"War on Film"

[Tom Odom]

Just for clarity here is a brief extract concerning what IO is and what it is not according to Joint Pub 3-13 Information Operations 2006:

Information operations (IO) are described as the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.

IO consists of five core capabilities which are: PSYOP, MILDEC, OPSEC, EW, and CNO. Of the five, PSYOP, OPSEC, and MILDEC have played a major part in military operations for many centuries. In this modern age, they have been joined first by EW and most recently by CNO. Together these five capabilities, used in conjunction with supporting and related capabilities, provide the JFC with the principal means of influencing an adversary and other target audiences (TAs) by enabling the joint forces freedom of operation in the information environment.

Capabilities supporting IO include information assurance (IA), physical security, physical attack, counterintelligence, and combat camera. These are either directly or indirectly involved in the information environment and contribute to effective IO. They should be integrated and coordinated with the core capabilities, but can also serve other wider purposes.

There are three military functions, public affairs (PA), civil military operations (CMO), and defense support to public diplomacy, specified as related capabilities for IO. These capabilities make significant contributions to IO and must always be coordinated and integrated with the core and supporting IO capabilities. However, their primary purpose and rules under which they operate must not be compromised by IO. This requires additional care and consideration in the planning and conduct of IO. For this reason, the PA and CMO staffs particularly must work in close coordination with the IO planning staff.

That is the current doctrine in IO at the Joint level. One thing of note is that strategic communications are separated from IO as a US government function per below:

strategic communication. Focused United States Government (USG) efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all elements of national power

Personally I believe such a separation is artificial at best and I would agree that if we lump strat comms into strat IO we are indeed getting our asses kicked. In that regard I agree 110% that it is a national issue and we--the military--are but supporting actors on the greater stage.

But at the operational and tactical levels we have made dramatic advances in IO since 2003 and especially since 2005. Some of those advances were luck but many were due to applied learning. We have learned -- again-- that COIN is not firepower dependent. And gradually we have incorporated non-military elements in that tactical and operational IO effort.

IO is the nothing to do with the application of force for the breaking of will.
It is therefore nothing to do with the military. It is entirely political, and thus the realm of civil servants and elected officials.

The above statement is wrong. IO does apply to the military. It is not purely political. Soldiers on patrol are very much part of the IO effort.

Best

Tom

[Ken White]

dispute about application of the word 'entirely' in Wilf's statement. Small matter.

More importantly, I totally agree with you on these:

"...if we lump strat comms into strat IO we are indeed getting our asses kicked. In that regard I agree 110% that it is a national issue and we--the military--are but supporting actors on the greater stage."

"...at the operational and tactical levels we have made dramatic advances in IO since 2003 and especially since 2005. Some of those advances were luck but many were due to applied learning. We have learned -- again-- that COIN is not firepower dependent. And gradually we have incorporated non-military elements in that tactical and operational IO effort."

"...Soldiers on patrol are very much part of the IO effort."

Ain't semantics grand...

[wm]

What one perceives is what one uses to categorize/identify reality. IO is largely, if not entirely, about shaping perceptions, and, as result, one's view of reality. Sometimes that is done by a kinetic restructuring of the perceptual field; sometimes it is done by a non-kinetic restructuring. As an example of the latter, OPSEC and camouflage preclude or limit observations/perceptions and, thereby, reorder what one's reality is.

No military force is able, uinilaterally, to so effect an another entity's perceptions in all of the aspects that would be necessary in order to get that other to reshape its view of reality sufficiently to change how it conducts its affairs. The military may have a lion's share of the IO operations pie at certain places and times. However, the full scope of IO operations between two adversarial nations far exceeds the abilities of the military. It is a case of all four pieces, not just a subset of DIME, talking the talk and walking the walk at the same time, and for the duration.

BTW, using a Joint Pub as a basis for defining IO seems to me to be a little bit of circular reasoning or an appeal to inappropriate authority--kind of like take a pronouncement from the Pope that Roman Catholicism is the true religion.

[William F. Owen]

Just for clarity here is a brief extract concerning what IO is and what it is not according to Joint Pub 3-13 Information Operations 2006:

I will read with interest, but I might further clarify my basic premise by saying, the Military needs to stay away from the media.

If by IO we mean leaflet drops, PA broadcasts and good old "PysOps" stuff, then OK. You are merely spreading a message, to better enable your operational and tactical aims. "Don't eat yellow snow, etc" Fine! No problem.

The second you start trying to use CNN, FOX, SKY or BBC to be part of that process, you've just rubbed up the Genie!

[Rank amateur]

I'm sure some soldier somewhere has issued false orders over the radio when they knew the enemy was listening. I don't know all the doctrinal definitions, but it sounds like an information operation to me.

[Ken White]

I'm sure some soldier somewhere has issued false orders over the radio when they knew the enemy was listening. I don't know all the doctrinal definitions, but it sounds like an information operation to me.

and the relevance of that to the discussion is?

[Norfolk]

IO involving the media can be a dodgy bit. But it has been waged successfully before by State actors; British IO operations using both domestic and foreign newspapers scored quite some success in WWI; the prime example of this, the British exploitation of the Zimmerman Telegram, was crucial to the course of the War. Similarly, the Brits were able to wage a reasonably successfully IO war against Germany and Japan in WWII - and again scoring considerable political successful with perhaps the main target audience - the U.S. No doubt that this was due in no small part to having "the man" and "the plan" in the person and policies of Winston Churchill - soldier, journalist, politician, and Scotch afficionado - a most useful combination for dealing with this sort of matter if there ever was one. And the U.S., especially in the person of Lt.Gen. Kelly, waged a media campaign during ODS that was little short of brilliant - though incidents such as the "Highway of Death", with crucial political and subsequently military consequences, nevertheless occurred.

But you have to have real, dedicated and resourced, specialists, higher commanders with a real grasp of the import of the IO effort, and a true unity of effort (centred upon a common goal with a common approach and single consistent - though still as inherently flexible as possible; easier said than done, message) between services and especially between the Government and the Military. The political message must be clear, concise, and unremitting. Without all that, more or less, it's just a tragicomedy of errors, sheep positively throwing themselves to the wolves.

[davidbfpo]

Posted on another thread, apologies if seen before, seems to fit here too:

Try the website of Professor Phil Taylor, Leeds University I am sure there will be something there: http://129.11.188.64/papers/index.cfm?outfit=pmt

He spoke recently on Psyops and has a ppt on AQ propaganda / use of the web; hopefully here on his site.

davidbfpo

[marct]

Hi Wilf,

I will read with interest, but I might further clarify my basic premise by saying, the Military needs to stay away from the media.

Hmmm. My problem with this is that I consider it to be impossible in the current information / civic environment. What the military does will be reported, so the media needs to be given a context in which that action is embedded. The reasoning for this is that, in the absence of a given context, the media will create their own context. I would also point out that this refers to the Mainstream Media (MSM) and not the "New Media" (e.g. bloggers etc., - Frontier 6 should wade in on this one).

If by IO we mean leaflet drops, PA broadcasts and good old "PysOps" stuff, then OK. You are merely spreading a message, to better enable your operational and tactical aims. "Don't eat yellow snow, etc" Fine! No problem.

I would certainly consider that to be part of IO; just not the whole. Context, context, context... as a friend of mine in Mass Communications keeps mumbling. "Context" is a battlespace and one that, IMO, is often forgotten. Why did those nasty AF types bomb a wedding party in Afghanistan? A pre-emptive media, context-strike would have set that up before hand. It was still a blunder (amongst other, less printable, terms), but some of the effects of (inevitably) poor targeting operations in COIN can be countered by pre-emptive media context strikes. That, IMO, is also one of the roles of IO; establishing the context in which operations take place.

The second you start trying to use CNN, FOX, SKY or BBC to be part of that process, you've just rubbed up the Genie!

Maybe, but CNN et alii are part of the battlespace and denying that is analogous to arguing that infantry shouldn't think about what's in the air because that "ain't my department".

[marct]

why I keep seeing ads for "Should Hillary Quit" in the google ad space? Honestly, the semantics behind that choice of ad being served in a thread on IO are truly fascinating !

[Spud]

PSYOP is lethal and we do PSYOP as a military tool. If you have any doubt that PSYOP is lethal, look at the Rwandan genocide or the use of suicide bombers.

It is an interesting discussion that we keep having at work ... is that PSYOP or is it physical destruction with a second and perhaps third order cognitive effect?

PSYOP is not pulling the trigger, wielding the machete or setting off the detonator ... that is physical destruction just the same as it would be for precisely placing a JDAM onto a key leadership target or the application of rapid aimed fire into an adversary.

Propaganda (we always like to make the distinction between us and them as futile as it seems) played a very definite role in influencing the cognitive process that lead to the Rwanda actions and the effects post the destructive activities were mostly psychological in that it reinforced the propaganda and influenced the cognitive to continue the bloodshed.

I would then argue was what we saw was IO ... the coordinated application of a number of lethal and non-lethal effects ISO of a line of operation.

[Spud]

I will read with interest, but I might further clarify my basic premise by saying, the Military needs to stay away from the media.

If by IO we mean leaflet drops, PA broadcasts and good old "PysOps" stuff, then OK. You are merely spreading a message, to better enable your operational and tactical aims. "Don't eat yellow snow, etc" Fine! No problem.

The second you start trying to use CNN, FOX, SKY or BBC to be part of that process, you've just rubbed up the Genie!

Based on the assumption that IO is only targeted at an adversary.

What a joy it is to not have any of that Smith-Mundt crap creating artificial firewalls between effects.

Our doctrine (which is not on the web) clearly identified that IO is a Operational activity. At the tactical end it is IO elements doing what they do best IAW the operational plan. At the strat level we "shape and influence" and if people get really smart and think about 80 per cent of those effects are created through a PA function. The remainder is done through specific strat targeting and as we see it simple relationships.

We are well progressed into a WoG approach to this. I chair a quarterly Strat-Com Working Group across all Fed Gov departments and we develop a WoG thematic approach to our operations regularly the receives the highest level of sign-off ... for those departments who only do PA our Strat-Com guidance gives thematic consistency. For those departments who actually execute operations it provides the strategic left and right for our operational documentation. When coupled with a strategic targeting directive which authorises the varying lethal and non-lethal effects, any restriction inherent on them and established a CDE methodology the Military has everything it needs to use information actions across the lines of operations. In no way does this mean we lying, deceiving or anything else in the media ... it just means that from a WoG perspective (and to borrow one of my favourite US Military terms) we achieve strategic “joined-uppedness” that supports our operations.

[Spud]

strategic communication. Focused United States Government (USG) efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all elements of national power
Tom

Whereas I quite like the working definition approved by the CJCS in Sep 2004 and became our mantra at MNF-I STRATCOM:

The transmission of integrated and coordinated U.S. Government themes and messages that advance U.S. interests and policies through a synchronised interagency effort supported by public diplomacy, public affairs and military information operations, in concert with other political, economic, information and military actions.

It looks surprisingly like the Aussie definition if you find and replace country names

PS: my apoligies for the rapid-fire posting ... that's what I get for living on the other side of the world.

[William F. Owen]

Based on the assumption that IO is only targeted at an adversary.

What a joy it is to not have any of that Smith-Mundt crap creating artificial firewalls between effects.

This is another can of worms - when IO becomes fused (or confused) with "Effects" - because the EBO boys actually say that EBO can be used "against" allies and neutrals. - and IO is a major part of EBO (and how do you usefully define the differences or two operational concepts that lack a useful or accurate definition)

The ultimate sense of all this, is that ultimately a military commander may use EBO and IO to effect his own "political" leadership, or the leadership of an NGO, neutral entity, or even allie. The only person I have ever met who was uncomfortable with that realisation was a former ZAPU commander!

What I am taking from this whole discussion is that there is marked reluctance to prescribe areas as "non-military" because admitting the limits of military thought and thus military power makes folks uncomfortable.

[Tom Odom]

Ken: dispute about application of the word 'entirely' in Wilf's statement. Small matter.

No Ken, I dispute the absolute pronouncement of Wilf's statement, meaning the entire statement and not merely the word entirely.

Wilf:
IO is the nothing to do with the application of force for the breaking of will.
It is therefore nothing to do with the military. It is entirely political, and thus the realm of civil servants and elected officials.

IO does apply to the breaking of will; PSYOP targets the enemy and the relevant population.

It is part of military operations as well as political and economic

Originally Posted by William F. Owen
I will read with interest, but I might further clarify my basic premise by saying, the Military needs to stay away from the media.

As Marc correctly says, this is absolutely impossible in today's operational environment. Media is part of the battlefield just like hills, deserts, and anything else you must adjust to as you fight. Moreover, trying to stay away from or isolate the media is not only fruitless, it is semi-suicidal.

The ultimate sense of all this, is that ultimately a military commander may use EBO and IO to effect his own "political" leadership, or the leadership of an NGO, neutral entity, or even allie. The only person I have ever met who was uncomfortable with that realisation was a former ZAPU commander!

Get out more. Wellington used IO although he did not call it that. Montgomery used IO. "Chinese" Gordon was at first an IO tool dispatched to the Sudan; he reversed the coin and used his status in Khartoum to influence the British government, of course losing his head in the process. Peacekeeping missions are to a very large degree IO formations as they are trip wires.

WM: BTW, using a Joint Pub as a basis for defining IO seems to me to be a little bit of circular reasoning or an appeal to inappropriate authority--kind of like take a pronouncement from the Pope that Roman Catholicism is the true religion.

What would you use to define doctrine other than the capstone doctrinal reference? I used the definiion to add some clarity to what is being discussed in discussing doctrine, perhaps seeing a doctrinal refence might help.

Tom

[William F. Owen]

As Marc correctly says, this is absolutely impossible in today's operational environment. Media is part of the battlefield just like hills, deserts, and anything else you must adjust to as you fight. Moreover, trying to stay away from or isolate the media is not only fruitless, it is semi-suicidal.

I concede it is impossible to discount the media, in the same way it is impossible to discount the weather. In the same way that you cannot control (or even fully predict) the weather, nor can you the media.

You can inoculate yourself from the negative effects of the weather, and likewise the media. The media is what Clausewitz would have regarded as "friction".

The whole premise of IO, as I understand it, is that you can influence the media. To support this premise, we always seem to default to examples like Hezbollah and say "ooh look! They do it." - when they have no moral or legal restraints.

If someone can genuinely discuss how you can teach a legally mandated overt military grouping to consistently and successfully "influence the media," then I am all ears - as a lot of other questionable ideas and assumptions made by modern military thinkers would then fall into place.

...the only problem would still be a complete lack of evidence that any of this actually works as planned.

[Tom Odom]

The whole premise of IO, as I understand it, is that you can influence the media. To support this premise, we always seem to default to examples like Hezbollah and say "ooh look! They do it." - when they have no moral or legal restraints.

And that means that you do not understand IO at least as it applies in US military doctrine. It is a much larger concept than simply media relations. Public affairs is related to IO but not the core of IO.

Of course we can influence the media. Anyone who choses to speak to the media will influence the media; the question is whether the results are positive or negative. And there is absolutely nothing dark or sinister about doing so; it has been done in many wars and many lands. As for evidence on whether media relations works, well look at the SWJ media rundown and see how many articles refer to media-military contacts.

But again in merely saying that IO is all about influencing the media, you are missing the larger effort.

Tom

[Tom Odom]

As a tiny vignette on Tac IO and media relations, this ain't bad at al...

Captain as Maestro, Conducting Amid Crises

On a recent winter evening in Mosul, Capt. David Sandoval sat at his desk dealing with the day’s various crises.

Michael Kamber for The New York Times

Capt. David Sandoval in Mosul, speaking with his men out on a difficult mission. “I sleep at least three hours a day,” he said.

Insurgents had fired on one of his platoons, killing a 10-year-old boy nearby. The captain sent men into the neighborhood to make sure residents knew American troops had not fired, and “to get the message out that the insurgents only bring you death and hardship,” he said.

Radios squawked updates from the field, and a phone rang incessantly with changes to a battle plan.

Two laptops sat before the captain. On one he updated targets his men would capture and kill before the night was over. He switched to the second computer and tried to finish a letter to his soldiers’ Family Readiness Group, run by his wife in the United States.

[Ken White]

at all sure we do...

Quote:
Ken: dispute about application of the word 'entirely' in Wilf's statement. Small matter.
No Ken, I dispute the absolute pronouncement of Wilf's statement, meaning the entire statement and not merely the word entirely.

Even though you also said:

Where we fail in particular in this IO effort is a lack of synchronization between what occurs via the military, the political, and yes, the economic.

Items which are abviously beyond the capability of the Armed foreces to integrate...

I also said ""Ain't semantics grand...""

You further said, in response to WM:

What would you use to define doctrine other than the capstone doctrinal reference? I used the definiion to add some clarity to what is being discussed in discussing doctrine, perhaps seeing a doctrinal refence might help.

Could I possibly and respectfully suggest that you are discussing Doctrine as it stands while some of us are discussing policy as it should be?

[marct]

Wayne made a very interesting point when he said that using doctrine to define IO was similar to using a Papal announcement. In one way, he is absolutely correct in this - it creates a self-limiting discussion; a semantic tautology if you will. At the same time, I think there is a real problem with not having a definition of IO and most of them come from doctrine.

So, in my usually modest way, I'm going to build one outside of doctrine, legal restrictions, etc. and see what we can come up with .

Let's start with some part defintions. First, what is "information"? My favorite definition of information, for a variety of reasons, comes from Gregory Bateson: "Information is a difference that makes a difference". From Steps to an Ecology of Mind (2000 edition):

"What is it in the territory that gets onto the map?" We know the territory does not get onto the map. That is the central point about which we here are all agreed. Now, if the territory were uniform, nothing would get onto the map except its boundaries, which are the points at which it ceases to be uniform against some larger matrix. What gets onto the map, in fact, is difference, be it a difference in altitude, a difference in vegetation, a difference in population structure, difference in surface, or whatever. Differences are the things that get onto a map.

A difference is a very peculiar and obscure concept. It is certainly not a thing or an event. This piece of paper is different than the wood of this lectern. There are many differences between them - of colour, texture, shape, etc... Of this infinitude, we select a very limited number which become information. In fact, what we mean by information - the elementary unit of information - is a difference which makes a difference (pp.457-459).

This is part of a larger discussion on the map-territory problem in epistemology; a problem that Wilf is alluding to when he defines IO as not part of the military sphere of operations (it's definitional).

Now, second definition; what is an "operation"? I would suggest (not require ) that an "operation" be defined as an "action which has the potential to transform some part of perceived or material reality". Note that there is absolutely nothing about intentionality in that definition, nor is there anything about who is acting or who is being acted upon - this allows for unanticipated consequences of actions in unintentional populations (the Butterfly Effect from Chaos theory if you will).

My earlier comments that mediaspace is a battlespace derive from this observation - it may not be part of the military "map", but it certainly has an indirect effect on military operations and hence must be part of an updated military map. This requirement, i.e. that mediaspace (broadly construed) must have a significant place in the military mapping of their battlespace is how I interpreted the argument by Frontier 6 on the SWJ blog. As to why it must be considered as part of the battlespace, I think Frontier 6 makes some good points, but I would add in a few others:

1. The media, both "old" and "new", helps to define and shape the "national will".
2. The "new" media allows for the rapid recruitment and deployment of pattern-based assets in the current conflict (a "pattern-based asset is any pattern of information that might "make a difference" to the current conflict, e.g. information on location, numbers, etc., recruitment, interpretation of current intelligence, PSYOPS, computer viruses, weapons construction plans, training materials, etc.).
3. The fragmentation of the media (both old and new), along with the introduction of highly interactive media (mainly "new") has reduced the efficiency of operations based around broadcast technologies (e.g. TV, Radio, Newspapers, etc.; See Levinson, The Soft Edge for a really good discussion of this).
4. The fragmentation of the media has also reduced the reach of any singular form of media and increased the formation of contingent and specialized communities.

If we combine these two definitions together, we end up with a definition of Information Operations that reads something like this:

Information operations are actions taken to produce changes in the material and perceptual realities of populations through the redefinition of those populations perceptual "maps".

Yes, I know that such a definition includes things such as propaganda, PSYOPS, strategic communications, etc. . In order to bring that definition down to something that is a little more manageable and usable by the military, it should be possible to isolate a sub-set of these operations that have a direct effect on what I called "pattern-based assets" in point 2 (above).

Having tossed the cat amongst the pigeons, think its time for another cup of coffee .

Marc