The John Boyd collection (merged thread)

[Norfolk]

I wish I could go to CGSC, heck I wish they'd let me go to platoon leader course. Anybody who could arrange that next summer would be my hero.

Mine too, Sam. I'd take a desk, chair, and a coffee mug set up in a broom closet if it were offered to me, provided I had full access to Leavenworth's libraries and DB's. Sneak me in under the job title Ft. Leavenworth, US Army, Golf Course FOREX Groundskeeper (and then I'd take care of another little bugbear regarding officer education...the groundhogs, or groundhogs and explosives/incendiaries, can be your friends, too...) Course, I'd need the help of the groundhogs to break me out of that other Ft. Leavenworth establishment shortly thereafter.

[Ron Humphrey]

Mine too, Sam. I'd take a desk, chair, and a coffee mug set up in a broom closet if it were offered to me, provided I had full access to Leavenworth's libraries and DB's. Sneak me in under the job title Ft. Leavenworth, US Army, Golf Course FOREX Groundskeeper (and then I'd take care of another little bugbear regarding officer education...the groundhogs, or groundhogs and explosives/incendiaries, can be your friends, too...) Course, I'd need the help of the groundhogs to break me out of that other Ft. Leavenworth establishment shortly thereafter.

Just being able to be here and have that access is immensely beneficial no matter what your job title. I think I heard their always looking for librarians and instructors, so never hurts to try

[selil]

I'll finish my doctorate next spring or fall... I wonder if I could take a year to teach there.... hmmmm

[Old Eagle]

CGSC regularly advertises for "title X" instructors. 2 yr contract w/ possible extensions.

[Hacksaw]

They expect a student load increase and are actively looking for CGSC instructors (I think in each department, but not sure). If interests and credentials coincide, you should definitely go to www.usajobs.gov. Not to mention it would increase the size of our non-virtual gatherings. Speaking of which CAVGUY has been delinquent, its time to counsel the young padawan.

[Cavguy]

Mine too, Sam. I'd take a desk, chair, and a coffee mug set up in a broom closet if it were offered to me, provided I had full access to Leavenworth's libraries and DB's. Sneak me in under the job title Ft. Leavenworth, US Army, Golf Course FOREX Groundskeeper (and then I'd take care of another little bugbear regarding officer education...the groundhogs, or groundhogs and explosives/incendiaries, can be your friends, too...) Course, I'd need the help of the groundhogs to break me out of that other Ft. Leavenworth establishment shortly thereafter.

Interestingly, Canada is sending a rep to be a part of the COIN Center here, in addition to the Canada LNO. Unfortunately, he's already been selected and arrives this summer.

And Hacksaw, I'll start a post today on another get together.

[120mm]

I would disagree strenuously that we need more people with history degrees. According to the AHA there are like 2500 PhDs in history granted for 300 positions each year. People with a history degree have a heck of time finding a job except in the military. As a West Point faculty member pointed out to me an engineer with broad enough instruction can make a passable historian, but it will be a rare historian that can make a passable engineer.

Q: Do you know what an Engineer calls a guy with a History Degree???

A: "Boss"

I find that engineers and other technical types make horrendous leaders. Partly because of lack of perspective, partly lack of "soft" skills" and partly because technical types tend to idealize solutions.

I would strongly and vociferously support stronger history and liberal arts education for all degrees including science, technology, engineering math (STEM). I am one of many graduates from an ABET accredited computer science degree program who got all of four or five liberal arts type courses all categorized "for engineers".

IMO, the single biggest downfall of the US education system, is that largely technical subjects are taught "in a vacuum" if you will. EVERY subject, to include Math and the "hard" sciences should be mastered as history, first. I grew up frustrated with mathematics, until I was exposed to math in the context of Airplane Mechanics, and later as the history of Mathematics. The most common thing I've heard kids say is "WTF do I need to know this crap?" and the math teacher seldom is equipped to give a satisfactory answer.

Historians make excellent researchers and analysts. And it annoys us when computer geeks hijack our language and use "analyst" when they mean "fellow computer geek".

[Fuchs]

I agree the intention was honest enough, but look where we are today. Boyd is applauded in ways that just make no sense given the evidence, and the facts. Lind came up with 4GW, which actually harmed understanding, and I won't even start on the OODA loopy garbage.

The intervening years have given us Maneuver Warfare, which once you actually break it down is an arbitrary collection of the obvious with a few attractive myths thrown in.Wilf

Sometimes old stuff needs a new, fashionable package to be seen.

Every - absolutely every - concept outside of hard scientific natural laws seems to be exaggerated. That's how things work. You won't be heard and won't get funds for research or sell books by stating the obvious in an unspectacular manner. Extreme concepts have a much larger audience potential (they need to please the people to realize this potential).

Practitioners don't need a perfect theoretical framework, and it's obvious that such a thing didn't exist any more since the Great War.
It's like the history of universal geniuses; the mankind had individuals who knew everything that was known about sciences till the 18th century - afterwards, we knew too much to fit this knowledge into one mind.
I believe we need to accept that the art of war will forever be a mosaic rather than a one-volume publication as in earlier times.
And every mosaic will have have an unrepresentative colour if looked at in isolation.

[Cavguy]

Okay,

Probably stepping into a minefield here.

I was reading Selil's blog on the new Boyd book coming out and it got me thinking.

First, I'll admit ignorance similar to I had on EBO a few months ago. I've heard of OODA (big shrug of shoulders, failed to see how it could change my life in any away) and know he was a deep thinking fighter pilot who concentrated on how to do things faster/better/more efficiently. I also understand he was a magnetic personality, kind of a Tony Robbins for the military.

What continues to puzzle me is the almost Jesus-like devotion to the man by certain groups and organizations, like DNI and others. Reading some of the fanboi material I am wondering what he has done besides develop the OODA loop that makes him worthy of such reverence. I found this on an amazon.com review -

Personally, after becoming acquainted with Boyd's work (I carry printed copies of his only published work, an essay called Destruction and Creation, in my computer bag read while traveling---giving copies to clients and friends) my business has changed and to a great extent, my life has changed. Boyd's method of synthesizing data from disparate sources has helped me to help clients solve problems and exposed me to areas I would have never investigated otherwise.
This book is important and highly recommended.

(emphasis mine)

Frankly, the level of messianic devotion of Lind & Co. kind of makes me wary of the stuff surrounding him. The tone of many of the DNI publications is invested with a certainty of opinion that rivals Paul Wolfowitz.

A recent paper discussed here termed him "The greatest American military strategist". A pretty strong assertion.

So educate me (I'm prepared to be convinced) - what is the big deal?

[carl]

I am a bit baffled too. I read a biography of him and concluded that he gave a hell of a briefing, could articulate things well that guys like Grant, Chamberlin and Forrest had a demostrated mastery of and was a hell of a stick and rudder man. The legend came apart a little too when it was explained how he was able to pull off his fabled trick of putting a guy on his six then turning the tables on him in a very short time.

The only thing I can figure is the devotees' never read much about the Forrests of old or of other pilots. (the sayings attributed to Forrest "keep up the scare" etc., are the best.)

[carl]

Oh, I forgot. To me, his best work was the first thing he did, whereby he explained the things good pilots did to beat not so good pilots so the not so good pilots could get better.

[sullygoarmy]

CavGuy...I'm sure a marine type can jump in here but working with the Marine Version of BCTP (MSTP)...they worship his OODA loop. Every class they gave us involved something with the OODA loop. Easier to remember than MDMP I guess.

Remember, this is also big stuff if you are a civilian...very sexy. Observer, orient, decide and act....makes a great t-shirt for a weekend offsight.

[Ski]

A message board thread cannot devote enough space and time to Boyd's work.

Have you read all his briefs (available on DNI)? Read both of his biographies, and Osinga's book if you have a chance.

Is Boyd a messiah? No way. Is he relevant? yep. Is he a great theorist? IMO, yep.

My biggest beef with Boyd's work is that it is overly complex, and not easily translated into the 9th grade reading comprehension standards in the military, so people get confused and blow him off. Kind of plays into the "Fuzziness or Fraud" thread that Col Waters started a week ago about maneuver warfare which isn't a surprise as maneuver warfare tenets are pure Boydian.

[Cavguy]

A message board thread cannot devote enough space and time to Boyd's work.

Have you read all his briefs (available on DNI)? Read both of his biographies, and Osinga's book if you have a chance.

Is Boyd a messiah? No way. Is he relevant? yep. Is he a great theorist? IMO, yep.

My biggest beef with Boyd's work is that it is overly complex, and not easily translated into the 9th grade reading comprehension standards in the military, so people get confused and blow him off. Kind of plays into the "Fuzziness or Fraud" thread that Col Waters started a week ago about maneuver warfare which isn't a surprise as maneuver warfare tenets are pure Boydian.

I've looked through most of the DNI stuff and came away confused - mostly. I guess I didn't see anything radical.

I didn't want to invest more of my reading time (yet) until I had a better idea of what he has done to warrant the devotion.

[ericmwalters]

I think the tone and terminology of religion is exactly appropriate here--"Jesus-like devotion" and "messianic" in particular. Because there are two things that Boyd's disciples (and that is a good term to use) exhibit: (1) there is salvation in the military "gospel" of Boyd and (2) a desire to "spread the good news." And I think you'll find, much like the early Christian church, two kinds of disciples: (1) those that knew Boyd (typically these are the most devoted) and (2) those who didn't but find his message addresses a great deal of their personal warfighting needs.

If you have the kind of itch that the Boyd message will scratch, you'll become one of the converts. If you don't, you won't. It's as simple as that.

As for me, I never got to meet John Boyd, but was tutored by some of the "disciples"--Mike Wyly, Bill Lind, John Schmitt, and Bruce Gudmundsson in particular...I've got my faded, dog-eared copy of Boyd's "Green Book" (a xeroxed collection of stuff he wanted people to read before he'd give his marathon lectures). I have an equally worn copy of Lind's/Wyly's MANEUVER WARFARE HANDBOOK. Back then when all this started we didn't have the commentators that we eventually got. This was all we had.

Apart from MW, Boyd's ideas on Energy-Maneuverability theory (and corresponding mathematics) and fast transients changed the way we evaluated, designed, and built fighter aircraft. The fact that he pushed this design philosophy through an entrenched Air Force bureaucracy that resisted him at every step makes him something of a hero in those circles. His guerrilla-style staffwork in the Pentagon after he retired, taking only the minimum of pay that would allow him to maintain a security clearance, made him an example of self-sacrifice that few saw before or since. That and his embullient, lively personality endeared many to him (and alienated many more).

His work in facilitating "fast transients" in fighter aircraft led to wider applications of the OODA loop into command and control as a whole. This concept--and it's application--is still only dimly understood by most and gets its most thorough treatment in Franz Osinga's book. It resonated with a lot of uniformed guys who saw the best diagnosis of what went wrong in Vietnam and contributed both to the Defense Reform Movement and to the "maneuver warfare" movement in the US Marine Corps. As I mentioned in the Discussion Board thread on "Fraud or Fuzziness?" it doesn't resonate nearly as well outside that context. This is why classic MW advocates always talk about it in the context of its theoretical opposite, attrition warfare (which is seen as personified in our conduct of the Vietnam War).

Certainly he's had the widest impact of anyone else within the U.S. in the late 20th Century in terms of military theory (admittedly, there's not a lot rivals for that title). I"d personally disagree that he's the greatest American military strategist--his contributions were not directly influencing American strategy, but American military theory that had (at best) an indirect influence on strategy, predominantly on military ways and means. But the Cold War thinkers like Herman Kahn, Bernard Brodie, etc., I think have that label of "strategist" best applied to them.

At issue (at least for me) is how well his ideas have translated into actual practice. Within the Marine Corps, we have those who will argue we got enough to make us more successful: Ray Smith in Grenada, Mike Myatt in the Persian Gulf War, and Jim Mattis in both the early days of Afghanistan and in the invasion of Iraq. All these men demonstrated practical mastery of "German School" MW tenets. Perhaps more importantly, the rest of the USMC understood enough to facilitate/support the kinds of things these men were doing--there was enough institutional inclination there as a result of MW to allow that style to be used in combat.

Of course, this is just a thumbnail sketch--to get a really good idea, one must read the books. I don't yet have the Roundtable book that Selil talks about in his blog that Cavguy mentions, but I'd have to recommend BOTH Grant Hammond's AND Robert Coram's biographies of Boyd, as well as James Burton's THE PENTAGON WARS. Those three books will explain Boyd's direct and immediate impact the best. As far as the ripples that flowed in all directions, we'll see if the Roundtable book addresses those.

[William F. Owen]

A message board thread cannot devote enough space and time to Boyd's work.

If we can do if for Clausewitz I suspect we can do it for Boyd.

Have you read all his briefs (available on DNI)? Read both of his biographies, and Osinga's book if you have a chance.

I have read all three, and they leave me unimpressed. I will admit to reading Osinga's book only once.

Is Boyd a messiah? No way. Is he relevant? yep. Is he a great theorist? IMO, yep.

If someone can show me an original or great theory, he authored, I am all ears.

In my opinion, Robert Leonhard is simply light years ahead of Boyd because he has contributed original, insightful and useful work, that you can read in books.

My biggest beef with Boyd's work is that it is overly complex, and not easily translated into the 9th grade reading comprehension standards in the military, so people get confused and blow him off.

I have no beef with Boyd. MY beef is with those who advocate him out of a sense of fashion, and mostly have little experience or knowledge with the wider and mostly more useful bodies of military thought.

Clausewitz is not simple either, but I get him. Most people criticising Clausewtiz haven't read his work thoroughly and/or discussed it with others.
Boyd left very very little written work to "not get".

He left presentations that are now presented by others, and were constantly evolving.

Kind of plays into the "Fuzziness or Fraud" thread that Col Waters started a week ago about maneuver warfare which isn't a surprise as maneuver warfare tenets are pure Boydian.

Boyd used the words "Manoeuvre Conflict". I can't think of one tennet of MW which is original to Boyd, or even if it is, withstands scrutiny. Most of what Boyd said about MW was put into writing by Lind.

What aspects of the conduct of Land Warfare are "Boydian" in nature? I can't think of one.

[Steve Blair]

Boyd's impact on aircraft design and theory was huge. I've never been convinced that he should have made the leap to ground warfare. As Eric points out, he did inspire a number of (in my opinion) better land warfare theorists, but I honestly don't think he was at their level. I've read Coram's book, and also had to slog through the DNI copies of Boyd's presentations for a class, and found little original in his thinking once you left the aviation field. He pulled some threads together, and certainly had the "fighter pilot mojo" to use on his followers, but I'd never call him a great American military strategist, let alone THE greatest.

I also tend to think that the OODA stuff also played well with those who were captivated by Lidell-Hart's indirect approach. I get what Boyd was trying to articulate, but I also think that there are limits to its application, and far too many of his followers overstep those limits.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

IMHO was he believed that institutions can often get enamored of a particular theory or doctrine which then tends to morph into dogma. He read widely and thought he better saw the "big picture" of historical military events and their application to current military thought.

Wilf is sort of right when he points out that Boyd offered no original or great theory. His Energy-Maneuverability theory was applied to fighter aircraft development, particularly the F-15 and 16. I do feel much of Boyd's work is insightful and useful, just not enough to place him on some sort of pedestal.

I agree with Cavguy, just going through Boyd's briefings can be confusing since they are absent the "voice over" he provided (they are not stand alone works).

I think through his "marathon" briefings Boyd merely tried to get folks to think more holistically about the lessons that can be gleaned from past conflicts, and that there were certain parallels to be found. Plus, the briefing was constantly being updated right up to Boyd's death, since he felt that nothing was static and that lessons could be constantly drawn.

As to the deification of him, I like to think Boyd would be the first to raise the BS flag on that...

[Cavguy]

IMHO was he believed that institutions can often get enamored of a particular theory or doctrine which then tends to morph into dogma. He read widely and thought he better saw the "big picture" of historical military events and their application to current military thought.

Wilf is sort of right when he points out that Boyd offered no original or great theory. His Energy-Maneuverability theory was applied to fighter aircraft development, particularly the F-15 and 16. I do feel much of Boyd's work is insightful and useful, just not enough to place him on some sort of pedestal.

I agree with Cavguy, just going through Boyd's briefings can be confusing since they are absent the "voice over" he provided (they are not stand alone works).

I think through his "marathon" briefings Boyd merely tried to get folks to think more holistically about the lessons that can be gleaned from past conflicts, and that there were certain parallels to be found. Plus, the briefing was constantly being updated right up to Boyd's death, since he felt that nothing was static and that lessons could be constantly drawn.

As to the deification of him, I like to think Boyd would be the first to raise the BS flag on that...

Interesting perspectives so far.

Energy/Maneuver. As it sounds that isn't really new - Sun-tzu really covered it in his concept of "chi", didn't he? There is an energy/spirit (there is no good translation for "chi") that is a key factor in military victory, gaining that is key.

I am sure he was a good/great leader/man, a patriot who worked hard for his country and as I understand was the champion of the F-16 as a fighter. I guess I have yet to see anything about what makes him so unique to rise to the "great" at an enduring level.

Secondly, borrowing from Eric's "religious" analogy - religious philosophies "call" us to do something - to change somehow. What is the simple "change" Boyd is calling for, other than to simply make decisions faster than the enemy can react?

[selil]

I'm not a Boydian but I do have interest in decision science. Beyond maneuver warfare, and in the world beyond the military there is an abundance of business decision science literature. How to make good decisions. Yet within my own discipline of information technology and security topics there is a dearth of any type of decision literature. How do you respond quick enough to threats when they are literally happening at the speed of light? The only answer is to get inside of the attacker process (as those happen at human speeds) and outwit or out think an adversary. From the Stoic philosophy scholars, to the John Dewey meta-cognition models, to Boyd and OODA my discipline is less worried about great military thinkers of dubious distinction and incredibly interested in strategies we woefully have under represented. Boyd provides frameworks that are pretty mobile and flexible. Right or wrong I'm not really sure as I'm still thinking about it. The "Round Table Book" though did provide insights that I didn't find in Corams book, or Burtons book. Like why Boyd didn't write a book which seems to be some of the consternation within this thread.