Originally Posted by
Pragmatic Thinker
I will keep my comments short since it is my first entry onto this blog site. I have been to OEF numerous times over the past three and a half years, and the author of this Economist article is correct that ISAF and CJTF-82 (to include the USSOF units) have divergent missions. However, I would argue this is true among the NATO members also serving in RC South (Kandahar, Helmand, and Zabul Provinces). The majority of the fighting (and unfortunately dying) is done by the Americans, Brits, and Canadians. The other "partners" within the NATO alliance are not viewed as aggressive in their strategies toward the Taliban. I would argue that it will take more than rebuilding (or building) infrastructure to counter the Taliban influence throughout Afghanistan. I believe one of the main concerns for military commanders is the lack of actual combat troops and the lift to move them across the battlefield. Many times it comes down to using the most lethality available to strike a target at that given moment. Is it worth killing 10 or more civilians to kill a significant leader like Mullah Dadullah Lang? I think in some respects the U.S. commanders on the ground believe the short term success of disrupting these groups is worth the cost...I happen to agree based on the conditions we fight under. It is extremely difficult to fight a war and kill the enemy in this context when your enemy hides among the people you're attempting to help....
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