Economist comments on Afghanistan

[Mark O'Neill]

Mark, there is one passage I keep coming back to from Krepinevich's Army and Vietnam when I think about Canada's decision to use tanks... it was by LTC Vann

G'Day Mooks,

I am a bit more circumspect on tanks than I am on many other weapon systems. The tank does have the advantage of being a direct fire weapon system, and the use of the infantry / tank telephone can go a long way to aiding dismounted troops accurately direct the tank's fire.

That said, the tank still sends a big 'message' - not just to the enemy, but also to the population. I do not think they are the sort of thing you want 'lying around' on urban street corners whilst you try and convince the population that things are returning to normal - their presence is 60t of RHA and other bits denying that fact. Accepting that tanks can be useful in support if and when insurgents are cornered or choose to fight it out, I believe the best tactic would be to keep them out of sight (and hence out of mind), and just use there inherent mobility for them to react / break cover as a QRF type firepower asset if required.

I guess the key thing to remember, about not just tanks but also any other form of AFV, is that their use physically separates the counterinsurgent from the population, thus increasing risk to the success of the operation. However, their non -use, in some instances, increases the physical risk to the counterinsurgent troops. Both are bad in their own way - it is one of those diabolical COIN paradoxes that Cohen , Crane, Nagl et al expanded upon in their March / April 2006 article in Military Review , subsequently paraphrased in FM 3-24.

I think that to some degree that the risk to own troops of being amongst the population is an inevitable part of COIN ops. If nations are unwilling to accept such risks,then it is time to get out of the COIN game and accept some compromises with your enemy, otherwise you are just prolonging the pain and your own eventual strategic defeat.

Cheers

Mark