New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict

[Dominique R. Poirier]

Often it takes frustrated people with no real material wants but a need for a "mission" in life. Once they find that "mission" they become the hardest ones to deal with, because you can't really fill their needs.

Mr. Blair,
coincidence makes that I am attempting to refine a behavioral approach of terrorism of my own and I find your assumptions attractive.

My comment would be pages long if I attempted to express myself as clearly as I would like about that. But let’s say that it all bears upon a frustration/action relationship; when inhibition does not take precedence over action as it happens in a majority of cases.

Most among us who are interested in that problem tackle it in wondering first why people become terrorists because we, who are not terrorist and unlikely to yield to similar behavior, are emotionally inclined to ask this question thus way.

My point is that since it proved to be fruitless until then, might it not be more enlightening to turn the question upside down?
That is, given that so many people are exposed to the presumed generating conditions for terrorism, or “root causes,” the triggering factors and catalysts--both for religious and political mobilization--that may lead to engagement in violent activity, why is it that so few people actually become terrorists?

When violent death within a relatively short lap of time is the likely outcome of action, then it is logical that inhibition will take precedence over action because survival (as drive originating in our Reptilian Brain) is theoretically much more powerful than unfulfilled endeavor or expectations in life. This seems explaining why terrorists are not more numerous.

Therefore, if unfulfilled expectations are the cause of the initial frustration before a person become a terrorist--and I believe as you do that they are in many cases—then they are unlikely to be the cause any longer once this same person is indeed become a terrorist. A change powerful enough to take precedence over the “rules” of the Reptilian Brain happened between these two events, if ever the solution lies here. But how might we “technically,” if I may say so, envisage it?

Regards,

[SteveMetz]

Mr. Blair,
coincidence makes that I am attempting to refine a behavioral approach of terrorism of my own and I find your assumptions attractive.

My comment would be pages long if I attempted to express myself as clearly as I would like about that. But let’s say that it all bears upon a frustration/action relationship; when inhibition does not take precedence over action as it happens in a majority of cases.

Most among us who are interested in that problem tackle it in wondering first why people become terrorists because we, who are not terrorist and unlikely to yield to similar behavior, are emotionally inclined to ask this question thus way.

My point is that since it proved to be fruitless until then, might it not be more enlightening to turn the question upside down?
That is, given that so many people are exposed to the presumed generating conditions for terrorism, or “root causes,” the triggering factors and catalysts--both for religious and political mobilization--that may lead to engagement in violent activity, why is it that so few people actually become terrorists?

When violent death within a relatively short lap of time is the likely outcome of action, then it is logical that inhibition will take precedence over action because survival (as drive originating in our Reptilian Brain) is theoretically much more powerful than unfulfilled endeavor or expectations in life. This seems explaining why terrorists are not more numerous.

Therefore, if unfulfilled expectations are the cause of the initial frustration before a person become a terrorist--and I believe as you do that they are in many cases—then they are unlikely to be the cause any longer once this same person is indeed become a terrorist. A change powerful enough to take precedence over the “rules” of the Reptilian Brain happened between these two events, if ever the solution lies here. But how might we “technically,” if I may say so, envisage it?

Regards,

Have you read Marc Sageman's book on this issue?

[Dominique R. Poirier]

Mr. Metz,
no, but coincidence (once more) makes that I recently ordered his Understanding Terror Networks, on Amazon; and also Knowing the Enemy, by Mary Habeck (if ever you did read this other book). Given the branch and field of Mr Sageman I expect much from that book. Amazon says I'll receive them on early July. Subsequently, I am unable to talk about it for now.

[SteveMetz]

Mr. Metz,
no, but coincidence (once more) makes that I recently ordered his Understanding Terror Networks, on Amazon; and also Knowing the Enemy, by Mary Habeck (if ever you did read this other book). Given the branch and field of Mr Sageman I expect much from that book. Amazon says I'll receive them on early July. Subsequently, I am unable to talk about it for now.

He also starts with the idea that many people are exposed to the "root causes" of terrorism, but only a small number become terrorists. He attributes it mostly to social network dynamics

[Lastdingo]

The Red Army Faction terrorists did not fit such descriptions.

They bacame terrorists while having no lower class background, but many finally became disappointed that their strategy failed and some even entered a peaceful, civilian life in their final sanctuary DDR. They apparently weren't allowed to leave again for terrorist acts, so settling down in the DDR seems to have been a kind of retirement for the RAF terrorists until the reunification.

[Steve Blair]

Therefore, if unfulfilled expectations are the cause of the initial frustration before a person become a terrorist--and I believe as you do that they are in many cases—then they are unlikely to be the cause any longer once this same person is indeed become a terrorist. A change powerful enough to take precedence over the “rules” of the Reptilian Brain happened between these two events, if ever the solution lies here. But how might we “technically,” if I may say so, envisage it?

Regards,

Mr. Poirier,

My personal opinion is that it takes two or three defining events to push a person into the terrorist spiral. One is, as I mentioned, the unfulfilled expectations. Another is a strong sense of personal betrayal by "the system" (this was seen in many of the RAF members, especially among the Baader-Meinhof "First Generation"). A third defining event is the need for revenge. This last need becomes more common as the terrorist cycle of violence increases (i.e., after the first generation of most groups is either killed or put in prison). The second generation then has the motive of either seeking vengeance or freedom for their comrades who have been "taken by the system." I also feel that once a group become driven primarily by the third motive they become almost beyond reach when it comes to negotiations.

I also make a distinction between insurgents and terrorists. This has more do to with what I see as differences in their motives and objectives. I don't feel that a pure terrorist group can make the switch to an insurgency, but it is very possible (and even common) for insurgents to slide into terrorist groups.

It is an interesting problem, and one that has distinct repercussions for COIN activities.

[Dominique R. Poirier]

He also starts with the idea that many people are exposed to the "root causes" of terrorism, but only a small number become terrorists. He attributes it mostly to social network dynamics

Mr. Metz,
Sorry to be that long.

Testimonies and assessment previously made by some experts show us that causes of terrorism—I mean, in that case, how a normal person like you and me comes to be a fanatic—may be dramatically different according to locations and narratives. We find some common features at some point, of course; but, for example, there is a nationalist terrorism in Palestine whereas al-Qeada’s terrorism is very different, in my own opinion. Thus it will be inescapably misleading to generalize, as Mr. Steve Blair suggests it in answer he just sent to me. I am not sure to correctly interpret the meaning you give to social network dynamics, but the two possible ways I see are:

-a given person is likely to be influenced in his choice and opinion by its social middle, sometimes from infancy on. When it comes to terrorism this definition applies to Palestine, or example.

- a given individual is likely to be influenced in his choice and opinion by its perception of the social middle it lives, sometimes from infancy on. The subtlety I introduce in this second case—in using the word “perception”—put the accent on the passive form of social networks dynamics by opposition to active in the former case. In the former the person is invited to belong, whereas it is not necessarily the case (not to say the contrary) in the later. The case of second generation Arabic immigrant living in European suburbs and dormitory cities relates to this second case.

Things are likely to be still different in the case of a Saudi living in his country, for example.

But all I see is that it is easier to frame the Palestinian terrorist than the Arabic terrorist born and living in Europe since we fail to correctly and accurately identify the step during which one frustrated individual is going to find the terrorist channel and to follow it while another individual will rot in its inhibition mood or, at best, will limit his action to stealing cars or selling narcotics in his neighborhood.

I am rather focusing my efforts on al-Qaeda and on the former case, to be precise.

In “Psychiatric Aspects of Terrorism in Italy,” criminologist Franco Ferracuti has noted that there is “no such thing as an isolated terrorist--that's a mental case.”

So my question is that while it is easy for a Palestinian living in Palestine to find the terrorist channel, it is hard to believe that the young second generation immigrant living in France or in Germany will find the terrorist channel at the next street corner. And since al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are very demanding in their choice of recruits the prerequisite for them is that they have to enjoy access to good intelligence while looking for the “right individual”. The task is as difficult as most of those Arabic immigrants do not use Internet. Terrorist recruiting cells in Europe—I ever we may call them like that—face exactly the same difficulties we do; they have to accurately profile the candidate, and we know how difficult and hazardous it is for state agencies we enjoy much more means and intelligence than them. Do you see my point?

P.S.: by the way, I just received Marc Sageman and Mary Habeck’s books this morning. It is much earlier than what Amazon said.
How strange it is that each time I order a used book via Amazon it needs three weeks to arrive in France whereas a new one claims a one week travel or so to do so?

Thanks you for your answers. I feel honored to collect your attention since I use to read the interresting essays you release on SSI.

[Dominique R. Poirier]

Mr. Poirier,

My personal opinion is that it takes two or three defining events to push a person into the terrorist spiral. One is, as I mentioned, the unfulfilled expectations. Another is a strong sense of personal betrayal by "the system" (this was seen in many of the RAF members, especially among the Baader-Meinhof "First Generation"). A third defining event is the need for revenge. This last need becomes more common as the terrorist cycle of violence increases (i.e., after the first generation of most groups is either killed or put in prison). The second generation then has the motive of either seeking vengeance or freedom for their comrades who have been "taken by the system." I also feel that once a group become driven primarily by the third motive they become almost beyond reach when it comes to negotiations.

I also make a distinction between insurgents and terrorists. This has more do to with what I see as differences in their motives and objectives. I don't feel that a pure terrorist group can make the switch to an insurgency, but it is very possible (and even common) for insurgents to slide into terrorist groups.

It is an interesting problem, and one that has distinct repercussions for COIN activities.

Mr Blair,
I express my point and my questions in my last answer to Mr. Steve Metz, actually. Also, your last statement fits my personal assumptions when you say “I don't feel that a pure terrorist group can make the switch to an insurgency, but it is very possible (and even common) for insurgents to slide into terrorist groups.” For, they are likely, indeed, to find the network channel while they fight with other insurgents somewhere in the world, whereas they are much less so to do so before.

It is less a matter of personal will than a matter of opportunity, I conclude. Would you agree with me on that last detail?

All this brings us back to my initial question: how can they be targeted and channeled and converted to the utmost forms of violence while living in peaceful areas or, if you prefer, much outside places where open insurgency exist? Are al-Qaeda talent spotters that numerous in Europe or in other countries where there is no open conflicts?

Once more I agree with you about the rest you wrote. Now I seize this opportunity you just provide me in order to ask another question which does not really calls for an answer but, instead, for further reflection.

Of which origin was the assistance and help the RAF and affiliated cells and individuals enjoyed? Did they act entirely by themselves, in perfect autonomy?

[Steve Blair]

With the terrorist groups, I don't think they need spotters as much as they do general organizers. In this they have learned from the anti-globalization groups that network loosely via the Internet and then operate in an almost autonomous manner until they are called together for a large protest or action. One of the dangers for law enforcement of a cellular organization is that they can reproduce through networks of "fellow travelers" and affiliates over a wide area.

With the B-M Gang/RAF, they began networking with other terrorist groups through PLO training camps if memory serves. Over time they began working with the IRA (providing safehouses in Europe in exchange for bomb-making training, for example) and other groups. Soon enough you would see "actions" mounted on the Continent by the RAF showing solidarity with the IRA. The RAF's organization model was cell-based, but I also believe they exercised a certain level of central planning.

This model has changed, based I believe on the success others have seen the various environmental, anti-globalization, and radical animal rights groups achieve with a "central goal-decentralized planning and execution" model. By this I mean that there is one "vision" for the movement as a whole (say stopping whaling in a particular area). Once that vision goes out, the smaller cells (which may never communicate and in fact have different sub-goals from the main vision) will stage their own protests or actions in that area in support of the main vision. This way you get centralized action (which may not always be what the organizers hoped for) based on a decentralized planning model that is very difficult to trace back to those who provided the basic message.

Hopefully that made at least some sense and answered part of your question. This is something I'm starting to bash together so it's still a work in progress.

[Merv Benson]

Steve,

Doesn't this organizational structure lend itself to being infiltrated by law enforcement or intelligence organizations? If so, why hasn't it been done more often?

[Steve Blair]

I don't think the loose ones do, because they are centered more around small cells of "fellow travelers." And even if they can be infiltrated, you only take down one small part of a very large, loose whole. By that I mean you can't infiltrate or track up to the next link in the chain because there often isn't one, at least in the conventional sense. In the old model you could take out one cell and then trace its comms back to another cell or a higher link. With the "vision-directed" networks you often don't have a higher link...just a pointer to a web site or blind mailing list that serves to send out general thoughts and comments.

I think this might be what we're seeing with the various terror cells in the US and UK (especially the UK). They are small, self-contained units that are "fellow travelers" with AQ in the sense that they have attached themselves to the same goals but are not necessarily part of a larger plan or game plan. We're conditioned to taking down one cell, and then following the trail of crumbs to another cell. With this model...there are no crumbs to follow.

This is where I see the internet having the biggest impact. It allows the rapid distribution of audio and visual messages...motivation tapes for the masses, if you will. Fellow travelers can access huge amounts of target information, operational data, and even training materials without ever having to link back to the main group or receive a single order from them.

[Rifleman]

I also make a distinction between insurgents and terrorists. This has more do to with what I see as differences in their motives and objectives. I don't feel that a pure terrorist group can make the switch to an insurgency, but it is very possible (and even common) for insurgents to slide into terrorist groups.

That's an interesting point. It reminds me of Civil War guerrillas. Some groups started out as guerrillas dedicated to a cause and later became terrorists.

[SteveMetz]

That's an interesting point. It reminds me of Civil War guerrillas. Some groups started out as guerrillas dedicated to a cause and later became terrorists.

In my own writing, I stress that insurgency is a strategy and terrorism is a tactic or method. From this perspective, I don't think it's worth killing too many gray cells (of which I don't have many to spare, and have elected to kill those that I do have with single malt scotch rather than word games) trying to decide whether a given group or given individual is an insurgent or a terrorist. Almost all insurgent movements use terrorism as a tactic. Some groups which do not utilize a strategy of insurgency also use terrorism as a tactic.

[Mark O'Neill]

In my own writing, I stress that insurgency is a strategy and terrorism is a tactic or method. From this perspective, I don't think it's worth killing too many gray cells (of which I don't have many to spare, and have elected to kill those that I do with single malt scotch) trying to decide whether a given group or given individual is an insurgent or a terrorist. Almost all insurgent movements use terrorism as a tactic. Some groups which do not utilize a strategy of insurgency also use terrorism as a tactic.

To quote my old Mozambican oppo " I full agree, you are deadly right".

In my research reading I am heartly sick of all of the lame definitions of both insurgency and terrorism that abound - some of them are pathologically stupid.

I actually think Tom Mockaitis' treatment of this debate up front on his recent book, The New Terrorism is spot on.

[SteveMetz]

To quote my old Mozambican oppo " I full agree, you are deadly right".

In my research reading I am heartly sick of all of the lame definitions of both insurgency and terrorism that abound - some of them are pathologically stupid.

I actually think Tom Mockaitis' treatment of this debate up front on his recent book, The New Terrorism is spot on.

Speaking of Mozambique, I remember when I was a fresh-out-of-grad-school, young professor eagerly awaiting the first time I'd see myself cited somewhere. At the time, I was writing on security in Southern Africa. I picked up a new book on that topic at my university's library, skimmed the endnotes and there it was! A citatition that said, "For instance, see Steven Metz....." So then I went to the text itself to see what the citation referenced. The text said (and I quote), "Many American academics have been duped by Mozambican misinformation." And *I* was the best example they could think of.

I was still happy--better to be a cited dupe than an unduped unknown.

[Bill Moore]

In general I concur that insurgency is a strategy and that terrorism is a tactic, but as I think most of us agree our current lexicon and structural models describing insurgency and terrorism are entirely inadequate to accurately express what we're experiencing.

Although not new, I think the extent of using terrorism as a personal or group expression is much greater than it has been previously. I read an interesting study recently that explored some of the psychological and sociological factors that influence individuals to consider joining terrorist organizations, or simply conducting a terrorist attack without joining a terrorist group (and I'm confident that many of the same factors apply to why individuals join gangs, insurgencies, etc., with the exception of the economic status. I "think" most foot soldiers in gangs and insurgencies are from the lower economic class).

The greatest factor seemed to be identity. The majority of recruits into Muslim extremist groups were in their young 20's to 30's, lower to upper middle class, educated, and experienced a recent life change such as the loss of a loved one. This recent change served to alter their perception of the world fundamentally, so now they begin a new search for meaning. These searchers were easily identified in Mosques, Madrassas's, etc., and they would be befriended and gradually led down the path of becoming a devote Muslim to Extremist. Of course this happens in Christian organizations also, we have all seen the lost kids who have all the sudden seen the light, and are easily manipulated by their new mentors.

I can't help but think that terrorism for "many" of these individual terrorists is simply a form of expression of being dissatisfied and/or frustrated with the world. Perhaps this pushes many attacks into the criminally insane areana, but these criminals are frequently mobilized and given direction by savvy strategists in this case, so their criminal act ends up serving a larger strategy. Now that we're in the information age, jihadists (and other groups) can use the internet to radicalize lost souls globally, thus you have emergent lone wolfs and terrorist cells world wide that are home grown, and no longer a part of the Afghan/USSR war alumni.

The psychological factors that make people vulnerable to this type of manipulation is increasing at an alarming rate due to social and psychological disruption due to globalization, the Iraq war, etc. Globalism is upsetting social norms (isn't this the underlying reason that Al Qaeda exists? They want to free their holy lands from these emergent norms that are not in step with their views of how a muslim should live), which sets many people on a new path searching for meaning (we had drugs and free sex in the 60s during our social upheaval, the Muslims have jihad). Proliferating violence equals more casualties, which in turn equals more potential recruits. The world wide web and sattelite TV reaches out to a global audience, part of which consists of potentially frustrated individuals who are looking for a way to express themselves. The media has allowed terrorist attacks to become a new norm for the angry man to express himself, and to a lesser extent the angry woman. The frequency of the attacks has lessened the moral reluctance to engage in such an act, as indicated by a recent of poll of American Muslims where several thought terrorist attacks were an acceptable act. In other words, it is gaining momentum, much like rap music did in the recent past as a means of expression world wide (I'm attempting to show a parallel of where a paticular behavior initially considered undesirable by those in the fold, starts gaining acceptance by those outside the fold, and before you know it young kids from Lebanon, Peru, and Japan are into rap, ugly clothes, wearing pants that don't cover the crack in their butt, etc. as the means for their generation to express themselves, what is especially interesting is national/nationalism norms are becoming less important).

Obviously my arguments are not well thought out or intellectually supported at this point, but I wanted to throw them out to the council in rough form as food for thought. I think if we continue to wage this conflict as a war, rather than a social/cultural issue, we'll continue to feed the beast and create a problem set that will become unsolvable.

[Rob Thornton]

I also agree that we have a deficient lexicon. Somehow insurgency doesn't seem to line up with the AQ strategy - it almost seems like they use it as an operational phase - but different then say Mao. I know it fits in the regard of being a strategy of the weak, but that is not how AQ professes it. Terrorism would seem inadequate as well and I think is better used to describe the tactic.

Can you use the idea of Jihad in some context? Is the reason we don't include use it because we lump it under insurgency? Are we mirror imagin our western definitions onto something that needs it own?

[Dominique R. Poirier]

Mr. Moore,
I find your comment is interesting, indeed; and I fully agree with you. I do not have much more to add, at that point.
I just began to read Marc Sageman’s book yesterday; Understanding Terror Networks. Though I am not finished I find this book very interesting in the sense that it is written by a serious and trustworthy person who approachrs things in a cold scientific manner.

Since I do not bring much contribution to your pertinent comment I remedy to this gap in reporting about a peculiar story--a priori unrelated to al-Qaeda in particular and to Muslim terrorism in general--which I believe is thought-provoking. Doubtless, you will not express any difficulty in finding where its interest lies.

On Monday June 22, 2007, in Britany, France, two young men and a young woman, respectively aged 20, 20 and 21, have been arrested by the French police on charge of burning the chapel de Loqueffret, a religious monument built during the XVIth century. They were part of a larger group of seven members suspected of having perpetrated multiple other related acts of vandalism against invaluable century old Christian religious symbols and monuments in the same region. While under interrogation the three young said that they acted entirely by their own and that what they did was a form of protest against “a monopolistic religious dominance” exereted by western Christianity that unjustly overthrew pagan religions in Europe, centuries ago (!). They claim to be themselves adept and practitioners of paganism and they expect a revival of paganism in Europe.

Here is the link, if ever you read French language:
http://tf1.lci.fr/infos/france/faits...fanation-.html

The three criminals do not belong to any religious organization of any sort, and they never received any instruction or exterior assistance.

This case doesn’t differ much from Islamist violence and intolerance, in my own opinion, but because what they did was unrelated to Islam the news of their arrest collected little interest, both from the media and the public.

Personally, I find this story interesting in the sense that it exemplifies that acts of violence and destruction done on behalf of religious claims can spontaneously occur in the most unexpected manner and for the most unexpected reasons. What else these three young men would have done if ever they had been smarter and more cautious? Other Church burnings, doubtless. Killings? Probably not, however. For they were unlikely to find exterior support, indoctrination and training on behalf of a Pagan religion in France.

However one may be tempted to hazard the guess that things would have been likely to turn otherwise if, instead of Paganism, they have expressed interest toward Islam. In all cases, we cannot but hold that they unmistakably belong to a category of persons we use to call religious fanatics; event though they didn’t kill or hurt someone. They did burn down one chapel and destroyed with sheer savagery numerous Christian monuments and painted some slogans and religious symbols of their own on many others; all marks of religious violence.

This case is no exception or singularity. It is the latest of a long list of exactly similar others perpetrated elsewhere in France during the last decade. But, according to the media, all attempts to find any link or relationship of any sort between their perpetrators proved to be fruitless. For, there is none, and there is no underground and organized pagan movement but some chitchats and mutual emulation on Internet. That’s all, and that’s why Church and chapel burnings and other forms of religious violence of this sort limit to isolated and sporadic cases unconnected each with others.

Is the mind of those perpetrators similar to this of a Muslim fanatic?

[SteveMetz]

Mr. Moore,
I find your comment is interesting, indeed; and I fully agree with you. I do not have much more to add, at that point.
I just began to read Marc Sageman’s book yesterday; Understanding Terror Networks. Though I am not finished with it, I find this book very interesting in the sense that it is written by a serious and trustworthy person who approach things in a cold scientific manner.

Since I do not bring much contribution to your pertinent comment I remedy to this gap in reporting about a peculiar story, a priori unrelated to al-Qaeda in particular and to Muslim terrorism in general, which I believe is thought provoking. Doubtless, you will not express any difficulty in finding its interest.

On Monday June 22, 2007, in Britany, France, two young men and a young woman, respectively aged 20, 20 and 21, have been arrested by the French police on charge of burning the chapel de Loqueffret, built during the XVIth century. They were part of a larger group of seven members suspected of having perpetrated multiple other acts of vandalism against invaluable century old Christian religious symbols and monuments in the same region. While under interrogation the three young said that they acted entirely by their own and that what they did was a form of protest against “a monopolistic religious dominance” that unjustly overthrew pagan religions in Europe, centuries ago (!). They claim to be themselves adept and practitioners of paganism and they expect a revival of paganism in Europe.

Here is the link, if ever you read French language:
http://tf1.lci.fr/infos/france/faits...fanation-.html

The three criminals do not belong to any religious organization of any sort, and they never received any instruction or exterior assistance.
This case doesn’t differ much from Islamist violence and intolerance, in my own opinion, but what because what they did was unrelated to Islam the news of their arrest collected little interest.
I find this story interesting in the sense that it exemplifies that acts of violence and destruction done on behalf of religious claims can spontaneously occur in the most unexpected manner and for the most unexpected reasons. What else these three young men would have done if ever they had been smarter and more cautious? Other Church burnings, doubtless. Killings? Probably not, however. For they were unlikely to find exterior support, indoctrination and training on behalf of a Pagan religion in France.

However one may be tempted to hazard the guess that things would have been likely to turn otherwise if, instead of Paganism, they have expressed interest toward Islam. In all cases, we cannot but hold that they unmistakably belong to a category of persons we use to call religious terrorists; event though they didn’t kill or hurt someone. They did burn down one chapel, destroyed with sheer savagery numerous Christian monuments and painted some slogans and religious symbols of their own on many others; all marks of religious violence.

This case is no exception or singularity. It is the latest of a long list of exactly similar others perpetrated elsewhere in France during the last decade. But, according to the media, all attempts to find any link or relationship of any sort between their perpetrators proved to be fruitless. For, there is none, and there is no underground and organized pagan movement but some chitchats and mutual emulation on Internet. That’s all, and that’s why Church and chapel burning and other forms of religious violence of this sort limit to isolated and sporadic cases unconnected each with others.

Is the mind of those perpetrators similar to this of a Muslim fanatic?

Hey--I have something in French for you!

[Dominique R. Poirier]

Hey--I have something in French for you!

Mr. Metz,
That’s the IFRI, with which Mr. Olivier Roy works, it seems to me.

In a past that begins to get remote I have had the opportunity to meet some Frenchs and other folks dealing with counterterrorism. I have even been member of a French Senate sponsored group studying terrorism. As far as I can remember I didn’t see any American during our meetings.
Well, it’s past and I put a definitive end to all relationships with those people for personal reasons, since long alrdeay.

What do you think about these statements of Olivier Roy?

“(….) the Western Muslim world. I don't buy this term "the West." In France we have many people demonstrating against American influence. Where is the West?”

“One year ago, when Mr. de Villepin was Minister of the Interior, he asked for a working breakfast with some experts like me, and he asked us to give him tips on how to curb Islamic unrest in the housing projects. I said, "One thing we can do is to reroute the Marxist extreme Left to the projects." The head of the police was next to the minister. He was not amused. But it's exactly what Villepin is doing now. He took my idea. He is now giving a new start to the extreme Left and, in a sense, many of the young who are trying to do something might not join al Qaeda but find a better perspective. These guys would have gone anywhere to do something.”

I found them in an interview of Olivier Roy done by Joanne J. Myers on March 30, 2006 at the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs.

Here is the link directing to the full text, just in case:
http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/5334.html

Well, I acknowledge there is an obvious need to collaborate on counterterrorism; for wants of a wider collaboration. But since France is no longer assimilated to the West…