued to see it as an issue secondary to "democratic reform" in a country that did not exist. My replacement fell right in on the party line that the FAZ as a functioning military with "behavior problems". When Ambassador Simpson came in as the new guy, he took an even harder line. Ultimately, Simpson, my replacement, and the COS complained about my reporting of Zaire-based violence launched out of the refugee camps into Rwanda to a roving DIA IG team. Odom had become AmEmbassy Kinshasa's issue rather than reporting reality. Simpson would continue to live in fantasy land until the RPA-sponsored and led Congolese rebels marched into Kinshasa in 1997.

So you are correct: we look at symptoms rather than source of the illness. And we tend to discount and even discard those who do otherwise.

Best

Tom

[SteveMetz]

Steve,

Your post has resonance when I look at the region I live in. I find that we (Aussies) have, to a certain degree, mastered the statements of the obvious and the hubris that you describe (although I admit to believing that the US are the blue ribbon / gold medallists in this event and we have a way to go to catch up).

My discussions with a range of members from friendly regional militaries support this. When you get to know them enough to get beyond the unfailing politeness most possess, it becomes very apparent that they are more than aware of the critiques you describe - and some.

I am starting to think that it is also all to easy to lump all these issues into the 'cultural awareness' or knowledge basket. The assumption that if we just 'understood' the culture better we would do better is trite. To me it increasingly is becoming just another 'silver bullet' that will prove ephemeral. Of course, we need to lift our game in this regard, I just do not see it as the answer in itself.

I have been grappling (literally, some of prose rivals 'On War' for density) with a book that you are probably aware of called why men rebel by Ted Robert Gurr. It is over 35 years old now, but elements of his argument ring true. To my mind at the moment his analysis of relative deprivation seems to make a better fit with many of the insurgent situations we see today than many of the other theories (Islamism as a root cause, economic deprivation etc) that are often tossed around. ( I will also admit at this point to favouring teh view that regional issues rather global ones as the root causes of most, if not all, insurgencies. That is not to say that there isn't inter-regional 'trade').

I am not sure that is answer to your question - It just makes a bit more sense to me at the moment than a lot of the other stuff I am reading.

Cheers

Mark

Mark,

Agree with you on Gurr. I have a brown, crumbling copy that I used as an undergraduate "back in the day." (I think it was made soon after Gutenberg invented the printing press). And since relative deprivation is based on perception, information technology and saturation amplifies it. People who didn't know their life sucked now do.

My mantra at all these wargames is that first we need to listen to our partner. I was aghast at the report of the Iraq Study Group last year because rather than saying Maliki needs to brief HIS national strategy and then we need to decide whether we can sign up to support it or not, it was another instance of us telling Maliki what his national strategy could be. At least I made some headway at this wargame I just participated in. In the first part of it in May, we were never told what our partner state saw as its shortcomings and needs. We just gave them what WE thought they wanted. At least this time around, the game designers had us get a briefing from the chief of staff of the partner military. We really needed a briefing from the partner president as well (rather than assuming that they are like us and speak with one voice), but I'll take the small victory and hope for the big one later.

[Steve Blair]

Yet another instance of the institutions learning little to nothing from Vietnam. We did pretty much the same thing there at the higher advisory level.

[Mark O'Neill]

I think it was made soon after Gutenberg invented the printing press

C'mon mate, you don't look day older than 60..

Your comment about seeking the back briefing from the ally is promising - at least someone asked. I wish I had a dollar for everytime I have seen someone talking at rather than to an ally from the developing world.

One of the most obvious places I remember seeing it was at Leavenworth during a Prairie Warrior a few years ago. Aussies, Brits and Kiwis would at least get the courtesy of feigned interest in their contributions to deliberations. Forget about it if you came from non-english speaking background - you were almost guaranteed to be assigned the task of populating the Powerpoint Shell for COA#25 of a logistic contingency that might occur at D + 356..

[marct]

Hi Steve,

I've just returned from a major irregular challenges wargame and it reinforced a point that I've been struck with for several years: when we Americans craft a strategy for counterinsurgency support or foreign internal defense, we often diagnose the problems that gave rise to insurgency correctly but fail to ask what may be the most important question: Why are things like they are in the country facing insurgency?

It's not only in cases of insurgency - it shows up in all sorts of American organizations, including the IMF, TNC's, etc. I came to the conclusion a long time ago that there was something inherently flawed in the US education system (probably not enough history) that reinforced a perception of a "one true way", i.e. republican "democracy" and limited capitalism. It is, in the truest sense of the word, a form of parochialism.

Mark noted that

I am starting to think that it is also all to easy to lump all these issues into the 'cultural awareness' or knowledge basket. The assumption that if we just 'understood' the culture better we would do better is trite. To me it increasingly is becoming just another 'silver bullet' that will prove ephemeral. Of course, we need to lift our game in this regard, I just do not see it as the answer in itself.

and I think he is right. Personally, I think that it is the solution, but it is not a golden BB - it has to be done at a national level, hence my comments on the education system.

This really isn't a new observation (see this article).

Marc

[Steve Blair]

It's not only in cases of insurgency - it shows up in all sorts of American organizations, including the IMF, TNC's, etc. I came to the conclusion a long time ago that there was something inherently flawed in the US education system (probably not enough history) that reinforced a perception of a "one true way", i.e. republican "democracy" and limited capitalism. It is, in the truest sense of the word, a form of parochialism.
Marc

I would tend to agree with the lack of history in American education having a fair amount to do with this. Back in the 1970s when the "math and science gap" became a big deal (again...I think it's happened five or six times and counting now) there was a huge emphasis placed on math and science...both areas with the idea of one right answer (that's of course a generalization...but it was one that did stick with many people). History was often reduced to "memorizing a few dates and names," with no real time spent on the linkage and cultural factors that go into history.

As a history guy this drives me nuts...has for many years now.

[120mm]

Neil Postman, in his book "Technopoly" suggested that all subjects should be taught as History. What good does knowing how to do a quadratic equation if you a) don't know why it was developed, and therefore have no idea why you should know it, and b) What the hell it is good for, outside of "checking a block."

I suggest that our perpetual weakness in the math and science field feeds off our neglect of history. I once attended a community college course in math, taught to airplane mechanics. These guys were NOT airplane mechanics because they were math wizards, to put it gently, but at the end of the two semesters, they were all capable of conducting mathematical equations up to and including simple calculus, primarily because the math was taught in the context of its history and applied to a relevant non-mathematic subject (aviation mechanics).

[Ken White]

That's been advocated by others but is rejected by too many in the Education establishment, unfortunately...

I found out a long time ago that when you have the time (and one usually does), take the time and expend the effort to tell the troops the why and wherefore you want something done. They then tend to respond more rapidly and with far better judgment when you tell them to do something and don't have time to explain.

It takes a little longer to merge the history and prospects into any lesson but the results make it more than worthwhile.