New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict

[Rob Thornton]

Goesh,

I just don’t think we have yet achieved a comprehensive understanding of the ideological drive of our foes.

I think that is why you see so many non-descriptive adjectives used to describe security challenges - words like - vague, nebulous, grey, etc.

Trying to understand non-western motivations from a (our) philosophical point of view where there is a reasonably defined line between church and state and where pluralism is seen as a strength is tough to do.

Empathy only gets you so far. Even defining the conditions that lead to destabilization must be placed in local or regional context - is there a universal context?

I guess the best we can do is create enough flexibility to allow for it to be addressed on the ground - what you hope though is that no one will be led to believe that just because what might work in one place is applicable in whole to the next.

One thing I do believe is that the divergence is probably a good sign. It shows that we are at least acknowledging that our off the shelf solution which kind of generalized responses are inadequate when considering that even small changes in geography or culture may require uniqueness in approach.

It will be an interesting couple of decades at least.

[120mm]

I, too, have strong suspicions that poverty and violence are correlational, not necessarily causal. Even if it WERE causal, the foundations of poverty are NOT the lack of material goods; poverty has political/social foundations that cannot be addressed by "programs" and "financial aid", and I doubt sincerely that we could effectively eliminate it, worldwide, through the theft of taxpayers' money and redistribution to "the poor".

Oddly enough, those who propose the strongest that material goods will stop violence are the first to accuse those who disagree with them of being "materialistic."

[Steve Blair]

Once again I think we're seeing echoes of the terrorist groups from the 1970s and 1980s when it comes to some levels of motivation. If you look at the Baader-Meinhoff Gang (later the Red Army Faction), only one of their original members could claim to be of the working class they were supposed to be representing (and he gave himself up rather quickly). The rest were from reasonably comfortable backgrounds but with personal problems. Some of the early personalities in the Italian Red Brigades also came from reasonably prosperous backgrounds.

Often it takes frustrated people with no real material wants but a need for a "mission" in life. Once they find that "mission" they become the hardest ones to deal with, because you can't really fill their needs.

And that's my ramble for the morning. Now off for coffee.

[Rob Thornton]

Are there (at least) 2 different types of terrorism to be concerned about? If we're talking about indig terror that is not facillitated by the state it is operating in, or if we're talking about a HN population that does not facillitate it as an alternative to functioning govt, or a group that is incapable of using state resources to aquire greater means - does that make a difference?

I did up the paper because DR Kilcullen's piece was a kind of a challenge - that asks a question about not only the causal nature of terror, but how to mitigate it. It raises the possibility that there might be a pro-active vs. a reactive way to approach it. I confined the proposal pretty much to the military side - which has all kinds of down sides (bunches of headaches and rislks) - but because its mostly military would make it more streamlined, or to some degree lessen the overhead.

The question is not only about the motivation of terrorist groups, but the way in which they are able to accelerate their growth and gain access to means they would not otherwise have.

I'm sort of working through this, but I do beleive that transnational groups beleive that some groups are more respondant to their message then others - impoverished states with lack of governance in total or in areas (grey spaces) are more permissive for them. How do you counter that - is it better to be reactive or proactive? Which is more efficient in the long or short of it? What are the alternatives? What are the risks and benefits? I'm pretty sure AQ and like groups have done the cost benefit analysis - but I'm not sure we have. Our traditional options & strengths may have caused us to overlook options, and may have even pre-cluded us from some - condsider the multitude of reasons why states in N.Africa are uncomfortable with the idea of hosting AFRICOM. Even using the military in a more internationally perceived "humanitarian" role may only be seen as realist opportunism - depends on how you go about it.

Regards, Rob

[Dominique R. Poirier]

Often it takes frustrated people with no real material wants but a need for a "mission" in life. Once they find that "mission" they become the hardest ones to deal with, because you can't really fill their needs.

Mr. Blair,
coincidence makes that I am attempting to refine a behavioral approach of terrorism of my own and I find your assumptions attractive.

My comment would be pages long if I attempted to express myself as clearly as I would like about that. But let’s say that it all bears upon a frustration/action relationship; when inhibition does not take precedence over action as it happens in a majority of cases.

Most among us who are interested in that problem tackle it in wondering first why people become terrorists because we, who are not terrorist and unlikely to yield to similar behavior, are emotionally inclined to ask this question thus way.

My point is that since it proved to be fruitless until then, might it not be more enlightening to turn the question upside down?
That is, given that so many people are exposed to the presumed generating conditions for terrorism, or “root causes,” the triggering factors and catalysts--both for religious and political mobilization--that may lead to engagement in violent activity, why is it that so few people actually become terrorists?

When violent death within a relatively short lap of time is the likely outcome of action, then it is logical that inhibition will take precedence over action because survival (as drive originating in our Reptilian Brain) is theoretically much more powerful than unfulfilled endeavor or expectations in life. This seems explaining why terrorists are not more numerous.

Therefore, if unfulfilled expectations are the cause of the initial frustration before a person become a terrorist--and I believe as you do that they are in many cases—then they are unlikely to be the cause any longer once this same person is indeed become a terrorist. A change powerful enough to take precedence over the “rules” of the Reptilian Brain happened between these two events, if ever the solution lies here. But how might we “technically,” if I may say so, envisage it?

Regards,

[SteveMetz]

Mr. Blair,
coincidence makes that I am attempting to refine a behavioral approach of terrorism of my own and I find your assumptions attractive.

My comment would be pages long if I attempted to express myself as clearly as I would like about that. But let’s say that it all bears upon a frustration/action relationship; when inhibition does not take precedence over action as it happens in a majority of cases.

Most among us who are interested in that problem tackle it in wondering first why people become terrorists because we, who are not terrorist and unlikely to yield to similar behavior, are emotionally inclined to ask this question thus way.

My point is that since it proved to be fruitless until then, might it not be more enlightening to turn the question upside down?
That is, given that so many people are exposed to the presumed generating conditions for terrorism, or “root causes,” the triggering factors and catalysts--both for religious and political mobilization--that may lead to engagement in violent activity, why is it that so few people actually become terrorists?

When violent death within a relatively short lap of time is the likely outcome of action, then it is logical that inhibition will take precedence over action because survival (as drive originating in our Reptilian Brain) is theoretically much more powerful than unfulfilled endeavor or expectations in life. This seems explaining why terrorists are not more numerous.

Therefore, if unfulfilled expectations are the cause of the initial frustration before a person become a terrorist--and I believe as you do that they are in many cases—then they are unlikely to be the cause any longer once this same person is indeed become a terrorist. A change powerful enough to take precedence over the “rules” of the Reptilian Brain happened between these two events, if ever the solution lies here. But how might we “technically,” if I may say so, envisage it?

Regards,

Have you read Marc Sageman's book on this issue?

[Steve Blair]

Therefore, if unfulfilled expectations are the cause of the initial frustration before a person become a terrorist--and I believe as you do that they are in many cases—then they are unlikely to be the cause any longer once this same person is indeed become a terrorist. A change powerful enough to take precedence over the “rules” of the Reptilian Brain happened between these two events, if ever the solution lies here. But how might we “technically,” if I may say so, envisage it?

Regards,

Mr. Poirier,

My personal opinion is that it takes two or three defining events to push a person into the terrorist spiral. One is, as I mentioned, the unfulfilled expectations. Another is a strong sense of personal betrayal by "the system" (this was seen in many of the RAF members, especially among the Baader-Meinhof "First Generation"). A third defining event is the need for revenge. This last need becomes more common as the terrorist cycle of violence increases (i.e., after the first generation of most groups is either killed or put in prison). The second generation then has the motive of either seeking vengeance or freedom for their comrades who have been "taken by the system." I also feel that once a group become driven primarily by the third motive they become almost beyond reach when it comes to negotiations.

I also make a distinction between insurgents and terrorists. This has more do to with what I see as differences in their motives and objectives. I don't feel that a pure terrorist group can make the switch to an insurgency, but it is very possible (and even common) for insurgents to slide into terrorist groups.

It is an interesting problem, and one that has distinct repercussions for COIN activities.

[Dominique R. Poirier]

Mr. Poirier,

My personal opinion is that it takes two or three defining events to push a person into the terrorist spiral. One is, as I mentioned, the unfulfilled expectations. Another is a strong sense of personal betrayal by "the system" (this was seen in many of the RAF members, especially among the Baader-Meinhof "First Generation"). A third defining event is the need for revenge. This last need becomes more common as the terrorist cycle of violence increases (i.e., after the first generation of most groups is either killed or put in prison). The second generation then has the motive of either seeking vengeance or freedom for their comrades who have been "taken by the system." I also feel that once a group become driven primarily by the third motive they become almost beyond reach when it comes to negotiations.

I also make a distinction between insurgents and terrorists. This has more do to with what I see as differences in their motives and objectives. I don't feel that a pure terrorist group can make the switch to an insurgency, but it is very possible (and even common) for insurgents to slide into terrorist groups.

It is an interesting problem, and one that has distinct repercussions for COIN activities.

Mr Blair,
I express my point and my questions in my last answer to Mr. Steve Metz, actually. Also, your last statement fits my personal assumptions when you say “I don't feel that a pure terrorist group can make the switch to an insurgency, but it is very possible (and even common) for insurgents to slide into terrorist groups.” For, they are likely, indeed, to find the network channel while they fight with other insurgents somewhere in the world, whereas they are much less so to do so before.

It is less a matter of personal will than a matter of opportunity, I conclude. Would you agree with me on that last detail?

All this brings us back to my initial question: how can they be targeted and channeled and converted to the utmost forms of violence while living in peaceful areas or, if you prefer, much outside places where open insurgency exist? Are al-Qaeda talent spotters that numerous in Europe or in other countries where there is no open conflicts?

Once more I agree with you about the rest you wrote. Now I seize this opportunity you just provide me in order to ask another question which does not really calls for an answer but, instead, for further reflection.

Of which origin was the assistance and help the RAF and affiliated cells and individuals enjoyed? Did they act entirely by themselves, in perfect autonomy?

[Steve Blair]

With the terrorist groups, I don't think they need spotters as much as they do general organizers. In this they have learned from the anti-globalization groups that network loosely via the Internet and then operate in an almost autonomous manner until they are called together for a large protest or action. One of the dangers for law enforcement of a cellular organization is that they can reproduce through networks of "fellow travelers" and affiliates over a wide area.

With the B-M Gang/RAF, they began networking with other terrorist groups through PLO training camps if memory serves. Over time they began working with the IRA (providing safehouses in Europe in exchange for bomb-making training, for example) and other groups. Soon enough you would see "actions" mounted on the Continent by the RAF showing solidarity with the IRA. The RAF's organization model was cell-based, but I also believe they exercised a certain level of central planning.

This model has changed, based I believe on the success others have seen the various environmental, anti-globalization, and radical animal rights groups achieve with a "central goal-decentralized planning and execution" model. By this I mean that there is one "vision" for the movement as a whole (say stopping whaling in a particular area). Once that vision goes out, the smaller cells (which may never communicate and in fact have different sub-goals from the main vision) will stage their own protests or actions in that area in support of the main vision. This way you get centralized action (which may not always be what the organizers hoped for) based on a decentralized planning model that is very difficult to trace back to those who provided the basic message.

Hopefully that made at least some sense and answered part of your question. This is something I'm starting to bash together so it's still a work in progress.

[Rifleman]

I also make a distinction between insurgents and terrorists. This has more do to with what I see as differences in their motives and objectives. I don't feel that a pure terrorist group can make the switch to an insurgency, but it is very possible (and even common) for insurgents to slide into terrorist groups.

That's an interesting point. It reminds me of Civil War guerrillas. Some groups started out as guerrillas dedicated to a cause and later became terrorists.

[SteveMetz]

That's an interesting point. It reminds me of Civil War guerrillas. Some groups started out as guerrillas dedicated to a cause and later became terrorists.

In my own writing, I stress that insurgency is a strategy and terrorism is a tactic or method. From this perspective, I don't think it's worth killing too many gray cells (of which I don't have many to spare, and have elected to kill those that I do have with single malt scotch rather than word games) trying to decide whether a given group or given individual is an insurgent or a terrorist. Almost all insurgent movements use terrorism as a tactic. Some groups which do not utilize a strategy of insurgency also use terrorism as a tactic.

[Lastdingo]

I, too, have strong suspicions that poverty and violence are correlational, not necessarily causal. Even if it WERE causal, the foundations of poverty are NOT the lack of material goods; poverty has political/social foundations that cannot be addressed by "programs" and "financial aid", and I doubt sincerely that we could effectively eliminate it, worldwide, through the theft of taxpayers' money and redistribution to "the poor".

Oddly enough, those who propose the strongest that material goods will stop violence are the first to accuse those who disagree with them of being "materialistic."

Getting out of poverty requires income, that's already almost all. With income you can pay for what you need.
The Black African tragedy is that even if one state suceeded in prospering, it would be drowned in the overall poverty around as there are few trade opportunities, too many diseases spilling over the borders and last but not least migrants that would fill any emptied slum quickly.
Look at Sierra Leone - they were just a normal African country till the Liberian Civil War factions had burned their land's resources and moved on to the next one just like the mercenaries lived off Germany in the 17th century's 30 years war.

[Rob Thornton]

What are the things that are going to effect the operational environment?

Which ones are conditions which cannot be changed, but just have to be acconted for, and which ones are problems that exist in those conditions?

Global warming for example is probably a condition - its getting warmer (not the "why" thread) and that is going to have an effect on people that will create some problems.

Is poverty a condition or problem?

How about Pandemics?

Is terrorism a condition or a problem?

My point is that solutions can be engineered to address a problem, but I'm not sure they apply to conditons.

With conditions you mitigate effects - the condition does not really go away.

That does not mean you can't do anything about a condition, particularly if its going to have an adverse effect that keeps you from doing what you need or want to do.

[SteveMetz]

What are the things that are going to effect the operational environment?

Which ones are conditions which cannot be changed, but just have to be acconted for, and which ones are problems that exist in those conditions?

Global warming for example is probably a condition - its getting warmer (not the "why" thread) and that is going to have an effect on people that will create some problems.

Is poverty a condition or problem?

How about Pandemics?

Is terrorism a condition or a problem?

My point is that solutions can be engineered to address a problem, but I'm not sure they apply to conditons.

With conditions you mitigate effects - the condition does not really go away.

That does not mean you can't do anything about a condition, particularly if its going to have an adverse effect that keeps you from doing what you need or want to do.

Funny you should mention that. I'm currently preparing comments on an HQDA concept paper that is trying to fit those things into the idea of "persistent conflict."

[Dominique R. Poirier]

Mr. Metz,
no, but coincidence (once more) makes that I recently ordered his Understanding Terror Networks, on Amazon; and also Knowing the Enemy, by Mary Habeck (if ever you did read this other book). Given the branch and field of Mr Sageman I expect much from that book. Amazon says I'll receive them on early July. Subsequently, I am unable to talk about it for now.

[SteveMetz]

Mr. Metz,
no, but coincidence (once more) makes that I recently ordered his Understanding Terror Networks, on Amazon; and also Knowing the Enemy, by Mary Habeck (if ever you did read this other book). Given the branch and field of Mr Sageman I expect much from that book. Amazon says I'll receive them on early July. Subsequently, I am unable to talk about it for now.

He also starts with the idea that many people are exposed to the "root causes" of terrorism, but only a small number become terrorists. He attributes it mostly to social network dynamics