The John Boyd collection (merged thread)

[Steve Blair]

Boyd also tended to react harshly to anything he saw as waste or foolish spending. Coram's book spends some time on this, including his marathon fights with the Air Force brass regarding aircraft design and what he saw as foolish modifications to sound designs (the F-15 and F-16 spring immediately to mind, but it's also worth remembering that one of his disciples played a major role in designing the A-10). I think it was that side of his personality that attracted followers, too.

Boyd in my mind is rather like Poole...a great synthesizer of ideas from a variety of sources but only original in a handful of cases. Boyd's originality is to my mind greater than Poole's, but they are in many ways similar.

[William F. Owen]

Boyd also tended to react harshly to anything he saw as waste or foolish spending. Coram's book spends some time on this, including his marathon fights with the Air Force brass regarding aircraft design and what he saw as foolish modifications to sound designs (the F-15 and F-16 spring immediately to mind, but it's also worth remembering that one of his disciples played a major role in designing the A-10). I think it was that side of his personality that attracted followers, too.

Boyd in my mind is rather like Poole...a great synthesizer of ideas from a variety of sources but only original in a handful of cases. Boyd's originality is to my mind greater than Poole's, but they are in many ways similar.

I would never challenge Boyd's take on fighter design (...yet...). If I wanted to design a a "dog fighter" (silly word) I'd have asked Boyd or better yet, Pierre Sprey. On EM theory, credit where credit is due. Boyd knew his stuff as a fighter pilot.

H John Poole wrote one of the most useful and original books ever, on dismounted infantry operations, with "The Last 100 Yards." Very, very good indeed. My own copy has doubled it's weight in Post-it notes!!

He then wrote some stuff that was vastly variable. Some good, some very poor and some beyond the area where he excels. It sells well, but I see little merit in it.

[Cavguy]

All good stuff. I still haven't seen anyone articulate/demonstrate on why DNI's materials, such as "FMFM-1a" usually contain statements like this:

"

America's greatest military theorist, Air Force Colonel John Boyd, used to say,"

No one has given a specific, concise version of what Boyd did that is new that merits such claims. I looked through the "briefs" on DNI and couldn't make much sense of them, only to be told I had to "see him in person".

I've learned that if one can't explain his/her idea briefly and what its relevance is then there is a problem with the idea.

[Uboat509]

I've learned that if one can't explain his/her idea briefly and what its relevance is then there is a problem with the idea.

Shhhh, they'll hear you.

[Steve Blair]

All good stuff. I still haven't seen anyone articulate/demonstrate on why DNI's materials, such as "FMFM-1a" usually contain statements like this:

"

No one has given a specific, concise version of what Boyd did that is new that merits such claims. I looked through the "briefs" on DNI and couldn't make much sense of them, only to be told I had to "see him in person".

I've learned that if one can't explain his/her idea briefly and what its relevance is then there is a problem with the idea.

Quite simple...they drank the Kool-Aide.....

[slapout9]

Link to LE paper on survial stress reaction vs. OODA loop. I was taught this back in the 80's and it comes from a medical theory from the 1930's. The four steps are:
1-perception
2-analyzing and evaluating
3-formulating a response
4-initiate a motor response
makes alot more sense to me this way then observe,orient,decide,act.

http://www.emich.edu/cerns/downloads...nforcement.pdf

[zenpundit]

CavGuy wrote:

"I've learned that if one can't explain his/her idea briefly and what its relevance is then there is a problem with the idea."

Hmmm...could be a self-referential example

On a serious note, the highest value that I see in Boyd's work was modeling the ethic of being a continuously learning, adaptive, thinking, competitor in a dynamic environment. Something that was very much against the cultural, organizational, grain of the U.S. military at the time, not to mention society at large.

Still does, in some quarters.

Boyd's "original" ideas or insights relate more to the OODA Loop and E-M Theory (if we are going to disallow the latter based on Sun-tzu and ch'i then I guess much of the credit for early twentieth century physics should go to Democritus) while his briefings were definitely examples of synthesis.

Most constructive or innovative thinking, including in the sciences, derives from synthesis, not analysis though both are useful cognitive tools that everyone should have in their kit.

[reed11b]

Boyd did a good job documenting structure and C2 themes and correlations (i.e. smaller independent formations and decentralized control) of successful military organizations. I feel that some of his broad conclusions are based on themes and correlations however. Neither equals empirical evidence. For all that, he invites and creates open thought and debate on tactics and structure that had been stagnant in the Army for a while. He also broke out of the "gaming simulation" that had been a favorite of Duprey and reminded us that war is fought by men. This may actually be his greatest contributions in my eyes, even if most of his tactical ideas are later found wanting.
Reed

[ericmwalters]

Cavguy wrote:

Energy/Maneuver. As it sounds that isn't really new - Sun-tzu really covered it in his concept of "chi", didn't he? There is an energy/spirit (there is no good translation for "chi") that is a key factor in military victory, gaining that is key.

That's not what Boyd was working on or what he meant by the term. Energy-Maneuverability theory was completely different. He was quantifying the amount of potential energy that a specific aircraft (i.e., "Aircraft Specific Energy") accumulated--and how fast it accumulated it for specific Air Combat Maneuvers. Likewise, he quantified how much and how fast that potential energy was converted into kinetic energy for certain ACM. I'm going to get overly simplistic here, but some aircraft add energy better than others in various dive profiles--the old F4 Phantom II immediately comes to mind. When the F4 pulled up into a climb out of those dives, it could use a good bit of that accumulated potential energy to help carry it up faster in the climb. E-M theory explained why F4s did so much better fighting in the vertical plane (climbing and diving) to negate the tighter turn radius of their MiG opponents fighting in the horizontal plane, especially at low altitudes. His mathematics changed the way we think about and compare aircraft to each other--mathematics we still use today.

Wilf writes:

In my opinion, Robert Leonhard is simply light years ahead of Boyd because he has contributed original, insightful and useful work, that you can read in books.

Well, I'm a fan of Bob's work which is the most understandable articulation of contemporary tactical military thought, but his books are not without flaws. I could get into that in another thread if anyone is interested so I won't tangent off the current thread here. He knows what my quibbles are; nevertheless, I was heavily influenced by him and it's reflected in my own professional writing. But Boyd has gotten far more exposure--and far more impact--than Bob Leonhard has. At least so far. We'll see in about thirty to fifty years from now.

Indeed, the most irritating thing about Boyd's work is that he left us next to nothing. Those briefs are hollow shells without his verbiage ("speaker notes") behind it. Or even the man behind it, as he could handle questions quite well. There's no body of work that he's written. So we rely on "the disciples" to interpret him and expand upon what he said. Christ wrote not a single book of the Bible and we know of him through his disciples and the interpreters ever since. Yup, the religious aspects really do appear to apply here.

People's frustration ("What's the big deal?") is certainly relevant and germane because--to those well-read in the art of war--we read Boyd's interpreters and shrug our shoulders. So what? Don't we all know that? Didn't we all know that? Like I said, if you don't have the kind of itch that Boyd's ideas were meant to scratch, he doesn't do much for you.

But to appreciate why he had the impact that he did, you have to put yourself back into the climate that existed in the Pentagon/DoD when he got there. Robert McNamara had implemented a heavily systems analysis approach to readiness and procurement--that, plus the natural inclination to package programs to Congress in ways domestic politicians could understand--seemed to pervert the force development process. There was a very heavy atmosphere of distrust about military advice; to McNamara and his followers who remained even after he was gone, what the military guys had to say seemed too fuzzy and "unsubstantiated." Read H.R. McMaster's terrific book DERELICTION OF DUTY and Lewis Sorley's HONORABLE WARRIOR for some necessary insight into what it was like to be a senior uniformed official in those days. And you can imagine how this translated into the action officers who served them. James Burton's book THE PENTAGON WARS is a good discussion of the latter.

So in walks "Genghis John" who has both the formidable quantitative skills and the historical background to detect any statistical hocus-pocus, and the burning, unquenchable desire to stop the B.S. going on that seems to substitute for sound military planning in "The Building." He embarrassed the hell out of people, and they didn't like being made fools out of. But his arguments were typically far better grounded than theirs were, and so demanded attention. When seniors tried to ignore him, he didn't play fair and often bureaucratically ambushed them. He proselytized through his "marathon" briefings which basically got people to think--if nothing else--gee, he's a really smart guy. If he doesn't like something, we better at least pay attention.

The reason those briefings were so long is that--and it's embarrassing to say this--most military people in the U.S. simply don't have a broad understanding of the art of war. Not really. The schools just don't give it to you. Much of this kind of understanding has to be achieved through a lot of self-study, which most don't have time to accomplish. And the DoD civilians had even less background. So Boyd had to lay some very basic theoretical groundwork that he should not have had to do in his briefings to establish the necessary context for where he was trying to go.

In my mind, Boyd did two things that are somewhat enduring, and I'm sure there will be discussion thread posters here who will disagree. The first is that he took "classic" art of war theory and added to it recent scholarship and thinking from a wide variety of fields. Osinga and Burton both talk about this, but Osinga really lays it out the best (and it also makes him hard to read if you are not familiar with the source books/theories). So Boyd "modernizes" a lot of old thinking. Now some will not be impressed by this, and I understand that. Some will wonder why that was necessary or even useful. I will tell you, if you've ever worked in the five-sided puzzle palace and you have a grip on military history and the art of war, you know why he had to do it. Using modern science, modern scholarship, modern/contemporary ideas were much "shinier" to the systems analysis oriented decisionmakers--it was harder for them to refute Boyd when he was quoting all this stuff. Had he stuck to the classics, he would have sounded like the old dusty generals they'd blown off previously.

Proof of his impact is that much of Boyd's ideas and terminology crept into DoD documents and planning--albeit often imperfectly. Leonhard has not so far enjoyed that kind of exposure and adoption, although I'd agree with Wilf that he deserves better than this.

The second thing is his theory on command and control and the nature of violent competition, shorthanded into the "OODA Loop"/"Decision Cycle." This is very complex idea that gets simplified and a lot is lost. Interestingly, the Soviets were looking at the very same things within their "Troop Control" military science, so I'm not sure who should get credit for the concept--Boyd or the Russian theoreticians. There's another master's thesis/PhD dissertation topic for somebody. I understand the OODA Loop is very much at issue and there are a lot of good criticisms of it. But I won't be able to address that here--I'll do it in the OODA Loop discussion thread over the next several weeks. Suffice it to say that those of us in the command and control business had to think of things differently because of that work--indeed, we'd not had the depth and focus that was needed before this particular theory was articulated. Was it a new theory? While the idea behind it isn't, the way it was discussed/applied was--and was a necessary foundation for both German School and Soviet School MW. But this brief summary isn't going to satisfy the skeptics, so I'll have to explain much more over at the other thread.

[Entropy]

From my perspective (intel), Boyd's EM work was really ground-breaking. Although often associated with fighters and dogfighting, EM theory can be used for any powered, maneuvarable aerodynamic body. The same basic EM diagram showing the performace of an aircraft is also used to model performance of missiles, for example. This quantitative analysis made all kinds of new tactics possible. Instead of relying on the "book answer" for the range of a surface-to-air missile, for example, EM theory allows the intel folks to model the missile's limits which allowed the identification of vulnerabilities. EM theory is really a foundation of almost all our air operations.

[Cavguy]

Cavguy wrote:



That's not what Boyd was working on or what he meant by the term. Energy-Maneuverability theory was completely different. He was quantifying the amount of potential energy that a specific aircraft (i.e., "Aircraft Specific Energy") accumulated--and how fast it accumulated it for specific Air Combat Maneuvers. Likewise, he quantified how much and how fast that potential energy was converted into kinetic energy for certain ACM. I'm going to get overly simplistic here, but some aircraft add energy better than others in various dive profiles--the old F4 Phantom II immediately comes to mind. When the F4 pulled up into a climb out of those dives, it could use a good bit of that accumulated potential energy to help carry it up faster in the climb. E-M theory explained why F4s did so much better fighting in the vertical plane (climbing and diving) to negate the tighter turn radius of their MiG opponents fighting in the horizontal plane, especially at low altitudes. His mathematics changed the way we think about and compare aircraft to each other--mathematics we still use today.

Thanks! I stand corrected. This is why I learn a lot from these threads!

[Cavguy]

From my perspective (intel), Boyd's EM work was really ground-breaking. Although often associated with fighters and dogfighting, EM theory can be used for any powered, maneuvarable aerodynamic body. The same basic EM diagram showing the performace of an aircraft is also used to model performance of missiles, for example. This quantitative analysis made all kinds of new tactics possible. Instead of relying on the "book answer" for the range of a surface-to-air missile, for example, EM theory allows the intel folks to model the missile's limits which allowed the identification of vulnerabilities. EM theory is really a foundation of almost all our air operations.

Okay, this is the tangible "so what" I am looking for. (same with Eric above).

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

this might also answer your "so what:"

People's frustration ("What's the big deal?") is certainly relevant and germane because--to those well-read in the art of war--we read Boyd's interpreters and shrug our shoulders. So what? Don't we all know that? Didn't we all know that? Like I said, if you don't have the kind of itch that Boyd's ideas were meant to scratch, he doesn't do much for you.

For those who are fairly well read, or educated, in the military arts Boyd's military history work might be a bit interesting, but there are no revelations in it. I feel his briefings were more targeted at those who were not very well read in the military arts.

In one area where Boyd influenced the Marine Corps (ironically the service who embraced him more than his own) was to sow the seeds of thought. It was around the time Boyd was briefing in Quantico that the Marine Corps began encouraging Marines to read more, through the publishing of the Commandant's Reading Lists for various grades. That would be books with a lot of big words and not too many pictures.

[William F. Owen]

Well, I'm a fan of Bob's work which is the most understandable articulation of contemporary tactical military thought, but his books are not without flaws. I could get into that in another thread if anyone is interested so I won't tangent off the current thread here. He knows what my quibbles are; nevertheless, I was heavily influenced by him and it's reflected in my own professional writing. But Boyd has gotten far more exposure--and far more impact--than Bob Leonhard has. At least so far. We'll see in about thirty to fifty years from now.

I don't agree with all Bob writes either. His Network centric stuff leaves me concerned, and mystified, but so what? There is no requirement in modern military thought to convince Wilf Owen. I'd still hold Bob's work to be some of the most important of the last 40 years.

People's frustration ("What's the big deal?") is certainly relevant and germane because--to those well-read in the art of war--we read Boyd's interpreters and shrug our shoulders. So what? Don't we all know that? Didn't we all know that? Like I said, if you don't have the kind of itch that Boyd's ideas were meant to scratch, he doesn't do much for you.

Could not have said it better myself, and when I did say almost this, on a Zenpundit Blog, there were howls of outrage!

[selil]

:People's frustration ("What's the big deal?") is certainly relevant and germane because--to those well-read in the art of war--we read Boyd's interpreters and shrug our shoulders. So what? Don't we all know that? Didn't we all know that? Like I said, if you don't have the kind of itch that Boyd's ideas were meant to scratch, he doesn't do much for you.

Could not have said it better myself, and when I did say almost this, on a Zenpundit Blog, there were howls of outrage!

Perhaps because figuratively smacking people around because you know something they don't know or have a different opinion about something that may be important to them is the equivalent of smacking a six year old around because they don't know calculus. Never mind the fact that philosophy, inspiration, education, and so much more are of value to a society even if not understood by an individual.

[CR6]

Perhaps because figuratively smacking people around because you know something they don't know or have a different opinion about something that may be important to them is the equivalent of smacking a six year old around because they don't know calculus.

If grown professionals in the defense community demosntrate the same grasp of military theory as a six year old in a calculus class, perhaps they deserve a figurative smack.

What I learned of Boyd from PME, as well as Hammond's and Corrum's books, made me respect the fact that he fought for what he believed in, invested a great deal of effort in his self-development and shared what he knew. Where the Boyd "myth" (an inprecise term, but I lack a better one at the moment) breaks down for me is the point where Boyd fans present his concepts as if everything that came before is irrelevant. It reminds me a little of Vizzini inThe Princess Bride, "Have you ever heard of Thucydides? Mahan? CLAUSEWITZ?...Morons!"

[selil]

If grown professionals in the defense community demosntrate the same grasp of military theory as a six year old in a calculus class, perhaps they deserve a figurative smack.

I think that is taking the analogy a bit far. The issue as I see it is knowledge centric hubris. The equivalent is that "You know Boyd and I know Clausewitz therefore you know nothing of importance". As pointed out to me many times, which translation of Clausewitz, what about Sun Tzu, Clausewitz is better considered and adapted versus applied strictly and all the rest of what I've called "The Clausewitz Caveats". Yet that intellectual honesty is not being attributed in several posts here toward Boyd.

Consider the whimsical Wilf and his comments that he went to zenpundit and told them Boyd was basically worthless (mildly edited) and was surprised at the vehemence he was subjected to. Imagine my surprise that taking a proverbially squat on something people are studying and trying to understand causes some form of censure (It was the book editors website for gosh sakes). Of course about once a week somebody does the same thing to my entire career field so I might be more sensitive to the ramifications.

Consider the squad component thread. It has spiraled around, and around, and around with thematic reversals for a long time. Nobody intellectually thrashed on that or even mentions the circular nature of the engagement. It is interesting to watch the discussion evolve and re-consider elements again and again. Yet now that we are talking about ideas and proponents of particular thinking strategies the cognitive effort evaporates and now anybody who discusses Boyd must defend concepts. There is no need to defend what is basically opinion in a shifting conceptual environment where ideas can be discussed without salience shifting to recalcitrance.

Unless the council is not capable of holding two or more competing concepts in their minds and weighing each on its merits without having to decry one or the others as foul for failure in cognitive intelligence. I'll hold up Clausewitz, Fochs, Liddel-Hart, Boyd, Sun-Tzu and others while I compare and contrast and accept what I can use and still not have to make any of them justify their existence. I don't have to reject all others to accept one. That is what the discussion appears to be leading towards. Rather than trying to discuss why it appears to be trending towards justify.

But, please do continue it is quite interesting and who knew a 57 page book and a review would cause so much amazing discussion.

[wm]

I think that is taking the analogy a bit far. The issue as I see it is knowledge centric hubris. The equivalent is that "You know Boyd and I know Clausewitz therefore you know nothing of importance". As pointed out to me many times, which translation of Clausewitz, what about Sun Tzu, Clausewitz is better considered and adapted versus applied strictly and all the rest of what I've called "The Clausewitz Caveats". Yet that intellectual honesty is not being attributed in several posts here toward Boyd.

. . .

Unless the council is not capable of holding two or more competing concepts in their minds and weighing each on its merits without having to decry one or the others as foul for failure in cognitive intelligence. I'll hold up Clausewitz, Fochs, Liddel-Hart, Boyd, Sun-Tzu and others while I compare and contrast and accept what I can use and still not have to make any of them justify their existence. I don't have to reject all others to accept one. That is what the discussion appears to be leading towards. Rather than trying to discuss why it appears to be trending towards justify.

This guy named Donald Davidson makes what I think is a very interesting point in an essay entitled "The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme." He suggests that we actually do a lot of "charitable" interpretation--that is, we presume that we understand what the other person holds for beliefs, etc. when they say things. We then engage in a give and take that allows us to reach some consensus position of understanding. I think that is what happened in the Squad threads.

It seems that a little less charity is being expressed in the various threads about Boyd, OODA, MW, etc. My take on this is that the acrimony in a debate varies inversely to the stakes/outcome of the debate. IOW, lots of folks have a lot of "skin" invested in the expanatory power of Boyd, Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, etc, but the cash value of that "skin" is actually quite small. On a day-to-day, non-academic basis, having one of them be more right really doesn't amount to much in how successfully we get along in the world of prosecuting warfare at the tactical level.

[William F. Owen]

Perhaps because figuratively smacking people around because you know something they don't know or have a different opinion about something that may be important to them is the equivalent of smacking a six year old around because they don't know calculus. Never mind the fact that philosophy, inspiration, education, and so much more are of value to a society even if not understood by an individual.

I strongly resent the implication that I have "smacked" anyone around.
I submit that most, if not all, the material I reference in my scepticism of Boyd , is extremely well known and widely read.

If someone if going to tell me that John Boyd is one of the "greatest military theorists," and is making that statement while being unfamiliar with the works of Clausewitz, Sun-Tzu, and BLH, at the very least, then why should I spare their feelings, by merely pointing them at the content of those works?

Consider the whimsical Wilf and his comments that he went to zenpundit and told them Boyd was basically worthless (mildly edited) and was surprised at the vehemence he was subjected to.

"Whimsical Wilf" did not go to Zenpundit. I was invited by Mark Safranski to Zenpundit to post a challenging or competing view point, as he felt such was lacking. Frankly, I felt it reasonable to expect more intelligent responses than I received. - but I apparently I live and learn.

The reason that Boyd is challenged is, for exactly the reason CAVGUY gave at the start of this thread. I also started a similar thread sometime last year. Why is he considered so great?

For the same reason, I have a great deal of scepticism about Basil Liddell-Hart, and to a lesser extent Fuller.

[Cavguy]

It seems that a little less charity is being expressed in the various threads about Boyd, OODA, MW, etc. My take on this is that the acrimony in a debate varies inversely to the stakes/outcome of the debate. IOW, lots of folks have a lot of "skin" invested in the explanatory power of Boyd, Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, etc, but the cash value of that "skin" is actually quite small. On a day-to-day, non-academic basis, having one of them be more right really doesn't amount to much in how successfully we get along in the world of prosecuting warfare at the tactical level.

WM,

I have very little vested in any of the methods talked about, except perhaps Slapout Based Warfare.

Seriously, what prompted this thread was my confusion over the near sainthood of John Boyd by certain organziations, and their strong claims that he was America's greatest military theorist.

I was simply asking someone to justify why/if this was so (I admitted some ignorance) and trying to separate hyperbole from fact about the man, his work, and influence.

It seems from the resulting discussion (which ties into the MW discussion) that most of the veneration comes from a time when the military thought culture had degenerated into decision matrices, checklists, COFM's, and other linear tools that were teaching individuals what to think, not how to think.

From what I have gathered Boyd began a counter-revolution against this, adding the "art" back into warfare in his lectures and writings. The USMC, in an intellectual rut, adopted this philosophy after some "Young Turks" (Lind, et al.) convinced the USMC to make "Maneuver War" the central tenant of its doctrine instead of attrition tactics. Maneuver War as implemented by the USMC was heavily influenced by Boydian thought.

As Eric stated, it was needed medicine and perhaps an oversold in an effort to change the mindset of a force. Now that that correction has happened in some ways, the devotion and passion of its proponents seems a little extreme to those who didn't grow up in a stats based military (like me), and are skeptical of anyone claiming to have it all figured out.

It seems to me Boyd was a charismatic, no-BS type of guy who didn't have patience for stupidity and things that don't work or are inefficient. Through force of character he managed to change some military culture for the long term. I admire that.

However, I haven't yet seen anything to justify that he is the "Greatest American Military Theorist" that Lind & Co. claim him to be, or why I need to adopt a "Boydian mindset" above all others.