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Thread: "War on Film"

  1. #41
    Council Member Spud's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    ...the only problem would still be a complete lack of evidence that any of this actually works as planned.
    "We admit we lost the media battle, but we didn’t lose the military battle”
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    Washington Post Dec. 18, 2004

  2. #42
    Council Member Spud's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    The ultimate sense of all this, is that ultimately a military commander may use EBO and IO to effect his own "political" leadership, or the leadership of an NGO, neutral entity, or even allie.
    How?

    The whole concept of a WoG approach to operations instantly negates this. If I acheive thematic consistency in messaging and establish the key narrative in a WoG sense the strategic guidance is being given to the operational commander. We don't operate without it. There is no way in hell I could influence my version of State, USAID or any of the other departments into approving S&I objectives that are focussed in that regard. What we've achieved (through lots of banging of heads on tables) is a WoG failsafe that ensures our military information activities have clearly defined left and right of arcs fully supported by the remainder of Government.

    The only nut we have yet to crack is when we work hard to synch with our coalition partners but at the WoG level there are other issues at play ... look at the current NATO troop commitment issue ... no one is near cracking that nut.

  3. #43
    Council Member Spud's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by marct View Post
    My earlier comments that mediaspace is a battlespace derive from this observation - it may not be part of the military "map", but it certainly has an indirect effect on military operations and hence must be part of an updated military map. This requirement, i.e. that mediaspace (broadly construed) must have a significant place in the military mapping of their battlespace
    Marc
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    from our down-under POV ... spot on. Army currently operates within eight Battlefield Operating Systems one of which is the IO BOS. Over the past few years it has been in and out of doctrine as higher struggled with where it fit ... is it C2 or is it a BOS of its own? For us (currently) it is the same as manoeuvre or offensive support or even (I'm cringing here) CSS.

    Our use of IO in this regard is not the carefully constructed (so as not to offend anyone) US IO definition posted by Tom ... it is simply an aspect of operations in which we can apply combat functions to create an effect.

    IO for us doesn't actually do anything more than coord and synch ... I can't IO you but I can deny, influence, destroy, inform etc using IO and non-IO elements. If I tie all of those actions together to create a specific effect ISO of a wider acty (or sometimes not) ... that is IO.

    While it means our doctrine is somewhat unwieldy ... ie everything is IO yet nothing is IO it has allowed us to truly crack the nut whereas the latest US one reigning it all back as only the five elements of COPED has simply meant true synchronisation is that more difficult as for the most part it is conducted by scifwits behind closed doors in separate compartments.

    My experiences in MNF-I in 04 proved the value of co-ording and synching these effects. STRATCOM in that HQs achieved successes that have never been replicated because we physically made the PD, PA and IO types sit in the same room and work together. Unfortunately however that loss of a dynamic one-star saw old rivalries come to fore and the organisation as it stood disintegrated and went back to operating in silos.

  4. #44
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Spud View Post
    How?

    The whole concept of a WoG approach to operations instantly negates this.
    WoG may (what ever that is). I just take it as being axiomatic that any concept that talks about "influencing adversaries, allies and neutrals," runs the risk of commanders seeking to influence their political leadership, AND having the doctrinal justification to do so.

    This is what I find so frustrating about all these wiz-bang concepts. They all seem to lack simple definitions, that state simply:

    What it is. Why we do it. How it should be done.

    ...and the counter argument is always "Oh, it's all terribly complex!" Frankly, the Babylonian Talmud, makes more sense to me than some of the stuff we discuss here!
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  5. #45
    Council Member Rockbridge's Avatar
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    Default Simple concept, difficult to execute

    At the most senior levels of military operations, commanders DO influence their political leadership. Every single day. The most effective plan for how they’re going to do it. They provide military impact assessments when political leaders decide to undertake a particular diplomatic course of action. They argue for resources. They propose Concepts of Operation for how to execute an op, and submit that COA to leaders along with a briefing that is designed to sway the approval authority’s opinion. The Commander who doesn’t influence his political leadership is negligent because one of his principle jobs is to utilize his many years of training and experience to ensure that the actions the military is asked to execute are feasible and nested with national security objectives. But … influencing your own political leadership (or that of allied nations) is not what IO (the military operation) is about, and that’s why this conversation keeps bouncing around so much.

    IO has a pretty simple definition and is a pretty simple concept, but I guess certain concepts are more difficult for some people to grasp than they are for others. I have a hard time with non-Euclidian geometry. It’s very difficult to talk about IO intelligently when those discussing it refuse to adhere to a common lexicon. If, for example we set out to discuss "football coaches," it will prove challenging to hold an intelligent conversation if you are referring to large vehicles that carry soccer fans while I am referring to the men who are in charge of teams like the Dallas Cowboys and New England Patriots. We may be using the same phrase, but we're sure not talking about the same thing.

    If the purpose of the discussion is to develop a definition for IO (as opposed to discussing an operational concept with an agreed upon definition), then the context of the discussion needs to be clarified.

    IO is very difficult to execute because there are more variables in the information environment that there are on the battlefield and because there are so many amateurs employed as IO planners. Adversary, neutral, and friendly parties from around the globe have direct impact in the information environment, almost exclusive of geography; timing is critical; and the best-laid IO plans can be completely turned upside down by seemingly innocuous actions taken by people who don't intend to spoil the plan.
    You can get more with a kind word and a gun than you can with a kind word alone

  6. #46
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Rockbridge View Post
    @ At the most senior levels of military operations, commanders DO influence their political leadership.

    @ It’s very difficult to talk about IO intelligently when those discussing it refuse to adhere to a common lexicon. .

    @ IO is very difficult to execute because there are more variables in the information environment that there are on the battlefield and because there are so many amateurs employed as IO planners.
    @ ...and in current operations, more junior commanders with access to media possess the same ability. It's how they are directed to use influence that is critical.

    @ Which is pretty much what I have been saying since I started posting here, especially as a lot of definitions and terms used are misleading, inaccurate and nonsensical.

    @ So the accepted norm for the critical activity is to entrust it to the least skilled? I'm not going to argue with this. Most of what I read about IO is amateurish and my first hand encounters with those who claim expertise in it, in relation to broadcast news, confirms your hypothesis.
    Last edited by William F. Owen; 03-22-2008 at 01:43 PM. Reason: depression
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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