"War on Film"

[Tom Odom]

Just for clarity here is a brief extract concerning what IO is and what it is not according to Joint Pub 3-13 Information Operations 2006:

Information operations (IO) are described as the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.

IO consists of five core capabilities which are: PSYOP, MILDEC, OPSEC, EW, and CNO. Of the five, PSYOP, OPSEC, and MILDEC have played a major part in military operations for many centuries. In this modern age, they have been joined first by EW and most recently by CNO. Together these five capabilities, used in conjunction with supporting and related capabilities, provide the JFC with the principal means of influencing an adversary and other target audiences (TAs) by enabling the joint forces freedom of operation in the information environment.

Capabilities supporting IO include information assurance (IA), physical security, physical attack, counterintelligence, and combat camera. These are either directly or indirectly involved in the information environment and contribute to effective IO. They should be integrated and coordinated with the core capabilities, but can also serve other wider purposes.

There are three military functions, public affairs (PA), civil military operations (CMO), and defense support to public diplomacy, specified as related capabilities for IO. These capabilities make significant contributions to IO and must always be coordinated and integrated with the core and supporting IO capabilities. However, their primary purpose and rules under which they operate must not be compromised by IO. This requires additional care and consideration in the planning and conduct of IO. For this reason, the PA and CMO staffs particularly must work in close coordination with the IO planning staff.

That is the current doctrine in IO at the Joint level. One thing of note is that strategic communications are separated from IO as a US government function per below:

strategic communication. Focused United States Government (USG) efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all elements of national power

Personally I believe such a separation is artificial at best and I would agree that if we lump strat comms into strat IO we are indeed getting our asses kicked. In that regard I agree 110% that it is a national issue and we--the military--are but supporting actors on the greater stage.

But at the operational and tactical levels we have made dramatic advances in IO since 2003 and especially since 2005. Some of those advances were luck but many were due to applied learning. We have learned -- again-- that COIN is not firepower dependent. And gradually we have incorporated non-military elements in that tactical and operational IO effort.

IO is the nothing to do with the application of force for the breaking of will.
It is therefore nothing to do with the military. It is entirely political, and thus the realm of civil servants and elected officials.

The above statement is wrong. IO does apply to the military. It is not purely political. Soldiers on patrol are very much part of the IO effort.

Best

Tom