The John Boyd collection (merged thread)

[William F. Owen]

Apparently USMC officers are a bit too clever for your comfort.

Not sure of your point. I hold the Corps in great esteem, have good friends in it and even wear USMC cuff-links presented to me by a USMC Colonel, so I am not disparaging USMC officers.

The UK adopted the Manoeuvrist Approach to Operations, as did the Australians and the Canadians. My example was referring to the USMC, but the point goes for almost all ABCAN armies, that had more military theory formed more of a part of professional training, then MW would have been treated more cautiously and in a more measured fashion.

...and for what it's worth, I thought MW was better than sex until I started reading and researching its origins in order to understand it better.

[stanleywinthrop]

Not sure of your point. I hold the Corps in great esteem, have good friends in it and even wear USMC cuff-links presented to me by a USMC Colonel, so I am not disparaging USMC officers.

Well, you may not have wished to give offense, sir, but you did so by suggesting the USMC adopted maneuver warfare out of ignorance. I suggest you study the topic and learn how it actually happened.

I'll actually agree that the USMC's version of Maneuver warfare has limited applicability in Iraq or Afghanistan these days, but it's adoption in the 1980s represented one of the biggest shifts in doctrine the U.S. military has ever willingly undergone.

[Steve Blair]

One thing I did like to see out of the USMC along with the maneuver warfare doctrine was a renewed interest in studying war in all its aspects in general. You started seeing the Commandant's reading list about that time, if memory serves, and the MCDP 1 series, which was more how to think about war than actual prescriptive doctrine.

[William F. Owen]

Well, you may not have wished to give offense, sir, but you did so by suggesting the USMC adopted maneuver warfare out of ignorance. I suggest you study the topic and learn how it actually happened.

Well sorry if I caused offence, and my intention was not to imply ignorance, in the way you seem to have understood it.

As concerns how the USMC came to adopt MW, I would love to know. Any sources of information you could suggest (other than the Boyd Biographies) would be gratefully accepted.

I contrast to the acceptance of MW it is interesting to see how the current fascination with COIN manifests itself by referencing vintage published work, and not seeking to manufacture innovative concepts.

[selil]

Well sorry if I caused offence, and my intention was not to imply ignorance, in the way you seem to have understood it.

As concerns how the USMC came to adopt MW, I would love to know. Any sources of information you could suggest (other than the Boyd Biographies) would be gratefully accepted.

I contrast to the acceptance of MW it is interesting to see how the current fascination with COIN manifests itself by referencing vintage published work, and not seeking to manufacture innovative concepts.

That's all right usually it is the Marines! who are offensive and generally distasteful. They don't call em' devil dogs because they are prim proper and refined. Marines! are heart breakers and life takers and Semper Fi.

“The Marines I have seen around the world have the cleanest bodies, the filthiest minds, the highest morale, and the lowest morals of any group of animals I have ever seen. Thank God for the United States Marine Corps!” - Eleanor Roosevelt,

If I remember right the maneuver warfare doctrine for the Marine Corps! was changing as the MEU concept was unfolding. It was pointed out to me recently that the Marines! though more than willing to move fast and light have taken armor to tiny Pacific islands, Vietnam, and in general like high speed maneuver warfare as much as any cavalry/armor army guy. I just think that they like big guns that go BOOM. Well to be more succinct I always appreciated big guns that made "other things" go BOOM.

[Steve Blair]

I contrast to the acceptance of MW it is interesting to see how the current fascination with COIN manifests itself by referencing vintage published work, and not seeking to manufacture innovative concepts.

I honestly don't know if I'd go that far. What they (and I reference the Marines) are doing now is pulling stuff that has worked off the shelf and using it as a touch-point and reference. I've seen some newer stuff come out and concepts develop that range away from some of the ideas expressed in the old Small Wars Manual.

[TT]

An interesting discussion.

As I know many here are very critical of some or all aspects of 4GW, let me say up front that I agree that there are problems with the 4GW concept (but more on that at the end). But let me also put up a bit of a defence for the 4GW advocates, for I also believe that they deserve some credit.

Part of the problem with the concept is that there that there are differences amongst those making the argument about what is 4GW, with perhaps one of the most significant differences being between Hammes’ conceptualization based on the evolution of revolutionary/insurgent/irregular warfare (ie 4GW as evolved insurgency) and many others who see insurgency/irregular warfare as only one aspect of 4GW (though to be fair to TX, he did note in The Sling and the Stone that he ultimately choose 4GW as the term he would use for lack of a better alternative - sorry, can’t remember the page number). But they hold some characteristics of 4GW in common These characteristics are:

1. Back in 1989, at the very heart of the 4GW concept what their argument that the state would face a growing crisis of legitimacy, which would increasingly weaken its authority over social organization and its monopoly on the use of force. This weakening of the authority and legitimacy of the state would in turn lead to the rise of a wide range of non-state actors, many who would challenge, or fight, the state and other entities for goals different from those of the state. Thus, proponents argue(d) that what is ‘new’ in 4GW is ‘who fights’ and ‘what they fight for’. Hence, as Granite State noted above, what they were suggesting (and Lind certainly still does) is that warfare increasingly would resemble in many ways warfare as it was before the Treaty of Westphalia and the subsequent growing control by states over the legitimate use of force. Worth noting here is that few advocates claimed that ‘4GW’ entities would use new tactics, rather their point has always been that they would use conventional and unconventional means (ie, not new ones) to achieve their ‘new’ aims and because of this and because of cultural differences that they might use old approaches in potentially new ways.

2. Proponents of this theory identified (with hindsight, reasonably accurately) the blurring nature of future conflict, especially the blurring of war and peace, the blurring between combatants and non-combatants, and the blurring of what constitutes the battlefield (the collapse, or compaction, of the strategic/operational/tactical levels of war), with conflict being non-linear and unbounded (by this I mean that such entities will use techniques and approaches – such as terrorism – not used by formal military organizations and that there are no front and rear – our societies and our beliefs are immediately pertinent targets). These emerging, non-state entities or actors, are weak in comparison to the militarily more powerful states, and so will use a wide range means other than military means in taking on the state.

3. The main effort of these non-state actors thus will be to use a variety of conventional and unconventional methods and approaches which are designed primarily to undermine the will of their adversaries and to morally undo them in an effort to foster the breakdown or social and political unity. These methods and approaches will encompass political, social, economic and culture means, aimed to affect the political, social, economic and culture of the state. That is, the aim of these nonstate actors is to influence – to disrupt, damage or change - our perceptions of ourselves, of our behaviour both on and off the battlefield. Thus the main thrust of such entities will be the strategic level of ‘war’, with their main aim of their actions being to affect us morally and mentally, and not just of state decision makers but of society as a whole.

These characteristics that they defined are pretty general, but then they were ‘fortunetelling’. These days most of them are fitting what we see happening into the concept (an exercise which can suffer from the facts being shoehorned to fit the concepts).

Finally, a couple of passing observations.

stanleywinthrop said:
How did Boyd get wrapped up into the 4GW theorists? To my knowledge he never uttered those words, and a careful reading of him shows that he divides warfare into very different categories (mental, moral, physical). Say what you want about his theories, but he really didn't have anything to do with 4GW.

As far as I know, Boyd did not, as Steve Blair rightly noted, have anything directly to do with the development of 4GW. The connection stems from 1) the original authors of the 1989 article were all followers of Boyd and his way of thinking (and still are); b) the first 3 generations of war were modeled, more or less in simplified form, from Boyd’s talks; and c) as their methodology, such as they can be said to have one, to limn out 4GW, was to apply Boyd’s general theory of change, ‘The Conceptual Spiral’ - which underpins Boyd's Patterns of Conflict and Discourse on Winning and Losing - as the means to delineate possible (potential?) future changes.

Steve Blair said: ...does not change the basic proposition that "4GW" is really nothing new...just older ideas that have been accelerated through technology

Worth mentioning, again, is that while some 4GW proponents seemed to suggest that these emerging non-state actors would use new tactics, many if most were largely silent on this issue (ie tactics), at least until recently when they started to point to current tactics being used as being consistent with their broader conceptualization of 4GW. Indeed, it was only with 9/11 that some advocates of 4GW (and not the originators or long time advocates) claimed that 4GW ‘has arrived’. But many others continued to refer to it as 'evolving'. In other words, they recognize that warfare constantly and continuously evolves, and that what we see today that is sometimes referred to as being 4GW is simply an early stage, or form, of 4GW.

So, yes, I agree that there certainly are problems with the 4GW concept. Not least is their use of history, but then historians have long complained loudly that political scientists misuse history – ie are selective in their use and interpretation – when these reprobates [errr, ummm, that includes me ] develop and/or defend a particular theory of international relations. Furthermore, the state, while in many instances is weaker in the way they suggested, is still here and does not appear about to go the way of the dodo anytime soon. So we do not see, to quote Steve Blair, ‘the titanic shift that 4GW advocates claim’ (yet, at any rate ). These, and other, critiques can be found elsewhere here on SWB, or in the August 2005 issue of Contemporary Security Policy (if you want ‘academics’ take on the concept). And one can (and maybe in some cases, should) question and even take umbrage at some of the specific analysis being generated these days.

Nonetheless, reflecting back to the original 1989 article, and even the 1994 follow-on, they got more right than wrong, in general terms, and decidedly got it more right than anyone else did ‘back in the day’ (think ‘RMA’! ). Except, of course, for van Creveld, who is often lumped in with the 4GW school due to Transformation of War [1991] but was not a member of it; rather he came to some similar conclusions as he had some of the same assumptions – ie, weakening of the state – but also derived more specific conclusions stemming from his analysis of historical and current (1991) trends (ie, war as crime, crime as war). In the end, I have to agree with Lawrie Freedman, who noted that the problems with the 4GW concept ‘is not in itself reason for neglecting its prescriptive aspects.’ (The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper 379, Oxford University Press, 2006 p. 21).

So while I think that the concept has its problems, I also think that the people who argued the concept (and still are) deserve more than a few kudos. I am with Ski that reading their current analyses is worthwhile even if you do not agree with it, for it often does make one think. Which is the reason why I enjoy reading these boards – you all make me think, and therefore learn (and yes, each and every one are unquestionably guilty of this 'crime' ).

Cheers

TT

[TT]

William F. Owen asked: As concerns how the USMC came to adopt MW, I would love to know. Any sources of information you could suggest (other than the Boyd Biographies) would be gratefully accepted.

The simple answer with respect to how the Corps came to adopt MW is ‘Vietnam’. Sort of.

It is possible to identify three strands of ‘sources’ (I am using ‘sources’ here fairly loosely and being 'academic'), all of which can be directly or indirectly linked to Vietnam.

First, the first public discussion of MW emerged as a consequence of the ‘heavy upping’ debate within the Corps in the middle to late 1970s. The short explanation of this debate is that Marines were debating how they should go about preparing to fight the Soviets or Soviet military clones, probably outnumbered. This a post-Vietman re-orientation. This debate and the emergence of MW is detailed in ‘“Innovate or Die”: Organizational Paranoia and the Origins of the Doctrine of Manoeuvre Warfare in the US Marine Corps’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3 (June 2006) pp. 475-503 (sorry, no link, but if you want a copy, PM or email me).

Second, was the Defence Reform movement, which first started to emerge in the mid-1970s and really started to gain political traction in Reagan’s first term. This encompassed a rather broad spectrum of people, but notably included Sen. Gary Hart, Boyd, and Lind. The Defence Reform Movement (though not Boyd in and of himself and his evolving thinking) stems indirectly from Vietnam.

Third, and finally, any number of Marine officers emerged from Vietnam with a view that there had to a better way to fight (ie than methodical warfare). There is no way of knowing how many such officers there were, but those that were so interested were probably very diffused across the Corps. Among the more prominent of such officers were Col. Michael Wyly and Gen. Al Gray (there were others who also fit, more or less, such as Lt. Gen. Paul van Riper who were not vocal – ie writing in the Gazette – proponents of MW).

To keep a long story reasonably short, two of these three ‘strands’ come together, serendipitously, in 1979 and 1980, while the third becomes really apparent in and around 1982/83. To explain, the first mention of ‘MW’ comes out in a two part article (Oct and Dec, 1979) in the Gazette. The article(s) acknowledge a range of actors, from Genghis Khan to Hannibal, among others, but also Boyd. One can semi trace the emergence of the thinking of the author of these pieces (a Marine Capt who disappears a year later) and it is extremely reasonable to assume that he at least heard Boyd give one (or more?) of his famous presentations probably sometime in late 1978 or early 1979 (but the historical record is silent on what other contact he may have had).

Pretty much at the same time as these articles were published, Wyly met Lind at an event (conference?), and Lind then subsequently introduced Wyly to Boyd (who taught at least one seminar of Wyly’s at the C&SC, thereby influencing a group of young officers - among whom were then Capt, now Col., GI Wilson, one of the original authors of 4GW in 1989). A number of these young officers started to meet with Lind to discuss MW (Col. Wilson was one of these). Lind published an article on what was MW in the Gazette in March 1980, thus starting what was referred to in the Corps as the ‘maneuvrist vs attritionist’ debate (publicly played out in the Gazette, though most of the articles were pro-MW). So that is two strands.

The third strand – at least in my thinking – centers on Gray and ‘practice’. Gray was an autodidact who read military history voraciously, and based on his experience and his reading was moving in the direction of MW. Sometime in the second half of the 1970s he met Boyd (I am aware that Gray listened to Boyd give his growingly long presentation at least three times). By 1982 Gray, commanding 2 Marine Division at Lejeune, had made MW the warfighting doctrine for the Division, invited Boyd down many times to give talks (and Lind to do so as well) and formed the MW Board (which generated a reading list of relevant articles and was crossed fertilized by some of the young Marine officers converted by Boyd, Wyly and, yes, Lind). Mostly importantly, he instigated free form, free intelligence, training exercises that converted a great many of his officers to the merits of MW (one example is Lt. Gen. Ray ‘E-Tool’ Smith, who served under Gray and subsequently applied the MW philosophy when he commanded the Marines in Grenada in 1983). Worth noting re the training exercises was that at the end of day there was a discussion of what had happened during the days exercise, with all and sundry able to ask questions, with the emphasis being on what were you thinking and why (Lind was often a participant). In sum, there was a developing practice within the ‘East Coast’ Marines of learning and applying MW. As a consequence of Gray’s efforts, there was at least some diffusion of MW through the Marine Corps by way of the officers who had served under Gray.

But all that said and done, the ‘reason’ why the Marine Corps eventually did adopt MW as its overarching warfighting philosophy was that Gray was unexpectedly (and I mean extremely unexpectedly) named as Commandant in 1987 by then SecNavy James Webb (yes, that James Webb). Webb had asked around about which Marine general who was a ‘warfighting’ general and Gray was named to him. Webb probably fits with those Marines who left Vietnam believing there had to be a better way to fight, for his fiction novel, Fields of Fire, among other things encompasses a critique of the way the Marines fought in that conflict (this book is still on the Commandant’s reading list, but not, I think, because of the critique). The rest, as they say, is history.

This is a very, very rough and ready overview of the ‘sources’ - it is a bit more complicated than I have outlined above.


s

elil posted: If I remember right the maneuver warfare doctrine for the Marine Corps! was changing as the MEU concept was unfolding.

Well remembered! You are thinking of the MEU (SOC). Under Gray the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) was renamed the Marine Expeditionary Unit (which is what it had been pre-Vietnam) and the Marine Corps, in order to forestall Marines being transferred to Special Operations Command, started giving MEU units Special Operations training (so SOC = Special Operations Capable). Of course, today, Marines have been transferred to Sp Ops Command……

William F. Owen posted: If enough USMC officers had read Du-Picq, Foch, Clausewitz, and even the awful Liddell-Hart, I don't think they'd even picked up the Manoeuvre Warfare handbook.

The Marine Corps Association bookstore in Quantico always has copies and seem to sell a fair few of the same. Whether young Marine officers truly understand the MW philosophy is another matter.

Steve Blair posted: One thing I did like to see out of the USMC along with the maneuver warfare doctrine was a renewed interest in studying war in all its aspects in general. You started seeing the Commandant's reading list about that time, if memory serves, and the MCDP 1 series, which was more how to think about war than actual prescriptive doctrine.

Your memory serves very, very well!. (There is obviously hope for me yet, apparently). Although there are one or two public mentions of a Marine Corps reading list in the mid 1980s (sorry, can’t remember exactly when but I remember one suggestion authored by some obscure Marine officer named TX Hammes ), the Commandant’s Reading List was initiated officially under Gray in 1990 in support of the promulgation of Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 (FMFM-1), Warfighting (as it was then known – now MCDP -1, which was rewritten in 1996-7). The Commandant’s reading list was part of a push to get Marine officers, at least, to read more military history (and also to undertand the 'why' of adopting MW), and as part of this through 1990-91 they revamped the curriculum at the C&SC (and indeed, created the MC University) with the emphasis being on infusing military history throughout the courses taught (see, for example, Paul K. van Riper, The relevance of history to the military profession: an American Marine’s view’, in Williamson Murray and Richard Hard Sinnreich, eds., The Past as Prologue, Cambridge University Press, 2006).

selil posted: It was pointed out to me recently that the Marines! though more than willing to move fast and light have taken armor to tiny Pacific islands, Vietnam, and in general like high speed maneuver warfare as much as any cavalry/armor army guy. I just think that they like big guns that go BOOM. Well to be more succinct I always appreciated big guns that made "other things" go BOOM.

I am tempted to say something here in response but one thing I have definitely learned is that the Marine Corps does do more than beaches…….

Cheers

TT

[William F. Owen]

Third, and finally, any number of Marine officers emerged from Vietnam with a view that there had to a better way to fight (ie than methodical warfare). There is no way of knowing how many such officers there were, but those that were so interested were probably very diffused across the Corps. Among the more prominent of such officers were Col. Michael Wyly and Gen. Al Gray (there were others who also fit, more or less, such as Lt. Gen. Paul van Riper who were not vocal – ie writing in the Gazette – proponents of MW).

Having met, corresponded, and broken bread with Van Riper, I have the utmost respect for the man. He is truly impressive.

... and like Riper, the USMC created the likes of Evans Carlson, Sam Griffiths and a bunch of other gifted officers, with a clear understanding of effective methods of fighting. Raiding is the acme of MW is it not? Translations of Mao, and Sun-Tzu?

Obviously there was a need to do things better and do better things, so why didn't the project start with the aim of researching this?

Why were concepts, some flawed, grouped together as MW, without someone saying "hold on a god**m second!", and re-write its doctrine emphasising what the historical and operational record told them, as being useful?

[William F. Owen]

.

1. Back in 1989, at the very heart of the 4GW concept what their argument that the state would face a growing crisis of legitimacy, which would increasingly weaken its authority over social organization and its monopoly on the use of force.

2. Proponents of this theory identified (with hindsight, reasonably accurately) the blurring nature of future conflict, especially the blurring of war and peace, the blurring between combatants and non-combatants, and the blurring of what constitutes the battlefield (the collapse, or compaction, of the strategic/operational/tactical levels of war), with conflict being non-linear and unbounded (by this I mean that such entities will use techniques and approaches – such as terrorism – not used by formal military organizations and that there are no front and rear – our societies and our beliefs are immediately pertinent targets)

Very useful summation TT. Many thanks.

1. Legitimacy. Exactly. Mao wrote about it. The Legitimate use of force is the essential under-pinning of all else. I don't think the state has a crisis in using force, IF it is used legitimately - which is the challenge. Why don't 4GW people just emphasise this without constructing all the 4GW stuff?

2. Why future conflict? Based on that description we had 4GW back in the Hussite Rebellion, the various and very annoying Welsh, Irish and Scottish rebellions and the actions of the secessionist living in His Majesties Colonies in the Americas. . Look at how the French kicked the British out of medieval France. The Indian Mutiny?

...so being that this is all fairly fundamental stuff, how can it get called 4GW, and who benefits from doing so?

[Ski]

You are missing the point on legitimacy, I think. It's about the legitimacy of the state to exist as a state - the failure to provide services, to provide security, the intrusion of the state into people's lives via high taxes, etc...it has nothing to do about using force, or the application of the military. It has everything to do with the state losing power and legitimacy in the eyes of its own people.

4GW is a return to pre-Treaty of Westphalia warfare in many aspects - due to the fracturing of the nation-state, the rise of non-state/sub-state actors, but with the added aspects of cheap global communications systems (the Internet/cell phones) and the dominance of the 24/7 media cycle where there is no filter for what is defined as "news".

I look at the state as being slowly stretched apart from two directions - economic globalization is degrading the state from above, and the rise of non/sub-state actors are degrading it from below. The larger, more resiliant states will survive and can possibly thrive. The smaller, weaker states often break due to these stresses - Somalia, Afghanistan, Haiti - and we've seen how difficult it is to rebuild states with the Iraqi adventure.

Very useful summation TT. Many thanks.

1. Legitimacy. Exactly. Mao wrote about it. The Legitimate use of force is the essential under-pinning of all else. I don't think the state has a crisis in using force, IF it is used legitimately - which is the challenge. Why don't 4GW people just emphasise this without constructing all the 4GW stuff?

2. Why future conflict? Based on that description we had 4GW back in the Hussite Rebellion, the various and very annoying Welsh, Irish and Scottish rebellions and the actions of the secessionist living in His Majesties Colonies in the Americas. . Look at how the French kicked the British out of medieval France. The Indian Mutiny?

...so being that this is all fairly fundamental stuff, how can it get called 4GW, and who benefits from doing so?