GEN Petraeus vs. Ralph Peters on Graduate Education for Officers

[SteveMetz]

Point well made Tom.

Often the only difference between folks like the Interahamwe and people who casually espouse violence and killing as if it had no more consequence than a transaction at the commissary is opportunity. How else can we account for things like you witnessed, or the actions of so many otherwise 'regular' folks who committed so many atrocities during the Holocaust or the ethnic cleansing in the FYRP?

We let people who espouse theories regarding violence and killing off the hook in 'peacetime' if we do not call them to account for their 'thoughts', by saying 'that is their right to free speech'. This, in my opinion, makes us complicit in any evil that follows.

That's an interesting argument but also a slippery slope. Using it, we could also argue that Richard Perle and Rush Limbaugh are responsible for the violence in Iraq today.

But flip comments aside, I see an important ethical distinction between advocating aggressive illegal violence (the Interhamwe) and advocating forceful methods against enemies. To the best of my knowledge (and someone correct me if I'm wrong), Ralph's argument has been that we are in a state of war but have imposed restraints on ourselves that states do not normally impose when in a state of war. Now, I personally disagree with that. In the monograph I'm working on now, I argue that "war" is not the appropriate response to the threat we face. But IF one buys the notion that we are at war, I think Ralph's position is at least reasonable.

[Granite_State]

That's an interesting argument but also a slippery slope. Using it, we could also argue that Richard Perle and Rush Limbaugh are responsible for the violence in Iraq today.

But flip comments aside, I see an important ethical distinction between advocating aggressive illegal violence (the Interhamwe) and advocating forceful methods against enemies. To the best of my knowledge (and someone correct me if I'm wrong), Ralph's argument has been that we are in a state of war but have imposed restraints on ourselves that states do not normally impose when in a state of war. Now, I personally disagree with that. In the monograph I'm working on now, I argue that "war" is not the appropriate response to the threat we face. But IF one buys the notion that we are at war, I think Ralph's position is at least reasonable.

I read Peters for the first time a few years back, initially liked him a lot, but in the wake of Iraq some of his stuff looks increasingly irresponsible and indeed ludicrous, the article about redrawing the borders of the Middle East being the best example. Saw him speak in DC once about four years ago, did enjoy him and thought he held his own with the likes of Christopher Hitchens.

I agree about the Parameters pieces, especially the one on warriors, prescient for when it was written. But he seems to rely on emotion and instinct far, far more than evidence, as others have noted. I didn't find his piece on the dreams of the Arabs all that persuasive. And I remember a cover story he did on suicide bombings for the Weekly Standard a little while back, was excited to read it but it became virtually unreadable about halfway through.

Here's a question though, bit of a digression from the original thread: does the "mailed fist" even work? Didn't seem to for the Germans in Yugoslavia, nor the Russians in Afghanistan, although us arming the mujahideen changed the playing field obviously. German genocide in Africa pre-WWI did the trick though. The Romans, of course, "made a desert and called it peace." Other historical examples are escaping me at the moment, not sure where you'd put Israeli COIN, certainly not genocide but not hearts and minds either. So even if we were to remove all the media and political consequences, is there a level of violence we can use, short of actual genocide, that would defeat a strong insurgency? I think Bill Lind, for what it's worth, would say the Hama model works, you can be very violent, but it has to be quick.

[SteveMetz]

I read Peters for the first time a few years back, initially liked him a lot, but in the wake of Iraq some of his stuff looks increasingly irresponsible and indeed ludicrous, the article about redrawing the borders of the Middle East being the best example. Saw him speak in DC once about four years ago, did enjoy him and thought he held his own with the likes of Christopher Hitchens.

I agree about the Parameters pieces, especially the one on warriors, prescient for when it was written. But he seems to rely on emotion and instinct far, far more than evidence, as others have noted. I didn't find his piece on the dreams of the Arabs all that persuasive. And I remember a cover story he did on suicide bombings for the Weekly Standard a little while back, was excited to read it but it became virtually unreadable about halfway through.

Here's a question though, bit of a digression from the original thread: does the "mailed fist" even work? Didn't seem to for the Germans in Yugoslavia, nor the Russians in Afghanistan, although us arming the mujahideen changed the playing field obviously. German genocide in Africa pre-WWI did the trick though. The Romans, of course, "made a desert and called it peace." Other historical examples are escaping me at the moment, not sure where you'd put Israeli COIN, certainly not genocide but not hearts and minds either. So even if we were to remove all the media and political consequences, is there a level of violence we can use, short of actual genocide, that would defeat a strong insurgency? I think Bill Lind, for what it's worth, would say the Hama model works, you can be very violent, but it has to be quick.

Luttwak contends that German occupation policy in World War II actually WAS effective. The idea that partisans were having much effect--he says--is mostly myth written by the victors. Take that for whatever you want.

It also worked for Imperial Russians and Soviets in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Advocates of the mailed fist would say it didn't work in Afghanistan because the Soviets never put in enough troops. It also worked in Guatemala, the United States, and Scotland.

[Tom Odom]

I see an important ethical distinction between advocating aggressive illegal violence (the Interhamwe) and advocating forceful methods against enemies. To the best of my knowledge (and someone correct me if I'm wrong), Ralph's argument has been that we are in a state of war but have imposed restraints on ourselves that states do not normally impose when in a state of war. Now, I personally disagree with that. In the monograph I'm working on now, I argue that "war" is not the appropriate response to the threat we face. But IF one buys the notion that we are at war, I think Ralph's position is at least reasonable.

Steve

I would say that is a question of how you define the enemy and how you see the conflict. I see it as a conflict that requires much less force and a broader spectrum of tools. I also see the enemy as a smaller and inherently dangerous foe not given to negotiation. A mailed fist is the wrong tool, one likely to spread the conflict.

Tom

[SteveMetz]

Steve

I would say that is a question of how you define the enemy and how you see the conflict. I see it as a conflict that requires much less force and a broader spectrum of tools. I also see the enemy as a smaller and inherently dangerous foe not given to negotiation. A mailed fist is the wrong tool, one likely to spread the conflict.

Tom

I agree with you. The point I was trying to make is that I think it's valid to critique Ralph's position on the basis of effectiveness or on the basis of incongruence with the American national culture (which was my line of attack against Luttwak), but I don't think you can say, ipso facto, that it's immoral IF one assumes we are at war. I buy Ralph's point that IF we are at war, we should behave as if we are at war. I do not buy the point that we are at war (or, more accurately, that war is the appropriate and effective response to the threat we face).

[John T. Fishel]

Steve--

I would contend that the "mailed fist" in Guatemala largely prolonged the war. Granted, military operations specifically targeted on insurgents were effective but those targeted on civilian, Indian communities were counterproductive. What worked for the Guatemalans was their Civil Affairs program called "Polos de Desarrollo" that created armed villages - Mayan language speaking - with significant economic, political, and social rewards. Indeed, it never was the scorched earth campaign initiated or expanded by Rios Montt that brought an end to the war but rather the return of democracy and a population centric strategy coupled with intelligence driven operations against the insurgents that won the fight.

I would also take issue with you regarding the notion that the insurgency in Iraq (and by extension other insurgencies) is not war. Indeed, isurgency is probably the most total war around requiring a real mobilization of the societies under attack or by the attackers if they would achieve success over thelong term. That does not mean repression as the strategy. Sure, absolute repression does work for a while. But to use the Guatemalan case again, the most recent insurgency was the third generation - the first two were wiped out - repressed absolutely - but insurgency was resurgent.

Cheers

JohnT

[Merv Benson]

I think an argument can be made that it was pretty effective for Saddam for several years. However, it was at the cost of several mass graves. That is a cost we are not willing to accept. I think the approach that is being suggested by Peters could work without the mass graves, but it would require more troops than we would ever be willing to commit to Iraq. I think the current surge suggest there is a more effective approach using more economy for force.

[SteveMetz]

Steve--

I would contend that the "mailed fist" in Guatemala largely prolonged the war. Granted, military operations specifically targeted on insurgents were effective but those targeted on civilian, Indian communities were counterproductive. What worked for the Guatemalans was their Civil Affairs program called "Polos de Desarrollo" that created armed villages - Mayan language speaking - with significant economic, political, and social rewards. Indeed, it never was the scorched earth campaign initiated or expanded by Rios Montt that brought an end to the war but rather the return of democracy and a population centric strategy coupled with intelligence driven operations against the insurgents that won the fight.

I would also take issue with you regarding the notion that the insurgency in Iraq (and by extension other insurgencies) is not war. Indeed, isurgency is probably the most total war around requiring a real mobilization of the societies under attack or by the attackers if they would achieve success over thelong term. That does not mean repression as the strategy. Sure, absolute repression does work for a while. But to use the Guatemalan case again, the most recent insurgency was the third generation - the first two were wiped out - repressed absolutely - but insurgency was resurgent.

Cheers

JohnT

I spent quite a bit of time working on a reply to your thoughtful post. Here's what I came up with: "Sez YOU!!!"

[Tom Odom]

I spent quite a bit of time working on a reply to your thoughtful post. Here's what I came up with: "Sez YOU!!!"

Oh man I am laughing so hard my gut hurts