Economist comments on Afghanistan

[FascistLibertarian]

I dont want to post the text itself (not sure about copyright laws, if its alright tell me and ill post it)
They discuss unity of effort, too few troops, and the recent civilians we have killed.

1) They call for the ISAF to have 'primacy' and 'oversight' over ther OEF.
2) They call for a population centered not insurgent centered approach.
3) Lastly, they call for aborting strikes against high risk targets if there is a 'serious risk' of civilians getting killed.

#1 I dont know enough about to say. In theory it makes sense. I dont know about the situation on the ground enough to say
#2 seems to make sense
#3 Will just make the Taliban hide among civilians more. If they know we will back off.

[kaur]

I suppose that this is this article

Fatal errors in Afghanistan
Jun 21st 2007
From The Economist print edition

http://www.economist.com/opinion/dis...ory_id=9366272

[FascistLibertarian]

yeah....
Thanks!

[Pragmatic Thinker]

I will keep my comments short since it is my first entry onto this blog site. I have been to OEF numerous times over the past three and a half years, and the author of this Economist article is correct that ISAF and CJTF-82 (to include the USSOF units) have divergent missions. However, I would argue this is true among the NATO members also serving in RC South (Kandahar, Helmand, and Zabul Provinces). The majority of the fighting (and unfortunately dying) is done by the Americans, Brits, and Canadians. The other "partners" within the NATO alliance are not viewed as aggressive in their strategies toward the Taliban. I would argue that it will take more than rebuilding (or building) infrastructure to counter the Taliban influence throughout Afghanistan. I believe one of the main concerns for military commanders is the lack of actual combat troops and the lift to move them across the battlefield. Many times it comes down to using the most lethality available to strike a target at that given moment. Is it worth killing 10 or more civilians to kill a significant leader like Mullah Dadullah Lang? I think in some respects the U.S. commanders on the ground believe the short term success of disrupting these groups is worth the cost...I happen to agree based on the conditions we fight under. It is extremely difficult to fight a war and kill the enemy in this context when your enemy hides among the people you're attempting to help....

[Tom Odom]

I will keep my comments short since it is my first entry onto this blog site. I have been to OEF numerous times over the past three and a half years, and the author of this Economist article is correct that ISAF and CJTF-82 (to include the USSOF units) have divergent missions. However, I would argue this is true among the NATO members also serving in RC South (Kandahar, Helmand, and Zabul Provinces). The majority of the fighting (and unfortunately dying) is done by the Americans, Brits, and Canadians. The other "partners" within the NATO alliance are not viewed as aggressive in their strategies toward the Taliban. I would argue that it will take more than rebuilding (or building) infrastructure to counter the Taliban influence throughout Afghanistan. I believe one of the main concerns for military commanders is the lack of actual combat troops and the lift to move them across the battlefield. Many times it comes down to using the most lethality available to strike a target at that given moment. Is it worth killing 10 or more civilians to kill a significant leader like Mullah Dadullah Lang? I think in some respects the U.S. commanders on the ground believe the short term success of disrupting these groups is worth the cost...I happen to agree based on the conditions we fight under. It is extremely difficult to fight a war and kill the enemy in this context when your enemy hides among the people you're attempting to help....

Good entry and I agree that this use of force is a central issue, one complicated by the subordinate issue of available forces. I have a different take on the need for short-term gains versus the long-term costs. If it ultimately adds to the duration of the war, short term successes are not successes.

Keep posting and do us a favor by introducing yourself at Tell Us About Yourself

best

Tom

[Mooks]

I agree with quite a bit of Pragmatic Thinker's discussion. A fear that some have related to me is that many commanders on the ground still have a kinetic view on the ground, even though Cimic and Psyops has taken hold. Often a "cimic" or "psyops" aspect will be included, just because they think they need one, not because they are thinking in the terms of these ideas. That’s changing but its not an easy.

One of the interesting aspects of this discussion on proportionality came with the decision to deploy Leopard tanks last fall. It was found that Canadian troops did not have an adequate weapon between the chain gun on the LAVs and Artillery/Air strikes, which could take on hard mud walls of compounds. Quite often the 25mm would be woefully ineffective against these reinforced walls, and strikes caused far too much collateral damage. The main gun of the Leopard was seen to be a "proportional" weapon: it could accurately deliver the precise amount of damage as well as being available whenever the commander desired.

In all fairness, (and to echo Pragmatic Thinker's thoughts) I don't think the NATO/OEF has sufficient troops in the region. This was all but stated by British officers about their stretch in Helmand, and I think many others agree with that assessment as well. As a result the best we can hope for is the maintenance of the current situation, but we will not make concrete steps towards achieving peace. It might occur in "generations" as some Canadian officials assert, something we will have to be there for 10+ years, but in some way I think that’s a bit of a cop out. It seems to tell me that we have a long term plan in but we can't really give any benchmarks for success in the least. Its not that I'm suggest that counter-insurgency operations aren't almost always long term endevours; they are, particularly in a place as fractured as Afghanistan. However given the growing strength of the insurgency, its increasing infiltration into rural areas, seem to suggest in many critical categories we are moving in the opposite direction.

I believe that privately at least a few officers believe that we are just trying to hold till 2009, when Canada is likely pull out and (more importantly) the US might redeploy troops from Iraq to Afghanistan, so that we might have more appropriate force levels given the task we are facing.