New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict

[Mark O'Neill]

Speaking of Mozambique, I remember when I was a fresh-out-of-grad-school, young professor eagerly awaiting the first time I'd see myself cited somewhere. At the time, I was writing on security in Southern Africa. I picked up a new book on that topic at my university's library, skimmed the endnotes and there it was! A citatition that said, "For instance, see Steven Metz....." So then I went to the text itself to see what the citation referenced. The text said (and I quote), "Many American academics have been duped by Mozambican misinformation." And *I* was the best example they could think of.

I was still happy--better to be a cited dupe than an unduped unknown.

Ouch!

That is gold - the original "well, there is good news, and there is bad news..."

Rob, regarding your point about introducing the term "jihad". I think that is problematic as it deliberately introduces a qualifier regarding terrorism / insurgency that reduces the universality of any subsequent definition or theory. Not all insurgent / terrorist Muslims in the world are fighting for what we might associate as a 'jihadist' cause. And, as we all know, not all terrorists or insurgents are Muslim. We have to be very careful about defining these terms (insurgency and terrorism) merely in terms of extreme Islamist behaviour just because that is what appears most problematic at the moment.

The 'West' made a similar error during the Cold War when we associated many nationalist or liberation movements with communism and the Soviet Bloc, rather than seeing their true nature. This in turn prolonged many conflicts, perhaps pointlessly.

My observation would be that the threat from radical Islam appears to have the same effect on rational strategic decision making that the 'threat' of communism had in a previous era. That is not to say that a threat does not exist, just that the nature and extent of it are often greatly mis-appreciated or exaggerated.

I, for one, am still trying to work out the reasoning behind the rhetoric that AQ is trying to, or will, 'destroy our way of life'. Seriously, how can a group of stateless individuals, half of whom are allegedly hiding in a cave somewhere on the Pakistan / Afghanistan border 'destroy' functioning liberal democracies such as ours, no matter how many bombs etc are let off?

The only answer I can even begin to see makings sense would be through our own disproportionate reaction to this perceived threat they offer. That is, our government's reactions through legislation, controls and actions that are enacted to counter the 'threat' actually could end up changing the way of life and liberties that our societies have now.

In effect, such an outcome could be interpreted, at least at one level, of 'destroying' our way of life - and we would have done it to ourselves. Now suppose that was AQ's intent all along? By reacting to the symptoms and manifestations of Islamic terrorism, rather than the recognising the true nature of the threat, are we in fact being suckered in by an abstract ' rope a dope' scheme?

Now that would be a 'premium' indirect strategy that both Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart would have approved of....

Meanwhile, back at the ranch, we cannot even agree on definitions of the 'threat'.

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Mark,
I heard CNN's Christina Quala Lampur interviewing the "face of Britain’s radical Islam" this morning (there is a special on it this evening). I'll paraphrase his comments probably but, "the only hope of Great Britain is the adoption of Sharia". When asked if he believed in Democracy (he is a lawyer in London, not a cleric) for the England, the state he lives in, he sounded off a resounding "no - there is but one way man should live, and that is the Sharia".

Now, I don't contest that in a pluralistic society we should allow people the opportunity to pursue their beliefs, however when they apply their beliefs to all others, and use the term "jihad" to describe the means to achieve it, what are we left to think. You could go with rationalizing that they are limiting it to "intellectual jihad", but is that a western "mirror imaging" of our own beliefs? I don't know.

I'm not sure AQ & like extremist organizations believe they have to have the means currently at their disposal, or that they must have milestones that are laid out in linear fashion. They seem to be much more event driven and believe that it is both their spiritual duty and thus moral/physical obligation to persevere in jihad. In their world the process matters as much as the end state. So while they may not be able to destroy the U.S. in a cataclysmic event, striking at the U.S. whenever, wherever, and however possible is still part of the process - God will provide the cataclysm when his followers on other demonstrate their spiritual purity and resolve sufficiently by carrying jihad to the unbelievers.

Meanwhile, they can still inflict a great deal of damage, both on the economy, our persons and our institutions. Their belief that the process matters is important since we tend to look at the process as something to get to an end.

That is why I'm unsure if insurgency fits well. Insurgencies work towards the constitution of a new state as the insurgents see it (steve is that fair?). While world Sharia could be described as an end state, I'm not sure AQ sees it that way based on how the Taliban behaved in Afghanistan - spiritual pursuits don't end with conquest, or they stagnate. Spiritual propagation is never ending unless for some reason the religion fundamentally changes (maybe like Zoroastrianism) - Marc T could make much better sense of this then me - I'm still trying to sort it out

[Merv Benson]

A former Muslim extremist writing about the recent activity in the UK said:

When I was still a member of what is probably best termed the British Jihadi Network, a series of semi-autonomous British Muslim terrorist groups linked by a single ideology, I remember how we used to laugh in celebration whenever people on TV proclaimed that the sole cause for Islamic acts of terror like 9/11, the Madrid bombings and 7/7 was Western foreign policy.

By blaming the government for our actions, those who pushed the 'Blair's bombs' line did our propaganda work for us. More important, they also helped to draw away any critical examination from the real engine of our violence: Islamic theology.

...

... what drove me and many of my peers to plot acts of extreme terror within Britain, our own homeland and abroad, was a sense that we were fighting for the creation of a revolutionary state that would eventually bring Islamic justice to the world.

How did this continuing violence come to be the means of promoting this (flawed) utopian goal? How do Islamic radicals justify such terror in the name of their religion? There isn't enough room to outline everything here, but the foundation of extremist reasoning rests upon a dualistic model of the world. Many Muslims may or may not agree with secularism but at the moment, formal Islamic theology, unlike Christian theology, does not allow for the separation of state and religion. There is no 'rendering unto Caesar' in Islamic theology because state and religion are considered to be one and the same. The centuries-old reasoning of Islamic jurists also extends to the world stage where the rules of interaction between Dar ul-Islam (the Land of Islam) and Dar ul-Kufr (the Land of Unbelief) have been set down to cover almost every matter of trade, peace and war.

What radicals and extremists do is to take these premises two steps further. Their first step has been to reason that since there is no Islamic state in existence, the whole world must be Dar ul-Kufr. Step two: since Islam must declare war on unbelief, they have declared war upon the whole world. Many of my former peers, myself included, were taught by Pakistani and British radical preachers that this reclassification of the globe as a Land of War (Dar ul-Harb) allows any Muslim to destroy the sanctity of the five rights that every human is granted under Islam: life, wealth, land, mind and belief. In Dar ul-Harb, anything goes, including the treachery and cowardice of attacking civilians.

...

When people search for the answer of why these people are attacking they rarely look at the inherent religious bigotry of the terrorist. In a recent online poll of the reasons for the attacks this was not included in any of the nine choices.

I think there is another aspect of Shari'a that drives the proponents to terrorism. It is a code that bases compliance on corporal punishment, whether it is beatings or dismemberment. The greater the transgression the more the corporal punishment is ratcheted up. It is easy with that background to rationalize inflicting a terrorist effect to insure submission and compliance.

[Mark O'Neill]

G'Day Rob and Merv,

I think your points are well made about those who seek the universal implementation of Sharia. However, I have several issues arising from the way in which we (the 'west') approach this:

1. We ignore the fact that their ability to achive this is about on par with my ability to get an NBL contract - zero. Yet we conflate the threat posed to an existential one. I agree with your point regarding the fact that they might yet cause a whole lot of destruction and damage - but, as bad as that could be, that is not going to end our state system. Yet we carry on as if it will.

2. Not all Muslims who are insurgent want Sharia. In my part of the world many of them are seeking ethnic or sub- nationalist agendas. If 'sharia' is actually on the list of demands it is a low order one.

3. Not all insurgents are Muslim, what good defining insurgency or terrorism in terms of Jihad if you are trying to counter the LTTE, FARC, ETA or the OPM? I perceive a real danger to our wider world view and policy formulations if we let the preoccupations that some nations ( mine included) have with Islamic terrorism obscure the true nature of the problem that regional and local insurgencies, of all flavours, pose to States in the globalised era. (And I am not talking about the obvious association with violence).

I am arguing for a more measured approach than what we have seen to date. The hysteria that has been whipped up about radical islam and jihad within the west makes Macarthyism seem balanced.

I am not saying we ignore the problem. Yes, we need to do something; yes we should not tolerate the development of such movements that seek to attack our people and yes , we should be proactive in pursuing them. But we need to do so with a clear vision and perspective about the true nature of the problem and its actual ability to threaten (and what it can threaten).

This is something that seems to have been lacking, and to my mind, remains lacking. And we are not helped by those who mistake polemicism for insight, and rhetoric as a subsitution for well thought through and enacted plans.

regards

Mark

[SteveMetz]

Hey Mark,
I heard CNN's Christina Quala Lampur interviewing the "face of Britain’s radical Islam" this morning (there is a special on it this evening). I'll paraphrase his comments probably but, "the only hope of Great Britain is the adoption of Sharia". When asked if he believed in Democracy (he is a lawyer in London, not a cleric) for the England, the state he lives in, he sounded off a resounding "no - there is but one way man should live, and that is the Sharia".

Now, I don't contest that in a pluralistic society we should allow people the opportunity to pursue their beliefs, however when they apply their beliefs to all others, and use the term "jihad" to describe the means to achieve it, what are we left to think. You could go with rationalizing that they are limiting it to "intellectual jihad", but is that a western "mirror imaging" of our own beliefs? I don't know.

I'm not sure AQ & like extremist organizations believe they have to have the means currently at their disposal, or that they must have milestones that are laid out in linear fashion. They seem to be much more event driven and believe that it is both their spiritual duty and thus moral/physical obligation to persevere in jihad. In their world the process matters as much as the end state. So while they may not be able to destroy the U.S. in a cataclysmic event, striking at the U.S. whenever, wherever, and however possible is still part of the process - God will provide the cataclysm when his followers on other demonstrate their spiritual purity and resolve sufficiently by carrying jihad to the unbelievers.

Meanwhile, they can still inflict a great deal of damage, both on the economy, our persons and our institutions. Their belief that the process matters is important since we tend to look at the process as something to get to an end.

That is why I'm unsure if insurgency fits well. Insurgencies work towards the constitution of a new state as the insurgents see it (steve is that fair?). While world Sharia could be described as an end state, I'm not sure AQ sees it that way based on how the Taliban behaved in Afghanistan - spiritual pursuits don't end with conquest, or they stagnate. Spiritual propagation is never ending unless for some reason the religion fundamentally changes (maybe like Zoroastrianism) - Marc T could make much better sense of this then me - I'm still trying to sort it out

A few points:

--I think the idea of "global sharia" is a minority one event among the small minority of Muslims who would be considered extremists. But, look at it this way: we talk all the time about spreading liberal democracy, that the world will never really know peace until it is composed solely of liberal democracies. Is that really different?
--I often argue that the idea that insurgents want to create a new state--which shows up in doctrine--is one example of us extrapolating Cold War era communist insurgency to a universal model. Some insurgents do, some don't. Insurgency is a strategy adopted by a wide array of groups with diverse objectives. I personally don't think we can ever understand AQ if we view them through the prism of the fundamentally political insurgencies of the Cold War. What they want is piety, justice, and morality (as they define them). To distort al Qaeda into the type of enemy we know and understand—a Hitler, Stalin, or Saddam Hussein who can be defeated by military means—may be emotionally appealing, but it does not reflect reality. And by pretending that the challenge from Islamic extremists is something it is not, we are less able to deal with the threat that it is.

[goesh]

I'm no longer convinced that all these sucide actions, in particular the actions of the bunglers, have any earthy conceived end and plot and intent laden with ideology and political goals. I'm beginning to think there is no great ascription to the AQ/jihadist ideology and dreams of Shariah land, that with some it is more an act of total rejection of that which can no longer be tolerated and altered, despite one's best efforts to the contrary. In a sea of sin and corruption and with maximum efforts extended to end or at least minimize said conditions, what options are left? Is the logical extension of Tazkiyyat an-Nafs, the way of heart cleansing, to gamble that Allah's mercy will find a place in paradise if some of the evil forces are cleansed in the process? The prohibition against suicide in Al Qu'ran is trumped by Allah's willingness to forgive (ar-Rahim). The concept of Istirhama, begging for mercy, may be more at play here than some nefarious alliance with AQ. Does the AQ ideology simply aid and abet these people and not actively groom and condition them? We may need to look to the Sufis for answers and allies if my hunch is right. I have no doubt the background on many of these characters/bunglers will show no great irrationality and deviance from the norm of Islamic life, that the course of their everyday affairs will be bland with consistency and obedience.

[Rob Thornton]

I remember sitting down with our PRT and discussing what they were trying to accomplish and how we might be able to help. The PRT Chief said they were there to build capacity - so other then sharing information with them, there was not much they could help with.

Today I had a chance to re-engage Capacity Building in a role playing excersices - I got to play the USAID rep in a mock PCC discussing theoretical policy actions

So I went fishing for a position to take based on USAID's long term perspective in the country at hand. I'm hoping one of our SWC members can tell me if I'm even in the ball park. I put it under this thread because building capacity is a big part of bringing stability, and bringing stability (or preventing instability) is part of this thread on the new paradigm of the 21st Century.

Capacity as I described it is about making (assisting the HN govt with planning and allocating resources to) something both attractive and exportable. Attractive so that it attracts both the indigenous population and investment (foreign or domestic) and exportable so that as a model, it can be stood up elsewhere in the state as security permits.

Capacity might be infrastucture such as physical roads, airports, ports, trains etc. to move trade or people, it might also be telecommunications, IT, education pools (needed to attract companies looking to out source or off shore), Public Works, health care, Agriculture, courts and municipalities, Security Force assist, banking, markes, elections or manufacturing.

The idea was sort of modeled on what I think the PRT in our neighborhood was trying to accomplish, but in this particular country the word "reconstruction" may not have been correct. It might have been more along the lines of CDT or Capacity Development Team since this was not a failed state, but one that had requested assistance before it failed.

The excercise was pretty good. One it brought up the issue that states are not a "one-size fits all" so the assistance we might provide must be tailored not only to our goals, and perceptions, but must take into account that state's goals and and its political realities (funny you should bring it up that afternoon Steve, because we had a similiar experience this morning) - it is a partnership.

I think the topic of "capacity building" is at least one we need exposure to regardless if we (green suiters) are tasked to do it, or if we are only taksed to facillitate it. I think it is a part of the 21st Century Paradigm.

So, who has a good way to look at capacity building?

[Beelzebubalicious]

Just started monitoring this site and am posting for the first time. I've been working in the international development business most of my career, mainly on USAID contracts, including some work in Iraq. Thought I might give your question a try. Here goes:

From my experience with USAID, they have traditionally looked at "capacity building" as strictly building the skills and capacity of Cooperating Country Nationals (CCNs). In the past especially, but also now, this involved a lot of training. More recently, it includes "empowering" people or "creating an enabling environment" as USAID has realized you can train the hell out of people, but if they have no personal power, influence or enabling environment, they're just a lot of people with good skills and no way to make use of them. It also doesn't help to take a person out of their environment/culture, train them and then drop them back into that environment, especially if it doesn't support what you've trained them to do.

The other element of capacity building is a shift from human capacity building to institutional or organizational capacity building. It's along the same lines as above. An individual has a limited potential to implement change, but an institution has greater influence and sustainability. Still, it's building the human capacity within institutions, not so much the infrastructure. However, USAID understands that you can't just build human capacity w/out the supporting infrastructure. You have to build a school before you train teachers (or at least do them at the same time).

Regarding Iraq and PRTs, I think the key concept is shifting from us doing it for them to them doing it themselves. It's a basic concept to understand, but much more difficult to implement. In war time and in absence of any local authority (or identifiable, trusted authority), you need to make decisions. But, earlier rather than later, you need to find capable people to trust, step back and trust them to make decisions and manage things. You don't just hand over the reigns and walk away, but train, mentor, advise and support - constantly reinforcing, monitoring and guiding and always stepping back as they step up (hopefully). Unfortunately, it takes a long time and a lot of patience and it requires one to allow local counterparts to make decisions and manage things in their own way (even if you don't agree with it).

It's not about sitting on the council, like we did with PRDCs, making decisions. That's not legitimate and that won't last. It's also not about making decisions, then going down to meet the local sheikhs to inform them of the decision and seek their buy-in (after the fact). It's more about supporting a process. How does a provincial council member seek the input of citizens and make decisions based on their input? How does a council member exert his/her authority when it's not clear to anyone what his/her authority is?

I hope that helps. I realize I strayed off topic into my own personal philosophy, so take it with its own dose of salt. I think it is a decent representation of how the soft power people think....

[Rob Thornton]

Beelzebubalicious,
That does help. I just returned from an Inter-Agency staff ride in D.C. and there is much of the same type of thought regarding "capacity building". There are allot of energetic and talented people from across the agencies who are working hard and have an amazing grasp of understanding the challenges, but are also adept at articulating the argument for change. I'm going to put some thoughts together based off of this week then post them. OVerall, I'd have to say that some of the executive directives regarding SSTRO and capacity building are starting to take root.
Best Regards, Rob

[Beelzebubalicious]

I agree that there are a lot of talented and bright people working these issues (and thinking about them). I've been to a few symposiums and such and always come away impressed by how people are tackling the issues. Getting past the language, culture and politics of the agencies, I think most people are on the same page.

I'd be interested to hear what's new. Thanks!

[Beelzebubalicious]

Rob, you mentioned you'd put some thoughts down on your recent trip. I would be interested in hearing more. In the meantime, the special inspector general for iraq reconstruction has come out today with its quarterly report to congress. Lots' of talk about capacity development, including a section on page 61. If I knew how to copy text from a PDF, I would paste here, but otherwise, you can go to:

http://www.sigir.mil/reports/quarter..._July_2007.pdf

[Rob Thornton]

Sorry, I've been tied to BSAP classroom requirements and trying to get in some family time as well

In a nutshell, the folks we met on our Inter-Agency staff ride from: DOS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction & Stability, some folks from thinks tinks, the NCTC (National Counter-Terrorism Center), DHS, etc. all semed to get it. That these are folks from inside the beltway physically if not culturally impies to me that they recognize the need and are taking documents like NSPD-44 seriously.

These are talented folks - the guy from DOS was sharp and had a firm understanding of Army Doctrine - he was not, nor had ever been a green suiter, but he had been on a PRT in Afghanistan.

If its starting to permeate D.C., and talented people are working it hard, that gives me some hope that we will do what is needed first, then hopefully it will be codified as an after-fact. Allot of the folks I've met here at the AWC who have come down as guest speakers for BSAP from the PKSOI and other departments have been heavilly involved in helping the Joint and Inter-Agency work through the issues associated with meeting the demands of SSTRO. The leaders returning and going back to OIF/OEF are bringing with them their imprints on the future Army, Joint and Inter-Agency processes and systems.

While this is not a very detailed trip report - it should indicate to folks that although it often feels like we're on geological time, quality change (more the .ppt deep) at the grass roots is happening.