The John Boyd collection (merged thread)

[zenpundit]

Thanks Norfolk!

A brief preface, Frans Osinga has agreed to participate in the Science, Strategy and War symposium and give a rebuttal/author's reply and generally discuss with the reviewers and readers.

Wilf Owen wrote:

I would dispute that assertion. Boyd may have described a process that sometimes occurs (like flatulence!). That is not to say that it forms the basis for anything useful in military thought or science.

I've looked at quite a few MRI scans taken in neuroscience and neurolearning. As a layman, the argument that the brain consists of interdependent "modules" capable of simultaneous and asynchronous processing seems to me to be credible enough to at least warrant sustained scientific investigation.

Boyd's OODA diagram represents (as I interpret it) a model of a dynamic mental process where multiple cognitive events are happening ( I'd say simultaneously in many instances). Does Boyd's model match what the brain is really doing ? Too early to say with certainty. Does the OODA Loop have any military utility? That depends on the context.

I have talked to at least three behavioural scientists and psychologists, who have all told me that even Boyd's most detailed OODA does not describe a decision making process that user awareness would enhance.

Having spent now spent over fifteen years working with students ranging from young children to adults, I can't say that I have ever come across one who understood or had awareness of their own decision-making process prior to being prompted to begin an introspective process of self-observation. Selil brought up metacognition. While metacognition does happen spontaneously and briefly, doing so perceptively and efficiently is really more of an acquired skill gained from sustained practice.

Take the "orientation" box for example. Self-awareness of the intellectual-cultural origins of one's own worldview, the limitations, strengths and blind spots is a critical bit of knowledge for being able to take active steps remediate one's own weaknesses. Or as a stepping stone to understanding alternate worldviews or perspectives - like those held by an adversary.

Now, at that level, who is OODA most useful for? Probably statesmen integrating DIME for making national strategy and foreign policy decisions, intel analysts and theater commanders. There are other ways to interpret this model. But what level of conflict is being discussed ? Few things or aspects of things are equally useful at all points on a continuum.

The OODA loop assumes rational collective human decisions under stress. Humans don't work like that

I would argue that OODA is foremost an individual psychological process. Collective OODA comes later and it is heavily mediated by social structure. Hierarchies, networks, markets all move information differently from one another.

EG- Someone learning to play chess could be said to be using an OODA loop. How does knowing that help, or speed their decision making process. If they can't see the other sides pieces, (as in conflict) how does understanding of OODA aid them?

Faster ain't always better. I realize that OODA has been primarily taught or proselytized ( NCW advocates for example) as yielding a comparative advantage in speed and the U.S. military should shoot for speed uber alles. Well, did Boyd actually say that was the only advantage? I'm not sure that was the case but I'm open to correction.

OODA, in the sense of focusing on the opponent's decision process, would certainly influence a commander or planner ( or chess player) into what pieces they might intentionally permit the adversary to see. Patton's fake army in England prior to D-Day, for example

How do you ensure all your command staff are using the same OODA loop?

You can't. The best outcome is relative congruence, IMHO.

[Ken White]

... I also believe that the proponents of MW recognised this and sought to promote a change in the cultural environment that would facilitate a flexibility of operational and tactical response that would be required in a changing operational environment – a culture built upon what Boyd termed the principles of the blitzkrieg:
• Without focus and direction (Schwerpunkt) at all levels, people will not know what to do
• Without mission responsibilities (Auftrag), people will not take the initiative
• Without intuitive competence (Fingerspitzengefühl), people will not spot mismatches
• Without mutual trust (Einheit), there is no moral force to put group goals above individuals’
In seeking to promote such a change they sought to establish a doctrine, i.e. a mutually understandable language, in which to express their ideas, and, whatever its admitted limitations, the vehicle they chose to express the difference between the current culture and its preferred model was the generational one, i.e. current meme of the US Armed Forces is second generation.

Yes they did seek to promote such a change -- but they didn't do it very well. Attack the elephants verbally as being too large and a huge Bull will just totally ignore you...

They were and are some smart guys but in their sales pitch, they didn't practice what they preach; they tried a frontal assault on a monolith; never a good plan.

As to the four bullets you provide, I submit, in order:

- Not true. You just have to train them properly. if you do not all the focus and direction is to no avail. with proper training, they'll innately know what the focus is. I'd also suggest that the word 'direction' was misunderstood (purposely?) by the Bulls to centralize decision making even more -- thus, the salesman by a poor choice of words hampered their own programs.

- Not true, comments above apply almost in totality.

- True, totally true. What is not addressed is how one trains intuitive competence... . Some have it, some don't. All the doctrine in the world won't fix that. To select for that I agree very much needed capability one has to say that some people are better than others; anathema to the 'egalitarian and meritocratic' US Armed Forces (and to Congress who fostered DOPMA to make sure those Forces didn't get elitist...

- Also totally true; while moral force is just a term, trust is vitally important in the true sense of vital -- because if Commanders do not trust their subordinates they over supervise and hamstring units. That trust is achieved through good training, it cannot be dictated.

...At the same time they seek to illustrate the requirement for a new meme through an exposition of the new operational environment, i.e. the rise of non-state actors as the primary challenge to American/Western national/Geopolitical interests, and express this meme as fourth generation.

I disagree with the generational aspect. First, non-state actors are not new; Thugees, assassins and anarchists all precede the adoption of the generational terminology by centuries. I believe non-state actors are a norm, historically and that the relatively artificial world wide suppression of them induced by the predominance of powerful states in the 1900-1990 period of constraint, particularly the Cold War tamped down the non-state effect temporarily. The end of that era allows the world to return to a more historically normal state of scattered chaos.

The terrible flaw is that the onset of such chaos was predictable (and was predicted), has been broadcast since 1972 or so and was diligently ignored by too many in the corridors of power.

...If we take Clausewitz’s trinity of state, people and army and recognise that American military superiority is such that no opponent, state or non-state, could hope to militarily defeat the US, we may recognise that any sensible opponent will aim to strike at one of the other foundations – generally choosing the will of the people to sustain a conflict by extending the war’s longevity whilst avoiding direct confrontation and maximising American expenditure of blood and treasure.

Obviously -- and yet, we utterly ignored that in spite of all evidence to the contrary. While the generations of warfare mantra did a good service in delineating the potential, the poor approach to promulgating the issues allowed it to be ignored.

At the same time a profound change has taken place in the attitude to the utility of force in Western civilisation... Even if we can fix our enemy in one place long enough to apply massive firepower to him we become revolted by the mass extermination of our enemies, without even consideration to the moral effect of any collateral damage to the innocent.

True but a fact divorced from the MW / 4GW mantra.

Even if we refuse to espouse MW ourselves we must be cognisant that our enemies don’t share this view, as we have seen recently in the Red Sea

Right area, wrong body of water...

...The Iranians clearly see something in this MW stuff, and are actively seeking to shape the battlefield by getting us used to them performing a “Crazy Ivan” whilst permitting them to close to within 200m of our vessels, i.e. where no defence is possible to a multiple missile launch...

That's not MW, that's just a common sense METT-T approach using so-called asymmetric warfare. Which in itself is just common sense. Do not attack Bull elephants head on; you've gotta flank 'em.

... Where would they get such an idea? Perhaps from an American military exercise conducted several years ago in which a retired Admiral ‘sank’ so many Blue Force ships that the exercise had to be stopped and then restarted because the Red Force was using the ‘wrong’ tactics.

Actually, that was Ol' Paul Van Riper, LTG USMC (Ret) who I knew when he was a Captain advising a Viet Namese Marine Battalion in 1966. He just applied common sense to the problem...

[Ken White]

...
Once upon a time, in a misty isle far, far away filled with castles (actually I still live there ), I pretty much believed the same thing. But my research and Marines learned me better .

some years ago wherein a Navy Captain said; "If you enter a Ship allocation conference with the Marines and see these young men with strange haircuts who seem like neanderthals and think they're stupid, you'll discover at the end of the day that not only did they get every hull they wanted where and when they wanted it but that you have also given away the Admiral's Barge and his Daughter" (or words to the effect).

[Ken White]

As you and many here are not boyd fans i know you'll reject it out of hand, but to quote boyd "War is not fought by equipment or by terrain. It is fought by people--who use their minds."

so have many others.

I was using 'intellectual' as I thought JikK was, in the academic sense. In the pure sense of the word intellectual, as in fighting is a mind over matter effort, of course.

I'd also point out that not only Boyd but Travis McGee in the old John B. MacDonald series said "We can't outfight them, we've got to out think them." Even Mel Gibson in Braveheart said "...You don't fight wi' your back, you fight wi' your mind..."

As JikK also pointed out, Napoleon, the guy who went to Moscow and made, in his last fight, made the mistake of attacking the Brits who excel at defense, said "in War, the moral is to the physical as three is to one."

So John from Erie had no patent on that idea...

[stanleywinthrop]

so have many others.

I was using 'intellectual' as I thought JikK was, in the academic sense. In the pure sense of the word intellectual, as in fighting is a mind over matter effort, of course.

I'd also point out that not only Boyd but Travis McGee in the old John B. MacDonald series said "We can't outfight them, we've got to out think them." Even Mel Gibson in Braveheart said "...You don't fight wi' your back, you fight wi' your mind..."

As JikK also pointed out, Napoleon, the guy who went to Moscow and made, in his last fight, made the mistake of attacking the Brits who excel at defense, said "in War, the moral is to the physical as three is to one."

So John from Erie had no patent on that idea...

Wow, john boyd was actually quoting braveheart in the late 1980's! I didn't know he had that kind of power! Thanks for the clue!

And where did I say he had a 'patent' on the idea?

[Ken White]

Wow, john boyd was actually quoting braveheart in the late 1980's! I didn't know he had that kind of power! Thanks for the clue!

And where did I say he had a 'patent' on the idea?

The point was not that he was ahead of his time because he wasn't -- but that fictional characters and that other guy, the short one, said the same sorts of things. So Ol' john gets a minor attaboy, Class 3, for stating the obvious. Lot of that going around.

You didn't. You just said something I thought slightly silly so I replied in kind.

[TT]

Ken posted: ....some years ago wherein a Navy Captain said; "If you enter a Ship allocation conference with the Marines and see these young men with strange haircuts who seem like neanderthals and think they're stupid, you'll discover at the end of the day that not only did they get every hull they wanted where and when they wanted it but that you have also given away the Admiral's Barge and his Daughter" (or words to the effect).

Getting every hull where and when they wanted is only deception, designed to disorganize and confuse the Navy – their main goal is always the Admirals Barge and Daughter.

[Ken White]

more generally the last named is the priority item...

Strangely enough, in working with the old 42 Cdo, I noted the RM has similar goals...

[wm]

Boyd . . .was referring to what to him is the most fundamental aspect of war, wars are fought by human beings who . . think to some degree to another before they act. Therefore, according to boyd, a key to understanding war is understanding how people think.

Knowing how people think is not enough. Knowing how people's decisions then motivate them to act is key. The so-called problem of "weakness of the will" has exercised act theorists and moral philosphers since at least the ancient Greeks. The core of this problem may be couched as follows: "How can people know what is the right thing to do yet fail to do it?"

I do not believe that Boyd has an answer any more satisfying than any other theorist about the problem of moving from decision to action. IIRC, he, like everyone else who writes on the subject, assumes that a good decision automatically makes one act. This is just hand waving to disguise what at root is a case of FM--F___ing Magic.

We know that good decisons do not always motivate action--just take a look at many of the so-called intelligence failings of the last century.

[Ken White]

Knowing how people think is not enough...
. . .
We know that good decisons do not always motivate action--just take a look at many of the so-called intelligence failings of the last century.

We over the last century have produced at various levels a lot of really good intel -- which got short shrift by the decision makers who all too often ignored it and thereby made bad decisions. The few real intel failures got a lot of publicity but their saving grace is that they caught the decision makers unaware and thus, no decision was made...

[wm]

We over the last century have produced at various levels a lot of really good intel -- which got short shrift by the decision makers who all too often ignored it and thereby made bad decisions. The few real intel failures got a lot of publicity but their saving grace is that they caught the decision makers unaware and thus, no decision was made...

I think just as often, the deicisions that were made were simply just not acted on.

For example, in The Last Battle , Cornelius Ryan describes how FDR proposed to divide up post-war Germany with the US in a wedge in the NW, Britain in the SW, and the USSR in the East. The three pieces of pie that he drew out were centered on Berlin. Unfortunately, no one chose to act on that decision by FDR, for a host of pretty bad reasons I suspect (Ryan identitifes two or three as I recall). I wonder how things would have shaped up in a post-war WWII Europe that gave the US control of the lion's share of industrial Germany, Britain the second largest piece of the spoils, the USSR a distant third and France none at all.

Imagine if senior folks had acted on the decisions that the USDAO Teheran made about the Shah's regime in the 1975-77 timeframe. Suppose the British had actuallty done what Balfour decided was right when he made the declaration instead of waiting about 30 years to act in a "half-stepping" manner on the matter.

Choosing not to act is in fact acting. Failing to act is something else entirely.

[stanleywinthrop]

Knowing how people think is not enough. .

Sometimes I think I'd be better off talking to my dog than around here. To the above-- No Sh## sherlock.

Just because I didn't bring it up before doesn't mean that Boyd doesn't go well beyond 'knowing how people think'. You and Ken White are extremely good at cherry picking and setting up classic straw-man arguments. I mean do you actually believe that Boyd felt that 'knowing how humans think' is the one step process to winning wars??????? Do you honestly believe that Boyd took his thinking no further than that?

Ken, you deride Boyd by pointing out many of his ideas are not origonal. You are failing to see that boyd's genius was the compilation of seemingly disperate ideas into one paridigm. I mean no kidding Boyd steals a lot of ideas from Clauswitz and others. Why is this so repulsive to you? Because a problem with synthetic thinking and reasoning?

John Conrad

[Steve Blair]

Why don't we all calm down and take some deep breaths here....

Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Boyd ALL complied ideas from others. They ALL also combined those ideas into something new and different.

I'd hate to see this degenerate into a mud-slinging fest or one riddled with excessive sarcasm and name-calling.

[Ron Humphrey]

Why don't we all calm down and take some deep breaths here....

Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Boyd ALL complied ideas from others. They ALL also combined those ideas into something new and different.

I'd hate to see this degenerate into a mud-slinging fest or one riddled with excessive sarcasm and name-calling.

One thing I remember coming to mind while attending courses at Baker was that the OODA cycle made me think of a consistent circle of thought / action.

For the military its all about the mission/fight/effect.
One must always look towards coming confrontation with the understanding that when it comes we must act in some form or another, even if that be not to act.

It seems to me that it often comes down to what we're thinking about about while we act. Although I'm sure it over simplifies Boyd's principles the part which stuck or at least appealed to me most was that during actions there must be constant dynamic reevaluation and subsequent change in action relative to the tasks.

Am I wrong in thinking that any application of Boyd to actual military planning is closer to tactical action than that of higher echelon. Not that it does or would not be beneficial for the higher echelons but simply due to the fact that when it comes to plan of action these echelons generally have more time to work out MDMP and such whereas those on the ground in contact simply have to work with what they've got until said action is complete.

[Eden]

Like the Bible and On War, Boyd is quoted by far more people than have ever read his work - and his body of work, by the way, is not that extensive.

As a result, most people who talk about Boyd have a kindergarten-level view of his ideas. Not anyone on this blog, I'm sure, but most people who discuss his philosophy have never actually read anything by the man himself. So, the creation of caricatures and strawmen is often a problem in evaluating the worth of his work.

In my opinion, his thought directly reflects his experiences. It is exactly what you would expect from a pilot. The OODA loop, for instance, is a great paradigm for a furball but is not particularly useful for the operational thinker. My bottom line appraisal of the man is that he has provided us with one or two new perspectives, but his loops and circles have led to a morbid fascination with technology and targeteering that have crippled deeper thought about operational art.

[Ken White]

Sometimes I think I'd be better off talking to my dog than around here. To the above-- No Sh## sherlock.

Might that have something to do with the tone and words used?

Ken, you deride Boyd by pointing out many of his ideas are not origonal. You are failing to see that boyd's genius was the compilation of seemingly disperate ideas into one paridigm. I mean no kidding Boyd steals a lot of ideas from Clauswitz and others. Why is this so repulsive to you? Because a problem with synthetic thinking and reasoning?

I have a warped sense of humor and am by nature somewhat irreverent. I also have a strong genetic predilection to react adversely to insults. Add those together and one can get some wrong ideas.

I do not deride Boyd one bit more than I deride myself or Britney Spears, I'm equal opportunity. Had you not cherry picked my comments above in this thread, you would have noted that I said I read most and totally agreed with some of his thoughts. I didn't and don't denigrate Boyd -- I do say that no one has all the right answers. Boyd's synthesis of his and other's thoughts are important -- but they are not the Holy Grail, there isn't one. That's all I've been saying.

My thoughts echo those of Steve Blair, above -- no sense in getting ugly and all theorists synthesize the thoughts of others (As, I have also said in this thread, do I). I further agree with the thoughts of Ron Humphrey and Eden above. Boyd has merit, he does not have all the answers.

[Rank amateur]

Therefore, according to boyd, a key to understanding war is understanding how people think.

This idea is also not new. Sun Tzu: "Know your enemy, know yourself." Lee was successful until he ran up against a general who's thinking Lee couldn't understand.

[William F. Owen]

Like the Bible and On War, Boyd is quoted by far more people than have ever read his work - and his body of work, by the way, is not that extensive.

Exactly! - and from what I am reading in Frans Osinga, not that original or well thought out!!

[William F. Owen]

I just spent a week in the company of Bill Lind and T X Hammes. Bill and I had few frank discussions about Boyd, MW and 4GW.

I have to say, I now know more than I ever did. Lind is a fascinating man, and TX is just a hell of a nice guy and hugely smart. Both men think very differently and seldom agree.

Broadly,

a. - I remain unconvinced about MW. - However, as a construct I can now see exactly what it tried to achieve with the US Forces and in Linds mind, failed.

b. - 4GW is designed to do the same thing and has the same weaknesses, as a result. When I pointed out that it was founded on very poor history, TX noted that it didn't matter if it got folks to think through the problem. - thus useful.

c. - According to Lind, the Osinga book is the book Boyd would have written. This disturbs me, but as Lind pointed out, I was seeking precision in a field where no such precision existed or looking for a black cat in a dark room that wasn't there!

[TT]

Wilf,

Kudos to you for admitting you are thinking over your earlier position and 'may' change your mind.

Very unlike a former senior US admin official and general that Steve has been heroically channeling on our behalf......

TT